(1) Any person or persons owning property which he, she, or they have power to convey, may effectively convey such property by a conveyance naming himself, herself, or themselves and another person or persons, as grantees, and the conveyance has the same effect as to whether it creates a joint tenancy, or tenancy in common, or tenancy in partnership, as if it were a conveyance from a stranger who owned the property to the persons named as grantees in the conveyance. (2) Any two or more persons owning property which they have power to convey, may effectively convey such property by a conveyance naming one, or more than one, or all such persons, as grantees, and the conveyance has the same effect, as to whether it creates a separate ownership, or a joint tenancy, or tenancy in common, or tenancy in partnership, as if it were a conveyance from a stranger who owned the property, to the persons named as grantees in the conveyance. (3) Any person mentioned in this section may be a married person, and any persons so mentioned may be persons married to each other. (4) The conveyance of all of the interest of one joint tenant to himself or herself as grantee, in which the intention to effect a severance of the joint tenancy expressly appears in the instrument, severs the joint tenancy.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
10
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1948–2023 · leading case:
In Re Est. of Potthoff, 733 N.W.2d 860 (Neb. 2007).
In Re Est. of Potthoff, 733 N.W.2d 860 (Neb. 2007).
· cites it 7× “15 In Nebraska, the common law requirement of the four unities persists subject to its modification by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-118 (Reissue 2003). 16 Section 76-118 provides: (1) Any person or persons owning property which he, she, or they have power to convey, may effectively…”
Strunk v. Chromy-Strunk, 708 N.W.2d 821 (Neb. 2006).
· cites it 2× “Section 76-118 of the Uniform Property Act states: (1) Any person or persons owning property which he, she, or they have power to convey, may effectively convey such property by a conveyance naming himself, herself, or themselves and another person or persons, as grantees, and…”
Krause v. Crossley, 277 N.W.2d 242 (Neb. 1979).
· cites it 6× “We have previously held that prior to the enactment of section 76-118, R. R. S. 1943, the attempted creation of a joint tenancy, where one or more of the unities were absent, resulted in a tenancy in common.”
Taylor v. Canterbury, 92 P.3d 961 (Colo. 2004).
“Neb.Rev.Stat. § 76-118(4) (2004). [1] Although permitting termination of joint tenancies by a self-conveyance comports with a preference for effectuating intention, it does permit one joint tenant to attempt to gain an advantage over the other by executing the self-conveyance…”
Crowell v. Milligan, 59 N.W.2d 346 (Neb. 1953).
· cites it 4× “Since the passage of section 76-118, R.R.S.1943, when read in connection with the definition of "property" in section 76-101, R.”
De Forge v. Patrick, 76 N.W.2d 733 (Neb. 1956).
· cites it 3× “See § 76-118, R. R. S. 1943. The deed here is within the authorization of section 76-118, R.”
Anson v. Murphy, 32 N.W.2d 271 (Neb. 1948).
· cites it 2× “The grantors were tenants in common who conveyed the property to themselves and others directly in the manner hereinbefore shown.”
In Re Ogier's Est., 125 N.W.2d 68 (Neb. 1963).
· cites it 2× “The creation, as well as the continued existence, of an estate in joint tenancy under the common law, which is recognized in this state, subject to the right of the Legislature to modify the common-law rule which it has done by section 76-118, R. R. S. 1943, requires a unity of…”
Gaudreault v. Gaudreault (Neb. Ct. App. 2023).
· cites it 4× “Paul also cites to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-118 (Reissue 2018) to argue that because Darlene was identified as “married” in the two deeds, that language included Paul in a joint tenancy.”
Szawicki v. Szawicki, 772 N.W.2d 110 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 2× “Having determined that the 1983 deed was not void for lack of Genevieve's acknowledgment, it follows that the 1986 deed filed by Genevieve conveying the deed to herself for the purposes of severing the joint tenancy was valid.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-118(4) — 1 case
Taylor v. Canterbury, 92 P.3d 961 (Colo. 2004).
“Neb.Rev.Stat. § 76-118(4) (2004). [1] Although permitting termination of joint tenancies by a self-conveyance comports with a preference for effectuating intention, it does permit one joint tenant to attempt to gain an advantage over the other by executing the self-conveyance…”
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