Montana Code Annotated

Mont. Code Ann. § 72-3-122 (2026)

Time Limit On Probate, Testacy, And Appointment Proceedings -- Exceptions

✓ current as of May 2026
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TITLE 72. ESTATES, TRUSTS, AND FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS

CHAPTER 3. UPC -- PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION

Part 1. General Provisions

Time Limit On Probate, Testacy, And Appointment Proceedings -- Exceptions

72-3-122. Time limit on probate, testacy, and appointment proceedings -- exceptions. (1) No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or appointment proceeding, other than a proceeding to probate a will previously probated at the testator's domicile and appointment proceedings relating to an estate in which there has been a prior appointment, may be commenced more than 3 years after the decedent's death, except:

(a) if a previous proceeding was dismissed because of doubt about the fact of the decedent's death, appropriate probate, appointment, or testacy proceedings may be maintained at any time thereafter upon a finding that the decedent's death occurred prior to the initiation of the previous proceeding and the applicant or petitioner has not delayed unduly in initiating the subsequent proceeding;

(b) appropriate probate, appointment, or testacy proceedings may be maintained in relation to the estate of an absent, disappeared, or missing person for whose estate a conservator has been appointed at any time within 3 years after the conservator becomes able to establish the death of the protected person;

(c) a proceeding to contest an informally probated will and to secure appointment of the person with legal priority for appointment in the event the contest is successful may be commenced within the later of 12 months from the informal probate or 3 years from the decedent's death;

(d) an informal appointment or a formal testacy or appointment proceeding may be commenced thereafter, if no proceedings concerning the succession or estate administration have occurred within the 3-year period after the decedent's death, but the personal representative has no right to possess estate assets provided in 72-3-606 beyond that necessary to confirm title to the property in the successors to the estate, and claims other than expenses of administration may not be presented against the estate; and

(e) a formal testacy proceeding may be commenced at any time after 3 years from the decedent's death for the purpose of establishing an instrument to direct or control the ownership of property passing or distributable after the decedent's death from one other than the decedent when the property is to be appointed by the terms of the decedent's will or is to pass or be distributed as a part of the decedent's estate or its transfer is otherwise to be controlled by the terms of the decedent's will.

(2) These limitations do not apply to proceedings to construe probated wills or determine heirs of an intestate.

(3) In cases under subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b), the date on which a testacy or appointment proceeding is properly commenced shall be deemed to be the date of the decedent's death for purposes of other limitations provisions of this code which relate to the date of death.

History: En. 91A-3-108 by Sec. 1, Ch. 365, L. 1974; R.C.M. 1947, 91A-3-108; amd. Sec. 9, Ch. 582, L. 1989; amd. Sec. 25, Ch. 592, L. 1995; amd. Sec. 58, Ch. 313, L. 2019.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases, 1984–2020 · leading case: In Re the Est. of Harris, 2015 MT 182 (Mont. 2015).
In Re the Est. of Harris, 2015 MT 182 (Mont. 2015). · cites it 21× “Whether the District Court’s order allowing probate of Dorothea’s estate complies with § 72-3-122, MCA. 2. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Harris on Contestants’ objections.”
Matter of Est. of Taylor, 675 P.2d 944 (Mont. 1984). · cites it 12× “Lillian filed a motion to dismiss Tope’s petition to probate the will contending that probate was barred by the three-year statute of limitations in the probate code (Section 72-3-122, MCA). The District Court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and its order dismissing…”
Puryer v. Barstis, 2016 MT 188 (Mont. 2016). · cites it 37× “We further conclude that the District Court did not err in concluding that because neither of the statutory exceptions set forth in § 72-3-122, MCA, applied, Barstis was entitled to summary judgment on his contention that the estate must proceed under Montana’s intestacy…”
Est. of Kurth, 2016 MT 188 (Mont. 2016). · cites it 36× “We further conclude that the District Court did not err in concluding that because neither of the statutory exceptions set forth in § 72-3-122, MCA, applied, Barstis was entitled to summary judgment on his contention that the estate must proceed under Montana’s intestacy…”
Est. of Swanberg, 2020 MT 153 (Mont. 2020). · cites it 2× “me limits: (1) if a personal representative has been appointed for the estate, the time of entry of any order approving final distribution of the estate or, if the estate is closed by statement, 6 months after the filing of the closing statement; (2) when it is no longer…”
Herman v. Lupoli, 2017 MT 10N (Mont. 2017). · cites it 5× “Section 72-3-122(1)(c), MCA, provides: (1) No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or appointment proceeding, other than a proceeding to probate a will previously probated at the testator’s domicile and appointment proceedings relating to an estate in…”
Est. of Kurth, 2017 MT 288N (Mont. 2017). · cites it 2× “At that time, Barstis offered to be personal representative. In response to Barstis’s notice, Marty filed a petition to formally probate the 1998 Will.”
Matter of Finco Trust, 2011 MT 303N (Mont. 2011). · cites it 2× “Section 72-3-122(1)(c), MCA; Mont. R. App.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 72-3-122(1) — 4 cases
In Re the Est. of Harris, 2015 MT 182 (Mont. 2015). “Whether the District Court’s order allowing probate of Dorothea’s estate complies with § 72-3-122, MCA. 2. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Harris on Contestants’ objections.”
Puryer v. Barstis, 2016 MT 188 (Mont. 2016). “We further conclude that the District Court did not err in concluding that because neither of the statutory exceptions set forth in § 72-3-122, MCA, applied, Barstis was entitled to summary judgment on his contention that the estate must proceed under Montana’s intestacy…”
Est. of Kurth, 2016 MT 188 (Mont. 2016). “We further conclude that the District Court did not err in concluding that because neither of the statutory exceptions set forth in § 72-3-122, MCA, applied, Barstis was entitled to summary judgment on his contention that the estate must proceed under Montana’s intestacy…”
Est. of Kurth, 2017 MT 288N (Mont. 2017). “At that time, Barstis offered to be personal representative. In response to Barstis’s notice, Marty filed a petition to formally probate the 1998 Will.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 72-3-122(1)(c) — 2 cases
Herman v. Lupoli, 2017 MT 10N (Mont. 2017). “Section 72-3-122(1)(c), MCA, provides: (1) No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or appointment proceeding, other than a proceeding to probate a will previously probated at the testator’s domicile and appointment proceedings relating to an estate in…”
Matter of Finco Trust, 2011 MT 303N (Mont. 2011). “Section 72-3-122(1)(c), MCA; Mont. R. App.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 72-3-122(1)(d) — 1 case
Est. of Kurth, 2016 MT 188 (Mont. 2016). “We further conclude that the District Court did not err in concluding that because neither of the statutory exceptions set forth in § 72-3-122, MCA, applied, Barstis was entitled to summary judgment on his contention that the estate must proceed under Montana’s intestacy…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 72-3-122(1)(e) — 1 case
Est. of Kurth, 2016 MT 188 (Mont. 2016). “We further conclude that the District Court did not err in concluding that because neither of the statutory exceptions set forth in § 72-3-122, MCA, applied, Barstis was entitled to summary judgment on his contention that the estate must proceed under Montana’s intestacy…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 72-3-122(l)(d) — 2 cases
In Re the Est. of Harris, 2015 MT 182 (Mont. 2015). “Whether the District Court’s order allowing probate of Dorothea’s estate complies with § 72-3-122, MCA. 2. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Harris on Contestants’ objections.”
Puryer v. Barstis, 2016 MT 188 (Mont. 2016). “We further conclude that the District Court did not err in concluding that because neither of the statutory exceptions set forth in § 72-3-122, MCA, applied, Barstis was entitled to summary judgment on his contention that the estate must proceed under Montana’s intestacy…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 72-3-122(l)(e) — 1 case
Puryer v. Barstis, 2016 MT 188 (Mont. 2016). “We further conclude that the District Court did not err in concluding that because neither of the statutory exceptions set forth in § 72-3-122, MCA, applied, Barstis was entitled to summary judgment on his contention that the estate must proceed under Montana’s intestacy…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 72-3-122(lXd) — 1 case
In Re the Est. of Harris, 2015 MT 182 (Mont. 2015). “Whether the District Court’s order allowing probate of Dorothea’s estate complies with § 72-3-122, MCA. 2. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Harris on Contestants’ objections.”
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