Minnesota Statutes
Minn. Stat. § 609.152 (2026)
[Repealed]
✓ current as of May 2026
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[Repealed, 1998 c 367 art 6 s 16]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 21
cases, 1993–2011 · leading case: State v. Kimmons, 502 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
State v. Kimmons, 502 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). “The trial court sentenced appellant to a double upward durational departure under Minn.Stat. § 609.152, subd. 2 (1990). Appellant claims the statute is unconstitutionally vague and unconstitutional as applied to him.”
State v. Gorman, 546 N.W.2d 5 (Minn. 1996). “1 However, the trial court, relying on both the presence of aggravating circum *7 stances and on the sentencing provisions of the career offender statute, Minn.Stat. § 609.152, subd. 3 (1994), sentenced appellant to 450 months, a double durational departure.”
State v. Smallwood, 594 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. 1999). “Smallwood was sentenced pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 609.152 (1998) as a dangerous offender to 240 months (20 years) confinement, the statutory maximum.”
Neal v. State, 658 N.W.2d 536 (Minn. 2003). “In Rachuy, we concluded that the district court could have increased a four-year presumptive sentence for theft by swindle to the statutory maximum of ten years under an earlier version of the career offender statute, Minn.Stat. § 609.152, subd. 3 (1998). 4 We specifically…”
State v. Rachuy, 502 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. 1993). “That is because the career offender statute, Minn.Stat. § 609.152, subd. 3, gives the trial court a legislatively-created ground for doing so.”
State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. 1996). “Murphy also contends that under the statute, the threat must be to commit a “crime of violence” within the meaning of “violent crime” in Minn.Stat. § 609.152, subd. 1(d). The court of appeals concluded that Murphy’s conduct constituted terroristic threats under the statute.”
State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 1998). “The relevant portion of the COS provides: Whenever a person is convicted of a felony, and the judge is imposing an executed sentence based on a sentencing guidelines presumptive imprisonment sentence, the judge may impose an aggravated durational departure from the presumptive…”
Vickla v. State, 793 N.W.2d 265 (Minn. 2011). “Prior to 1998, Minn.Stat. § 609.152, subd. 3 (1996), provided courts with the authority to sentence defendants to the statutory maximum when the defendant met the statutory criteria of a "career offender.”
State v. Flemino, 529 N.W.2d 501 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). “Appellant Enrico Antonio Flemino, convicted of two counts of felon in possession of a handgun, appeals his sentence for the statutory maximum of 60 months under the career offender statute, Minn.Stat. § 609.152, subd. 3 (1992). We affirm.”
State v. Rachuy, 495 N.W.2d 6 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). “Did the trial court err in using Minn. Stat. § 609.152 (1990) in conjunction with the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines to impose consecutive sentences? 2.”
State v. Munger, 597 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). “The court also departed upwardly from the 21-month presumed sentence for second-degree assault, pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 609.152, subd. 3 (1996) (providing increased sentences for career offenders).”
State v. Kortkamp, 560 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). “Appellant also challenges his sentence as a career offender pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 609.152, subd. 3, and alleges lack of notice of the state’s planned use of uncharged conduct to establish career offender status.”
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