WORKER'S DISABILITY COMPENSATION ACT OF 1969
Act 317 of 1969
418.827 Third party liability.
Sec. 827.
(1) Where the injury for which compensation is payable under this act was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than a natural person in the same employ or the employer to pay damages in respect thereof, the acceptance of compensation benefits or the taking of proceedings to enforce compensation payments shall not act as an election of remedies but the injured employee or his or her dependents or personal representative may also proceed to enforce the liability of the third party for damages in accordance with this section. If the injured employee or his or her dependents or personal representative does not commence the action within 1 year after the occurrence of the personal injury, then the employer or carrier, within the period of time for the commencement of actions prescribed by statute, may enforce the liability of such other person in the name of that person. Not less than 30 days before the commencement of action by any party under this section, the parties shall notify, by certified mail at their last known address, the bureau, the injured employee, or in the event of the employee's death, his or her known dependents or personal representative or known next of kin, his or her employer, and the carrier. Any party in interest shall have a right to join in the action.
(2) Prior to the entry of judgment, either the employer or carrier or the employee or the employee's personal representative may settle their claims as their interest shall appear and may execute releases therefor.
(3) Settlement and release by the employee is not a bar to action by the employer or carrier to proceed against the third party for any interest or claim it might have.
(4) If the injured employee or his or her dependents or personal representative settle their claim for injury or death or commence proceedings thereon against the third party before the payment of worker's compensation, such recovery or commencement of proceedings shall not act as an election of remedies and any moneys so recovered shall be applied as herein provided.
(5) In an action to enforce the liability of a third party, the plaintiff may recover any amount which the employee or his or her dependents or personal representative would be entitled to recover in an action in tort. Any recovery against the third party for damages resulting from personal injuries or death only, after deducting expenses of recovery, shall first reimburse the employer or carrier for any amounts paid or payable under this act to date of recovery and the balance shall immediately be paid to the employee or his or her dependents or personal representative and shall be treated as an advance payment by the employer on account of any future payments of compensation benefits.
(6) Expenses of recovery shall be the reasonable expenditures, including attorney fees, incurred in effecting recovery. Attorney fees, unless otherwise agreed upon, shall be divided among the attorneys for the plaintiff as directed by the court. Expenses of recovery shall be apportioned by the court between the parties as their interests appear at the time of the recovery.
(7) Compensation benefits referred to in this section shall in each instance include but not be limited to all expenses incurred under sections 315 and 345.
(8) The furnishing of, or failure to furnish, safety inspections or safety advisory services incident to providing worker's compensation insurance, or pursuant to a contract providing for safety inspections or safety advisory services between the employer and a self-insurance service organization or a union shall not subject the insurer or self-insured service organization, or their agents or employees, or the union, its members or the members of its safety committee, to third party liability for damages for injury, death or loss resulting therefrom.
History: 1969, Act 317, Eff. Dec. 31, 1969 ;-- Am. 1972, Act 285, Imd. Eff. Oct. 30, 1972 ;-- Am. 1993, Act 198, Eff. Dec. 28, 1994
Compiler's Notes:
Section 3 of Act 198 of 1993 provides as follows:
“Section 3. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), this amendatory act shall not take effect unless the state administrative board certifies in writing to the secretary of state by December 31, 1994 that an agreement for the transfer of all or substantially all of the assets and the assumption of all or substantially all of the liabilities of the state accident fund has been consummated with a permitted transferee pursuant to the requirements of section 701a of the worker's disability compensation act of 1969, Act No. 317 of the Public Acts of 1969, being section 418.701a of the Michigan Compiled Laws, as added by this amendatory act.
“(2) Sections 700 and 701a as added by this amendatory act shall take effect upon the date of enactment of this amendatory act.”
PopularName Notes:
Act 317
Notes of Decisions
Franges v. Gen. Motors Corp., 274 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1979).
· cites it 20× “MCLA 418.827; MSA 17.237(827). *602 FACTS Certain common elements appear in these three cases.”
Great Am. Ins. v. Queen, 300 N.W.2d 895 (Mich. 1980).
· cites it 22× “Neither auto insurance company notified Great American of their no-fault disbursements to Queen.”
Petersen v. Magna Corp., 773 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. 2009).
· cites it 8× “[19] The Legislature often vests discretion in magistrates using the word "may.”
Downie v. Kent Prods., Inc, 362 N.W.2d 605 (Mich. 1985).
· cites it 10× “At the same time, she instituted this action against Bliss pursuant to MCL 418.827; MSA 17.237(827). During the course of trial, plaintiff advanced several theories of recovery, [2] but only the issues of implied warranty and negligence arising from a duty to warn were presented…”
Harris v. Vernier, 617 N.W.2d 764 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 8× “MCL 418.827(1); MSA 17.237(827)(1). However, this exclusion does not affect the general observation that the Legislature intended both the WDCA and the no-fault act to apply in cases where a plaintiff suffers personal injuries in an automobile accident while in the course of…”
Tucker v. Clare Bros. Ltd., 493 N.W.2d 918 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 20× “The majority's statement does not recognize *524 that the relevant statute, MCL 418.827; MSA 17.237(827), does indeed treat differently those compensation carriers who do intervene and those who do not.”
Flower v. Gensterblum, 272 N.W.2d 726 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
· cites it 24× “1(1) and MCL 418.827(1); MSA 17.237(827)(1), in order to recover its payments from any damages plaintiff might receive.”
Crawley v. Schick, 211 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).
· cites it 9× “Thus in determining whether the circuit court correctly apportioned Liberty Mutual’s share of the expenses of the suit our task narrows to ascertaining what benefits accrued to Liberty Mutual as a result of the plaintiffs suit.”
Farrell v. Dearborn Mfg. Co., 330 N.W.2d 397 (Mich. 1982).
· cites it 6× “The Court also concluded that MCL 418.827; MSA 17.237(827) barred this suit for an intentional tort against a co-employee.”
Eddington Est. v. Eppert Oil Co., 490 N.W.2d 872 (Mich. 1992).
· cites it 16× “[8] The Legislature did not specify those who may be classified as "plaintiffs" for the purpose of bringing a third-party tort action because it is possible that the employer or compensation carrier or other individuals may be the party bringing the action.”
Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 445 N.W.2d 795 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 6× “II On appeal, plaintiff argues that the common law and the Workers' Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.827, subds (1) and (5); MSA 17.237(827), subds (1) and (5), impose an affirmative duty on an employer to preserve evidence which might be *139 used in an employee's…”
Lone v. Esco Elevators, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
· cites it 9× “(1) When an employer or its insurer pays worker’s compensation benefits to an injured employee and the employee and his wife obtain a tort judgment from a third-party tortfeasor, does MCLA 418.827; MSA 17.237(827) authorize the employer to claim reimbursement or an advance…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.827(1) — 62 cases
Harris v. Vernier, 617 N.W.2d 764 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
“MCL 418.827(1); MSA 17.237(827)(1). However, this exclusion does not affect the general observation that the Legislature intended both the WDCA and the no-fault act to apply in cases where a plaintiff suffers personal injuries in an automobile accident while in the course of…”
Flower v. Gensterblum, 272 N.W.2d 726 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
“1(1) and MCL 418.827(1); MSA 17.237(827)(1), in order to recover its payments from any damages plaintiff might receive.”
Petersen v. Magna Corp., 773 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. 2009).
“[19] The Legislature often vests discretion in magistrates using the word "may.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.827(2) — 3 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.827(3) — 2 cases
Tucker v. Clare Bros. Ltd., 493 N.W.2d 918 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
“The majority's statement does not recognize *524 that the relevant statute, MCL 418.827; MSA 17.237(827), does indeed treat differently those compensation carriers who do intervene and those who do not.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.827(5) — 67 cases
Great Am. Ins. v. Queen, 300 N.W.2d 895 (Mich. 1980).
“Neither auto insurance company notified Great American of their no-fault disbursements to Queen.”
Downie v. Kent Prods., Inc, 362 N.W.2d 605 (Mich. 1985).
“At the same time, she instituted this action against Bliss pursuant to MCL 418.827; MSA 17.237(827). During the course of trial, plaintiff advanced several theories of recovery, [2] but only the issues of implied warranty and negligence arising from a duty to warn were presented…”
Eddington Est. v. Eppert Oil Co., 490 N.W.2d 872 (Mich. 1992).
“[8] The Legislature did not specify those who may be classified as "plaintiffs" for the purpose of bringing a third-party tort action because it is possible that the employer or compensation carrier or other individuals may be the party bringing the action.”
Harris v. Vernier, 617 N.W.2d 764 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
“MCL 418.827(1); MSA 17.237(827)(1). However, this exclusion does not affect the general observation that the Legislature intended both the WDCA and the no-fault act to apply in cases where a plaintiff suffers personal injuries in an automobile accident while in the course of…”
Petersen v. Magna Corp., 773 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. 2009).
“[19] The Legislature often vests discretion in magistrates using the word "may.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.827(5)(6) — 1 case
Crawley v. Schick, 211 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).
“Thus in determining whether the circuit court correctly apportioned Liberty Mutual’s share of the expenses of the suit our task narrows to ascertaining what benefits accrued to Liberty Mutual as a result of the plaintiffs suit.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.827(5M7) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.827(6) — 13 cases
Franges v. Gen. Motors Corp., 274 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1979).
“MCLA 418.827; MSA 17.237(827). *602 FACTS Certain common elements appear in these three cases.”
Crawley v. Schick, 211 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).
“Thus in determining whether the circuit court correctly apportioned Liberty Mutual’s share of the expenses of the suit our task narrows to ascertaining what benefits accrued to Liberty Mutual as a result of the plaintiffs suit.”
Petersen v. Magna Corp., 773 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. 2009).
“[19] The Legislature often vests discretion in magistrates using the word "may.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.827(8) — 9 cases
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