Missouri Revised Statutes

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 375.420 (2026)

Vexatious refusal to pay claim, damages for, exception

✓ current as of May 2026
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  375.420.  Vexatious refusal to pay claim, damages for, exception. — In any action against any insurance company to recover the amount of any loss under a policy of automobile, fire, cyclone, lightning, life, health, accident, employers' liability, burglary, theft, embezzlement, fidelity, indemnity, marine or other insurance except automobile liability insurance, if it appears from the evidence that such company has refused to pay such loss without reasonable cause or excuse, the court or jury may, in addition to the amount thereof and interest, allow the plaintiff damages not to exceed twenty percent of the first fifteen hundred dollars of the loss, and ten percent of the amount of the loss in excess of fifteen hundred dollars and a reasonable attorney's fee; and the court shall enter judgment for the aggregate sum found in the verdict.

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(RSMo 1939 § 6040, A.L. 1975 H.B. 93)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 5929; 1919 § 6337; 1909 § 7068

(1960) Missouri vexatious delay statute held inapplicable to declaratory judgment action brought by an insurance carrier.  Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. v. Davis, 277 F.2d 765.

(1960) In action against surety on notary's bond for damages for fraudulently affixing his jurat on an application for transfer of motor vehicle title containing statements as to ownership he knew to be false, relator could recover only nominal damages where notary's actions were not the proximate cause of injury and judgment denying recovery of damages and attorneys' fees under vexatious refusal to pay statute was proper. State ex rel. Koste v. Maryland Casualty Co. of Baltimore (A.), 335 S.W.2d 510.

(1961) On transfer to Supreme Court, held that notary's act of affixing false jurat was an inseparable and essential part of his fraudulent scheme as used car dealer and was one of several proximate causes of relator's loss. Judgment of trial court affirmed including denial of recovery under vexatious refusal to pay statute. State ex rel. Koste v. Maryland Casualty Co.  of Baltimore (Mo.), 344 S.W.2d 55.

(1961) No recovery under this statute can be had for vexatious refusal to pay where there is a bona fide dispute over the existence or extent of liability. Loulos v. United Security Insurance Company (A.), 350 S.W.2d 87.

(1961) This statute applies to suits brought on surety bonds on public works contracts but the penalty prescribed it to be assessed only when the refusal to pay is without reasonable or proper cause. In this case the penalty should not have been imposed. Phoenix Assurance Co. of New York v. Appleton City, 296 F.2d 787.

(1962) Penalty provision is to be strictly construed, as refusal to pay must be willful and without reasonable cause as the facts appeared to a reasonable and prudent man before the trial not merely because the judgment, after trial, is adverse to the insurer. King v. Empire Insurance Company (A.), 364 S.W.2d 40.

(1973) Statute of limitations defense is an "open question of law" and refusal to pay could not, to a legal certainty, be considered vexatious. Crenshaw v. Great Central Insurance Co.  (CA Mo.), 482 F.2d 1255.

(1974) This section covers surety bonds and evidence held to support finding of vexatious refusal. Housing Authority of City of Clinton v. Baumann (A.), 512 S.W.2d 436.

(1975) Denial of liability under a fire insurance policy without stating any ground for denial is sufficient to warrant submission of issue of vexatious refusal. Hounihan v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Mo. (A.), 523 S.W.2d 173.

(1986) Actions under sections 375.296, 375.420 and 376.620, RSMo, against a self-insured welfare benefit trust held to have been preempted by provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, section 1144 of title 29, United States Code. Hoeflicker v. Central States, Etc., Health & Welfare, 644 F.Supp. 195 (W.D. Mo.).

(2000) Plain language of statute does not preempt a tort claim for defamation.  Overcast v. Billings Mutual Insurance Co., 11 S.W.3d 62 (Mo.banc).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 273 cases (57 in the last 5 years), 1952–2026 · leading case: Dhyne v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 188 S.W.3d 454 (Mo. 2006).
Dhyne v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 188 S.W.3d 454 (Mo. 2006). · cites it 27× “State Farm Fire and Casualty Company appeals from a judgment in favor of Kristen Dhyne on her suit for damages and attorney’s fees under section 375.420, RSMo 2000. Section 375.420 allows an insured to recover when the insurer “has refused to pay a loss without reasonable cause…”
Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62 (Mo. 2000). · cites it 40× “On appeal, the insurance company renewed its main contentions: (1) that Overcast’s sole remedy against the company is for breach of contract because the statute, section 375.420, 1 which provides enhanced recovery for an insurance company’s vexatious refusal to pay, preempts all…”
Pannell v. Missouri Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 595 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). · cites it 37× “In addition to damages claimed under the policy, insured also sought damages and reasonable attorney’s fees against the association' for vexatious delay pursuant to Section 375.420, RSMo 1969. Commencing on January 31, 1977, and concluding on February 3, 1977, the case was tried…”
DeWitt v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 667 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. 1984). · cites it 12× “(12) Defendant formally denied plaintiff's claim on December 22, 1980.”
Crewse v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 26× “11 which parallels the language of section 375.420, RSMo 1978, because the evidence did not support a finding that their refusal to pay the claim was in any manner vexatious or in bad faith.”
Ryann Spencer Grp., Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 275 S.W.3d 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 10× “On August 15, 2006, Appellant filed its Petition against Respondents, alleging in Count I, breach of contract against Assur- *287 anee, by not paying Appellant’s claim for damages resulting from a sudden fire casualty loss; Count II, vexatious refusal to pay under Section…”
Stark Liquidation Co. v. Florists' Mut. Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 8× “Rather, the trial court granted summary judgment in Stark’s favor for its vexatious refusal claim and awarded, among other things, attorneys’ fees and statutory penalties *401 pursuant to Section 375.420 (the Missouri Vexatious Refusal to Pay statute).”
Wireco Worldgroup, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 897 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2018). · cites it 6× “The district court, 2 at the pleading stage, dismissed a claim for vexatious refusal to pay under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 375.420 . The district court then granted summary judgment for Liberty on WireCo's remaining breach of contract claims.”
Watters v. Travel Guard Int'l, 136 S.W.3d 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 6× “296; Section 375.420. 7 The statute permitting penalties for an insurer’s refusal to pay without *109 reasonable cause or excuse, is penal in nature and must be strictly construed.”
Duncan v. Andrew Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 665 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 11× “It is a clear expression of public policy on the subject vitiating any need for extending the tort of bad faith to first party claims.”
Catron v. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1987). · cites it 8× “§ 375.420 RSMo 1978. It also noted the statutory scheme which exempts county mutual insurance companies from the operation of the vexatious delay statute.”
Wood v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 980 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 7× “Insured also contended Insurer was hable for the amount provided in Section 375.420 RSMo 1986 2 because Insurer’s refusal to defend was vexatious and without reasonable cause.”
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