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Missouri Revised Statutes

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.190 (2026)

Limitations on actions originating in other states

✓ current as of May 2026
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  516.190.  Limitations on actions originating in other states. — Whenever a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state, territory or country in which it originated, said bar shall be a complete defense to any action thereon, brought in any of the courts of this state.

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(RSMo 1939 § 1021)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 869; 1919 § 1324; 1909 § 1895

(1974) Any defense against foreign statute by waiver or estoppel should be recognized in applying this section. Wilburn v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of St. Louis (C.A. Mo.), 492 F.2d 1288.

(1974) Held it is not necessary to raise "borrowing statute" as an affirmative defense since courts are bound to take judicial notice of the laws of all states. (C.A. Mo.) McIndoo v. Burnett, 494 F.2d 1311.

(1975) Word "originated" as used in this section means "accrued".  Schnabel v. Taft Broadcasting Company Inc. (A.), 525 S.W.2d 819.

(1976) Where plaintiff was injured in accident in Illinois while on a trip that was to begin and end in Missouri and all parties were Missouri residents and plaintiff had not charged defendants with willful and wanton misconduct, necessary under the Illinois guest statute, nevertheless, the Missouri borrowing statute made the Illinois statute of limitations applicable to plaintiff's action for damages and the action was barred. Trzecki v. Gruenewald (Mo.), 532 S.W.2d 209.

(1987) The provisions of section 516.170, RSMo, protecting the rights of persons under disability, apply to any statute of limitations borrowed under the provisions of section 516.190, RSMo. Dorris v. McClanahan, 725 S.W.2d 870 (Mo.banc).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 90 cases (12 in the last 5 years), 1964–2025 · leading case: Thompson Ex Rel. Thompson v. Crawford, 833 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. 1992).
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Thompson Ex Rel. Thompson v. Crawford, 833 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. 1992). · cites it 47× “Accordingly, this cause of action is fully barred by the laws of Tennessee, and under the mandate of section 516.190, RSMo, the Tennessee statute of limitations is a complete defense in Missouri.”
Dorris v. McClanahan, 725 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. 1987). · cites it 76× “The trial court ruled that because the Illinois statute of limitations applicable to personal injury would have barred plaintiff's suit in Illinois, section 516.190 RSMo 1986, the borrowing statute, barred plaintiff's suit in Missouri.”
Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984). · cites it 8× “Missouri's borrowing statute, section 516.190, RSMo 1978, provides: "Whenever a cause of action has been fully barred by the laws of the state, territory or country in which it originated, said bar shall be a complete defense to any action thereon, brought in any of the courts…”
Ferrellgas, Inc. v. Edward A. Smith, P.C., 190 S.W.3d 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 9× “6, made applicable by Missouri’s borrowing statute, section 516.190, RSMo. 1 The motion referred to a federal case in which APU (the predecessor of Ferrellgas) had brought claims of legal malpractice against Smith, Gill for its handling of the Hightower lawsuit, APU v.”
Natalini v. Little, 185 S.W.3d 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 12× “Those grounds were: • Missouri’s borrowing statute (§ 516.190) requires application of the Kansas statute of limitation which time-bars Plaintiffs wrongful death action; • Kansas substantive law applies to this wrongful death action, and such law precludes a wrongful-death…”
Harris-Laboy v. Blessing Hosp., Inc., 972 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 11× “In that motion, the hospital alleged that Laboy’s suit was *524 barred by the applicable statute of limitations from the State of Illinois, 735 ILCS 5/13-212 (West 1996), made applicable to the suit by the Missouri borrowing statute, section 516.190, RSMo 1994. Two other…”
Kampe v. Colom, 906 S.W.2d 796 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 12× “Kampe claims that section 516.190, RSMo 1986, the “borrowing statute,” was the applicable statute of limitations in this case because the alleged misconduct purportedly occurred in Nebraska on or about May 15, 1986.”
Alvarado v. H & R BLOCK, INC., 24 S.W.3d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 12× “” Block thereafter, in its answer filed on May 30, 1997, and its answer to the first amended petition filed on April 14, 1998, asserted that the Alvarado’s claims were “barred by the applicable statute of limitations.”
Nat'l Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Frame, 41 S.W.3d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 15× “Later, on March 3, 2000, Appellants amended their respective answers by in-terlineation with leave, alleging that the four-year Texas statute of limitation was the applicable statute of limitations pursuant to the “alleged agreement” or to Section 516.190 RSMo 1994 (all further…”
Reid v. Doe Run Resources Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1015 (E.D. Mo. 2015). · cites it 10× “Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.190. Under the plain language of this statute, see, e.”
Harper v. Gibson, 601 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Mo. 1985). · cites it 21× “§ 516.190, Missouri's borrowing statute, and that defendant’s alternative motion for summary judgment should be granted.”
Jon Couzens, Jr. v. William Donohue, 854 F.3d 508 (8th Cir. 2017). · cites it 2× “” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.190 . The term “originated” within this statute has been defined to mean “accrued.”
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