Neb. Rev. Stat. » Chapter 29
Nebraska Revised Statutes

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (2026)

Trial within six months; time; how computed

✓ current as of July 2026
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(1) Every person indicted or informed against for any offense shall be brought to trial within six months, and such time shall be computed as provided in this section.

(2) Such six-month period shall commence to run from the date the indictment is returned or the information filed, unless the offense is a misdemeanor offense involving intimate partners, as that term is defined in section 28-323, in which case the six-month period shall commence from the date the defendant is arrested on a complaint filed as part of a warrant for arrest.

(3) If a defendant is to be tried again following a mistrial, an order for a new trial, or an appeal or collateral attack, such period shall commence to run from the date of the mistrial, order granting a new trial, or the mandate on remand.

(4) The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for trial:

(a) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including, but not limited to, an examination and hearing on competency and the period during which he or she is incompetent to stand trial; the time from filing until final disposition of pretrial motions of the defendant, including motions to suppress evidence, motions to quash the indictment or information, demurrers and pleas in abatement, and motions for a change of venue; and the time consumed in the trial of other charges against the defendant;

(b) The period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request or with the consent of the defendant or his or her counsel. A defendant without counsel shall not be deemed to have consented to a continuance unless he or she has been advised by the court of his or her right to a speedy trial and the effect of his or her consent. A defendant who has sought and obtained a continuance which is indefinite has an affirmative duty to end the continuance by giving notice of request for trial or the court can end the continuance by setting a trial date. When the court ends an indefinite continuance by setting a trial date, the excludable period resulting from the indefinite continuance ends on the date for which trial commences. A defendant is deemed to have waived his or her right to speedy trial when the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the defendant or his or her counsel extends the trial date beyond the statutory six-month period;

(c) The period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney, if:

(i) The continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material to the state's case, when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence will be available at the later date; or

(ii) The continuance is granted to allow the prosecuting attorney additional time to prepare the state's case and additional time is justified because of the exceptional circumstances of the case;

(d) The period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant;

(e) A reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and there is good cause for not granting a severance. In all other cases, the defendant shall be granted a severance so that he or she may be tried within the time limits applicable to him or her; and

(f) Other periods of delay not specifically enumerated in this section, but only if the court finds that they are for good cause.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 275 cases (67 in the last 5 years), 1972–2026 · leading case: State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844 (Neb. 2019).
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State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844 (Neb. 2019). · cites it 22× “Following a hearing, the district court overruled the motion in a written order. The district court concluded that all of the time between the first continuance requested by the State through its second continuance and Lovvorn's motion for discharge was excludable under Neb.”
State v. Nelson, 984 N.W.2d 620 (Neb. 2023). · cites it 67× “The statutory right to a speedy trial is set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 2016).”
State v. Johnson, 268 N.W.2d 85 (Neb. 1978). · cites it 90× “Johnson, III, defendant and appellant herein, was brought to trial within 6 months of the commencement of this criminal action against him as required by section 29-1207, R.R.S.1943. In a complaint filed in the county court of Red Willow County on August 18, 1976, the defendant…”
State v. Covey, 673 N.W.2d 208 (Neb. 2004). · cites it 45× “On February 14, 2003, Covey filed a motion to discharge on the ground that he had not been brought to trial within the 6-month time period allowed under the speedy trial statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 1995).”
State v. Williams, 761 N.W.2d 514 (Neb. 2009). · cites it 28× “ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Williams assigns that the district court erred in overruling his motion for discharge, because the State failed to bring his case to trial within the statutory 6-month period required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 2008).”
State v. Brown, 310 Neb. 224 (Neb. 2021). · cites it 34× “When calculating the time for speedy trial pur- poses, the State bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the applicability of one or more of the excluded time periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (4) (Reissue 2016).”
State v. Garcia, 302 Neb. 406 (Neb. 2019). · cites it 15× “Garcia specifically claims he was provided ineffective assistance when trial counsel (1) failed to obtain a second opinion regarding his mental illness, (2) failed to move for a mistrial when his mental illness disrupted trial **434 proceedings, (3) failed to present a…”
State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749 (Neb. 2021). · cites it 52× “To meet its burden of proving exclud- able time under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (4), the State is entitled to rely on evidence offered by the defendant and received by the court.”
State v. Feldhacker, 672 N.W.2d 627 (Neb. 2004). · cites it 28× “On September 24, 2001, McBride filed an amended motion for absolute discharge asserting Feldhacker’s right to a speedy trial discharge pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 1995); Neb.”
State v. Kolbjornsen, 888 N.W.2d 153 (Neb. 2016). · cites it 15× “During a hearing on the motion, the court stated that it would 1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-3805 (Reissue 2016).”
State v. Beitel, 296 Neb. 781 (Neb. 2017). · cites it 56× “The plain lan- guage of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (4)(e) (Reissue 2016) and its legis- lative history both suggest that the Nebraska Legislature intended the statutory right to speedy trial to be a personal right which is not lost merely because a defendant is joined for trial…”
State v. Jennings, 308 Neb. 835 (Neb. 2021). · cites it 41× “When calculating the time for speedy trial pur- poses, the State bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the applicability of one or more of the excluded time periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (4) (Reissue 2016).”
Show all 275 citing cases →
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(1) — 65 cases
State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844 (Neb. 2019). “Following a hearing, the district court overruled the motion in a written order. The district court concluded that all of the time between the first continuance requested by the State through its second continuance and Lovvorn's motion for discharge was excludable under Neb.”
State v. Garcia, 302 Neb. 406 (Neb. 2019). “Garcia specifically claims he was provided ineffective assistance when trial counsel (1) failed to obtain a second opinion regarding his mental illness, (2) failed to move for a mistrial when his mental illness disrupted trial **434 proceedings, (3) failed to present a…”
State v. Brown, 310 Neb. 224 (Neb. 2021). “When calculating the time for speedy trial pur- poses, the State bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the applicability of one or more of the excluded time periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (4) (Reissue 2016).”
State v. Boslau, 601 N.W.2d 769 (Neb. 1999).
State v. Dailey, 639 N.W.2d 141 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(2) — 37 cases
State v. Lebeau, 784 N.W.2d 921 (Neb. 2010).
State v. Garcia, 302 Neb. 406 (Neb. 2019). “Garcia specifically claims he was provided ineffective assistance when trial counsel (1) failed to obtain a second opinion regarding his mental illness, (2) failed to move for a mistrial when his mental illness disrupted trial **434 proceedings, (3) failed to present a…”
State v. Brown, 310 Neb. 224 (Neb. 2021). “When calculating the time for speedy trial pur- poses, the State bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the applicability of one or more of the excluded time periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (4) (Reissue 2016).”
State v. Jennings, 308 Neb. 835 (Neb. 2021). “When calculating the time for speedy trial pur- poses, the State bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the applicability of one or more of the excluded time periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (4) (Reissue 2016).”
State v. Baker, 652 N.W.2d 612 (Neb. 2002).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(3) — 18 cases
State v. Baker, 652 N.W.2d 612 (Neb. 2002).
State v. Palmer, 399 N.W.2d 706 (Neb. 1986).
State v. Hayes, 639 N.W.2d 418 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002).
State v. Gibbs, 570 N.W.2d 326 (Neb. 1997).
State v. Kula, 579 N.W.2d 541 (Neb. 1998).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(3)(c)(i) — 1 case
State v. Lux (Neb. Ct. App. 2021).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4) — 135 cases
State v. Garcia, 302 Neb. 406 (Neb. 2019). “Garcia specifically claims he was provided ineffective assistance when trial counsel (1) failed to obtain a second opinion regarding his mental illness, (2) failed to move for a mistrial when his mental illness disrupted trial **434 proceedings, (3) failed to present a…”
State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749 (Neb. 2021). “To meet its burden of proving exclud- able time under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (4), the State is entitled to rely on evidence offered by the defendant and received by the court.”
State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844 (Neb. 2019). “Following a hearing, the district court overruled the motion in a written order. The district court concluded that all of the time between the first continuance requested by the State through its second continuance and Lovvorn's motion for discharge was excludable under Neb.”
State v. Chase, 310 Neb. 160 (Neb. 2021).
State v. Shipler, 758 N.W.2d 41 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a) — 101 cases
State v. Covey, 673 N.W.2d 208 (Neb. 2004). “On February 14, 2003, Covey filed a motion to discharge on the ground that he had not been brought to trial within the 6-month time period allowed under the speedy trial statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 1995).”
State v. Nelson, 984 N.W.2d 620 (Neb. 2023). “The statutory right to a speedy trial is set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 2016).”
State v. Feldhacker, 672 N.W.2d 627 (Neb. 2004). “On September 24, 2001, McBride filed an amended motion for absolute discharge asserting Feldhacker’s right to a speedy trial discharge pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 1995); Neb.”
State v. Williams, 761 N.W.2d 514 (Neb. 2009). “ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Williams assigns that the district court erred in overruling his motion for discharge, because the State failed to bring his case to trial within the statutory 6-month period required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 2008).”
State v. Webb, 974 N.W.2d 317 (Neb. 2022).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(b) — 73 cases
State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844 (Neb. 2019). “Following a hearing, the district court overruled the motion in a written order. The district court concluded that all of the time between the first continuance requested by the State through its second continuance and Lovvorn's motion for discharge was excludable under Neb.”
State v. Gill, 297 Neb. 852 (Neb. 2017).
State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749 (Neb. 2021). “To meet its burden of proving exclud- able time under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (4), the State is entitled to rely on evidence offered by the defendant and received by the court.”
State v. Space, 980 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 2022).
State v. Lear, 316 Neb. 14 (Neb. 2024).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(c) — 9 cases
State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844 (Neb. 2019). “Following a hearing, the district court overruled the motion in a written order. The district court concluded that all of the time between the first continuance requested by the State through its second continuance and Lovvorn's motion for discharge was excludable under Neb.”
State v. Chase, 310 Neb. 160 (Neb. 2021).
State v. Billingsley, 309 Neb. 616 (Neb. 2021).
State v. Brown, 310 Neb. 224 (Neb. 2021). “When calculating the time for speedy trial pur- poses, the State bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the applicability of one or more of the excluded time periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (4) (Reissue 2016).”
State v. Bedford, 980 N.W.2d 451 (Neb. Ct. App. 2022).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(c)(i) — 17 cases
State v. Roundtree, 658 N.W.2d 308 (Neb. Ct. App. 2003).
State v. Shipler, 758 N.W.2d 41 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008).
State v. Turner, 564 N.W.2d 231 (Neb. 1997).
State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844 (Neb. 2019). “Following a hearing, the district court overruled the motion in a written order. The district court concluded that all of the time between the first continuance requested by the State through its second continuance and Lovvorn's motion for discharge was excludable under Neb.”
State v. Billingsley, 309 Neb. 616 (Neb. 2021).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(c)(ii) — 5 cases
State v. Robertson, 881 N.W.2d 864 (Neb. 2016).
State v. Billingsley, 309 Neb. 616 (Neb. 2021).
State v. Chase, 310 Neb. 160 (Neb. 2021).
State v. Nelson, 984 N.W.2d 620 (Neb. 2023). “The statutory right to a speedy trial is set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 2016).”
State v. Wochner (Neb. Ct. App. 2023).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(d) — 24 cases
State v. Petty, 691 N.W.2d 101 (Neb. 2005).
State v. Jennings, 308 Neb. 835 (Neb. 2021). “When calculating the time for speedy trial pur- poses, the State bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the applicability of one or more of the excluded time periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (4) (Reissue 2016).”
State v. Chapman, 307 Neb. 443 (Neb. 2020).
State v. Steele, 624 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 2001).
State v. Hernandez, 309 Neb. 299 (Neb. 2021).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(e) — 7 cases
State v. Beitel, 296 Neb. 781 (Neb. 2017). “The plain lan- guage of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (4)(e) (Reissue 2016) and its legis- lative history both suggest that the Nebraska Legislature intended the statutory right to speedy trial to be a personal right which is not lost merely because a defendant is joined for trial…”
State v. Nelson, 984 N.W.2d 620 (Neb. 2023). “The statutory right to a speedy trial is set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 2016).”
State v. Lafler, 405 N.W.2d 576 (Neb. 1987).
State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749 (Neb. 2021). “To meet its burden of proving exclud- able time under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (4), the State is entitled to rely on evidence offered by the defendant and received by the court.”
State v. Manley, 220 S.W.3d 116 (Tex. App. 2007).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f) — 67 cases
State v. Brown, 310 Neb. 224 (Neb. 2021). “When calculating the time for speedy trial pur- poses, the State bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the applicability of one or more of the excluded time periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (4) (Reissue 2016).”
State v. Covey, 673 N.W.2d 208 (Neb. 2004). “On February 14, 2003, Covey filed a motion to discharge on the ground that he had not been brought to trial within the 6-month time period allowed under the speedy trial statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 1995).”
State v. Feldhacker, 672 N.W.2d 627 (Neb. 2004). “On September 24, 2001, McBride filed an amended motion for absolute discharge asserting Feldhacker’s right to a speedy trial discharge pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 1995); Neb.”
State v. Petty, 691 N.W.2d 101 (Neb. 2005).
State v. Williams, 761 N.W.2d 514 (Neb. 2009). “ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Williams assigns that the district court erred in overruling his motion for discharge, because the State failed to bring his case to trial within the statutory 6-month period required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 2008).”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(b) — 1 case
State v. McAuliffe (Neb. Ct. App. 2021).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(c) — 2 cases
State v. Carrera, 25 Neb. Ct. App. 650 (Neb. Ct. App. 2018).
State v. Carrera, 25 Neb. Ct. App. 650 (Neb. Ct. App. 2018).
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(f) — 1 case
State v. Britsch (Neb. Ct. App. 2026).
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