NRS
32.260 Appointment of receiver.
1. The court may appoint a receiver:
(a) Before judgment, to protect a party that
demonstrates an apparent right, title or interest in real property that is the
subject of the action, if the property or its revenue-producing potential:
(1) Is being subjected to or is in danger
of waste, loss, dissipation or impairment; or
(2) Has been or is about to be the subject
of a voidable transaction;
(b) After judgment:
(1) To carry the judgment into effect; or
(2) To preserve nonexempt real property
pending appeal or when an execution has been returned unsatisfied and the owner
refuses to apply the property in satisfaction of the judgment;
(c) In an action in which a receiver for real
property may be appointed on equitable grounds; or
(d) During the time allowed for redemption, to
preserve real property sold in an execution or foreclosure sale and secure its
rents to the person entitled to the rents.
2. In connection with the foreclosure or
other enforcement of a mortgage, a mortgagee is entitled to appointment of a
receiver for the mortgaged property if:
(a) Appointment is necessary to protect the
property from waste, loss, transfer, dissipation or impairment;
(b) The mortgagor agreed in a signed record to
appointment of a receiver on default;
(c) The owner agreed, after default and in a
signed record, to appointment of a receiver;
(d) The property and any other collateral held by
the mortgagee are not sufficient to satisfy the secured obligation;
(e) The owner fails to turn over to the mortgagee
proceeds or rents the mortgagee was entitled to collect; or
(f) The holder of a subordinate lien obtains
appointment of a receiver for the property.
3. The court may condition appointment of
a receiver without prior notice under paragraph (a) of subsection 2 of NRS 32.250 or without a prior hearing under
paragraph (b) of subsection 2 of NRS 32.250
on the giving of security by the person seeking the appointment for the payment
of damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred or suffered by any
person if the court later concludes that the appointment was not justified. If
the court later concludes that the appointment was justified, the court shall
release the security.
(Added to NRS by 2017,
1224)
Notes of Decisions
Fed. Nat'l Mortg. v. Westland Liberty Vill., 515 P.3d 329 (Nev. 2022).
· cites it 44× “Relying on NRS 32.260, Fannie Mae subsequently argues that a recelver was warranted because Westland agreed in the deed of trust to the appointment of a receiver on default and the properties were subject to waste and dissipation.”
Waid v. York Holding, Ltd., No. 2:24-cv-01850 (D. Nev. Jan. 22, 2025).
· cites it 2× “010 13 and NRS 32.260 as of December 19, 2024. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction to direct the receiver 14 and determine any controversy related to the receivership or receivership property pursuant to NRS 15 32.”
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 32.260(1): 1 case
Fed. Nat'l Mortg. v. Westland Liberty Vill., 515 P.3d 329 (Nev. 2022).
“Relying on NRS 32.260, Fannie Mae subsequently argues that a recelver was warranted because Westland agreed in the deed of trust to the appointment of a receiver on default and the properties were subject to waste and dissipation.”
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 32.260(1)(a): 1 case
Waid v. York Holding, Ltd., No. 2:24-cv-01850 (D. Nev. Jan. 22, 2025).
“010 13 and NRS 32.260 as of December 19, 2024. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction to direct the receiver 14 and determine any controversy related to the receivership or receivership property pursuant to NRS 15 32.”
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 32.260(1)(a)(1): 1 case
Fed. Nat'l Mortg. v. Westland Liberty Vill., 515 P.3d 329 (Nev. 2022).
“Relying on NRS 32.260, Fannie Mae subsequently argues that a recelver was warranted because Westland agreed in the deed of trust to the appointment of a receiver on default and the properties were subject to waste and dissipation.”
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 32.260(2): 1 case
Fed. Nat'l Mortg. v. Westland Liberty Vill., 515 P.3d 329 (Nev. 2022).
“Relying on NRS 32.260, Fannie Mae subsequently argues that a recelver was warranted because Westland agreed in the deed of trust to the appointment of a receiver on default and the properties were subject to waste and dissipation.”
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 32.260(2)(b): 1 case
Fed. Nat'l Mortg. v. Westland Liberty Vill., 515 P.3d 329 (Nev. 2022).
“Relying on NRS 32.260, Fannie Mae subsequently argues that a recelver was warranted because Westland agreed in the deed of trust to the appointment of a receiver on default and the properties were subject to waste and dissipation.”
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