Nevada Revised Statutes

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.010 (2026)

First degree

✓ current as of July 2026
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NRS 205.010  First degree.  A person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned, or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any:

      1.  Dwelling house or other structure or mobile home, whether occupied or vacant; or

      2.  Personal property which is occupied by one or more persons,

Ê whether the property of the person or of another, is guilty of arson in the first degree which is a category B felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for a minimum term of not less than 2 years and a maximum term of not more than 15 years, and may be further punished by a fine of not more than $15,000.

      [1911 C&P § 359; A 1927, 228; 1943, 181; 1943 NCL § 10307]—(NRS A 1967, 493; 1975, 916; 1979, 1439; 1987, 1475; 1995, 1213)

     

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13 cases, 1973–2020 · leading case: Ewish v. State, 871 P.2d 306 (Nev. 1994).
Ewish v. State, 871 P.2d 306 (Nev. 1994). · cites it 2× “[3] Nevada's arson statute, *311 NRS 205.010, prohibits the willful and malicious burning of a dwelling.”
Scarbo v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, 206 P.3d 975 (Nev. 2009). “Roebke was charged with felony first-degree arson, a violation of NRS 205.010. Shortly thereafter, defense counsel expressed doubt about the petitioners’ competency to stand trial.”
Iverson v. State, 807 P.2d 1372 (Nev. 1991). · cites it 4× “Any person who willfully and maliciously attempts to set fire to or attempts to burn or to aid, counsel or procure the burning of any of the buildings or property mentioned in NRS 205.010, 205.015, and 205.020, or who commits any act preliminary thereto or in furtherance…”
McGervey v. State, 958 P.2d 1203 (Nev. 1998). · cites it 2× “” As NRS 205.010 relates to arson rather than habitu-ality, and as the information referred to NRS 207.”
Peterson v. Sheriff, 598 P.2d 623 (Nev. 1979). “480; NRS 205.010). Thereafter, they filed pretrial petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the district court contending, among other things, that there was insufficient evidence presented to the grand jury to support the charges.”
United States v. Mitchell, 218 F. Supp. 3d 360 (M.D. Penn. 2016). “§§ 28-502 to -504; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 205.010 -.025; N.H. Rev.”
Dorsey v. State, 620 P.2d 1261 (Nev. 1980). “NRS 205.010. He was sentenced to fifteen years in the Nevada State Penitentiary.”
State Vs. Dist. Ct. (radonski, (david)), 2020 NV 23 (Nev. 2020). · cites it 6× “The question requires us to interpret NRS 205.010 and NRS 205.020, which define both first- and third-degree arson, respectively, as "willfully and maliciously seating] fire to or burn [ing] or SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 6 (0) I947A • , ; causling] to be burned" any property,…”
Lee v. State, 415 P.3d 22 (Nev. 2018). · cites it 2× “Lee failed to demonstrate deficient performance because the pet store was an "other structure" within the plain language of NRS 205.010(1) and, under the same provision, whether that structure was occupied is irrelevant.”
Nelson (Charles) v. State (Nev. 2013). · cites it 2× “First-degree arson NRS 205.010 defines first-degree arson as "willfully and maliciously set[ting] fire .”
Lee (Gloria) v. State (Nev. 2018). “Lee failed to demonstrate deficient performance because the pet store was an "other structure" within the plain language of NRS 205.010(1) and, under the same provision, whether that structure was occupied is irrelevant.”
Bennett (Justin) v. State (Nev. 2013). “287(1)(b) (discharging a firearm out of a motor vehicle); NRS 205.010 (first-degree arson); NRS 209.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.010(1) — 2 cases
Lee v. State, 415 P.3d 22 (Nev. 2018). “Lee failed to demonstrate deficient performance because the pet store was an "other structure" within the plain language of NRS 205.010(1) and, under the same provision, whether that structure was occupied is irrelevant.”
Lee (Gloria) v. State (Nev. 2018). “Lee failed to demonstrate deficient performance because the pet store was an "other structure" within the plain language of NRS 205.010(1) and, under the same provision, whether that structure was occupied is irrelevant.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.010(2) — 1 case
McGervey v. State, 958 P.2d 1203 (Nev. 1998). “” As NRS 205.010 relates to arson rather than habitu-ality, and as the information referred to NRS 207.”
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