Nev. Rev. Stat. » NRS: CHAPTER 34 - WRITS; PETITION TO ESTABLISH FACTUAL INNOCENCE
Nevada Revised Statutes

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.590 (2026)

Cases where imprisonment after discharge is permitted

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NRS 34.590  Cases where imprisonment after discharge is permitted.  No person who has been discharged by the order of the judge upon habeas corpus issued pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be again imprisoned, restrained or kept in custody for the same cause, except in the following cases:

      1.  If the person shall have been discharged from custody on a criminal charge and be afterwards committed for the same offense by legal order or process.

      2.  If after a discharge for defect of proof, or for any defect of the process, warrant or commitment in a criminal case, the person be again arrested on sufficient proof and committed by legal process for the same offense.

      [29:93:1862; B § 377; BH § 3699; C § 3771; RL § 6254; NCL § 11403]

     

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases, 1969–1998 · leading case: State v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. Cnty. of Humboldt, 964 P.2d 48 (Nev. 1998).
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State v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court of the State of Nevada ex rel. Cnty. of Humboldt, 964 P.2d 48 (Nev. 1998). · cites it 4× “As we noted in Stone , NRS 34.590 specifically permits the state to re-arrest and reinstitute the same charges in justice’s court against an accused who has successfully obtained a discharge from custody by way of a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”
Stone v. State, 450 P.2d 136 (Nev. 1969). · cites it 3× “2 The appellant was released from custody in the State of New Mexico because there was a defect of proof concerning his identity and his presence in the State of Nevada at the time the alleged crimes were committed.”
McGee v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 470 P.2d 132 (Nev. 1970). · cites it 2× “It is apparent that each statute, NRS 34.590 and NRS *426 34.380(4), enjoys a significant role in our procedural machinery, depending upon the circumstances, sometimes providing the sole remedy and sometimes a choice of remedies.”
Tener v. Babcock, 632 P.2d 1140 (Nev. 1981). “570, which must be memorialized in an order, NRS 34.590. Accordingly, we hold that until a written order discharging the habeas corpus petitioner is signed by the judge and filed by the clerk, seeNRCP 58(c), the Eureka Bank rule does not apply, and the judge retains the power to…”
Sheriff v. Walsh, 822 P.2d 109 (Nev. 1991). “2d 132 (1970); see also NRS 34.590. In this case, the subsequent prosecution was not untimely, nor was the prosecutor’s alleged failure to comply with important procedural rules during the first grand jury proceedings willful.”
Glasgow v. Sheriff, 515 P.2d 64 (Nev. 1973). “NRS 34.590; McGee v. Sheriff, 86 Nev. 421 , 470 P.”
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