Mass. Gen. Laws » Part I Title XXI Chapter 151A
Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151A, § 24 (2026)

Eligibility for benefits

✓ current as of July 2026
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Section 24. An individual, in order to be eligible for benefits under this chapter, shall—

(a) Have been paid wages in the base period amounting to at least thirty times the weekly benefit rate; provided, however, that for the period beginning on January first, nineteen hundred and ninety-five the individual has been paid wages of at least two thousand dollars during said base period; provided, further, that said amount shall be increased annually proportionately, rounding to the nearest one hundred dollars, to any increases which have occurred during the prior calendar year in the minimum wage as set forth in section one of chapter one hundred and fifty-one; and, provided further, that any such increase shall be effective beginning on the first Sunday in January.

Wages paid during the base period which had previously been used to establish a benefit year commencing prior to October third, nineteen hundred and ninety-three, may also be used to establish a benefit year commencing on or after October third, nineteen hundred and ninety-three but prior to October second, nineteen hundred and ninety-four. Notwithstanding the provisions of section thirty-eight regarding responding to a commissioner's notice, no account of an employer which pays contributions pursuant to section fourteen or section fourteen C or makes payments in lieu of contributions pursuant to section fourteen A shall be charged for any benefits paid based on base period wages used to establish entitlement under this subparagraph but shall be charged to the appropriate solvency account; provided, however, that any benefits paid based on all or any portion of such wages were charged previously to such employer's account or charged to the appropriate solvency account.

(b) Be capable of, available, and actively seeking work in his usual occupation or any other occupation for which he is reasonably fitted; and

(c) Have given notice of his unemployment, by registering either in a public employment office or in such other manner, and within such time or times, as the commissioner shall prescribe, and have given notice of the continuance of his unemployment and furnished information concerning any remuneration received by him during the period for which he claims benefits, in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the commissioner.

An individual who is certified as attending an industrial retraining course or other vocational training course as provided under section thirty shall be deemed to be available for work under clause (b) of the first paragraph of this section.

No individual shall be considered ineligible for benefits because of failure to comply with the provisions of said clause (b) if such failure is due to an illness or disability which occurs during a period of unemployment after he has filed a claim and registered for work, and has been determined to be otherwise eligible; provided, that no work which would have been considered suitable but for such illness or disability was offered to him after he became ill or disabled; provided further, that the exception granted under this paragraph shall apply to three weeks only within a benefit year.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 39 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1966–2026 · leading case: Keough v. Dir. of the Div. of Emp. Sec., 344 N.E.2d 894 (Mass. 1976).
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Keough v. Dir. of the Div. of Emp. Sec., 344 N.E.2d 894 (Mass. 1976). · cites it 14× “The decision was predicated on the fact that she had placed "a restriction on her employability, namely, that her acceptance of any work not within walking distance of her home, depended on whether transportation arrangements could be made," and he found her not to meet the…”
Russo v. Dir. of the Div. of Emp. Sec., 387 N.E.2d 551 (Mass. 1979). · cites it 4× “We hold that the denial was in error, because under G. L. c. 151A, § 24, and Pub. L. No. 95-19, § 104 , his failure was excused by his illness.”
Benoit v. City of Boston, 75 N.E.3d 1 (Mass. 2017). “Enacted in 1935, the unemployment compensation statute, G. L. c. 151A, § 24, 12 serves as a temporary economic stabilization mechanism for terminated employees who meet the statutory criteria.”
Dohoney v. Dir. of the Div. of Emp. Sec., 386 N.E.2d 10 (Mass. 1979). “When in force, § 27 dealt solely with the question of a claimant’s availability for work, see G. L. c. 151A, § 24(6), not with the issue of whether a claimant left work voluntarily.”
Schulte v. Dir. of the Div. of Emp. Sec., 379 N.E.2d 588 (Mass. 1978). · cites it 2× “Either of these rulings, if correct in law and fact, would alone be a sufficient basis for denying benefits under G. L. c. 151A, § 24 (b). The vagueness of the decision, however, makes it impossible for us to determine whether both of these rulings, or merely one, and if one…”
Dir. of the Div. of Emp. Sec. v. Town of Mattapoisett, 467 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1984). “71, § 42, precede DES adjudication under G. L. c. 151A, § 24. We do not reach DBS’s argument that even if principles of issue preclusion were otherwise applicable, the provision in G.”
In Re Boston Reg'l Med. Ctr., 256 B.R. 212 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000). “G.L. c. 151A, § 24. An eligible individual is paid weekly benefits at a rate equal to 50 percent of the individual’s “average weekly wage” during *219 the individual’s “base period,” but no more than 57/é percent of the average weekly-wage of all employees covered by the…”
Dir. of the Div. of Emp. Sec. v. Fitzgerald, 414 N.E.2d 608 (Mass. 1980). “10 See also G. L. c. 151A, § 24, as amended through St.”
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. Dir. of the Div. of Emp. Sec., 382 N.E.2d 195 (Mass. 1978). “The only question of law presented is whether the claimant, by making known her intention to return to Harvard in the fall, “has so restricted her employability as to remove herself from the labor force and render herself not ‘available for work’ within the meaning of G. L. c.…”
Evancho v. Dir. of the Div. of Emp. Sec., 376 N.E.2d 854 (Mass. 1978). · cites it 2× “” See also G. L. c. 151A, § 24 (b). 2 This statutory definition provided the judge and agency below with two distinct grounds on which to base their decisions.”
Colon v. Astrue, 841 F. Supp. 2d 495 (D. Mass. 2012). “Specifically, Colon appears to contend that the ALJ should have adopted as true the hypothetical, posed by her counsel at the hearing, that Colon could only concentrate for one-hour increments throughout an eight-hour workday.”
Faria v. Dir. of the Div. of Emp. Sec., 215 N.E.2d 90 (Mass. 1966). · cites it 2× “The issue is whether, as' required by G. L. c. 151A, § 24 (b), Faria" was “available for work and unable to obtain work in his usual occupation or any other occupation for which he is reasonably fitted.”
Show all 39 citing cases →
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151A, § 24(6) — 2 cases
Dohoney v. Dir. of the Div. of Emp. Sec., 386 N.E.2d 10 (Mass. 1979). “When in force, § 27 dealt solely with the question of a claimant’s availability for work, see G. L. c. 151A, § 24(6), not with the issue of whether a claimant left work voluntarily.”
Conlon v. Dir. of the Div. of Emp. Sec., 413 N.E.2d 727 (Mass. 1980).
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151A, § 24(a) — 2 cases
O'Connor v. Dir. of the Div. of Emp. Sec., 387 N.E.2d 1132 (Mass. 1979).
Buchanan v. Demong, 654 F. Supp. 139 (D. Mass. 1987).
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151A, § 24(b) — 5 cases
Colon v. Astrue, 841 F. Supp. 2d 495 (D. Mass. 2012). “Specifically, Colon appears to contend that the ALJ should have adopted as true the hypothetical, posed by her counsel at the hearing, that Colon could only concentrate for one-hour increments throughout an eight-hour workday.”
Russo v. Dir. of the Div. of Emp. Sec., 387 N.E.2d 551 (Mass. 1979). “We hold that the denial was in error, because under G. L. c. 151A, § 24, and Pub. L. No. 95-19, § 104 , his failure was excused by his illness.”
Giorgi v. Doody, 537 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Mass. 1982).
Appeal of Williamson, 671 A.2d 112 (N.H. 1996).
Kelly v. Nordberg, 848 F. Supp. 284 (D. Mass. 1994).
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151A, § 24(c) — 2 cases
Town of South Hadley v. Dir. of the Div. of Emp. Sec., 389 Mass. 399 (Mass. 1983).
York v. Encompass Ins., 2003 Mass. App. Div. 45 (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 2003).
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151A, § 24(l)(a) — 1 case
Buchanan v. Doody, 571 F. Supp. 1206 (D. Mass. 1983).
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