Minn. Stat. » CHAPTER 340. INTOXICATING LIQUORS
Minnesota Statutes

Minn. Stat. § 340.941 (2026)

[Repealed]

✓ current as of May 2026
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[Repealed, 1985 c 305 art 13 s 1]

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7 cases, 1953–2006 · leading case: State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 1986).
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State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 1986). · cites it 116× “73 pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 340.941 (1984), which imposes vicarious criminal liability on an employer whose employee serves intoxicating liquor to a minor.”
Urban v. Am. Legion Dep't of Minnesota, 723 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2006). · cites it 8× “Compare Minn.Stat. § 340.941 *5 (1984) with Minn.”
State v. Young, 294 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 1980). · cites it 13× “4 The controversy in this case centers around Minn. Stat. § 340.941 (1978), which imposes vicarious criminal liability on employers for their employees’ illegal sales of liquor.”
Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 57 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1953). · cites it 2× “Section 340.941 expressly provides that any sale of liquor in a public drinking place by any clerk, barkeep, or other employe authorized to sell liquor in such place is the act of the employer as well as of the person actually making the sale and both the employer and employe…”
State v. Young, 268 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1978). · cites it 6× “We reverse and hold that § 340.941, which makes employers vicariously liable for their employee’s illegal liquor sales, also applies to off-sale liquor establishments.”
Hartwig v. Loyal Order of Moose, Brainerd Lodge No. 1246, 91 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. 1958). “Defendants contend that the trial court should not have read § 340.941, applicable to sale by an employee, for the reason that there is no evidence in the record indicating that any clerk, barkeeper, or other employee of either of the defendants furnished or sold liquor to…”
State v. Wohlsol, Inc., 670 N.W.2d 292 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). “§ 340.941 (1986). The state argues that the current statute does not impose vicarious liability and, because the legislature did not modify the term “permit” in the current statute with “intentionally,” “knowingly,” or “willfully,” it is logical to assume that no such…”
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