a. Any person who manufactures, distributes or dispenses methamphetamine, lysergic acid diethylamide, phencyclidine or any other controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedules I or II, or any controlled substance analog thereof, in violation of subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:35-5, is strictly liable for a death which results from the injection, inhalation or ingestion of that substance, and is guilty of a crime of the first degree.
b. The provisions of N.J.S. 2C:2-3 (governing the causal relationship between conduct and result) shall not apply in a prosecution under this section. For purposes of this offense, the defendant's act of manufacturing, distributing or dispensing a substance is the cause of a death when:
(1) The injection, inhalation or ingestion of the substance is an antecedent but for which the death would not have occurred; and
(2) The death was not:
(a) too remote in its occurrence as to have a just bearing on the defendant's liability; or
(b) too dependent upon conduct of another person which was unrelated to the injection, inhalation or ingestion of the substance or its effect as to have a just bearing on the defendant's liability.
c. It shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this section that the decedent contributed to his own death by his purposeful, knowing, reckless or negligent injection, inhalation or ingestion of the substance, or by his consenting to the administration of the substance by another.
d. Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude or limit any prosecution for homicide. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S. 2C:1-8 or any other provision of law, a conviction arising under this section shall not merge with a conviction for leader of narcotics trafficking network, maintaining or operating a controlled dangerous substance production facility, or for unlawfully manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense the controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog which resulted in the death.
Notes of Decisions
State v. Ferguson, 187 A.3d 865 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018).
· cites it 12× “The present appeal focuses on count fourteen, which charges defendants with first-degree strict liability for drug-induced death in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9. Specifically, count fourteen alleges that defendants distributed heroin, and that Cabral died as a result of…”
State v. Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165 (N.J. 1994).
“N.J.S.A 2C:35-9 (section 9) reads as follows: a.”
Commonwealth v. Highhawk, 687 A.2d 1123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
· cites it 2× “, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9. [9] We pause to address the applicability of 1 Pa.”
DeBlasio v. Groff (In Re Groff), 301 B.R. 644 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2003).
· cites it 2× “With reference to NJ.S.A. 2C:35-9, Strict Liability for Drug-Induced Deaths, from which the strict liability causation provision is derived, the Legislative Commentary about the statute reflects that "[t]o maximize the deterrent effect, this offense is made one of strict…”
State of Iowa v. Cornell Miller, 874 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 2× “47(7) did not require proof of recklessness); see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-9(a) (West 2015) (“Any person who manufactures, distributes or dispenses .”
State in Interest of AJ, 556 A.2d 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
· cites it 2× “The finding of probable cause to believe that the Juvenile committed a delinquent act which if committed by an adult would constitute strict liability for drug-induced deaths pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9. The Juvenile contends that the trial court erred in finding probable cause…”
State ex rel. A.J., 556 A.2d 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
· cites it 2× “The finding of probable cause to believe that the Juvenile committed a delinquent act which if committed by an adult would constitute strict liability for drug-induced deaths pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9. The Juvenile contends that the trial court erred in finding probable cause…”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-9(a) — 20 cases
State v. Ferguson, 187 A.3d 865 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018).
“The present appeal focuses on count fourteen, which charges defendants with first-degree strict liability for drug-induced death in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9. Specifically, count fourteen alleges that defendants distributed heroin, and that Cabral died as a result of…”
State of Iowa v. Cornell Miller, 874 N.W.2d 659 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015).
“47(7) did not require proof of recklessness); see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-9(a) (West 2015) (“Any person who manufactures, distributes or dispenses .”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-9(b)(1) — 1 case
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-9(b)(2) — 2 cases
State v. Ferguson, 187 A.3d 865 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018).
“The present appeal focuses on count fourteen, which charges defendants with first-degree strict liability for drug-induced death in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9. Specifically, count fourteen alleges that defendants distributed heroin, and that Cabral died as a result of…”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-9(b)(2)(a) — 2 cases
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