Missouri Revised Statutes

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 441.060 (2026)

Tenancy at will, sufferance, month to month, how terminated

✓ current as of May 2026

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441.060. Tenancy at will, sufferance, month to month, how terminated — judgment of eviction, how effectuated, landlord's liability. — 1. A tenancy at will or by sufferance, or for less than one year, may be terminated by the person entitled to the possession by giving one month's notice, in writing, to the person in possession, requiring the person in possession to vacate the premises.

2. An occupancy limitation of two persons per bedroom residing in a dwelling unit shall be presumed reasonable for this state. The two-person limitation shall not apply to a child or children born to the tenants during the course of the lease.

3. Except as otherwise provided by law, all contracts or agreements for the leasing, renting or occupation of stores, shops, houses, tenements or other buildings in cities, towns or villages, and of stores, shops, houses, tenements or other buildings except when such leasing, renting or occupation is as tenant of real estate used or rented for agricultural purposes, other than garden purposes, not made in writing, signed by the parties thereto, or their agents, shall be held and taken to be tenancies from month to month, and all such tenancies may be terminated by either party thereto, or the party's agent, giving to the other party, or the party's agent, one month's notice, in writing, of the party's intention to terminate such tenancy.

4. (1) Except as provided in subdivision (2), the landlord or the tenant may terminate a month-to-month tenancy by a written notice given to the other party stating that the tenancy shall terminate upon a periodic rent-paying date not less than one month after the receipt of the notice.

(2) When a person occupies and has an ownership interest in a mobile home and is leasing the land or the lot upon which the mobile home is located, a tenancy for less than one year may be terminated by the landlord by giving written notice to the tenant that the tenancy shall terminate not sooner than sixty days from the date the rent payment next becomes due, notwithstanding any written lease provision regarding earlier lease termination to the contrary.

5. If after the rendition of a judgment and a request for an execution on any judgment rendered in an action pursuant to chapter 524, chapter 534, chapter 535, or this chapter and there is no stay of execution, the service officer fails to deliver possession of the premises to the landlord within seven days of the delivery of the writ to such officer, the landlord may, within sixty days of the date of the judgment, in the presence of a municipal or county law enforcement officer of the jurisdiction in which the premises are located, without breach of the peace, break and remove locks, enter and take possession of the premises and remove any household goods, furnishings, fixtures or any other personal property left in or at the premises, provided the law enforcement officer is first presented a true copy of the judgment and order of execution, and the law enforcement officer acknowledges in writing such presentation, and such acknowledgment is filed in court by the plaintiff within five days following taking possession of the premises.

6. Except for negligent, willful or wanton acts or omissions of the landlord, or failure to both timely obtain and file the law enforcement officer acknowledgment described in the preceding subsection, the landlord shall have no liability for loss or damage to any household goods, furnishings, fixtures or any other personal property left in or at the dwelling unit, by reason of the landlord's removal of the property in accordance with the provisions of this section.

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(RSMo 1939 § 2971, A.L. 1951 p. 747, A.L. 1997 H.B. 361)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 2584; 1919 § 6880; 1909 § 7883

CROSS REFERENCE:

Leases, not in writing, operate as estates at will, 432.050

(1956) When on nonpayment of rent under lease by tenant, landlord invoked harsh remedy of common law forfeiture and sought to recover double damages and double rents, he would be held to strict requirements of common law as to forfeiture, i.e. that rent was required to be demanded on the day it became due. Waring v. Rogers (A.), 286 S.W.2d 374.

(1962) Where tenant did not give notice in writing of termination of month-to-month tenancy, landlord recovered rent for three month period extending to time landlord restored center partition in building which act constituted acceptance of surrender of premises. Rauth v. Dennison (A.), 357 S.W.2d 201.

(1963) Where tenant did not occupy dwelling house under written agreement, and written notice to remove was served on August 7, 1961, landlord had immediate right to possession when she sued in ejectment therefor on September 14, 1961, and restitution of possession was proper. Davis v. Broughton (A.), 369 S.W.2d 857.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 34 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1952–2021 · leading case: Longmier v. Kaufman, 663 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).

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Longmier v. Kaufman, 663 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 6× “The above quoted language from Shaffer has much more applicability to this case where we are concerned with the lease statute, § 441.060, than in Shaffer , which concerned the Statute of Frauds, § 432.”

Bramer v. Abston, 553 S.W.3d 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 2× “Abston was also granted leave to file an answer to Bramer's petition, including affirmative defenses that: (1) Bramer breached the implied warranty of habitability of the property; (2) the petition failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted, and (3)…”

Blackburn v. Habitat Dev. Co., 57 S.W.3d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “1983) the court refused to permit circumvention of the oral lease statute, § 441.060, RSMo 1978, by means of promissory estoppel.”

Cusumano v. Outdoors Today, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). · cites it 3× “We note that Section 441.060(1) RSMo 1978 requiring one month’s notice prior to termination of a “tenancy by sufferance” does not apply to the facts presented in this case.”

State Ex Rel. State High. Comm'n v. St. Charles Cnty. Assocs., 698 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 5× “§ 441.060(2) RSMo 1978 provides that all leasing agreements *36 except those made for agricultural purposes “not made in writing, signed by the •parties thereto, or their agents, shall be held and taken to be tenancies from month to month_” (emphasis added).”

Gal v. Bishop, 674 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 3× “§ 441.060(1). The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment for possession of the premises.”

Kansas City Stock Yards Co. v. A. Reich & Sons, 250 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. 1952). · cites it 3× “Section 441.060 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. The fact that they continued the tenancy from month to month from 1938 to 1949, does not bring it within the Statute of Frauds.”

Brewer v. Tip Top Credit Union (In Re Brewer), 65 B.R. 75 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986). · cites it 5× “See section 441.060 RSMo to the effect that “(a) tenancy at will or by sufferance, or for less than one year, may be terminated by the person entitled to the possession by giving one month’s notice, in writing, to the person in possession requiring him to remove.”

Doris Kocina v. Tracy Johannes, 505 S.W.3d 474 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 2× “Johannes relies on language' in the notice that Johannes and her son were occupying the apartment as tenants from month-to-month and that the notice was given for the purpose of terminating the tenancy in accordance with section 441.060. The facts in this case are clearly…”

McGuire v. Bode, 607 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). · cites it 2× “The respondent reminds us that the plaintiff rented the house and moved in under a month-to-month tenancy, § 441.060, RSMo 1978, and that her tenancy was subject to termination upon 30 days’ notice regardless who the owner was, whether the defendant or his assignee.”

Bach v. McGrath, 982 S.W.2d 734 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 3× “” Section 441.060, RSMo Cum.Supp.1997. Here, Defendant held over after the termination of his tenancy and Plaintiffs may bring an unlawful detainer action to remove him from possession of the property.”

Davidson v. Kenney, 971 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 4× “§ 441.060, RSMo 1994. “A month to month tenancy is determinable at the end of the month.”

Show all 34 citing cases →

— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 441.060(1) — 4 cases

Cusumano v. Outdoors Today, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 136 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). “We note that Section 441.060(1) RSMo 1978 requiring one month’s notice prior to termination of a “tenancy by sufferance” does not apply to the facts presented in this case.”

Johnson v. Simpson Oil Co., 394 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).

Gal v. Bishop, 674 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). “§ 441.060(1). The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment for possession of the premises.”

Phillips v. Huffman (In Re Huffman), 171 B.R. 649 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994).

— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 441.060(2) — 5 cases

Longmier v. Kaufman, 663 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). “The above quoted language from Shaffer has much more applicability to this case where we are concerned with the lease statute, § 441.060, than in Shaffer , which concerned the Statute of Frauds, § 432.”

State Ex Rel. State High. Comm'n v. St. Charles Cnty. Assocs., 698 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). “§ 441.060(2) RSMo 1978 provides that all leasing agreements *36 except those made for agricultural purposes “not made in writing, signed by the •parties thereto, or their agents, shall be held and taken to be tenancies from month to month_” (emphasis added).”

Gal v. Bishop, 674 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). “§ 441.060(1). The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment for possession of the premises.”

Bi-State Dev. Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Metro. Dist. v. Nikodem, 859 S.W.2d 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).

Collet Ventures, Inc. v. Marchese (In re Collet Ventures, Inc.), 106 B.R. 607 (W.D. Mo. 1989).

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