Missouri Revised Statutes

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.430 (2026)

Limitation as to action, exception

✓ current as of May 2026

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287.430. Limitation as to action, exception. — Except for a claim for recovery filed against the second injury fund, no proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall be maintained unless a claim therefor is filed with the division within two years after the date of injury or death, or the last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury or death, except that if the report of the injury or the death is not filed by the employer as required by section 287.380, the claim for compensation may be filed within three years after the date of injury, death, or last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury or death. The filing of any form, report, receipt, or agreement, other than a claim for compensation, shall not toll the running of the periods of limitation provided in this section. The filing of the report of injury or death three years or more after the date of injury, death, or last payment made under this chapter on account of the injury or death, shall not toll the running of the periods of limitation provided in this section, nor shall such filing reactivate or revive the period of time in which a claim may be filed. A claim against the second injury fund shall be filed within two years after the date of the injury or within one year after a claim is filed against an employer or insurer pursuant to this chapter, whichever is later. In all other respects the limitations shall be governed by the law of civil actions other than for the recovery of real property, but the appointment of a conservator shall be deemed the termination of the legal disability from minority or disability as defined in chapter 475. The statute of limitations contained in this section is one of extinction and not of repose.

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(RSMo 1939 § 3727, A.L. 1941 p. 718, A.L. 1947 V. II p. 448, A.L. 1965 pp. 397, 419, A.L. 1980 H.B. 1396, A.L. 1981 H.B. 324, A.L. 1983 S.B. 44 & 45, A.L. 1992 H.B. 975, A.L. 1993 S.B. 251, A.L. 1998 H.B. 1237, et al.)

Prior revision: 1929 § 3337

(1965) There is no legislative intent expressed in this section to extinguish completely a workmen's compensation claim if not filed within the period provided by the statute. Welborn v. Southern Equipment Company (Mo.), 395 S.W.2d 119.

(1966) While the furnishing of an elastic bandage by the employer's nurse constituted medical aid to relieve from the effects of injury, the mere wearing of that elastic bandage did not toll the statute of limitations while wearing the bandage. Morgan v. Krey Packing Co. (A.), 403 S.W.2d 668.

(1967) The word "treatment" does not include mere physical examination or mere diagnosis. Bryant v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (A.), 416 S.W.2d 195.

(1968) The limitation period does not begin to run until it becomes reasonably discoverable and apparent that a compensable injury has been sustained. Williams v. S.N. Long Warehouse Co. (A.), 426 S.W.2d 725.

(1976) Held, advice to treat ankle with "warm soaks" constituted "medical treatment" and that such treatment constituted "payment" sufficient to toll statute of limitations. Faries v. ACF Industries, Inc. (A.), 531 S.W.2d 93.

(2002) Use of term "extinction" indicates legislative intent that the two-year limitation is substantive and jurisdictional rather than procedural and waivable. Marston v. Juvenile Justice Center, 88 S.W.3d 534 (Mo.App.W.D.).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 107 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1952–2023 · leading case: Treasurer of Missouri-custodian v. Cook, 323 S.W.3d 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).

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Treasurer of Missouri-custodian v. Cook, 323 S.W.3d 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 28× “The Second Injury Fund filed an answer asserting that Cook’s claim was time barred under section 287.430, RSMo 2000. An administrative law judge (ALJ) held a hearing on this matter in February 2009.”

Robert Dungan v. Fuqua Homes, Inc., 437 S.W.3d 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 54× “Mo.Rev.Stat. § 287.430 (1978). In 1980, the statute was amended to read, in pertinent part: "No proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall be maintained unless a claim therefor is filed with the division within two years after the date of injury or death-” Mo.”

DeRousse v. PPG Indus., Inc., 598 S.W.2d 106 (Mo. 1980). · cites it 49× “380, RSMo 1978, operates to toll the running of the one year limitations period on workmen’s compensation claims provided in § 287.430, RSMo 1978. We hold that such failure does not toll the running of the limitations period, and reverse.”

Grubbs v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, 298 S.W.3d 907 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 19× “The Fund argues the Commission erred in failing to find Employee’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations in Section 287.430, RSMo 2000, 1 and in failing to find that Employee released the Fund from liability regarding his July 80, 2003 accident.”

Kincade v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 92 S.W.3d 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 17× “SIF claims the Commission erred in finding Claimant’s claim against the Fund to be within the time limitations designated in Section 287.430 RSMo 2000 1 and that the evidence does not support the Commission’s determination that Claimant’s prior injuries were an obstacle to…”

Phillip Guinn, Claimant-appellant v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Respondent-respondent, 577 S.W.3d 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 18× “The Commission determined that: Because we conclude that [Guinn]'s claim against the Second Injury Fund alleging both tinnitus and hearing loss was, in any event, untimely filed pursuant to § 287.430, we need not consider or determine herein whether those authorities should be…”

Ming v. Gen. Motors Corp., 130 S.W.3d 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 20× “The ALJ found that in the absence of a timely filed report of injury, Ming had “three years from the date of -injury in which to toll the statute by filing a suit in a court with the requisite jurisdiction for damages for bodily injury” under sections 287.430 and 287.440. The…”

Daniel Small v. Red Simpson, Inc., 484 S.W.3d 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 20× “Small “has not established that he is entitled to the benefit of the three-year claim filing period set forth in § 287.430 RSMo.” While adopting the ALJ’s other findings, conclusions, award, and decision, the Commission concluded as follows: The parties stipulated that employer…”

Elrod v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, 138 S.W.3d 714 (Mo. 2004). · cites it 10× “The Administrative Law Judge held that Elrod’s claim against the Fund was not barred by the statute of limitations in section 287.430. The ALJ also found: (1) El-rod’s preexisting injury to her right ankle caused a 12.”

Marston v. Juv. Just. Ctr. of the 13th Jud. Circuit, 88 S.W.3d 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 15× “On October 5, 1998, the Juvenile Justice Center filed an amended answer and asserted for the first time that the claim appeared to be “time-barred by Section 287.430, RSMo.” On September 14, 2001, Administrative Law Judge Hannelore D.”

Miller v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 316 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 20× “1, which affected the accrual dates under the statute of limitations in Section 287.430. [2] On review, the Commission affirmed the denial of compensation on the 2007 claim.”

Brown v. Ozark Christian Schs. of Neosho, 847 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 46× “The sole issue is whether the claim is barred by § 287.430, RSMo Cum.Supp.1983, 1 which reads, in pertinent part: No proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall be maintained unless a claim therefor is filed .”

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