NRS
40.430 Action for recovery of debt secured by mortgage or other lien;
“action” defined.
1. Except in cases where a person proceeds
under subsection 2 of NRS 40.495 or
subsection 1 of NRS 40.512, and except
as otherwise provided in NRS 118C.220,
there may be but one action for the recovery of any debt, or for the
enforcement of any right secured by a mortgage or other lien upon real estate.
That action must be in accordance with the provisions of NRS 40.426 to 40.459, inclusive. In that action, the
judgment must be rendered for the amount found due the plaintiff, and the
court, by its decree or judgment, may direct a sale of the encumbered property,
or such part thereof as is necessary, and apply the proceeds of the sale as
provided in NRS 40.462.
2. This section must be construed to
permit a secured creditor to realize upon the collateral for a debt or other
obligation agreed upon by the debtor and creditor when the debt or other
obligation was incurred.
3. At any time not later than 5 business
days before the date of sale directed by the court, if the deficiency resulting
in the action for the recovery of the debt has arisen by failure to make a
payment required by the mortgage or other lien, the deficiency may be made good
by payment of the deficient sum and by payment of any costs, fees and expenses
incident to making the deficiency good. If a deficiency is made good pursuant
to this subsection, the sale may not occur.
4. A sale directed by the court pursuant
to subsection 1 must be conducted in the same manner as the sale of real
property upon execution, by the sheriff of the county in which the encumbered
land is situated, and if the encumbered land is situated in two or more
counties, the court shall direct the sheriff of one of the counties to conduct
the sale with like proceedings and effect as if the whole of the encumbered
land were situated in that county.
5. Within 30 days after a sale of property
is conducted pursuant to this section, the sheriff who conducted the sale shall
record the sale of the property in the office of the county recorder of the
county in which the property is located.
6. As used in this section, an “action”
does not include any act or proceeding:
(a) To appoint a receiver for, or obtain
possession of, any real or personal collateral for the debt or as provided in NRS 32.015.
(b) To enforce a security interest in, or the
assignment of, any rents, issues, profits or other income of any real or
personal property.
(c) To enforce a mortgage or other lien upon any
real or personal collateral located outside of the State which does not, except
as required under the laws of that jurisdiction, result in a personal judgment
against the debtor.
(d) For the recovery of damages arising from the
commission of a tort, including a recovery under NRS 40.750, or the recovery of any
declaratory or equitable relief.
(e) For the exercise of a power of sale pursuant
to NRS 107.080.
(f) For the exercise of any right or remedy
authorized by chapters 104 to 104C, inclusive, of NRS or by the Uniform
Commercial Code as enacted in any other state, including, without limitation,
an action for declaratory relief pursuant to chapter
30 of NRS to ascertain the identity of the person who is entitled to
enforce an instrument pursuant to NRS
104.3309.
(g) For the exercise of any right to set off, or
to enforce a pledge in, a deposit account pursuant to a written agreement or
pledge.
(h) To draw under a letter of credit.
(i) To enforce an agreement with a surety or
guarantor if enforcement of the mortgage or other lien has been automatically
stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 or pursuant to an order of a federal
bankruptcy court under any other provision of the United States Bankruptcy Code
for not less than 120 days following the mailing of notice to the surety or
guarantor pursuant to subsection 1 of NRS
107.095.
(j) To collect any debt, or enforce any right,
secured by a mortgage or other lien on real property if the property has been
sold to a person other than the creditor to satisfy, in whole or in part, a
debt or other right secured by a senior mortgage or other senior lien on the
property.
(k) Relating to any proceeding in bankruptcy,
including the filing of a proof of claim, seeking relief from an automatic stay
and any other action to determine the amount or validity of a debt.
(l) For filing a claim pursuant to chapter 147 of NRS or to enforce such a claim
which has been disallowed.
(m) Which does not include the collection of the
debt or realization of the collateral securing the debt.
(n) Pursuant to NRS
40.507 or 40.508.
(o) Pursuant to an agreement entered into
pursuant to NRS 361.7311 between an
owner of the property and the assignee of a tax lien against the property, or
an action which is authorized by NRS 361.733.
(p) Which is exempted from the provisions of this
section by specific statute.
(q) To recover costs of suit, costs and expenses
of sale, attorneys’ fees and other incidental relief in connection with any
action authorized by this subsection.
[1911 CPA § 559; RL § 5501; NCL § 9048]—(NRS A 1965,
915; 1969,
572; 1987,
1345; 1989,
888, 1768;
1993,
151; 2009,
1005, 1329;
2011,
1492; 2013,
1566, 2201;
2015,
3336; 2017,
1115; 2021,
1414)
Notes of Decisions
McDonald v. D.P. Alexander & Las Vegas Boulevard, LLC, 123 P.3d 748 (Nev. 2005).
· cites it 27× “McDonald argues, however, that the district court misapplied the one-action rule, NRS 40.430, to exempt D.P. Alexander. 3 Statutory interpretation is a question of law, and our review of the district court’s interpretation of the one-action rule is also de *816 novo.”
Bonicamp v. Vazquez, 91 P.3d 584 (Nev. 2004).
· cites it 19× “: In this appeal, we consider whether the district court erroneously awarded judgment to respondents under NRS 40.430, Nevada’s one-action rule. We affirm.”
Paramount Ins., Inc. v. Rayson & Smitley, 472 P.2d 530 (Nev. 1970).
· cites it 14× “010 apply in an action for judicial foreclosure of a trust deed on real property? II. Whether an affidavit of a party's counsel is sufficient to establish that the security has become of insufficient value? 1.”
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. KB Home, 740 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Nev. 2010).
· cites it 15× “in any particular order, including, but not limited to, any right arising out of NRS § 40.430.” Consequently, Builders have waived resort to the one action rule with respect to enforcement of the Guarantees.”
McMillan v. United Mortg. Co., 412 P.2d 604 (Nev. 1966).
· cites it 11× “Involved is the interplay of two statutes: the "one-action rule" announced in NRS 40.430 pertaining to the enforcement of a right secured by mortgage on real estate, and NRS 31.”
Keever v. Nicholas Beers Co., 611 P.2d 1079 (Nev. 1980).
· cites it 6× “The district court rejected appellants-defendants’ contentions below that recovery was barred by the one action rule, NRS 40.430, and by the antiwaiver provision of NRS 40.”
Nevada Land & Mortg. Co. v. Hidden Wells Ranch, Inc., 435 P.2d 198 (Nev. 1967).
· cites it 8× “Appellant (defendant below) assigns as error the trial court’s refusal to properly apply NRS 40.430, its misinterpretation and misapplication of the ruling in McMillan v.”
Nevada Wholesale Lumber Co. v. Myers Realty, Inc., 544 P.2d 1204 (Nev. 1976).
· cites it 7× “Lumber Company and Myers Realty both agree that Lumber Company obtained a valid personal judgment against the Lundgrens either through their express waiver of the benefit of NRS 40.430 2 or by their implied waiver of its *28 protection through failure to defend Lumber Company’s…”
Edelstein v. Bank of New York Mellon, 286 P.3d 249 (Nev. 2012).
“When the grantor defaults on the note, the deed-of-trust beneficiary can select the judicial process for foreclosure pursuant to NRS 40.430 or the “nonjudicial” foreclosure-by-trustee’s sale procedure under NRS Chapter 107.”
Bldg. Energetix Corp. v. EHE, LP, 294 P.3d 1228 (Nev. 2013).
· cites it 3× “BE asserted the one-action rale, NRS 40.430, and its associated anti-deficiency statutes, see NRS 40.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.430(1) — 23 cases
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. KB Home, 740 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Nev. 2010).
“in any particular order, including, but not limited to, any right arising out of NRS § 40.430.” Consequently, Builders have waived resort to the one action rule with respect to enforcement of the Guarantees.”
McDonald v. D.P. Alexander & Las Vegas Boulevard, LLC, 123 P.3d 748 (Nev. 2005).
“McDonald argues, however, that the district court misapplied the one-action rule, NRS 40.430, to exempt D.P. Alexander. 3 Statutory interpretation is a question of law, and our review of the district court’s interpretation of the one-action rule is also de *816 novo.”
Bonicamp v. Vazquez, 91 P.3d 584 (Nev. 2004).
“: In this appeal, we consider whether the district court erroneously awarded judgment to respondents under NRS 40.430, Nevada’s one-action rule. We affirm.”
Keever v. Nicholas Beers Co., 611 P.2d 1079 (Nev. 1980).
“The district court rejected appellants-defendants’ contentions below that recovery was barred by the one action rule, NRS 40.430, and by the antiwaiver provision of NRS 40.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.430(2) — 1 case
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.430(4) — 5 cases
McDonald v. D.P. Alexander & Las Vegas Boulevard, LLC, 123 P.3d 748 (Nev. 2005).
“McDonald argues, however, that the district court misapplied the one-action rule, NRS 40.430, to exempt D.P. Alexander. 3 Statutory interpretation is a question of law, and our review of the district court’s interpretation of the one-action rule is also de *816 novo.”
Bonicamp v. Vazquez, 91 P.3d 584 (Nev. 2004).
“: In this appeal, we consider whether the district court erroneously awarded judgment to respondents under NRS 40.430, Nevada’s one-action rule. We affirm.”
Bldg. Energetix Corp. v. EHE, LP, 294 P.3d 1228 (Nev. 2013).
“BE asserted the one-action rale, NRS 40.430, and its associated anti-deficiency statutes, see NRS 40.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.430(4)(g) — 1 case
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. KB Home, 740 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Nev. 2010).
“in any particular order, including, but not limited to, any right arising out of NRS § 40.430.” Consequently, Builders have waived resort to the one action rule with respect to enforcement of the Guarantees.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.430(4)(i) — 1 case
McDonald v. D.P. Alexander & Las Vegas Boulevard, LLC, 123 P.3d 748 (Nev. 2005).
“McDonald argues, however, that the district court misapplied the one-action rule, NRS 40.430, to exempt D.P. Alexander. 3 Statutory interpretation is a question of law, and our review of the district court’s interpretation of the one-action rule is also de *816 novo.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.430(4)(j) — 1 case
McDonald v. D.P. Alexander & Las Vegas Boulevard, LLC, 123 P.3d 748 (Nev. 2005).
“McDonald argues, however, that the district court misapplied the one-action rule, NRS 40.430, to exempt D.P. Alexander. 3 Statutory interpretation is a question of law, and our review of the district court’s interpretation of the one-action rule is also de *816 novo.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.430(4)(m) — 1 case
McDonald v. D.P. Alexander & Las Vegas Boulevard, LLC, 123 P.3d 748 (Nev. 2005).
“McDonald argues, however, that the district court misapplied the one-action rule, NRS 40.430, to exempt D.P. Alexander. 3 Statutory interpretation is a question of law, and our review of the district court’s interpretation of the one-action rule is also de *816 novo.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.430(6) — 1 case
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. KB Home, 740 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Nev. 2010).
“in any particular order, including, but not limited to, any right arising out of NRS § 40.430.” Consequently, Builders have waived resort to the one action rule with respect to enforcement of the Guarantees.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.430(6)(c) — 6 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.430(6)(e) — 4 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.430(6)(j) — 2 cases
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