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Neb. Rev. Stat.Chapter 29

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1817 (2026)

Plea in bar; allegations; reply to plea; how issues tried

Edition and currency
text as last checked Oct. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTtext as last checked Oct. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history) cited 1986–2018 17citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 17 opinions since 1986.

The accused may then offer a plea in bar to the indictment that he has before had judgment of acquittal, or been convicted, or been pardoned for the same offense; and to this plea the county attorney may reply that there is no record of such acquittal or conviction, or that there has been no pardon. On the trial of such issue to the court or to a jury, if the court desires to submit such issue to a jury, the accused must produce the record of such conviction or acquittal, or the pardon, and prove that he is the same person charged in the record or mentioned in the pardon; and shall be permitted to adduce such other evidence as may be necessary to establish the identity of the offense.

The 17 cases that cite Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1817 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Williams, 774 N.W.2d 384 (Neb. 2009).
cites § 29-1817 11×cited by 66 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“Appellant's plea in bar does not meet requirements of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1817 (Reissue 2008) and does not allege further prosecution barred by the double jeopardy clauses of the federal or state constitutions.”
2
GREENState v. Milenkovich, 458 N.W.2d 747 (Neb. 1990).
cites § 29-1817 9×cited by 53 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“The first issue we must address is whether this court has jurisdiction to hear an immediate appeal from an order overruling a plea in bar filed pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1817 (Reissue 1989).”
The case’s holding
A defendant may present evidence outside the information to establish the identity of an offense for a double jeopardy plea in bar.
3
GREENState v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229 (Neb. 2008).
cites § 29-1817 2×cited by 247 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“The district court determined that the plea in bar statute, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-1817 (Reissue 1995), only permits a defendant to file a plea in bar before entering a plea to the general issues.”
The case’s holding
Electrocution violates the Nebraska Constitution because its history of burning bodies is inconsistent with evolving standards of decency and poses a risk of unnecessary and wanton pain.
Later courts cite it for
“based its holdings on state courts' factual assumptions, which, in turn, relied on untested science from 1890.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Hansen, 542 N.W.2d 424 (Neb. 1996).
cites § 29-1817 4×cited by 75 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“2d 747 (1990), this court said that there is no question that a determination of a nonfrivolous double jeopardy claim affects the substantial right not to be tried twice for the same offense and concluded that a denial of a plea in bar, filed pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-1817…”
The case’s holding
Administrative driver's license revocation is a remedial measure rather than punishment and does not violate double jeopardy protections even if it serves a secondary deterrent purpose.
Later courts cite it for
“although there is an element of deterrence” · 1 citing court
5
GREENState v. Marshall, 690 N.W.2d 593 (Neb. 2005).
cites § 29-1817 2×cited by 106 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“2d 659, 661 (2001), that this rule applies only to the denial of a “true plea in bar,” which we defined as one meeting the requirements of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1817 (Reissue 1995).”
The case’s holding
A mistrial does not terminate jeopardy if the trial was fundamentally flawed by a structural error such as the deprivation of state-mandated peremptory challenges.
6
GREENState v. Irish, 391 N.W.2d 137 (Neb. 1986).
cites § 29-1817 4×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1817 (Reissue 1985), Irish filed a plea in bar.”
Later courts cite it for
“trial court abuses its discretion in denying a motion for change of venue where the defendant establishes that local conditions and pretrial publicity make it impossible to secure a fair trial.” · 1 citing court
7
GREENState v. Huff, 776 N.W.2d 498 (Neb. 2009).
cites § 29-1817 2×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“[8] See, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-1817 (Reissue 2008); State v.”
8
GREENState v. Miner, 733 N.W.2d 891 (Neb. 2007).
cites § 29-1817 2×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“22 See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1817 (Reissue 1995); State v.”
9
GREENState v. Combs, 900 N.W.2d 473 (Neb. 2017).
cites § 29-1817 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“He argues that he presented evidence that the jury voted to acquit him on three of the four counts, but that the jury did not enter a verdict of acquittal on those counts because it mistakenly thought it had to reach a unanimous verdict on all counts.”
The case’s holding
A jury's private vote does not constitute a verdict until it is formally rendered in open court and accepted by the trial judge.
Later courts cite it for
“the better practice would have been for the district court to have inquired of the jury whether it was deadlocked on every count before it granted a mistrial.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Kula, 579 N.W.2d 541 (Neb. 1998).
cites § 29-1817 2×cited by 75 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“It is significant that in denying Kula’s motion for leave to withdraw his prior plea, the district court ruled on the merits of his contemporaneously filed plea in bar by making a specific finding that retrial would not constitute double jeopardy.”
The case’s holding
Where a conviction is reversed for prosecutorial misconduct, constitutional speedy trial delay is measured from the appellate mandate, and retrial is not barred by double jeopardy absent intent to provoke a mistrial.
11
GREENState v. Rubio, 623 N.W.2d 659 (Neb. 2001).
cites § 29-1817 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1817 (Reissue 1995).”
12
GREENState v. Lynch, 533 N.W.2d 905 (Neb. 1995).
cites § 29-1817 2×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“On the trial of such issue to the court or to a jury, if the court desires to submit such issue to a jury, the accused must produce the record of such conviction or acquittal, or the pardon, and prove that he is the same person charged in the record or mentioned in the pardon;…”
13
GREENState v. Smith, 529 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 29-1817 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“Smith filed a plea in bar on March 18, 1994, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1817 (Reissue 1989), in which he argued that he had “faced these charges or the same elements of these charges previously, and for these said charges and/or elements of said charges he was acquitted by…”
14
GREENState v. Wilson, 556 N.W.2d 643 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 29-1817 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1817 (Reissue 1995) provides that a plea in bar may be offered alleging that the defendant “has before had judgment of acquittal, or been convicted, or been pardoned for the same offense.”
15
GREENState v. Joseph, 499 N.W.2d 858 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 29-1817 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“Joseph responded by filing a plea in bar pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1817 (Reissue 1989), in which he argued that he had been acquitted of voluntary manslaughter and that he could not “be retried .”
Later courts cite it for
“involuntary manslaughter is not a lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter.” · 2 citing courts
16
NEUTRALState v. Grizzle, 774 N.W.2d 634 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 29-1817 2×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 29-1817
“Under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-1817 (Reissue 2008), an accused may "offer a plea in bar to the indictment that he has before had judgment of acquittal, or been convicted, or been pardoned for the same offense.”
17
NO FLAGState v. Price, No. A-17-565, 2018 WL 718501 (Neb. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2018).
cites § 29-1817 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 29-1817
“Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1817 (Reissue 2016), a criminal defendant “may .”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198620022018

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 2009. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Neb.12Neb. Ct. App.5
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: text as last checked Oct. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.