516.200. If defendant be out of state before or departs after cause of action commences, when action may be commenced. — If at any time when any cause of action herein specified accrues against any person who is a resident of this state, and he is absent therefrom, such action may be commenced within the times herein respectively limited, after the return of such person into the state.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
17
cases, 1956–2014 · leading case:
Poling v. Moitra, 717 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. 1986).
Poling v. Moitra, 717 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. 1986).
· cites it 55× “105, RSMo 1978, bars such a claim against a physician who left Missouri to reside in another state, or whether the tolling provisions of § 516.200, RSMo 1978, are applicable even though the physician remained subject to personal service and personal judgment under Missouri's…”
Rademeyer v. Farris, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (E.D. Mo. 2001).
· cites it 25× “Defendant, in turn challenges the constitutionality of Mo.Rev. Stat. § 516.200 which tolls the statute of limitations when a defendant departs from and resides outside of Missouri.”
Ahearn v. Lafayette Pharmacal, Inc., 729 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 8× “Plaintiff next contends that § 516.200 RSMo (1986) tolled the statute of limitations as to certain defendants in this case.”
Dupree v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 63 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2002).
· cites it 8× “Moitra for the proposition that a statute of limitations is tolled even if service can be had under the long-arm statute.”
Harris-Laboy v. Blessing Hosp., Inc., 972 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 5× “Second, it is possible that the statute of limitations has been tolled by the provisions of section 516.200, RSMo 1994. Laboy’s cause of action accrued against Mukerji after she saw her in April and July 1991.”
Genrich v. Williams, 869 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 9× “Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment and contended that the statute of limitations for appellant’s action had expired. The trial court sustained the motion and found that respondent was never a resident of the State of Missouri and therefore the tolling statute § 516.”
Haver v. Bassett, 287 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956).
· cites it 7× “However, our appellate courts have-decided analogous questions in construing-what is now section 516.200 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., a tolling statute which is not-applicable to actions for wrongful death.”
Link v. Ise, 716 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
· cites it 7× “Plaintiff relies on § 516.200, RSMo 1978, which reads If at any time when any cause of action herein specified accrues against any person who is a resident of this state, and he is absent therefrom, such action may be commenced within the times herein respectively limited, after…”
Lough Ex Rel. Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. 1993).
· cites it 2× “The "impracticalities" exceptions deal with factual situations in which the injured party is prevented, for reasons beyond his control, from pursuing his remedy. These include lack of knowledge or non-discovery of the injury or the damage (§ 516.”
Bethke v. Bethke, 676 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 6× “It also reflects, however, her assertion that the period of limitation was tolled by the provisions of § 516.200, RSMo (Supp.1983). That statute states: If at any time when any cause of action herein specified accrues against any person who is a resident of this state, and he is…”
Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958).
“) This was undoubtedly done for the same reason; namely, that the general tolling provisions or exceptions did not apply to this special act which carried its own limitations.”
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