Missouri Revised Statutes

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.125 (2026)

Shoplifting

✓ current as of May 2026

Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section MO-REVrevisor.mo.gov Justiaon Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

537.125. Shoplifting — detention of suspect by merchant — liability presumption. — 1. As used in this section:

(1) "Mercantile establishment" means any mercantile place of business in, at or from which goods, wares and merchandise are sold, offered for sale or delivered from and sold at retail or wholesale;

(2) "Merchandise" means all goods, wares and merchandise offered for sale or displayed by a merchant;

(3) "Merchant" means any corporation, partnership, association or person who is engaged in the business of selling goods, wares and merchandise in a mercantile establishment;

(4) "Wrongful taking" includes stealing of merchandise or money and any other wrongful appropriation of merchandise or money.

2. Any merchant, his agent or employee, who has reasonable grounds or probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a wrongful taking of merchandise or money from a mercantile establishment, may detain such person in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time for the purpose of investigating whether there has been a wrongful taking of such merchandise or money. Any such reasonable detention shall not constitute an unlawful arrest or detention, nor shall it render the merchant, his agent or employee, criminally or civilly liable to the person so detained.

3. Any person willfully concealing unpurchased merchandise of any mercantile establishment, either on the premises or outside the premises of such establishment, shall be presumed to have so concealed such merchandise with the intention of committing a wrongful taking of such merchandise within the meaning of subsection 1, and the finding of such unpurchased merchandise concealed upon the person or among the belongings of such person shall be evidence of reasonable grounds and probable cause for the detention in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time, of such person by a merchant, his agent or employee, in order that recovery of such merchandise may be effected, and any such reasonable detention shall not be deemed to be unlawful, nor render such merchant, his agent or employee criminally or civilly liable.

4. Any merchant, his agent or employee, who has reasonable grounds or probable cause to believe that a person has committed a wrongful taking of property, as defined in this section, and who has detained such person and investigated such wrongful taking, may contact law enforcement officers and instigate criminal proceedings against such person. Any such contact of law enforcement authorities or instigation of a judicial proceeding shall not constitute malicious prosecution, nor shall it render the merchant, his agent or employee criminally or civilly liable to the person so detained or against whom proceedings are instigated.

--------

(L. 1961 p. 571 §§ 1, 2, 3, A.L. 1985 H.B. 225)

(1972) This section adds to previously existing law a presumption that the willful concealment of property supplies the intent to steal. It is still, however, a jury issue as to whether there existed a willful concealment. The presumption is rebuttable by evidence such as that accused placed the tape recorder batteries in his pocket to aid in inspecting a magazine on a rack, and that he had no intent to steal. Schwane v. Broger Company (A.), 480 S.W.2d 113.

(1978) It was error for trial court to read a portion of statute, but counsel failed to state the proper objection at time evidence was admitted. Bly v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. (A.), 562 S.W.2d 723.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 19 cases, 1966–2015 · leading case: Deborah Barkley v. McKeever Enter., Inc. d/b/a Price Chopper, 456 S.W.3d 829 (Mo. 2015).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Deborah Barkley v. McKeever Enter., Inc. d/b/a Price Chopper, 456 S.W.3d 829 (Mo. 2015). · cites it 78× “2, and “in order that recovery of such merchandise may be effected,” § 537.”

Bly v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). · cites it 35× “On appeal Delores Bly contends the trial court erred (1) in taking judicial notice of Section 537.125, RSMo 1969, 2 and, after doing so, in reading a portion of subsection 3 thereof to the jury, (2) in refusing Instruction No.”

Rankin v. Venator Grp. Retail, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 11× “M.A.I. 32.13 sets forth an affirmative defense of justification for arrest in a false imprisonment case for a shopkeeper as to a shoplifter.”

Helming v. Adams, 509 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). · cites it 5× “The principle enunciated in Teel , with certain limitations, was codified by the Missouri General Assembly in 1961 and presently constitutes Section 537.125 RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S. Apparently Pand-jiris was additionally qualified in State v.”

Settle v. State, 679 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “1956) (involving the authority of private watchman to arrest for misdemeanors as a defense to a false arrest civil suit); Section 537.125 Cumm.Supp.1983 (the merchant’s privilege).”

Peak Ex Rel. Peak v. W. T. Grant Co., 409 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1966). · cites it 3× “Defendant also contends that plaintiff did not make a submissible case because it had reasonable grounds to believe that plaintiff had wrongfully taken merchandise and hence, under § 537.125 RSMo 1961 Supp., V.A.M.S., it had a right to detain her in a reasonable manner, for a…”

Hoene v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 487 S.W.2d 479 (Mo. 1972). · cites it 2× “On this evidence defendant asserts as its first point that a verdict should have been directed for it (a), because plaintiff failed to prove that defendant acted maliciously and without reasonable grounds; and (b), because there was “no conflict in the evidence as to probable…”

Fogarty v. J.C. Penney Co., 736 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 5× “T Plaintiffs allege trial error in giving defendant’s verdict director which submitted defendant’s affirmative defense based upon § 537.125, RSMo 1978 (amended 1985). The instruction given was MAI 32.”

Stewart v. K-Mart Corp., 747 S.W.2d 205 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 2× “The statute from which defendants derive their theory of affirmative defense is § 537.125 RSMo (1986). That statute provides in part: 2.”

Nelson v. R. H. MacY & Co., 434 S.W.2d 767 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968). · cites it 3× “440 but such amendment was not permitted by the trial court and the defendant on this appeal does not allege error in such ruling. Under the substantive law set out above, M.”

Schwane v. Kroger Co., 480 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). · cites it 5× “It is also contended that Section 537.125, RSMo., 1969, V.A.M.S., creating a presumption of intent to commit a wrongful taking of unpurchased merchandise by any person concealing it upon his person removes the issue of “want of *115 probable cause” as an element of malicious…”

Williams v. Venture Stores, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “§ 537.125, RSMo 1978. 2 . The "principle" of McGinnis was not followed in Ward for the reason that the employer’s post-trial motion alternatively sought judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.”

Show all 19 citing cases →

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.