Nevada Revised Statutes

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.670 (2026)

Award of reasonable costs, attorney’s fees and monetary relief under certain circumstances; separate action for damages; sanctions for frivolous or vexatious special motion to dismiss; interlocutory appeal

✓ current as of July 2026

Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section NRSleg.state.nv.us (official) Justiaon Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

NRS 41.670 Award of reasonable costs, attorney’s fees and monetary relief under certain circumstances; separate action for damages; sanctions for frivolous or vexatious special motion to dismiss; interlocutory appeal.

1. If the court grants a special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to NRS 41.660:

(a) The court shall award reasonable costs and attorney’s fees to the person against whom the action was brought, except that the court shall award reasonable costs and attorney’s fees to this State or to the appropriate political subdivision of this State if the Attorney General, the chief legal officer or attorney of the political subdivision or special counsel provided the defense for the person pursuant to NRS 41.660.

(b) The court may award, in addition to reasonable costs and attorney’s fees awarded pursuant to paragraph (a), an amount of up to $10,000 to the person against whom the action was brought.

(1) Compensatory damages;

(2) Punitive damages; and

(3) Attorney’s fees and costs of bringing the separate action.

2. If the court denies a special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to NRS 41.660 and finds that the motion was frivolous or vexatious, the court shall award to the prevailing party reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred in responding to the motion.

3. In addition to reasonable costs and attorney’s fees awarded pursuant to subsection 2, the court may award:

(a) An amount of up to $10,000; and

(b) Any such additional relief as the court deems proper to punish and deter the filing of frivolous or vexatious motions.

4. If the court denies the special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to NRS 41.660, an interlocutory appeal lies to the Supreme Court.

(Added to NRS by 1993, 2848; A 1997, 1366, 2593; 2013, 624)

LIABILITY OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS MOTIVATED BY CHARACTERISTICS OF VICTIM

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 52 cases (21 in the last 5 years), 2004–2026 · leading case: Stubbs v. Strickland, 297 P.3d 326 (Nev. 2013).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Stubbs v. Strickland, 297 P.3d 326 (Nev. 2013). · cites it 10× “We conclude that if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action before the defendant files either an initial responsive pleading or a special motion to dismiss pursuant to NRS 41.670, the defendant cannot file an anti-SLAPP suit against the plaintiff based on that action.”

Kosor, Jr. Vs. Olympia Co.'s, LLC, 2020 NV 83 (Nev. 2020). · cites it 4× “660 (rights); NRS 41.670 (remedies). We review a district court's decision refusing to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statutes de novo.”

Maietta Constr., Inc. v. Wainwright, 2004 ME 53 (Me. 2004). “04 (1) (LEXIS through 2003 legislation); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.670 (1) (Bender, LEXIS through 2003 legislation); N.”

Metabolic Rsch., Inc. v. Scott Ferrell, 693 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2012). “8 See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 41.670. This further satisfies us that “the class of claims, taken as a whole, can be adequately vindicated by other means.”

Smith Vs. Zilverberg c/w 80348, 2021 NV 7 (Nev. 2021). · cites it 44× “liSmith also argues that the statutory language implies that a district court may grant a $10,000 award only when frivolous or vexatious conduct 16 The plain language of NRS 41.670 does not limit the statutory award to $10,000 per lawsuit.”

In re EB Holdings II, Inc., 589 B.R. 704 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2017). “3, citing NRS 41.670(4). The GoldenTree Plaintiffs allege that EBH is in breach of the PIK Loan Agreement through the insolvency event of default set forth in Section 4.”

Padda Vs. Hendrick (Nev. 2020). · cites it 11× “ORDER OF REVERSAL AND REMAND This is an appeal from a district court order awarding attorney fees and costs pursuant to NRS 41.670. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Kathleen E.”

Sanson v. Bulen (Nev. 2022). · cites it 10× “The district court then awarded appellants their requested attorney fees and costs under NRS 41.670(1)(a), which provides that "the court shall award" reasonable costs and attorney fees to a prevailing defendant on a special motion to dismiss.”

Walker v. Intelli-heart Servs. Inc. (D. Nev. 2020). · cites it 10× “NRS § 41.670 does not explicitly address whether 25 fees on fees are recoverable, and the Court was unable to locate any caselaw—and the 26 parties have not brought any to the Court’s attention—specifying one way or the other.”

Nat'l Jewish Democratic Council v. Adelson (S.D.N.Y. 2019). · cites it 8× “” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.670 (1)(c). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.”

LHF Prods., Inc. v. Does (D. Nev. 2019). · cites it 6× “670(1)(a), like under 22 23 55 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.670 (1)(a). 1 California’s anti-SLAPP statute, is mandatory.”

Show all 52 citing cases →

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.670(1) — 2 cases

Padda Vs. Hendrick (Nev. 2020). “ORDER OF REVERSAL AND REMAND This is an appeal from a district court order awarding attorney fees and costs pursuant to NRS 41.670. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Kathleen E.”

Panik v. TMM, Inc. (Nev. 2023).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.670(1)(a) — 10 cases

Smith Vs. Zilverberg c/w 80348, 2021 NV 7 (Nev. 2021). “liSmith also argues that the statutory language implies that a district court may grant a $10,000 award only when frivolous or vexatious conduct 16 The plain language of NRS 41.670 does not limit the statutory award to $10,000 per lawsuit.”

Walker v. Intelli-heart Servs. Inc. (D. Nev. 2020). “NRS § 41.670 does not explicitly address whether 25 fees on fees are recoverable, and the Court was unable to locate any caselaw—and the 26 parties have not brought any to the Court’s attention—specifying one way or the other.”

Sanson v. Bulen (Nev. 2022). “The district court then awarded appellants their requested attorney fees and costs under NRS 41.670(1)(a), which provides that "the court shall award" reasonable costs and attorney fees to a prevailing defendant on a special motion to dismiss.”

LHF Prods., Inc. v. Does (D. Nev. 2019). “670(1)(a), like under 22 23 55 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.670 (1)(a). 1 California’s anti-SLAPP statute, is mandatory.”

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.670(1)(b) — 9 cases

Sanson v. Bulen (Nev. 2022).

Welt Vs. Shapiro c/w 67363, 2017 NV 6 (Nev. 2017).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.670(1)(c) — 3 cases

Welt Vs. Shapiro c/w 67363, 2017 NV 6 (Nev. 2017).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.670(2) — 5 cases

Stubbs v. Strickland, 297 P.3d 326 (Nev. 2013). “We conclude that if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action before the defendant files either an initial responsive pleading or a special motion to dismiss pursuant to NRS 41.670, the defendant cannot file an anti-SLAPP suit against the plaintiff based on that action.”

Race v. Stout Mgmt. (Nev. 2016).

Am. Preparatory Schs., Inc. v. Nevada Charter Academies (D. Nev. 2020).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.670(3)(a) — 1 case

Haro, III v. Thomas Keller Restaurant Grp. (D. Nev. 2022).

— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.670(4) — 7 cases

Kosor, Jr. Vs. Olympia Co.'s, LLC, 2020 NV 83 (Nev. 2020). “660 (rights); NRS 41.670 (remedies). We review a district court's decision refusing to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statutes de novo.”

Delucchi Vs. Songer, 2017 NV 42 (Nev. 2017).

Patin v. Lee (Nev. 2017).

Delucchi Vs. Songer, 2017 NV 42 (Nev. 2017).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.