NRS
18.110 Verified memorandum of costs: Filing and service; witness’ and
clerk’s fee; retaxing and settling costs.
1. The party in whose favor judgment is
rendered, and who claims costs, must file with the clerk, and serve a copy upon
the adverse party, within 5 days after the entry of judgment, or such further
time as the court or judge may grant, a memorandum of the items of the costs in
the action or proceeding, which memorandum must be verified by the oath of the
party, or the party’s attorney or agent, or by the clerk of the party’s
attorney, stating that to the best of his or her knowledge and belief the items
are correct, and that the costs have been necessarily incurred in the action or
proceeding.
2. The party in whose favor judgment is
rendered shall be entitled to recover the witness fees, although at the time
the party may not actually have paid them. Issuance or service of subpoena
shall not be necessary to entitle a prevailing party to tax, as costs, witness
fees and mileage, provided that such witnesses be sworn and testify in the
cause.
3. It shall not be necessary to embody in
the memorandum the fees of the clerk, but the clerk shall add the same
according to the fees of the clerk fixed by statute.
4. Within 3 days after service of a copy
of the memorandum, the adverse party may move the court, upon 2 days’ notice,
to retax and settle the costs, notice of which motion shall be filed and served
on the prevailing party claiming costs. Upon the hearing of the motion the
court or judge shall settle the costs.
[1911 CPA § 445; A 1919,
56; NCL § 8934]—(NRS A 1977,
775)
Notes of Decisions
Vill. Builders 96, L. P. v. U.S. Labs., Inc., 112 P.3d 1082 (Nev. 2005).
· cites it 4× “Labs contends that because the motion was actually filed early, in between the time when the district court granted summary judgment and when it entered the judgment, it meets the requirements of NRS 18.110. Furthermore, U.S. Labs contends that the costs requested in the instant…”
Flamingo Realty, Inc. v. Midwest Dev., Inc., 879 P.2d 69 (Nev. 1994).
· cites it 6× “Although we recognize that noncompliance with NRS 18.110 would ordinarily require the forfeiture of costs, under the peculiar circumstances of this case we will allow the cost award to stand since Fields must prevail on her claim that the award should be passed through her to…”
Kahn v. Morse & Mowbray, 117 P.3d 227 (Nev. 2005).
· cites it 2× “020 and NRS 18.110, arguing that the complaint was brought without reasonable grounds.”
Eberle v. State ex rel. Redfield Trust, 836 P.2d 67 (Nev. 1992).
· cites it 5× “Appellants contend that respondents’ request for extraordinary expert witness fees and costs was not timely under NRS 18.110(1). Specifically, appellants contend that judgment was entered on October 17, 1988, when Judge Guinan entered an “Order Granting Permanent Injunction.”
Fleischer v. August, 737 P.2d 518 (Nev. 1987).
· cites it 6× “He claimed Fleischer should have filed a motion to retax costs pursuant to NRS 18.110(4), and, since she failed to do this in a timely fashion, she was barred from disputing the award of costs.”
Ross v. Giacomo, 635 P.2d 298 (Nev. 1981).
· cites it 2× “The second notice of entry was obviously intended to advise appellant that respondent had filed a memorandum of costs as provided for in NRS 18.110. This second notice had the memorandum attached to it and was used as a vehicle for service of the memorandum.”
O'Connell v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 429 P.3d 664 (Nev. 2018).
“Further, O'Connell's application indicated that counsel had performed a considerable amount of work-"hundreds of hours" on the case-and she included the contingency fee agreement as part of her request for fees.”
Mays v. Todaro, 626 P.2d 260 (Nev. 1981).
· cites it 2× “NRS 18.110. On the other hand, appellants made no move to retax and settle costs pursuant to NRS 18.”
Gibellini v. Klindt, 885 P.2d 540 (Nev. 1994).
“Respondents filed their memorandum of costs and disbursements pursuant to NRS 18.110, requesting $13,936.76. Appellants filed a motion to retax costs on March 12, 1992, objecting, inter alia, to the Westlaw fee of $464.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 18.110(1) — 22 cases
Vill. Builders 96, L. P. v. U.S. Labs., Inc., 112 P.3d 1082 (Nev. 2005).
“Labs contends that because the motion was actually filed early, in between the time when the district court granted summary judgment and when it entered the judgment, it meets the requirements of NRS 18.110. Furthermore, U.S. Labs contends that the costs requested in the instant…”
Flamingo Realty, Inc. v. Midwest Dev., Inc., 879 P.2d 69 (Nev. 1994).
“Although we recognize that noncompliance with NRS 18.110 would ordinarily require the forfeiture of costs, under the peculiar circumstances of this case we will allow the cost award to stand since Fields must prevail on her claim that the award should be passed through her to…”
Eberle v. State ex rel. Redfield Trust, 836 P.2d 67 (Nev. 1992).
“Appellants contend that respondents’ request for extraordinary expert witness fees and costs was not timely under NRS 18.110(1). Specifically, appellants contend that judgment was entered on October 17, 1988, when Judge Guinan entered an “Order Granting Permanent Injunction.”
O'Connell v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 429 P.3d 664 (Nev. 2018).
“Further, O'Connell's application indicated that counsel had performed a considerable amount of work-"hundreds of hours" on the case-and she included the contingency fee agreement as part of her request for fees.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 18.110(4) — 5 cases
Fleischer v. August, 737 P.2d 518 (Nev. 1987).
“He claimed Fleischer should have filed a motion to retax costs pursuant to NRS 18.110(4), and, since she failed to do this in a timely fashion, she was barred from disputing the award of costs.”
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