Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2B (2026)

Tort actions arising from improvements to real property

✓ current as of July 2026

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Section 2B. Action of tort for damages arising out of any deficiency or neglect in the design, planning, construction or general administration of an improvement to real property, other than that of a public agency as defined in section thirty-nine A of chapter seven shall be commenced only within three years next after the cause of action accrues; provided, however, that in no event shall such actions be commenced more than six years after the earlier of the dates of: (1) the opening of the improvement to use; or (2) substantial completion of the improvement and the taking of possession for occupancy by the owner.

Actions of tort for damages arising out of any deficiency or neglect in the design, planning, construction, or general administration of an improvement to real property of a public agency, as defined in said section thirty-nine A shall be commenced only within three years next after the cause of action accrues; provided, however, that in no event shall actions be commenced more than six years after the earlier of the dates of: (1) official acceptance of the project by the public agency; (2) the opening of the real property to public use; (3) the acceptance by the contractor of a final estimate prepared by the public agency pursuant to chapter thirty, section thirty-nine G; or (4) substantial completion of the work and the taking possession for occupancy by the awarding authority.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 156 cases (8 in the last 5 years), 1974–2025 · leading case: Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1982).

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Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1982). · cites it 58× “This case raises the issue of the application and constitutionality of G. L. c. 260, § 2B, 2 a statute that places a time limit on the liability of architects and contractors.”

Bridgwood v. A.J. Wood Constr., Inc., 105 N.E.3d 224 (Mass. 2018). · cites it 26× “142A, § 17 (10), is subject to the six-year statute of repose set forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2B. The plaintiff, Terry Bridgwood, commenced this action in 2016, alleging that renovations performed in 2000 and 2001 by the defendants, A.”

Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. Crandall Dry Dock Engineers, Inc., 489 N.E.2d 172 (Mass. 1986). · cites it 8× “4 The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff’s claim was time-barred by G. L. c. 260, § 2B, 5 a statute of repose, as well as a statute of limitations, which limits the time period within which tort claims may be brought against design…”

White v. Peabody Constr. Co., Inc., 434 N.E.2d 1015 (Mass. 1982). · cites it 6× “In relevant part these motions raised the statute of limitations (G. L. c. 260, § 2B) as a bar to the negligence counts and lack of privity as a bar to the warranty counts.”

Aldrich v. ADD Inc., 437 Mass. 213 (Mass. 2002). · cites it 6× “A second judge granted the architect’s subsequent motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claim was time barred by the three-year limitation set forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2B. A third judge denied the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint to…”

Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Weston & Sampson Engineers, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 688 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). · cites it 10× “484, § 53, which provides in pertinent part: “Action of tort for damages arising out of any deficiency or neglect in the design, planning, construction or general administration of an improvement to real property, .”

Dighton v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co. Sert, Jackson & Assoc., 506 N.E.2d 509 (Mass. 1987). · cites it 8× “The defendant and third-party plaintiff, Federal Pacific Electric Company (Federal Pacific), asks us to reconsider whether a manufacturer is protected by the so-called "statute of repose," G.L.c. 260, § 2B [4] (hereafter § 2B); *689 and, if not, whether the statute is…”

Milligan v. Tibbetts Eng'g Corp., 461 N.E.2d 808 (Mass. 1984). · cites it 8× “The question posed by this case is whether the construction of a dead-end road is an “improvement to real property,” as that phrase is used in G. L. c. 260, § 2B. 2 We *365 conclude that it is, and that the plaintiffs claim against the defendant is therefore barred because it…”

Parent v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 556 N.E.2d 1009 (Mass. 1990). · cites it 5× “First, Stone & Webster argues that those portions of the negligence claim which are predicated on Stone & Webster’s actions in 1958 are barred by the repose provisions of G. L. c. 260, § 2B (1988 ed.). That statute provides, in relevant part, that tort claims “for damages…”

Berish v. Bornstein, 437 Mass. 252 (Mass. 2002). · cites it 3× “In addition, the claim must be brought within the three-year statute of limitation and the six-year statute of repose set forth in G. L. c. 260, § 2B. 25 Because of the distinctive ownership divisions between units and common areas that characterize condominiums, the protections…”

Raffel v. Perley, 437 N.E.2d 1082 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). · cites it 7× “2 The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether the defendant designed or planned “an improvement to real property” so as to be protected by the six-year provision of G. L. c. 260, § 2B. 3 We reverse as we hold that a survey and plan dividing property into lots, at least…”

Fine v. Huygens, DiMella, Shaffer & Assocs., 783 N.E.2d 842 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). · cites it 5× “93A against ACS, Coastal, and Howard (the only defendants against whom such claims were made), and did not consider whether the claims against Coastal and Howard were also barred by operation of G. L. c. 260, § 2B, the statute of repose applicable to improvements to real…”

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