NRS
195.030 Accessories.
1. Every person who is not the spouse or
domestic partner of the offender and who, after the commission of a felony,
destroys or conceals, or aids in the destruction or concealment of, material
evidence, or harbors or conceals such offender with intent that the offender
may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having
knowledge that such offender has committed a felony or is liable to arrest, is
an accessory to the felony.
2. Every person who is not the spouse,
domestic partner, brother or sister, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild
of the offender, who, after the commission of a gross misdemeanor, harbors,
conceals or aids such offender with intent that the offender may avoid or
escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge that such
offender has committed a gross misdemeanor or is liable to arrest, is an
accessory to the gross misdemeanor.
3. As used in this section, “domestic
partner” means a person who is in a domestic partnership that is registered or
recognized pursuant to chapter 122A of NRS,
and that has not been terminated pursuant to that chapter.
[1911 C&P § 10; RL § 6275; NCL § 9959]—(NRS A 1959,
294; 2013,
1381; 2017,
294)
Notes of Decisions
Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2007).
· cites it 2× “See Nev. Rev.Stat. § 195.030. California, however, has no such explicit exception.”
Brooks v. State, 180 P.3d 657 (Nev. 2008).
· cites it 2× “34 *212 Remaining claims Brooks also raised the following claims: the district court erred by refusing a defense instruction on accessory after the fact under NRS 195.030, the prosecutor misstated facts in closing argument, the district court failed to conduct a meaningful…”
State v. Stull, 909 P.2d 1180 (Nev. 1996).
· cites it 4× “Whether the law of accessories and Lynette's alleged common law marriage to Stull are relevant The district court queried whether NRS 195.030, which defines accessories to a crime, applied in this case.”
Edwards v. State, 524 P.2d 328 (Nev. 1974).
· cites it 2× “[2] Since we conclude evidence was ample to convict appellant of burglary as a principal, we need not consider that his own testimony arguably showed him at least an accessory within NRS 195.030(1), to wit: a person not standing in the relation of husband or wife, brother or…”
Mangeris v. Gordon, 580 P.2d 481 (Nev. 1978).
“NRS 195.030; State v. Michaud, 114 A.2d 352 (Me.”
Woods v. State, 696 P.2d 464 (Nev. 1985).
“NRS 195.030(1). Since Raye Wood and Lima had discussed killing a randomly chosen woman to cover up the Davis murder, Raye Wood might also have exposed herself to criminal liability for conspiracy to commit murder.”
Carstairs v. State, 575 P.2d 927 (Nev. 1978).
“During Meek’s absence, Nollsch placed appellant under arrest for harboring a fugitive, a violation of NRS 195.030. Meek subsequently returned to the area of the original stop and observed appellant in handcuffs.”
Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales (9th Cir. 2007).
· cites it 2× “See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 195.030 . California, however, has no such explicit exception.”
Slagowski v. Cent. Washington Asphalt, 291 F.R.D. 563 (D. Nev. 2013).
· cites it 2× “010 extends to ”[t]he driver of any vehicle involved in an [injury] accident” that fails to stop at the accident, which would include Wentland, the driver of the second Central Washington Asphalt truck. And Nevada criminal law further provides for accessory liability for a…”
Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales (9th Cir. 2006).
“See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 195.030 . California, however, has no such explicit excep- tion.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 195.030(1) — 3 cases
Edwards v. State, 524 P.2d 328 (Nev. 1974).
“[2] Since we conclude evidence was ample to convict appellant of burglary as a principal, we need not consider that his own testimony arguably showed him at least an accessory within NRS 195.030(1), to wit: a person not standing in the relation of husband or wife, brother or…”
Woods v. State, 696 P.2d 464 (Nev. 1985).
“NRS 195.030(1). Since Raye Wood and Lima had discussed killing a randomly chosen woman to cover up the Davis murder, Raye Wood might also have exposed herself to criminal liability for conspiracy to commit murder.”
Slagowski v. Cent. Washington Asphalt, 291 F.R.D. 563 (D. Nev. 2013).
“010 extends to ”[t]he driver of any vehicle involved in an [injury] accident” that fails to stop at the accident, which would include Wentland, the driver of the second Central Washington Asphalt truck. And Nevada criminal law further provides for accessory liability for a…”
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