Revised Statutes of 1846
R.S. of 1846
566.132 Agreements, contracts, or promises required to be in writing and signed; enforcement; "financial institution" defined.
Sec. 2.
(1) In the following cases an agreement, contract, or promise is void unless that agreement, contract, or promise, or a note or memorandum of the agreement, contract, or promise, is in writing and signed with an authorized signature by the party to be charged with the agreement, contract, or promise:
(a) An agreement that, by its terms, is not to be performed within 1 year from the making of the agreement.
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or misdoings of another person.
(c) An agreement, promise, or undertaking made upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises to marry.
(d) A special promise made by a personal representative to answer damages out of his or her own estate.
(e) An agreement, promise, or contract to pay a commission for or upon the sale of an interest in real estate.
(f) An assignment of things in action, whether intended as a transfer for sale, for security, or otherwise.
(g) An agreement, promise, contract, or warranty of cure relating to medical care or treatment. This subdivision does not affect the right to sue for malpractice or negligence.
(2) A person shall not bring an action against a financial institution to enforce any of the following promises or commitments of the financial institution unless the promise or commitment is in writing and signed with an authorized signature by the financial institution:
(a) A promise or commitment to lend money, grant or extend credit, or make any other financial accommodation.
(b) A promise or commitment to renew, extend, modify, or permit a delay in repayment or performance of a loan, extension of credit, or other financial accommodation.
(c) A promise or commitment to waive a provision of a loan, extension of credit, or other financial accommodation.
(3) A person shall not bring an action to enforce an agreement, promise, or contract to pay a commission for or upon the sale of an interest in real estate against the owner or purchaser of the real estate unless the agreement, promise, or contract is in writing signed by the party to be charged.
(4) As used in this section, "financial institution" means a state or national chartered bank, a state or federal chartered savings bank or savings and loan association, a state or federal chartered credit union, a person licensed or registered under the mortgage brokers, lenders, and servicers licensing act, 1987 PA 173, MCL 445.1651 to 445.1684, or the secondary mortgage loan act, 1981 PA 125, MCL 493.51 to 493.81, or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof.
History: R.S. 1846, Ch. 81 ;-- CL 1857, 3183 ;-- CL 1871, 4698 ;-- How. 6185 ;-- CL 1897, 9515 ;-- Am. 1913, Act 238, Eff. Aug. 14, 1913 ;-- CL 1915, 11981 ;-- CL 1929, 13417 ;-- Am. 1945, Act 261, Eff. Sept. 6, 1945 ;-- CL 1948, 566.132 ;-- Am. 1974, Act 343, Imd. Eff. Dec. 21, 1974 ;-- Am. 1992, Act 245, Eff. Jan. 1, 1993 ;-- Am. 2020, Act 63, Imd. Eff. Mar. 17, 2020
Notes of Decisions
Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Aronoff Living Trust, 853 N.W.2d 481 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 35× “132(2) and noted that it required a written promise or commitment in contradistinction to the requirements stated under MCL 566.132(1), which can be satisfied with a memorandum.”
Crown Tech. Park v. D&N Bank, FSB, 619 N.W.2d 66 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 50× “§ 566.132; MSA 26.922, did not bar Crown Technology's promissory estoppel claim.”
Barclae v. Zarb, 834 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 17× “Zarb moved for summary disposition on plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that the statute of frauds, MCL 566.132, precluded plaintiffs from bringing an action for breach of alleged oral representations regarding financial accommodations.”
Rodgers v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank Na, 890 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 6× “Defendant argued that the statute of frauds, MCL 566.132(2), barred plaintiffs’ claims because the loan-modification agreement that plaintiffs sought to enforce was never signed by any authorized representative.”
Manuel v. Gill, 753 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. 2008).
· cites it 4× “[2] MCL 566.132 provides: (1) In the following cases an agreement, contract, or promise is void unless that agreement, contract, or promise, or a note or memorandum of the agreement, contract, or promise is in writing and signed with an authorized signature by the party to be…”
Cruz v. Capital One, N.A., 192 F. Supp. 3d 832 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
· cites it 4× “Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132 (2)(c) (emphasis added).”
Bullock v. Auto. Club of Mich., 444 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. 1989).
· cites it 6× “MCL 566.132; MSA 26.922. The defendant failed to raise this issue in the trial court and the matter is therefore not properly before this Court.”
KELLY-STEHNEY & Assocs., INC. v. MacDonald's Indus. Prods., Inc., 693 N.W.2d 394 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 5× “This matter was subsequently remanded to this Court by the Supreme Court, 469 Mich 1046 (2004), with directions that we remand the case to the trial court for consideration of the following issues: (1) whether there is a writing here sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds,…”
CAM Constr. v. Lake Edgewood Condo. Ass'n, 640 N.W.2d 256 (Mich. 2002).
· cites it 2× “MCL 566.132(1)(a). The circuit court granted defendant's motion in December 1998 and plaintiff did not appeal that decision.”
Gillis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 875 F. Supp. 2d 728 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
· cites it 9× “Gillis’ fraud and misrepresentation claims: (1) the claims are barred by Michigan’s statute of frauds for actions against a financial institution to enforce a promise or commitment to modify a loan, Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132 (2); (2) the claims fail because they are based upon…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(1) — 20 cases
Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Aronoff Living Trust, 853 N.W.2d 481 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014).
“132(2) and noted that it required a written promise or commitment in contradistinction to the requirements stated under MCL 566.132(1), which can be satisfied with a memorandum.”
KELLY-STEHNEY & Assocs., INC. v. MacDonald's Indus. Prods., Inc., 693 N.W.2d 394 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
“This matter was subsequently remanded to this Court by the Supreme Court, 469 Mich 1046 (2004), with directions that we remand the case to the trial court for consideration of the following issues: (1) whether there is a writing here sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds,…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(1)(a) — 12 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(1)(b) — 7 cases
Manuel v. Gill, 753 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. 2008).
“[2] MCL 566.132 provides: (1) In the following cases an agreement, contract, or promise is void unless that agreement, contract, or promise, or a note or memorandum of the agreement, contract, or promise is in writing and signed with an authorized signature by the party to be…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(1)(e) — 10 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(1)(f) — 5 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(1)(g) — 3 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(2) — 40 cases
Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Aronoff Living Trust, 853 N.W.2d 481 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014).
“132(2) and noted that it required a written promise or commitment in contradistinction to the requirements stated under MCL 566.132(1), which can be satisfied with a memorandum.”
Rodgers v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank Na, 890 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
“Defendant argued that the statute of frauds, MCL 566.132(2), barred plaintiffs’ claims because the loan-modification agreement that plaintiffs sought to enforce was never signed by any authorized representative.”
Barclae v. Zarb, 834 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
“Zarb moved for summary disposition on plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that the statute of frauds, MCL 566.132, precluded plaintiffs from bringing an action for breach of alleged oral representations regarding financial accommodations.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(2)(1)(a) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(2)(a) — 4 cases
Barclae v. Zarb, 834 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
“Zarb moved for summary disposition on plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that the statute of frauds, MCL 566.132, precluded plaintiffs from bringing an action for breach of alleged oral representations regarding financial accommodations.”
Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Aronoff Living Trust, 853 N.W.2d 481 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014).
“132(2) and noted that it required a written promise or commitment in contradistinction to the requirements stated under MCL 566.132(1), which can be satisfied with a memorandum.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(2)(b) — 5 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(3) — 10 cases
Barclae v. Zarb, 834 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
“Zarb moved for summary disposition on plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that the statute of frauds, MCL 566.132, precluded plaintiffs from bringing an action for breach of alleged oral representations regarding financial accommodations.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(5) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(a) — 15 cases
Bullock v. Auto. Club of Mich., 444 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. 1989).
“MCL 566.132; MSA 26.922. The defendant failed to raise this issue in the trial court and the matter is therefore not properly before this Court.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(b)(1) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(c) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(e) — 5 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(g) — 9 cases
KELLY-STEHNEY & Assocs., INC. v. MacDonald's Indus. Prods., Inc., 693 N.W.2d 394 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
“This matter was subsequently remanded to this Court by the Supreme Court, 469 Mich 1046 (2004), with directions that we remand the case to the trial court for consideration of the following issues: (1) whether there is a writing here sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds,…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(l) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(l)(a) — 6 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(l)(b) — 4 cases
Manuel v. Gill, 753 N.W.2d 48 (Mich. 2008).
“[2] MCL 566.132 provides: (1) In the following cases an agreement, contract, or promise is void unless that agreement, contract, or promise, or a note or memorandum of the agreement, contract, or promise is in writing and signed with an authorized signature by the party to be…”
In Re Gene, 207 B.R. 861 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1997).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.132(l)(f) — 1 case
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