NRS
41.139 Actions by peace officers, firefighters and emergency medical
attendants for injury resulting from willful acts or negligent management of
property; employer not liable.
1. Except as otherwise provided in
subsection 2, a peace officer, firefighter or emergency medical attendant may
bring and maintain an action for damages for personal injury caused by the
willful act of another person, or by another person’s lack of ordinary care or
skill in the management of the person’s property, if the conduct causing the
injury:
(a) Occurred after the person who caused the
injury knew or should have known of the presence of the peace officer,
firefighter or emergency medical attendant;
(b) Was intended to injure the peace officer,
firefighter or emergency medical attendant;
(c) Violated a statute, ordinance or regulation:
(1) Intended to protect the peace officer,
firefighter or emergency medical attendant; or
(2) Prohibiting resistance to or requiring
compliance with an order of a peace officer or firefighter; or
(d) Was arson.
2. This section does not impose liability
on the employer of the peace officer, firefighter or emergency medical
attendant.
3. As used in this section:
(a) “Emergency medical attendant” means a person
who is:
(1) Licensed as an attendant or certified
as an emergency medical responder, emergency medical technician, advanced
emergency medical technician or paramedic pursuant to chapter 450B of NRS; or
(2) Authorized to practice as an emergency
medical technician, advanced emergency medical technician or paramedic in this
State under the Recognition of Emergency Medical Services Personnel Licensure
Interstate Compact ratified by NRS
450B.145.
(b) “Peace officer” has the meaning ascribed to
it in NRS 169.125.
(Added to NRS by 1985,
151; A 1991,
457; 2005,
317; 2013,
951; 2023,
2291; 2025,
184)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
8
cases, 1994–2017 · leading case:
Wiley v. Redd, 885 P.2d 592 (Nev. 1994).
Wiley v. Redd, 885 P.2d 592 (Nev. 1994).
· cites it 12× “At issue are the common law firefighter’s rule, which operates to bar tort recovery by firefighters, police officers, and other public officers (hereinafter “safety officers”), NRS 41.139, which limits the common law rule’s scope, and Alarmco’s duty at common law.”
Sepega v. DeLaura Concurrence, 167 A.3d 916 (Conn. 2017).
· cites it 2× “We only mention these other jurisdictions for a broader view of places that are apparently unaffected by the lack of the firefighter's rule.”
Borgerson v. Scanlon, 19 P.3d 236 (Nev. 2001).
· cites it 4× “OPINION Per Curiam: This case involves an interpretation of the Firefighter’s Rule, codified at NRS 41.139, in the context of a district court order granting summary judgment for respondent Patricia Scanlon, both individually and doing business as The Water Hole Bar, in a…”
Minnich v. Med Waste, Inc., 564 S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 2002).
“9 (West 2001) (allowing police officers and firefighters to recover where negligence occurred after negligent party knew of officer’s or firefighter’s presence, or where negligent act or omission violated statute, or was independent of reason officer or firefighter was…”
Moody v. Delta W., Inc., 38 P.3d 1139 (Alaska 2002).
“2d 935, 940 (1994) (limited by Nev.Rev.Stat. § 41.139); Matarese v. Nationwide Mut.”
Moody v. Manny's Auto Repair, 871 P.2d 935 (Nev. 1994).
· cites it 26× “We conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as: (1) neither the firefighter’s rule nor NRS 41.139 preclude Moody’s suit for personal injuries because the event which caused Moody to be on Manny’s and Peress’s premises was not the event which injured…”
Apodaca v. Willmore (Kan. 2017).
“9 (firefighters, among others, permitted to bring 14 action for negligence in course of performing duty only under enumerated circumstances, such as for conduct occurring after firefighter arrives at scene); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.139 (same); N.H. Rev.”
Sepega v. DeLaura (Conn. 2017).
“We only mention these other jurisdictions for a broader view of places that are apparently unaffected by the lack of the firefighter’s rule.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.139(1) — 2 cases
Wiley v. Redd, 885 P.2d 592 (Nev. 1994).
“At issue are the common law firefighter’s rule, which operates to bar tort recovery by firefighters, police officers, and other public officers (hereinafter “safety officers”), NRS 41.139, which limits the common law rule’s scope, and Alarmco’s duty at common law.”
Moody v. Manny's Auto Repair, 871 P.2d 935 (Nev. 1994).
“We conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as: (1) neither the firefighter’s rule nor NRS 41.139 preclude Moody’s suit for personal injuries because the event which caused Moody to be on Manny’s and Peress’s premises was not the event which injured…”
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