(a) A surviving spouse, heir or
devisee who feloniously and intentionally kills or aids and abets the killing
of the decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under this
article, and the estate of the decedent passes as if such spouse, heir, or
devisee had predeceased the decedent. Property appointed by the will of the
decedent to or for the benefit of such devisee passes as if the devisee had
predeceased the decedent.
(b) Any joint tenant who feloniously and intentionally kills
or aids and abets the killing of another joint tenant thereby effects a severance
of the interest of the decedent so that the share of the decedent passes as
his property and such joint tenant has no rights by survivorship. This provision
applies to joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety in real and personal
property, joint accounts in banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions
and other institutions, and any other form of co-ownership with survivorship
incidents.
(c) A named beneficiary of a bond, life insurance policy,
or other contractual arrangement who feloniously and intentionally kills or
aids and abets the killing of the principal obligee or the individual upon
whose life the policy is issued is not entitled to any benefit under the bond,
policy or other contractual arrangement, and it becomes payable as though
such beneficiary has predeceased the decedent.
(d) Real property
specified for a designated beneficiary of a transfer on death deed who feloniously
and intentionally kills or aids and abets the killing of the transferor who
signed the transfer on death deed or any other owner of the real property
shall pass as if the designated beneficiary had predeceased the transferor.
(e) Any other acquisition
of property or interest by the killer or by one who aids and abets the killer
is treated in accordance with the principles of this section.
(f) A final judgment of conviction
of felonious and intentional killing or aiding and abetting therein is conclusive
for purposes of this section. In the absence of a conviction of felonious
and intentional killing or aiding and abetting therein, the court may determine
by a preponderance of evidence whether the killing or aiding and abetting
therein was felonious and intentional for purposes of this section.
(g) This section does not
affect the rights of any person who, before rights under this section have
been adjudicated, purchases, from the killer or aider and abettor for value
and without notice, property which the killer or aider and abettor would have
acquired except for this section, but the killer or aider and abettor is liable
for the amount of the proceeds or the value of the property. Any insurance
company, bank, or other obligor making payment according to the terms of its
policy or obligation is not liable by reason of this section unless prior
to payment it has received at its home office or principal address written
notice of a claim under this section.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
10
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1980–2024 · leading case:
In Re Est. of Krumwiede, 647 N.W.2d 625 (Neb. 2002).
In Re Est. of Krumwiede, 647 N.W.2d 625 (Neb. 2002).
· cites it 23× “After Wilhelm was informally appointed, Jeremy Krumwiede, son of Wanda and Wilhelm, filed an objection pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2354 (Reissue 1995), which is Nebraska’s homicide probate statute.”
Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389 (Md. 1986).
· cites it 2× “§ 72-2-204 (1985); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2354 (1985); Nev.Rev.”
Vanderlinden v. Metro. Life Ins., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Neb. 2001).
· cites it 4× “The answer alleges, among other affirmative defenses, that plaintiffs state-law claim is preempted by ERISA, 1 that plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and that plaintiff is a suspect in the death of his wife and therefore may be precluded from…”
Cook v. Grierson, 845 A.2d 1231 (Md. 2004).
“§ 72-2-813 (2003)(disclaimed); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2354 (1995)(predeceased); NJ.”
Howsden v. Rolenc, 360 N.W.2d 680 (Neb. 1985).
· cites it 2× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2354 (Reissue 1979) provides in part: (a) A surviving spouse, heir or devisee who feloniously and intentionally kills or aids and abets the killing of the decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under this article, and the estate of the…”
Unum Life Ins. Co. v. Ebberson (D. Neb. 2021).
· cites it 6× “Because of the competing claims for the remaining $23,400 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2354 , Nebraska’s “slayer” statute, which prohibits the payment of life insurance benefits to one who feloniously and intentionally kills the insured, Unum filed this interpleader action asking…”
Unum Life Ins. Co. v. Ebberson (D. Neb. 2020).
· cites it 2× “Because of the competing claims for the remaining $23,400 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2354 , Nebraska’s “slayer” statute, which prohibits 1 Marvin L.”
In Re Guardianship & Conservatorship of McDowell, 762 N.W.2d 615 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 4× “The trial court's conclusion in its paragraph 8 that the specific nomination of a guardian in Chris' last will and testament was not controlling because it was prepared 4 days prior to his death does not appear to have any legal basis, unless the court intended to base its…”
USAA Life Ins. Co. v. Roman (D. Neb. 2024).
“§ 30-2354 (c) (providing “[a] named beneficiary of a bond, life insurance policy, or other contractual arrangement who feloniously and intentionally kills or aids and abets the killing of the principal obligee or the individual upon whose life the policy is issued is not…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2354(a) — 1 case
In Re Guardianship & Conservatorship of McDowell, 762 N.W.2d 615 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009).
“The trial court's conclusion in its paragraph 8 that the specific nomination of a guardian in Chris' last will and testament was not controlling because it was prepared 4 days prior to his death does not appear to have any legal basis, unless the court intended to base its…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2354(c) — 1 case
Vanderlinden v. Metro. Life Ins., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Neb. 2001).
“The answer alleges, among other affirmative defenses, that plaintiffs state-law claim is preempted by ERISA, 1 that plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and that plaintiff is a suspect in the death of his wife and therefore may be precluded from…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2354(e) — 1 case
In Re Est. of Krumwiede, 647 N.W.2d 625 (Neb. 2002).
“After Wilhelm was informally appointed, Jeremy Krumwiede, son of Wanda and Wilhelm, filed an objection pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2354 (Reissue 1995), which is Nebraska’s homicide probate statute.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.