Michigan Compiled Laws

Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.331 (2026)

Persons conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon deceased employee.

✓ current as of July 2026
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WORKER'S DISABILITY COMPENSATION ACT OF 1969


Act 317 of 1969


418.331 Persons conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon deceased employee.

Sec. 331.

    Except as otherwise provided in this section, a child under the age of 16 years, or 16 years or over if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, is conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon the parent with whom he or she is living at the time of the death of that parent. In the event of the death of an employee who has at the time of death a living child by a former spouse or a child who has been deserted by the deceased employee under the age of 16 years, or over if physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, that child shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon the deceased employee, even though not living with the deceased employee at the time of death. The death benefit shall be divided among all persons who are wholly dependent upon the deceased employee, in equal shares. The total sum due a surviving spouse and his or her own children shall be paid directly to the surviving spouse for his or her own use, and for the use and benefit of his or her own children. If during the time compensation payments continue, a worker's compensation magistrate finds that the surviving spouse is not properly caring for those children, the worker's compensation magistrate shall order the shares of the children to be thereafter paid to their guardian or legal representative for their use and benefit, instead of to their father or mother. In all cases the sums due to the children by the former spouse of the deceased employee shall be paid to their guardians or legal representatives for the use and benefit of those children. In all other cases questions of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts at the time of the injury. If a deceased employee leaves a person wholly dependent upon him or her for support, that person shall be entitled to the whole death benefit and persons partially dependent, if any, shall receive no part thereof, while the person wholly dependent is living. All persons wholly dependent upon a deceased employee, whether by conclusive presumption or as a matter of fact, shall be entitled to share equally in the death benefit in accordance with the provisions of this section. If there is no one wholly dependent or if the death of all persons wholly dependent occurs before all compensation is paid, and there is only 1 person partially dependent, that person is entitled to compensation according to the extent of his or her dependency; and if there is more than 1 person partially dependent, the death benefit shall be divided among them according to the relative extent of their dependency. A person shall not be considered a dependent unless he or she is a member of the family of the deceased employee, or unless such person bears to the deceased employee the relation of widower or widow, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister.

History: 1969, Act 317, Eff. Dec. 31, 1969 ;-- Am. 1985, Act 103, Imd. Eff. July 30, 1985 ;-- Am. 1994, Act 271, Imd. Eff. July 11, 1994 ;-- Am. 2011, Act 266, Imd. Eff. Dec. 19, 2011

Constitutionality Notes:

    The Michigan supreme court held violative of the fourteenth amendment the conclusive presumption of dependency for widows set forth in the worker's disability compensation act. Day v W A Foote Memorial Hospital, 412 Mich 698; 316 NW2d 712 (1982).

Compiler's Notes:

    For legislative intent as to severability, see Compiler's note to MCL 418.213.

    Enacting section 2 of Act 266 of 2011 provides:

    "Enacting section 2. This amendatory act applies to injuries incurred on or after its effective date."

PopularName Notes:

Act 317

PopularName Notes:

Heart and Lung Act
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 34 cases, 1973–2008 · leading case: Paige v. City of Sterling Heights, 720 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. 2006).
Paige v. City of Sterling Heights, 720 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. 2006). · cites it 16× “The WCAC rejected defendant's argument and held that Adam is conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent under MCL 418.331, which provides, in pertinent part: The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: * * *…”
Weems v. Chrysler Corp., 533 N.W.2d 287 (Mich. 1995). · cites it 12× “Thus, partial benefits are a percentage of whole benefits that have already been adjusted for statutory maximums and minimums.”
Moore v. Painting, 745 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 21× “302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration, as on leave granted, of the question whether the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission erred in holding that the decedent had “deserted” the plaintiffs daughter,…”
Murphy v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 523 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. 1994). · cites it 8× “[MCL 418.331; MSA 17.237(331).] *112 It must be determined whether the effect of being "conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent" differs from the effects of a factual determination of dependency.”
Pike v. City of Wyoming, 433 N.W.2d 768 (Mich. 1988). · cites it 8× “237(353)(1)(a)(i) provides: (1) For the purposes of sections 351 to 361, dependency shall be determined as follows: (a) The following shall be conclusively presumed to be dependent for support upon an injured employee: (i) The wife of an injured employee living with such…”
Theodore v. Packing Materials, Inc, 240 N.W.2d 255 (Mich. 1976). · cites it 4× “It does provide, however, that "In all other cases questions of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the fact, as that fact may be at the time of the injury”.”
Riley v. Northland Geriatric Ctr., 433 N.W.2d 787 (Mich. 1988). · cites it 2× “[7] MCL 418.331(1)(a); MSA 17.237(331)(1)(a).”
Bettelon v. Metalock Repair Serv., 358 N.W.2d 608 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 3× “Crockett, under MCL 418.331; MSA 17.237(331). The record discloses that Davy R.”
Day v. W a Foote Mem'l Hosp., 316 N.W.2d 712 (Mich. 1982). · cites it 2× “_ 1 "(1) The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: "(a) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his death, or from whom, at the time of his death a hearing referee shall find the wife was…”
Lambard v. Saga Food Serv., Inc, 338 N.W.2d 207 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 2× “Consequently, we hold that the Supreme Court’s decision in Day should be applied to require proof of dependency only in those cases arising subsequent to the decision in Day , cases pending before the WCAB at the time of the decision, and cases already decided by the WCAB in…”
Wojciechowski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 390 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 2× “We find this issue to be frivolous because MCL 418.331; MSA 17.237(331) only applied when the claimant was deceased.”
Moore v. Prestige Painting, 745 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 21× “Dependency under MCL 418.331 The WCAC must review the magistrate's decision under the "substantial evidence" standard, and we review the WCAC's findings of fact under the "any evidence" standard.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.331(1) — 1 case
Wojciechowski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 390 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). “We find this issue to be frivolous because MCL 418.331; MSA 17.237(331) only applied when the claimant was deceased.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.331(1)(a) — 3 cases
Riley v. Northland Geriatric Ctr., 433 N.W.2d 787 (Mich. 1988). “[7] MCL 418.331(1)(a); MSA 17.237(331)(1)(a).”
Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 406 N.W.2d 222 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
Costa v. Chrysler Corp., 394 N.W.2d 6 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.331(1)(b) — 3 cases
Murphy v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 523 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. 1994). “[MCL 418.331; MSA 17.237(331).] *112 It must be determined whether the effect of being "conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent" differs from the effects of a factual determination of dependency.”
Hammons v. City of Highland Park Police Dep't, 364 N.W.2d 575 (Mich. 1985).
Washburn v. Am. Roofing Co., 217 N.W.2d 104 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.331(a) — 1 case
Pike v. City of Wyoming, 433 N.W.2d 768 (Mich. 1988). “237(353)(1)(a)(i) provides: (1) For the purposes of sections 351 to 361, dependency shall be determined as follows: (a) The following shall be conclusively presumed to be dependent for support upon an injured employee: (i) The wife of an injured employee living with such…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.331(b) — 11 cases
Paige v. City of Sterling Heights, 720 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. 2006). “The WCAC rejected defendant's argument and held that Adam is conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent under MCL 418.331, which provides, in pertinent part: The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: * * *…”
Moore v. Painting, 745 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007). “302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration, as on leave granted, of the question whether the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission erred in holding that the decedent had “deserted” the plaintiffs daughter,…”
Weems v. Chrysler Corp., 533 N.W.2d 287 (Mich. 1995). “Thus, partial benefits are a percentage of whole benefits that have already been adjusted for statutory maximums and minimums.”
Moore v. Prestige Painting, 745 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008). “Dependency under MCL 418.331 The WCAC must review the magistrate's decision under the "substantial evidence" standard, and we review the WCAC's findings of fact under the "any evidence" standard.”
Theodore v. Packing Materials, Inc, 240 N.W.2d 255 (Mich. 1976). “It does provide, however, that "In all other cases questions of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the fact, as that fact may be at the time of the injury”.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.331(l)(a) — 3 cases
Riley v. Northland Geriatric Ctr., 433 N.W.2d 787 (Mich. 1988). “[7] MCL 418.331(1)(a); MSA 17.237(331)(1)(a).”
Lambard v. Saga Food Serv., Inc, 338 N.W.2d 207 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). “Consequently, we hold that the Supreme Court’s decision in Day should be applied to require proof of dependency only in those cases arising subsequent to the decision in Day , cases pending before the WCAB at the time of the decision, and cases already decided by the WCAB in…”
Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 406 N.W.2d 222 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.331(l)(b) — 2 cases
Murphy v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 523 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. 1994). “[MCL 418.331; MSA 17.237(331).] *112 It must be determined whether the effect of being "conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent" differs from the effects of a factual determination of dependency.”
Day v. W a Foote Mem'l Hosp., 316 N.W.2d 712 (Mich. 1982). “_ 1 "(1) The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: "(a) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his death, or from whom, at the time of his death a hearing referee shall find the wife was…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.