Mont. Code Ann. » TITLE 30. TRADE AND COMMERCE · CHAPTER 3. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS · Part 1. Short Title, Form, and Interpretation
Montana Code Annotated

Mont. Code Ann. § 30-3-102 (2026)

Definitions

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  1. MCA Contents
  2. TITLE 30
  3. CHAPTER 3
  4. Part 1
  5. 30-3-102 Definitions

TITLE 30. TRADE AND COMMERCE

CHAPTER 3. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

Part 1. Short Title, Form, and Interpretation

Definitions

30-3-102. Definitions. (1) In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, the following definitions apply:

(a) "Acceptor" means a drawee that has accepted a draft.

(b) "Drawee" means a person ordered in a draft to make payment.

(c) "Drawer" means a person that signs a draft as a person ordering payment.

(d) "Good faith" means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.

(e) "Maker" means a person that signs a note as promisor of payment.

(f) "Order" means a written instruction to pay money signed by the person giving the instruction. The instruction may be addressed to any person, including the person giving the instruction, or to one or more persons jointly or in the alternative but not in succession. An authorization to pay is not an order unless the person authorized to pay is also instructed to pay.

(g) "Ordinary care" in the case of a person engaged in business means observance of reasonable commercial standards, prevailing in the area in which that person is located, with respect to the business in which that person is engaged. In the case of a bank that takes an instrument for processing for collection or payment by automated means, reasonable commercial standards do not require the bank to examine the instrument if the failure to examine does not violate the bank's prescribed procedures and the bank's procedures do not vary unreasonably from general banking usage not disapproved by this chapter or chapter 4.

(h) "Party" means party to an instrument.

(i) "Promise" means a written undertaking to pay money signed by the person undertaking to pay. An acknowledgment of an obligation by the obligor is not a promise unless the obligor also undertakes to pay the obligation.

(j) "Prove" with respect to a fact means to meet the burden of establishing the fact (30-1-201(2)(h)).

(k) "Remitter" means a person that purchases an instrument from its issuer if the instrument is payable to an identified person other than the purchaser.

(2) Other definitions applying to this chapter and the sections in which they appear are:

"Acceptance". 30-3-410.

"Accommodated party". 30-3-415.

"Accommodation party". 30-3-415.

"Alteration". 30-3-407.

"Anomalous indorsement". 30-3-204.

"Blank indorsement". 30-3-204.

"Cashier's check". 30-3-104.

"Certificate of deposit". 30-3-104.

"Certified check". 30-3-410.

"Check". 30-3-104.

"Consideration". 30-3-303.

"Draft". 30-3-104.

"Fiduciary". 30-3-308.

"Holder in due course". 30-3-302.

"Incomplete instrument". 30-3-115.

"Indorsement". 30-3-203.

"Indorser". 30-3-203.

"Instrument". 30-3-104.

"Issue". 30-3-125.

"Issuer". 30-3-125.

"Negotiable instrument". 30-3-104.

"Negotiation". 30-3-202.

"Note". 30-3-104.

"Payable at a definite time". 30-3-109.

"Payable on demand". 30-3-108.

"Payable to bearer". 30-3-111.

"Payable to order". 30-3-111.

"Payment". 30-3-603.

"Person entitled to enforce". 30-3-301.

"Presentment". 30-3-504.

"Reacquisition". 30-3-208.

"Represented person". 30-3-308.

"Special indorsement". 30-3-204.

"Teller's check". 30-3-104.

"Transfer of instrument". 30-3-210.

"Traveler's check". 30-3-104.

"Value". 30-3-303.

(3) The following definitions in other chapters apply to this chapter:

"Bank". 30-4-105.

"Banking day". 30-4-104.

"Clearinghouse". 30-4-104.

"Collecting bank". 30-4-105.

"Customer". 30-4-104.

"Depositary bank". 30-4-105.

"Documentary draft". 30-4-104.

"Intermediary bank". 30-4-105.

"Item". 30-4-104.

"Payor bank". 30-4-105.

"Suspends payments". 30-4-104.

(4) In addition, chapter 1 contains general definitions and principles of construction and interpretation applicable throughout this chapter.

History: En. Sec. 3-102, Ch. 264, L. 1963; R.C.M. 1947, 87A-3-102; amd. Sec. 89, Ch. 410, L. 1991; amd. Sec. 30, Ch. 575, L. 2005; amd. Sec. 21, Ch. 200, L. 2025.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases, 1979–2017 · leading case: Valley Bank v. Hughes, 2006 MT 285, 147 P.3d 185.
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Valley Bank v. Hughes, 2006 MT 285, 147 P.3d 185. · cites it 7× “3 Section 30-3-102(g), MCA, defines “ordinary care” as follows: “Ordinary care” in the case of a person engaged in business means observance of reasonable commercial standards, prevailing in the area in which that person is located, with respect to the business in which that…”
First SEC. Bank of Bozeman v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040 (Mont. 1979). · cites it 3× “1947, now section 30-3-102(l)(a), MCA, he issues the instrument upon the first delivery thereof to a holder.”
Smith v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins., 2011 MT 216, 260 P.3d 163. · cites it 6× “” Section 30-3-102(l)(f), MCA. The bank ordered in the draft to make payment is the “drawee,” and the person who signs the draft ordering payment is the “drawer” (also sometimes called the “maker”).”
Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Madison Valley Props. Inc., 1998 MT 93, 958 P.2d 57. · cites it 3× “” Section 30-3-102(1)(d), MCA. Although fair dealing is a broad term that must be defined in context, it is clear that it is concerned with the fairness of conduct rather than the care with which an act is performed.”
Carelli v. Hall, 926 P.2d 756 (Mont. 1996). “The central issue in this case is whether Stires is liable on the debt evidenced by the promissory note and security agreement for the purchase of the elk executed by Hall in Carelli’s favor.”
Villarreal v. First Presidio Bank, 283 F. Supp. 3d 548 (W.D. Tex. 2017). “Mont. Code Ann. § 30-3-102 (f). Connecticut likewise codifies that an "order means a written instruction to pay money signed by the person giving the instruction" at Section 42a-3-103 of the Connecticut General Statutes.”
State v. Taylor, 745 P.2d 337 (Mont. 1987). · cites it 3× “Section 30-3-102(b), MCA. When we examine the withdrawal slips in this case, we do not find therein any promise or order to pay any person.”
State v. McNeil, 1998 MT 232N. “He points to the definition of "order" set forth at § 30-3-102 file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/97-575_(9-17-98)_Opinion.”
Mont. Code Ann. § 30-3-102(1)(d): 1 case
Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Madison Valley Props. Inc., 1998 MT 93, 958 P.2d 57. “” Section 30-3-102(1)(d), MCA. Although fair dealing is a broad term that must be defined in context, it is clear that it is concerned with the fairness of conduct rather than the care with which an act is performed.”
Mont. Code Ann. § 30-3-102(b): 1 case
State v. Taylor, 745 P.2d 337 (Mont. 1987). “Section 30-3-102(b), MCA. When we examine the withdrawal slips in this case, we do not find therein any promise or order to pay any person.”
Mont. Code Ann. § 30-3-102(g): 1 case
Valley Bank v. Hughes, 2006 MT 285, 147 P.3d 185. “3 Section 30-3-102(g), MCA, defines “ordinary care” as follows: “Ordinary care” in the case of a person engaged in business means observance of reasonable commercial standards, prevailing in the area in which that person is located, with respect to the business in which that…”
Mont. Code Ann. § 30-3-102(l)(a): 1 case
First SEC. Bank of Bozeman v. Goddard, 593 P.2d 1040 (Mont. 1979). “1947, now section 30-3-102(l)(a), MCA, he issues the instrument upon the first delivery thereof to a holder.”
Mont. Code Ann. § 30-3-102(l)(f): 1 case
Smith v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins., 2011 MT 216, 260 P.3d 163. “” Section 30-3-102(l)(f), MCA. The bank ordered in the draft to make payment is the “drawee,” and the person who signs the draft ordering payment is the “drawer” (also sometimes called the “maker”).”
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