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Minn. Stat.Chapter 609. Criminal Code

Minn. Stat. § 609.343 (2026)

Criminal Sexual Conduct In The Second Degree

Edition and currency
text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTtext as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history) cited 1979–2026 234citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 234 opinions since 1979, 26 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (20 cases).

Subdivision 1.Adult victim; crime defined.

A person who engages in sexual contact with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree if any of the following circumstances exists:

(a) circumstances existing at the time of the act cause the complainant to have a reasonable fear of imminent great bodily harm to the complainant or another;

(b) the actor is armed with a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the complainant to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon and uses or threatens to use the dangerous weapon to cause the complainant to submit;

(c) the actor causes personal injury to the complainant, and any of the following circumstances exist:

(i) the actor uses coercion to accomplish the sexual contact;

(ii) the actor uses force, as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (2); or

(iii) the actor knows or has reason to know that the complainant is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless;

(d) the actor uses force as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (1); or

(e) the actor is aided or abetted by one or more accomplices within the meaning of section 609.05, and either of the following circumstances exists:

(i) the actor or an accomplice uses force or coercion to cause the complainant to submit; or

(ii) the actor or an accomplice is armed with a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the complainant to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon and uses or threatens to use the weapon or article to cause the complainant to submit.

Subd. 1a.Victim under the age of 18; crime defined.

A person who engages in sexual contact with anyone under 18 years of age is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree if any of the following circumstances exists:

(a) circumstances existing at the time of the act cause the complainant to have a reasonable fear of imminent great bodily harm to the complainant or another;

(b) the actor is armed with a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the complainant to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon and uses or threatens to use the dangerous weapon to cause the complainant to submit;

(c) the actor causes personal injury to the complainant, and any of the following circumstances exist:

(i) the actor uses coercion to accomplish the sexual contact;

(ii) the actor uses force, as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (2); or

(iii) the actor knows or has reason to know that the complainant is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless;

(d) the actor is aided or abetted by one or more accomplices within the meaning of section 609.05, and either of the following circumstances exists:

(i) the actor or an accomplice uses force or coercion to cause the complainant to submit; or

(ii) the actor or an accomplice is armed with a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the complainant to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon and uses or threatens to use the weapon or article to cause the complainant to submit;

(e) the complainant is under 14 years of age and the actor is more than 36 months older than the complainant. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense. In a prosecution under this clause, the state is not required to prove that the sexual contact was coerced;

(f) the complainant is at least 14 but less than 16 years of age and the actor is more than 36 months older than the complainant and in a current or recent position of authority over the complainant. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense;

(g) the complainant was under 16 years of age at the time of the sexual contact and the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant. Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense;

(h) the actor has a significant relationship to the complainant, the complainant was under 16 years of age at the time of the sexual contact, and:

(i) the actor or an accomplice used force or coercion to accomplish the contact;

(ii) the complainant suffered personal injury; or

(iii) the sexual abuse involved multiple acts committed over an extended period of time.

Neither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the complainant is a defense; or

(i) the actor uses force, as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (1).

Subd. 2.Penalty.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 609.3455; or Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.109, a person convicted under subdivision 1 or subdivision 1a may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 25 years or to a payment of a fine of not more than $35,000, or both.

(b) Unless a longer mandatory minimum sentence is otherwise required by law or the Sentencing Guidelines provide for a longer presumptive executed sentence, the court shall presume that an executed sentence of 90 months must be imposed on an offender convicted of violating subdivision 1, clause (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), or subdivision 1a, clause (a), (b), (c), (d), (h), or (i). Sentencing a person in a manner other than that described in this paragraph is a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.

(c) A person convicted under this section is also subject to conditional release under section 609.3455.

Subd. 3.Stay.

Except when imprisonment is required under section 609.3455; or Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 609.109, if a person is convicted under subdivision 1a, clause (g), the court may stay imposition or execution of the sentence if it finds that:

(a) a stay is in the best interest of the complainant or the family unit; and

(b) a professional assessment indicates that the offender has been accepted by and can respond to a treatment program.

If the court stays imposition or execution of sentence, it shall include the following as conditions of probation:

(1) incarceration in a local jail or workhouse;

(2) a requirement that the offender complete a treatment program; and

(3) a requirement that the offender have no unsupervised contact with the complainant until the offender has successfully completed the treatment program unless approved by the treatment program and the supervising correctional agent.

The 20 cases that cite Minn. Stat. § 609.343 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. 2001).
cites § 609.343 29×cited by 68 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“In May 1999, respondent Edwin Olaf Vick was found guilty by a jury and convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2000). Vick petitioned for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel and…”
The case’s holding
A trial court's failure to strike or provide cautionary instructions regarding other-crimes evidence does not constitute plain error if limiting instructions are given.
Later courts cite it for
“a defendant bears a heavy burden to overturn a jury verdict.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENJason Donald Matakis v. State of Minnesota, 862 N.W.2d 33 (Minn. 2015).
cites § 609.343 16×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“342 (2014) and three counts of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree under Minn. Stat. § 609.343 (2014). 1 Matakis entered an Alford guilty plea 2 to one count of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, in violation of Minn.”
The case’s holding
A court may deny a postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing if the petition fails to state supporting facts for the alleged grounds.
Later courts cite it for
“we review legal issues de novo, but on factual issues our review is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the postconviction court's findings.” · 13 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Austin, 788 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 609.343 22×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“Does the intent element of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, as defined in Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2006), require the state to prove that the defendant acted with sexual or aggressive intent and intended a particular result? II.”
Later courts cite it for
“intended the specific result of touching m.r.g.'s intimate body parts.” · 1 citing court
4
GREENState v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. 2006).
cites § 609.343 6×cited by 105 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“Appellant, Paul Kermit Ness, was charged with second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2004), for inappropriately touching an 11-year-old boy during an art class Ness taught.”
The case’s holding
Evidence of other offenses admitted under a common scheme or plan must have a marked similarity in modus operandi to the charged offense.
Later courts cite it for
“must have a marked similarity in modus operandi to the charged offense.” · 12 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Fields, 730 N.W.2d 777 (Minn. 2007).
cites § 609.343 8×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“1(g), 2(a) (1996); one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343 , subds. 1(a), 2(a) (1996); and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn.”
The case’s holding
Eliciting clearly inadmissible evidence may constitute prosecutorial misconduct, but questioning about prior misconduct that is not clearly inadmissible under unsettled procedural rules is not misconduct, even without objection.
Later courts cite it for
“clear or established standards of conduct, e.g., rules, laws, orders by a district court, or clear commands in this state's case law.” · 6 citing courts
6
GREENState of Minnesota v. Dakari Michael Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. 2015).
cites § 609.343 8×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“In this case, Coles’ sentence of commitment to the Commissioner of Corrections for 48 months for second-degree criminal sexual conduct, Minn. Stat. § 609.343 , subd. 1(a) (2014), is a greater-than-double upward durational departure from the presumptive stayed sentence of 21…”
The case’s holding
A challenge to a sentence imposed as part of a plea agreement must be brought as a petition for postconviction relief because it impacts more than just the sentence.
Later courts cite it for
“where the sentence at issue is imposed as part of a plea agreement, a motion to change that sentence impacts more than simply the sentence, and rule 27.03 does not apply.” · 5 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Scott, 501 N.W.2d 608 (Minn. 1993).
cites § 609.343 14×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“We believe that the state has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted on the second degree charge even if the evidence admitted in error had been excluded at trial.”
Later courts cite it for
“unless the court finds that the child lacks the capacity to remember or to relate truthfully facts respecting which the child is examined.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENTaylor v. State, 670 N.W.2d 584 (Minn. 2003).
cites § 609.343 4×cited by 75 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (1992) (sexual contact with a child under the age of 13, where the actor is more than 36 months older than the child).”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court may not depart from a presumptive sentence based on facts the legislature already considered in determining the degree of seriousness of the offense.
Later courts cite it for
“facts that were already taken into account by the legislature in determining the degree of seriousness of the offense.” · 4 citing courts
9
GREENBjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 2007).
cites § 609.343 4×cited by 64 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“Whether consent can form the basis of an affirmative defense of assumption of the risk in a civil suit concerning the sexual abuse of a child, however, is an issue of first impression in this state.”
The case’s holding
The defense of primary assumption of the risk is unavailable as a matter of law in cases involving the sexual abuse of a child.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) the existence of a duty of care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) injury.” · 5 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Shamp, 422 N.W.2d 520 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 609.343 12×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“1(h)(v) (1986), and one count of second degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(g) (1986). On appeal, appellant claims the trial court erred in its jury instructions, improperly denied his right of cross examination, erred in allowing the…”
Later courts cite it for
“counsel traditionally is given considerable leeway in cross examinations, short of questions which harass or are repetitive.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENO'MEARA v. State, 679 N.W.2d 334 (Minn. 2004).
cites § 609.343 4×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“O’Meara was convicted of two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a)(2) (1998).”
The case’s holding
A criminal case remains pending on direct review until the time for appeal is exhausted and the period for filing a petition for certiorari has elapsed or been denied.
Later courts cite it for
“the availability of appeal has been exhausted, the time for a petition for certiorari has elapsed or a petition for certiorari with the supreme court has been filed and finally denied.” · 5 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 1998).
cites § 609.343 8×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“1(a) (1996) (requiring that voters be 18 years old); Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (1996) (criminalizing sexual contact with a child under the age of 13 when the actor is more than 36 months older even if the 13-year-old consents to the contact); Minn.”
The case’s holding
A mandatory life sentence with a thirty-year minimum for a fifteen-year-old convicted of first-degree murder does not violate the Minnesota Constitution's prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.
Later courts cite it for
“united states supreme court has upheld punishments that, although they may be cruel, are not unusual.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENState v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006).
cites § 609.343 4×cited by 52 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“1(a) (2004) (engaging in sexual penetration with another person under 13 years of age when the actor is more than 36 months older than the complainant), and second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343 , subd. 1(a) (2004) (engaging in sexual…”
The case’s holding
Statements are non-testimonial under the Confrontation Clause if neither the declarant nor the government questioner acts to a substantial degree to produce a statement for trial.
Later courts cite it for
“whether either a declarant or government questioner is acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial.” · 5 citing courts
14
GREENState of Minnesota v. Carl Lee Nodes, 863 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. 2015).
cites § 609.343 6×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“; count two charged Nodes with criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2014), also for his conduct with S.”
Later courts cite it for
“if a statute is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning.” · 3 citing courts
15
GREENSean Michael Wocelka v. State of Minnesota, 9 N.W.3d 390 (Minn. 2024).
cites § 609.343 28×cited by 1 case
Later courts cite it for
“it is unreasonable to think that the legislature would have enacted, and the governor would have signed, a d-12 statute.” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENState v. McCray, 753 N.W.2d 746 (Minn. 2008).
cites § 609.343 4×cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“1(a) (2006), and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2006). Both offenses involve sexual conduct in which “the complainant is under 13 years of age and the actor is more than 36 months older than the complainant,” but…”
Later courts cite it for
“a prosecutor engages in prosecutorial misconduct when he violates clear or established standards of conduct, e.g., rules, laws, orders by a district court, or clear commands in this state's case law.” · 12 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. 1993).
cites § 609.343 4×cited by 76 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“The court of appeals granted the defendant, Thomas Wermerskirchen, a new trial on a charge he sexually touched his 9-year-old daughter and thereby committed criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (1990). 1 The court of appeals ruled (1)…”
The case’s holding
Evidence of other crimes is admissible to establish a common scheme or plan and to prove the commission of the charged offense in child sex abuse cases.
Later courts cite it for
“a fabrication or a mistake in perception by the victim.” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. 1999).
cites § 609.343 4×cited by 73 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“See Minn.Stat. § 609.343 (1998) (defining second-degree criminal sexual conduct).”
The case’s holding
Joinder of criminal offenses is improper unless the offenses are part of a single behavioral incident or course of conduct.
Later courts cite it for
“our duty is to look at the record as a whole to determine whether, in light of the evidence therein, the district court acted 'arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to legal usage.” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 1989).
cites § 609.343 6×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“He was acquitted of one other count of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(h)(v) (1988) (multiple acts committed over an extended period of time).”
The case’s holding
Removing a defendant from the courtroom during child testimony requires specific evidence that the child would be psychologically traumatized by the defendant's presence.
Later courts cite it for
“is or would be psychologically traumatized and that traumatization is substantially caused by the presence of the defendant rather than by other reasons.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Calmes, 632 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 2001).
cites § 609.343 3×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 609.343
“On February 13, 1997, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Thomas Calmes pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(d) (2000), and first-degree burglary in violation of Minn.”
The case’s holding
Due process is violated when a sentence is enhanced after a defendant develops a crystallized expectation of finality in the earlier sentence.
Later courts cite it for
“due process may be violated when a defendant's sentence is enhanced after the defendant has developed a crystallized expectation of finality in the earlier sentence.” · 4 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197920022026

One bar per year. Tallest: 23 cases in 2015. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Minn. Ct. App.149Minn.77Tex. Crim. App.25th Cir.19th Cir.1La.1Tenn.1
By subsection
(a)20 cases
State v. Cermak, 350 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1984).
State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984).
State v. Cermak, 365 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 1985).
State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
State v. Cermak, 344 N.W.2d 833 (Minn. 1984).
Showing the top 5 of 20. More in the list view →
(b)1 case
State v. Hesse, 281 N.W.2d 491 (Minn. 1979).
(c)4 cases
State v. Beard, 380 N.W.2d 537 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
Stephens v. State, 369 N.W.2d 603 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
State v. Lockhart, 376 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
In re the Welfare of S. R., 289 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. 1980).
(d)2 cases
State v. Hayes, 304 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1981).
Palm v. State, 321 N.W.2d 34 (Minn. 1982).
(e)2 cases
State v. Mattson, 376 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1985).
State v. Mar, 291 N.W.2d 223 (Minn. 1980).
(e)(i)5 cases
State v. Mattson, 376 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1985).
In re the Welfare of D.L.K., 381 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. 1986).
State v. Dooley, 380 N.W.2d 582 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
State v. Mattson, 356 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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