Mississippi Code
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (2024)
When arrests may be made without warrant
✓ Justia copy: laws through about 2024 (2025 and 2026 sessions missing)
- (1) An officer or private person may arrest any person without warrant, for an indictable offense committed, or a breach of the peace threatened or attempted in his presence; or when a person has committed a felony, though not in his presence; or when a felony has been committed, and he has reasonable ground to suspect and believe the person proposed to be arrested to have committed it; or on a charge, made upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the party proposed to be arrested. And in all cases of arrests without warrant, the person making such arrest must inform the accused of the object and cause of the arrest, except when he is in the actual commission of the offense, or is arrested on pursuit.
- (2) Any law enforcement officer may arrest any person on a misdemeanor charge without having a warrant in his possession when a warrant is in fact outstanding for that person's arrest and the officer has knowledge through official channels that the warrant is outstanding for that person's arrest. In all such cases, the officer making the arrest must inform such person at the time of the arrest the object and cause therefor. If the person arrested so requests, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable.
- (3)
- (a) Any law enforcement officer shall arrest a person with or without a warrant when he has probable cause to believe that the person has, within twenty-four (24) hours of such arrest, knowingly committed a misdemeanor or felony that is an act of domestic violence or knowingly violated provisions of a criminal domestic violence or sexual assault protection order issued pursuant to Section 97-3-7(11), 97-3-65(6) or 97-3-101(5) or an ex parte protective order, protective order after hearing or court-approved consent agreement entered by a chancery, circuit, county, justice or municipal court pursuant to the Protection from Domestic Abuse Law, Sections 93-21-1 through 93-21-29, Mississippi Code of 1972, or a restraining order entered by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction to protect an applicant from domestic violence.
- (b) If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that two (2) or more persons committed an act of domestic violence as defined herein, or if two (2) or more persons make complaints of domestic violence to the officer, the officer shall attempt to determine who was the principal aggressor. The term principal aggressor is defined as the party who poses the most serious ongoing threat, or who is the most significant, rather than the first, aggressor. The officer shall presume that arrest is not the appropriate response for the person or persons who were not the principal aggressor. If the officer affirmatively finds more than one (1) principal aggressor was involved, the officer shall document those findings.
- (c) To determine which party was the principal aggressor, the officer shall consider the following factors, although such consideration is not limited to these factors:
- (i) Evidence from the persons involved in the domestic abuse;
- (ii) The history of domestic abuse between the parties, the likelihood of future injury to each person, and the intent of the law to protect victims of domestic violence from continuing abuse;
- (iii) Whether one (1) of the persons acted in self-defense; and
- (iv) Evidence from witnesses of the domestic violence.
- (d) A law enforcement officer shall not base the decision of whether to arrest on the consent or request of the victim.
- (e) A law enforcement officer's determination regarding the existence of probable cause or the lack of probable cause shall not adversely affect the right of any party to independently seek appropriate remedies.
- (4)
- (a) Any person authorized by a court of law to supervise or monitor a convicted offender who is under an intensive supervision program may arrest the offender when the offender is in violation of the terms or conditions of the intensive supervision program, without having a warrant, provided that the person making the arrest has been trained at the Law Enforcement Officers Training Academy established under Section 45-5-1 et seq., or at a course approved by the Board on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Training.
- (b) For the purposes of this subsection, the term "intensive supervision program" means an intensive supervision program of the Department of Corrections as described in Section 47-5-1001 et seq., or any similar program authorized by a court for offenders who are not under jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections.
- (5) As used in subsection (3) of this section, the phrase "misdemeanor or felony that is an act of domestic violence" shall mean one or more of the following acts between current or former spouses or a child of current or former spouses, persons living as spouses or who formerly lived as spouses or a child of persons living as spouses or who formerly lived as spouses, a parent, grandparent, child, grandchild or someone similarly situated to the defendant, persons who have a current or former dating relationship, or persons who have a biological or legally adopted child together:
- (a) Simple or aggravated domestic violence within the meaning of Section 97-3-7;
- (b) Disturbing the family or public peace within the meaning of Section 97-35-9, 97-35-11, 97-35-13 or 97-35-15; or
- (c) Stalking within the meaning of Section 97-3-107.
- (6) Any arrest made pursuant to subsection (3) of this section shall be designated as domestic assault or domestic violence on both the arrest docket and the incident report. Any officer investigating a complaint of a misdemeanor or felony that is a crime of domestic violence who finds probable cause that such an offense has occurred within the past twenty-four (24) hours shall file an affidavit on behalf of the victim(s) of the crime, regardless of whether an arrest is made within that time period. If the crime is reported or investigated outside of that twenty-four-hour period, the officer may file the affidavit on behalf of the victim. In the event the officer does not file an affidavit on behalf of the victim, the officer shall instruct the victim of the procedure for filing on his or her own behalf.
- (7) A law enforcement officer shall not be held liable in any civil action for an arrest based on probable cause and in good faith pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, or failure, in good faith, to make an arrest pursuant to subsection (3) of this section.
- (8) The authority for the State Chief Deputy Fire Marshal and deputy state fire marshals to make arrests shall be governed by the provisions of Section 45-11-1.
Codes, 1857, ch. 64, art. 276; 1871, § 2776; 1880, § 3026; 1892, § 1375; 1906, § 1447; Hemingway's 1917, § 1204; 1930, § 1227; 1942, § 2470; Laws, 1968, ch. 355, § 1; Laws, 1988, ch. 571, § 1; Laws, 1989, ch. 330, § 1; Laws, 1989, ch. 364, § 1; Laws, 1995, ch. 328, § 1; Laws, 1996, ch. 483, § 1; Laws, 1999, ch. 504, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 554, § 1; Laws, 2000, ch. 555, § 2; Laws, 2002, ch. 510, § 1; Laws, 2008, ch. 391, § 3; Laws, 2009, ch. 433, § 4; Laws, 2010, ch. 536, § 2; Laws, 2012, ch. 514, § 9, eff. 7/1/2012.
Amended by Laws, 2017, ch. 414, HB 1356, 3, eff. 4/6/2017.
Amended by Laws, 2015, ch. 332, HB 556, 1, eff. 7/1/2015.
Amended by Laws, 2014, ch. 322, SB 2629, 1, eff. 7/1/2014.
Amended by Laws, 2013, ch. 360, HB 437, 2, eff. 7/1/2013.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 99
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1974–2025 · leading case: City of Laurel v. Williams ex rel. Williams, 21 So. 3d 1170 (Miss. 2009).
City of Laurel v. Williams ex rel. Williams, 21 So. 3d 1170 (Miss. 2009). “Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (d) (Rev.2007). The record in this matter contains substantial evidence to determine that Wilson was the principal aggressor and to establish probable *1186 cause for arrest.”
Turner v. State, 732 So. 2d 937 (Miss. 1999). “This Court found that, [T]he record is devoid of any proof that Officer Griffin, at the time he arrested Rome, had any reasonable ground to `suspect and believe' that Rome had committed the `felony' as required by Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7.[ ]. According to Griffin, he did not…”
Delker v. State, 50 So. 3d 309 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). “Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-3-7(1) (Rev.2007) provides: An officer or private person may arrest any person without warrant, for an indictable offense committed, or a breach of the peace threatened or attempted in his presence; or when a person has committed a felony,…”
Collins v. Tallahatchie Cnty., 876 So. 2d 284 (Miss. 2004). “Although Essie concedes that no arrest warrant was issued, she claims that probable cause existed for a warrantless arrest and/or, in the alternative, that a warrantless arrest was specifically authorized by Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7(3). The County rebuts this assertion by arguing…”
Moore v. State, 933 So. 2d 910 (Miss. 2006). “Section 99-3-7 provides: (1) An officer or private person may arrest any person without a warrant, for an indictable offense committed, or a breach of the peace threatened or attempted in his presence; or when a person has committed a felony, though not in his presence; or when…”
Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110 (Miss. 1999). “The State distinguishes between the standard of reasonable suspicion required for an investigative stop and the misdemeanor / felony distinction made by Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7 in determining probable cause to arrest.”
Delker v. State, 50 So. 3d 300 (Miss. 2010). “See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (Rev.2007). Therefore, the circuit court held that the traffic stop was legal and the evidence obtained was not subject to the exclusionary rule.”
Bayse v. State, 420 So. 2d 1050 (Miss. 1982). “Further, section 99-3-7 of the Mississippi Code Annotated (1972) limits the circumstances under which a law enforcement officer may arrest a defendant on a misdemeanor charge without warrant, and the statute provides that such an arrest is legal only when the officer knows that…”
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). “2001) (“when a public offense has been committed or attempted in the officer’s presence”); Miss. Code Ann. §99-3-7 (Supp. 1998) (for indictable offense committed in presence of officer); §45-3-21(l)(a)(vi) (by Highway Safety Patrol Officers of “any person or persons committing…”
Shields v. State, 722 So. 2d 584 (Miss. 1998). “In the case at bar, the State admits an incorrect indictment and conviction for aggravated assault under Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7(b), as well as its failure to indict on the charge of simple assault pursuant to Miss.”
Maurice Townsend v. State of Mississippi, 188 So. 3d 616 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). “did purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme disregard for human life, attempt to cause serious bodily injury to Officer David Sabin, a law enforcement officer, in violation of the provisions of Section 99-3-7(2) . . . which offense is…”
Jones v. State, 461 So. 2d 686 (Miss. 1984). “Jones calls our attention to Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (1972) which provides as follows: An officer or private person may arrest any person without a warrant, for an indictable offense committed, or a breach of the peace threatened or attempted in *695 his presence; or when a…”
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7(1): 30 cases
Delker v. State, 50 So. 3d 309 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). “Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-3-7(1) (Rev.2007) provides: An officer or private person may arrest any person without warrant, for an indictable offense committed, or a breach of the peace threatened or attempted in his presence; or when a person has committed a felony,…”
Moore v. State, 933 So. 2d 910 (Miss. 2006). “Section 99-3-7 provides: (1) An officer or private person may arrest any person without a warrant, for an indictable offense committed, or a breach of the peace threatened or attempted in his presence; or when a person has committed a felony, though not in his presence; or when…”
Turner v. State, 732 So. 2d 937 (Miss. 1999). “This Court found that, [T]he record is devoid of any proof that Officer Griffin, at the time he arrested Rome, had any reasonable ground to `suspect and believe' that Rome had committed the `felony' as required by Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7.[ ]. According to Griffin, he did not…”
Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110 (Miss. 1999). “The State distinguishes between the standard of reasonable suspicion required for an investigative stop and the misdemeanor / felony distinction made by Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7 in determining probable cause to arrest.”
Lee v. MGM Resorts Mississippi, Inc., 200 So. 3d 1129 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7(2): 2 cases
Maurice Townsend v. State of Mississippi, 188 So. 3d 616 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). “did purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme disregard for human life, attempt to cause serious bodily injury to Officer David Sabin, a law enforcement officer, in violation of the provisions of Section 99-3-7(2) . . . which offense is…”
McLamb v. State, 456 So. 2d 743 (Miss. 1984).
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7(3): 7 cases
City of Laurel v. Williams ex rel. Williams, 21 So. 3d 1170 (Miss. 2009). “Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (d) (Rev.2007). The record in this matter contains substantial evidence to determine that Wilson was the principal aggressor and to establish probable *1186 cause for arrest.”
Collins v. Tallahatchie Cnty., 876 So. 2d 284 (Miss. 2004). “Although Essie concedes that no arrest warrant was issued, she claims that probable cause existed for a warrantless arrest and/or, in the alternative, that a warrantless arrest was specifically authorized by Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7(3). The County rebuts this assertion by arguing…”
Fair v. Town of Friars Point, 930 So. 2d 467 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
City of Jackson v. Calcote, 910 So. 2d 1103 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
Johnson v. City of Quitman, 66 So. 3d 1261 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7(3)(a): 3 cases
City of Laurel v. Williams ex rel. Williams, 21 So. 3d 1170 (Miss. 2009). “Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (d) (Rev.2007). The record in this matter contains substantial evidence to determine that Wilson was the principal aggressor and to establish probable *1186 cause for arrest.”
Mills v. City of Water Valley, 66 So. 3d 193 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
Fair v. Town of Friars Point, 930 So. 2d 467 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7(3)(b): 2 cases
City of Laurel v. Williams ex rel. Williams, 21 So. 3d 1170 (Miss. 2009). “Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (d) (Rev.2007). The record in this matter contains substantial evidence to determine that Wilson was the principal aggressor and to establish probable *1186 cause for arrest.”
Mills v. City of Water Valley, 66 So. 3d 193 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7(3)(b)(c)(d): 1 case
City of Laurel v. Williams ex rel. Williams, 21 So. 3d 1170 (Miss. 2009). “Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (d) (Rev.2007). The record in this matter contains substantial evidence to determine that Wilson was the principal aggressor and to establish probable *1186 cause for arrest.”
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7(6): 1 case
Mills v. City of Water Valley, 66 So. 3d 193 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7(7): 3 cases
City of Laurel v. Williams ex rel. Williams, 21 So. 3d 1170 (Miss. 2009). “Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (d) (Rev.2007). The record in this matter contains substantial evidence to determine that Wilson was the principal aggressor and to establish probable *1186 cause for arrest.”
Collins v. Tallahatchie Cnty., 876 So. 2d 284 (Miss. 2004). “Although Essie concedes that no arrest warrant was issued, she claims that probable cause existed for a warrantless arrest and/or, in the alternative, that a warrantless arrest was specifically authorized by Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7(3). The County rebuts this assertion by arguing…”
City of Laurel v. Clyde Williams, No. 2008-CA-01137-SCT (Miss. June 23, 2008).
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7(a): 2 cases
Shields v. State, 722 So. 2d 584 (Miss. 1998). “In the case at bar, the State admits an incorrect indictment and conviction for aggravated assault under Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7(b), as well as its failure to indict on the charge of simple assault pursuant to Miss.”
Delker v. State, 50 So. 3d 300 (Miss. 2010). “See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (Rev.2007). Therefore, the circuit court held that the traffic stop was legal and the evidence obtained was not subject to the exclusionary rule.”
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7(b): 2 cases
City of Laurel v. Williams ex rel. Williams, 21 So. 3d 1170 (Miss. 2009). “Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (d) (Rev.2007). The record in this matter contains substantial evidence to determine that Wilson was the principal aggressor and to establish probable *1186 cause for arrest.”
Shields v. State, 722 So. 2d 584 (Miss. 1998). “In the case at bar, the State admits an incorrect indictment and conviction for aggravated assault under Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7(b), as well as its failure to indict on the charge of simple assault pursuant to Miss.”
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7(c): 1 case
City of Laurel v. Williams ex rel. Williams, 21 So. 3d 1170 (Miss. 2009). “Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (d) (Rev.2007). The record in this matter contains substantial evidence to determine that Wilson was the principal aggressor and to establish probable *1186 cause for arrest.”
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