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Minn. Stat.Chapter 170. Traffic Accident Provisions

Minn. Stat. § 170.54 (2026)

[Repealed]

Edition and currency
text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTtext as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history) cited 1947–2010 79citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 79 opinions since 1947.

[Renumbered 169.09, subd 5a]

The 20 cases that cite Minn. Stat. § 170.54 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENBoatwright v. Budak, 625 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 170.54 45×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“Alamo moved to limit its liability to $100,000, pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 170.54 (2000). The district court denied the motion, concluding that Iowa law, which has no limit on a rental-car company’s vicarious liability, applies.”
Later courts cite it for
“only the last two elements of the five-point methodology for resolving conflict questions are relevant in tort cases.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 170.54 20×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“1982), we held that when an adult gave initial permission to a minor under Minn.Stat. § 170.54 (1982), the adult was liable for claims arising out of negligent use of the vehicle by the minor, notwithstanding that at the time and place of the accident the minor was violating…”
The case’s holding
An insurer provides coverage under an omnibus clause if the driver had initial permission, even if the subsequent use exceeds the owner's express limitations short of theft.
Later courts cite it for
“persons injured by the negligent operation of automobiles 'an approximate certainty' of an effective recovery” · 1 citing court
3
GREENChristensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 2003).
cites § 170.54 8×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“Minn.Stat. § 170.54 (2002). To effectuate this intent, automobile liability insurance policies contain an omnibus clause that creates liability insurance for permissive drivers.”
The case’s holding
Minnesota follows the initial permission rule for omnibus clauses, so a vehicle's accidental destruction in a collision does not establish conversion and coverage remains permissive.
Later courts cite it for
“looking to insuring intent is appropriate only where policies contain conflicting 'other insurance' clauses.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENJones v. Fleischhacker, 325 N.W.2d 633 (Minn. 1982).
cites § 170.54 12×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“We are called upon to determine whether a minor child, initially given permission by his parent to drive a motor vehicle owned by the parent, but who violated the parent’s express instructions, is deemed to be the *635 agent of the parent pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 170.54 (1980)…”
cites § 170.54 6×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“Minn.Stat. § 170.54. The section in the Safety Responsibility Act requiring liability coverage for permissive drivers was repealed, but it is likely due to the fact that the same coverage was provided by the No-Fault Act's residual liability requirement.”
The case’s holding
Minnesota's No-Fault Act requires residual liability insurance to cover the insured vehicle, not every insured person driving any vehicle, so a resident child driving an uninsured nonowned car is not covered.
Later courts cite it for
“mandatory aspect of residual liability insurance is coverage for the insured vehicle, so that if the insured vehicle is the at-fault vehicle in an accident, there will be liability coverage.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENHoffmann v. Wiltscheck, 411 N.W.2d 923 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 170.54 12×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“See Minn.Stat. § 170.54 (1982) (a vehicle operator is “deemed the agent” of an owner who consents to the operator’s use of the vehicle).”
Later courts cite it for
“any right the plaintiff can establish to recover damages from the principal is offset by the plaintiff's obligation to repay the same damages.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENPluntz v. Farmington Ford-Mercury, Inc., 470 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
cites § 170.54 20×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“Did the trial court err by imposing liability on appellant Farmington by operation of Minn.Stat. § 170.54 (1988) (Safety Responsibility Act)? ANALYSIS Standard of review On appeal from summary judgment, the function of this court is to determine whether genuine issues of…”
8
GREENWelle v. Prozinski, 258 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. 1977).
cites § 170.54 6×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“The trial court employed this particular provision of the statute in conjunction with § 170.54, 4 to hold that Askren, as owner of the Cougar automobile on the date of the accident, was vicariously liable for Welle’s injuries and subsequent damages.”
9
GREENSafeco Ins. Companies v. Diaz, 385 N.W.2d 845 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
cites § 170.54 6×cited by 17 cases
Later courts cite it for
“policy exclusions which attempt to prevent the coverage from following the person are inconsistent with the purposes of the minnesota no fault act” · 1 citing court
10
GREENAvis Rent-A-Car Sys. v. Vang, 123 F. Supp. 2d 504 (D. Minn. 2000).
cites § 170.54 23×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“Plaintiffs, Avis Rent-a-Car (“Avis”) and Continental Casualty Company (“Continental”), and defendants move on cross-motions for summary judgment for a judicial declaration on the following issues: 1) whether Minn.Stat. § 170.54 applies to hold Avis vicariously liable for the…”
11
GREENMcClain v. Begley, 465 N.W.2d 680 (Minn. 1991).
cites § 170.54 4×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“4 (dealing with leased cars), and Minn.Stat. § 170.54 (the Safety Responsibility Act).”
Later courts cite it for
“attempt to deny all omnibus coverage . . . was void” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENJacobsen v. Dailey, 36 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. 1949).
cites § 170.54 6×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“We there held that contributory negligence of a husband operating upon a public highway an automobile of which his wife was a co-owner and in which she was riding at the time of its collision with the truck of a third person was not imputable to the wife merely because of such…”
The case’s holding
A consenting driver is the owner's agent only for owner liability to third persons, so the driver's negligence is not imputed to an owner suing for damage to his car.
13
GREENKender v. Auto-Owners Ins., 2010 WI App 121, 793 N.W.2d 88.
cites § 170.54 6×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“To support its argument, Auto-Owners relies on the language of Minn. Stat. § 170.54 : Driver deemed agent of owner.”
14
GREENRunia v. Marguth Agency, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 45 (Minn. 1989).
cites § 170.54 4×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“The trial court held that application of the Safety Responsibility Act, Minn.Stat. § 170.54 (1988), to the policy definition of "insured" resulted in no coverage.”
Later courts cite it for
“the standard for review of a bench trial is broader than the standard for jury verdicts.” · 1 citing court
15
GREENBank North v. Soule, 420 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 1988).
cites § 170.54 6×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“Rebuttal of the statutory presumption was frequently permitted in cases involving attempts to impose vicarious liability pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 170.54 (1986) (the Safety Responsibility Act).”
Later courts cite it for
“this system of single filing was obviously designed to protect all persons in commercial transactions involving the vehicle, especially transferees and secured parties.” · 1 citing court
16
GREENLunderberg v. Bierman, 63 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 1954).
cites § 170.54 3×cited by 97 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“That does not mean that appellant may not be liable to the third-party plaintiff for indemnity, as we have pointed out above.”
The case’s holding
An automobile owner liable solely by statute for the negligence of another may recover indemnity from the negligent party or their employer.
Later courts cite it for
“the whole doctrine of indemnity rests upon the proposition that, when one is compelled to pay money which in justice another ought to pay, the former may recover of the latter the sum so paid unless the one making the payment is barred by the wrongful nature of his conduct.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENWhite v. White, 676 N.W.2d 682 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 170.54 18×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 170.54
“* In challenging the district court’s grant of summary judgment, appellant argues that Minn.Stat. § 170.54 (2002), the Safety Responsibility Act, provides coverage to respondent granddaughter as operator of the vehicle in which appellant was injured, notwithstanding the fact…”
18
GREENAgency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Am. Fam. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 519 N.W.2d 483 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 170.54 4×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“But respondent has never attempted to disavow its vicarious tort liability under Minn.Stat. § 170.54. The issue in dispute is not whether respondent could excuse itself from tort liability, but rather how much of that liability had to be satisfied by respondent’s admitted…”
Later courts cite it for
“the applicable motor vehicle financial responsibility laws of the state in which this agreement of rental was executed” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENFoster v. Bock, 39 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 1949).
cites § 170.54 5×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“3 Defendants assert that plaintiff has not sustained the burden of proof on the issue of express or implied consent under § 170.54. We are not concerned with the prima facie case that arises for a plaintiff from the mere proof of ownership.”
Later courts cite it for
“although a formal exception need not be taken to an inadvertent omission or error in a trial court's instruction to the jury, such omission or error is no ground for granting a new trial unless the trial court's attention has been seasonably directed thereto in some manner.” · 3 citing courts
20
GREENFrye v. Anderson, 80 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 1957).
cites § 170.54 5×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 170.54
“” Section 170.54 provides that “Whenever any motor vehicle, after Laws 1945, Chapter 285, becomes effective, shall be operated upon any'public street or highway of this state, by any person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, express or implied, the operator…”

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Citing cases by year
194719782010

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 1988. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Minn.38Minn. Ct. App.28D. Minn.6Ark.18th Cir.1Bankr. D. Del.1Ky.1S.D.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 10 courts in all.

By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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