Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 120 (2026)

Entry upon private property after being forbidden as trespass; prima facie evidence; penalties; arrest; tenants or occupants excepted

✓ current as of July 2026

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Section 120. Whoever, without right enters or remains in or upon the dwelling house, buildings, boats or improved or enclosed land, wharf, or pier of another, or enters or remains in a school bus, as defined in section 1 of chapter 90, after having been forbidden so to do by the person who has lawful control of said premises, whether directly or by notice posted thereon, or in violation of a court order pursuant to section thirty-four B of chapter two hundred and eight or section three or four of chapter two hundred and nine A, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than thirty days or both such fine and imprisonment. Proof that a court has given notice of such a court order to the alleged offender shall be prima facie evidence that the notice requirement of this section has been met. A person who is found committing such trespass may be arrested by a sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable or police officer and kept in custody in a convenient place, not more than twenty-four hours, Sunday excepted, until a complaint can be made against him for the offence, and he be taken upon a warrant issued upon such complaint.

This section shall not apply to tenants or occupants of residential premises who, having rightfully entered said premises at the commencement of the tenancy or occupancy, remain therein after such tenancy or occupancy has been or is alleged to have been terminated. The owner or landlord of said premises may recover possession thereof only through appropriate civil proceedings.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 81 cases (10 in the last 5 years), 1969–2026 · leading case: Commonwealth v. Hood, 452 N.E.2d 188 (Mass. 1983).

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Commonwealth v. Hood, 452 N.E.2d 188 (Mass. 1983). · cites it 8× “, on December 21, 1981, approximately thirty people gathered in a public park across the street from the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc.”

Wilber v. Curtis, 872 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2017). “; trespass, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266 § 120 (2001); and interfering with a police officer in the performance of his duties, see Commonwealth v.”

Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333 (Mass. 2016). “2 The trial judge allowed the defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty on a trespass charge, G. L. c. 266, § 120. 3 Given our conclusion, we need not address the defendant’s argument about the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.”

Goddard v. Kelley, 629 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D. Mass. 2009). · cites it 2× “” See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 120 . Defendants contend that even if they did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff for trespassing, they nonetheless had probable cause to arrest him for any of three misdemeanor offenses.”

Lazlo L. v. Commonwealth, 122 N.E.3d 532 (Mass. 2019). · cites it 3× “On June 13, 2018, police filed an application for a complaint against Miles for trespassing in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 120, and disorderly conduct in violation of G.”

Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc., 17 N.E.3d 1026 (Mass. 2014). · cites it 2× “14 Glovsky contends that Visconti's statement carried an implicit threat of arrest pursuant to G. L. c. 266, § 120, which provides: "Whoever, without right enters or remains in or upon the .”

Commonwealth v. Villagran, 81 N.E.3d 310 (Mass. 2017). · cites it 2× “What is left then is the defendant's mere presence, a possible criminal trespass in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 120. However, reasonable suspicion of a criminal trespass did not arise where none of the information available to Murphy suggested that the defendant "remain[ed] in…”

Commonwealth v. Peloquin, 770 N.E.2d 440 (Mass. 2002). “See G. L. c. 266, § 120. The exact boundaries of G.”

United States v. Coccia, 446 F.3d 233 (1st Cir. 2006). “Under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 266, § 120 D, a car may be only be towed from private property at the request of the car owner or the property owner.”

Commonwealth v. Magadini, 52 N.E.3d 1041 (Mass. 2016). · cites it 2× “The criminal trespass statute, G. L. c. 266, § 120, provides in relevant part, “Whoever, without right enters or remains in or upon the dwelling house, [or] buildings .”

Commonwealth v. Nelson, 909 N.E.2d 42 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009). · cites it 4× “Concluding that it does, we reverse the defendant’s conviction of criminal trespass, G. L. c. 266, § 120. Approximately seven months before the events leading to the current case, the defendant was arrested 1 at the Old Colony Housing Development (Old Colony) and told that he…”

Commonwealth v. Noffke, 379 N.E.2d 1086 (Mass. 1978). · cites it 3× “The defendant was tried and convicted in a District Court of trespass in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 120. He appealed to the Superior Court for a trial de nova.”

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