Section 27. No restriction imposed after December thirty-first, nineteen hundred and sixty-one shall be enforceable:—
(a) unless the person seeking enforcement (1) is a party to the instrument imposing the restriction and it is stated to be for his benefit or is entitled to such benefit as a successor to such party, or (2) is an owner of an interest in benefited land which either adjoins the subject parcel at the time enforcement is sought or is described in the instrument imposing the restriction and is stated therein to be benefited, and
(b) after thirty years from the imposition of the restriction, unless (1) the restriction is imposed as part of a common scheme applicable to four or more parcels contiguous except for any intervening streets or ways, and provision is made in the instrument or instruments imposing it for extension for further periods of not more than twenty years at a time by owners of record, at the time of recording of the extension, of fifty per cent or more of the restricted area in which the subject parcel is located, and an extension in accordance with such provision is recorded before the expiration of the thirty years or earlier date of termination specified in the instrument and names or is signed by one or more of the persons appearing of record to own the subject parcel at the time of such recording, and in case of such recording, twenty years, or the specified extension term if less than twenty years, has not expired after the recording of any such extension without the recording of a further like extension; or (2) in the case of any other restriction, a notice of restriction is recorded before the expiration of the thirty years, and in case of such recording, twenty years have not expired after the recording of any notice of restriction without the recording of a further notice of restriction.
A notice of restriction under this section shall not extend the period of enforceability unless it (a) is signed by a person then entitled of record to the benefit of the restriction and describes his benefited land, if any, (b) describes the subject parcel, (c) names one or more of the persons appearing of record to own the subject parcel at the time, and (d) specifies the instrument imposing the restriction and its place of record in the public records.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 20
cases, 1975–2014 · leading case: Brear v. Fagan, 447 Mass. 68 (Mass. 2006).
Brear v. Fagan, 447 Mass. 68 (Mass. 2006). · cites it 8דWe also consider whether a restriction of a specified duration can be extended beyond its stated term by filing a notice of restriction pursuant to G.”
Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Urstadt Biddle Props., Inc., 740 N.E.2d 1286 (Mass. 2001). · cites it 3דThe judge disagreed with Urstadt’s argument that G. L. c. 184, § 27, set forth below, 3 governed the case and that the restriction had been extended under § 27 (b).”
Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 390 N.E.2d 243 (Mass. 1979). “Others are found in G. L. c. 184, §§ 27, 30, which regulate enforcement of land-use restrictions generally.”
Atwood v. Walter, 714 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999). · cites it 5דEnforcement of the restriction pursuant to G. L. c. 184, §27. The restriction sought to be enforced is contained in article 3.”
Patterson v. Paul, 448 Mass. 658 (Mass. 2007). “The plaintiffs contend that the judge erred in concluding that the view easements are affirmative easements not subject to the thirty-year limitation set forth in G.”
Well-Built Homes, Inc. v. Shuster, 834 N.E.2d 1213 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). · cites it 2ד85, 90 (1979); G. L. c. 184, § 27. 14 Chiefly at issue here is whether the Shusters intended the benefit to run with Barbara’s land.”
Murphy v. Plan. Bd., 874 N.E.2d 455 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). · cites it 2דHe argues alternatively that, even if the board’s authority to impose conditions is not open to challenge, the conditions imposed are in any event unenforceable because the requirements of G. L. c. 184, §§ 27(a) and 30, have not been met, and the restrictions do not comport with…”
Rosenfeld v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Mendon, 940 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011). · cites it 2דOn appeal from a summary judgment of the Superior Court, the plaintiffs claim error in the affirmance of a special permit issued by the defendant zoning board of appeals of Men-don (board) in favor of the defendant Gray Wolf Development Corporation (Gray Wolf), and in the…”
Guillette v. Daly Dry Wall, Inc., 325 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 1975). “The sole issue raised by the defendant is whether it is bound by a restriction contained in deeds to its neighbors from a common grantor, when it took without knowledge 3 of the restrictions and under a deed which did not *359 mention them.”
Kelley v. Cambridge Historical Comm'n, 993 N.E.2d 1228 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013). “Moreover, Rosenfeld turned on a narrow question of how G. L. c. 184, § 27(a)(2), should be interpreted, and that section does not even apply to preservation restrictions.”
Wine v. Plan. Bd., 908 N.E.2d 806 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009). “68, 76-77 (2006), and G. L. c. 184, § 27(6).”
Murphy v. Plan. Bd., 874 N.E.2d 455 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). “He argues alternatively that, even if the board’s authority to impose conditions is not open to challenge, the conditions imposed are in any event unenforceable because the requirements of G. L. c. 184, §§ 27(a) and 30, have not been met, and the restrictions do not comport with…”
Atwood v. Walter, 714 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999). “Enforcement of the restriction pursuant to G. L. c. 184, §27. The restriction sought to be enforced is contained in article 3.”
Atwood v. Walter, 714 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999). “Enforcement of the restriction pursuant to G. L. c. 184, §27. The restriction sought to be enforced is contained in article 3.”
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 184, § 27(a)(2) — 2 cases
Kelley v. Cambridge Historical Comm'n, 993 N.E.2d 1228 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013). “Moreover, Rosenfeld turned on a narrow question of how G. L. c. 184, § 27(a)(2), should be interpreted, and that section does not even apply to preservation restrictions.”
Rosenfeld v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Mendon, 940 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011). “On appeal from a summary judgment of the Superior Court, the plaintiffs claim error in the affirmance of a special permit issued by the defendant zoning board of appeals of Men-don (board) in favor of the defendant Gray Wolf Development Corporation (Gray Wolf), and in the…”
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