Mass. Gen. Laws » Part I Title XXI Chapter 152
Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 32 (2026)

Persons presumed dependent on employee; division of benefits and payments for children of former marriage; parent surviving dependent parent; dependency determined by facts; division of benefits

✓ current as of July 2026
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Section 32. The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee:

(a) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his death, or from whom, at the time of his death, the department shall find the wife was living apart for justifiable cause or because he had deserted her. The findings of the department upon the questions of such justifiable cause and desertion shall be final.

(b) A husband upon a wife with whom he lives at the time of her death.

(c) Children under the age of eighteen years (or over said age, if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning) upon the parent with whom they are living at the time of the death of such parent, there being no surviving dependent parent; provided, that in case of the death of an employee who has at the time of his death living children by a former wife or husband, under the age of eighteen years (or over said age, if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning), said children shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon such deceased employee, and the death benefit shall be divided between the surviving wife or husband and all the children of the deceased employee in equal shares, the surviving wife or husband taking the same share as a child. The total sum due the surviving wife or husband and her or his own children shall be paid directly to the wife or husband for her or his own use and for the benefit of her or his own children, and the sums due to the children by the former wife or husband of the deceased employee shall be paid to their guardians or legal representatives for the benefit of such children. Children, within the meaning of this paragraph, shall also include any children of the deceased employee conceived but not born at the time of the employee's injury, and the compensation provided for by this chapter on account of any such children shall be payable from the date of their birth.

(d) Children under the age of eighteen years (or over said age but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning) upon a parent who was at the time of his death legally bound or ordered by law, decree or order of court or other lawful requirement to support such children although living apart from such child or children. Children, within the meaning of this paragraph, shall also include any children of the deceased employee conceived but not born at the time of the employee's injury, and the compensation provided for by this chapter on account of any such children shall be payable from the date of their birth.

(e) A parent upon an unmarried child under the age of eighteen years; provided, that such child was living with the parent at the time of the injury resulting in death.

If a parent determined to be dependent for support in whole or in part on a child shall die, leaving the other parent surviving, the surviving parent shall succeed to the rights to compensation of the deceased parent, if such child was living with such surviving parent at the time of the injury resulting in the death of such child.

In all other cases questions of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the fact as the fact may be at the time of the injury, or at the time of his death; and in such other cases, if there is more than one person wholly dependent the death benefit shall be divided equally among them, and persons partly dependent, if any, shall receive no part thereof, and if there is no one wholly dependent and more than one person partly dependent, the death benefit shall be divided among them according to the relative extent of their dependency.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24 cases, 1921–2006 · leading case: Rae v. Air-Speed, Inc., 435 N.E.2d 628 (Mass. 1982).
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Rae v. Air-Speed, Inc., 435 N.E.2d 628 (Mass. 1982). “3 Rae, as a statutory dependent of *196 an employee (see G. L. c. 152, §§32 and 33), would have received workers’ compensation benefits if an appropriate insurance policy had been in effect at the date of her husband’s death, although her husband’s estate would not receive such…”
Morgan v. Lalumiere, 493 N.E.2d 206 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986). “It was pointless and somewhat confusing for the judge to require as a condition of Mark’s recovery that the jury find that he was a minor when the evidence was indisputably to the contrary.”
McDonough's Case, 858 N.E.2d 1084 (Mass. 2006). “Section 32 of the workers’ compensation act, G. L. c. 152, § 32, contains a conclusive presumption that a wife is “wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee” when she lives with him at the time of his death.”
Panesis v. Loyal Prot. Life Ins., 359 N.E.2d 319 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977). “G. L. c. 152, § 32(c). Ferriter’s Case, 269 Mass.”
Gillard's Case, 244 Mass. 47 (Mass. 1923). “Neither made any decision of that question. It seems pretty clear that dependent minor children are conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent upon the father with whom they live in the absence of claim by a widow.”
Craddock's Case, 37 N.E.2d 508 (Mass. 1941). “Robert Hary Craddock, being under the age of sixteen, is conclusively presumed to be dependent upon his father for support under G. L. c. 152, § 32(d), and is entitled to compensation at the rate of $10 a week from April 25, 1939, to continue, subject to the provisions of the…”
Carey's Case, 850 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 2× “2, § 7, now G. L. c. 152, § 32, as amended by St. 1950, c.”
Miller's Case, 138 N.E. 254 (Mass. 1923). “” G. L. c. 152, § 32, cl. d. It is to be noted that the claimant was not only living apart from the deceased employee, but was ,so living under the decree entered by the Superior Court in said divorce proceedings.”
Pierce's Case, 166 N.E. 636 (Mass. 1929). “G. L. c. 152, § 32, as amended provides: "The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: .”
Ferriter's Case, 168 N.E. 747 (Mass. 1929). “G. L. c. 152, § 32 (c). Whether he, as a member of the family, or next of kin of his father, was a “dependent,” within the meaning of the statutory definition of dependency, depends upon whether as a matter of fact he was “wholly or partly dependent upon the earnings of the…”
Donnelly v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 443 N.E.2d 416 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). “In Nelson's Case, 217 Mass. 467 (1914), the court construed the language in the workmen’s compensation statute which states that a wife seeking compensation based upon the conclusive presumption of dependency must be living with her husband.”
Gleason's Case, 269 Mass. 583 (Mass. 1930). “The contention of the claimant is that she is conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon the deceased employee under G. L. c. 152, § 32 (a), which so classifies “A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his death.”
Show all 24 citing cases →
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 32(c) — 2 cases
Morgan v. Lalumiere, 493 N.E.2d 206 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986). “It was pointless and somewhat confusing for the judge to require as a condition of Mark’s recovery that the jury find that he was a minor when the evidence was indisputably to the contrary.”
Panesis v. Loyal Prot. Life Ins., 359 N.E.2d 319 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977). “G. L. c. 152, § 32(c). Ferriter’s Case, 269 Mass.”
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 32(d) — 1 case
Craddock's Case, 37 N.E.2d 508 (Mass. 1941). “Robert Hary Craddock, being under the age of sixteen, is conclusively presumed to be dependent upon his father for support under G. L. c. 152, § 32(d), and is entitled to compensation at the rate of $10 a week from April 25, 1939, to continue, subject to the provisions of the…”
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