N.M. Stat. § 12-2A-2 (2026)

Unless a word or phrase is defined in the statute or rule being construed, its
meaning is determined by its context, the rules of grammar and common usage. A word
or phrase that has acquired a technical or particular meaning in a particular context has
that meaning if it is used in that context.

History: Laws 1997, ch. 173, § 2.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Effective dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 173 § 22 made the Uniform Statute and Rule
Construction Act effective July 1, 1997.

Plain meaning and legislative intent. — If the meaning of a statute is truly clear - not
vague, uncertain, ambiguous, or otherwise doubtful - it is of course the responsibility of
the judiciary to apply the statute as written and not to second-guess the legislature's
selection from among competing policies or adoption of one of perhaps several ways of
effectuating a particular legislative objective. But courts must exercise caution in
applying the plain meaning rule; its beguiling simplicity may mask a host of reasons why
a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face, may for one reason or another
give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the statute's
meaning. While - as in this case - one part of the statute may appear absolutely clear
and certain to the point of mathematical precision, lurking in another part of the
enactment, or even in the same section, or in the history or background of the
legislation, or in an apparent conflict between the statutory wording and the overall
legislative intent, there may be one or more provisions giving rise to genuine uncertainty
as to what the legislature was trying to accomplish. In such a case, it is part of the
essence of judicial responsibility to search for and effectuate the legislative intent - the
purpose or object - underlying the statute. State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 1994-
NMSC-023, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352.

Application of plain meaning rule. — Plain meaning rule does not require a
mechanical, literal interpretation of a statute. State v. Calvert, 2003-NMCA-028, 133
N.M. 281, 62 P.3d 372, cert. denied, 133 N.M. 413, 63 P.3d 516.
When ordinary meaning given to words. — Ordinary words are given ordinary
meaning where there is no evidence of legislative intent to do otherwise. State ex rel.
Maloney v. Sierra, 1970-NMSC-144, 82 N.M. 125, 477 P.2d 301.

When no intent, otherwise, usual meaning given. — In construing a statute where
there is no clearly expressed legislative intent requiring otherwise, the word is to be
given its usual, ordinary meaning. Tafoya v. New Mexico State Police Bd., 1970-NMSC-
106, 81 N.M. 710, 472 P.2d 973.

Unless different intent indicated words given ordinary meaning. — Words used in
a statute are to be given their ordinary and usual meaning unless a different intent is
clearly indicated. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Marquez, 1960-NMSC-099, 67
N.M. 353, 355 P.2d 287.

Presumption words are used in ordinary sense. — Statutory words are presumed to
be used in their ordinary and usual sense. Bettini v. City of Las Cruces, 1971-NMSC-
054, 82 N.M. 633, 485 P.2d 967.

Each word construed with other words to accomplish legislative purpose. — The
rules of construction require each word or phrase used in a statute to be construed in
connection with every other word, phrase or portion, so as to accomplish the legislative
purpose. Peyton v. Nord, 1968-NMSC-027, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716.

Technical words. — The interpretation of technical language in a statute can and
should be informed by evidence concerning how those technical terms are interpreted
by experts in the pertinent field. Dynacon, Inc. v. D & S Contracting, Inc., 1995-NMCA-
071, 120 N.M. 170, 899 P.2d 613.

Statute given effect as written unless different intent. — A statute is to be read and
given effect as written and the words used in a statute are to be given their ordinary and
usual meaning unless a different intent is clearly indicated. Gonzales v. Oil, Chem. &
Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 1966-NMSC-211, 77 N.M. 61, 419 P.2d 257.

Statutes must be read according to their grammatical sense. Garcia v. Schneider,
Inc., 1986-NMCA-127, 105 N.M. 234, 731 P.2d 377.

Meaning of "indebtedness". — In using word "indebtedness" in statute creating and
organizing new county, legislature intended what that expression meant in common
parlance. Sierra County v. Dona Ana County, 1889-NMSC-017, 5 N.M. 190, 21 P. 83.

Meaning of "removed". — The removal contemplated by the word "removed" as used
in N.M. Const., art. XX, § 2, refers to ouster from office of an officer under the provisions
of the statute authorizing removal for misconduct. It has no reference to ouster by quo
warranto proceedings, which are invoked and exercised only where a person is
usurping the functions of an office to which he has no legal title. The provision clearly
intended to permit the immediate removal from office of all officers who were found
guilty of misconduct sufficient to oust them from office. Haymaker v. State ex rel.
McCain, 1917-NMSC-005, 22 N.M. 400, 163 P. 248.

Construction of "the ballot shall contain . . .". — The words "the ballot shall contain
the text of the ordinance or resolution . . .." from Section 3-14-17 NMSA 1978 direct that
the ballot show the complete text of a proposed ordinance. The statute is not
ambiguous, therefore construction is not called for. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-40.

Meaning of "vacancy". — The word "vacancy," as applied to an office, has no
technical meaning. An office is vacant whenever it is unoccupied by a legally qualified
incumbent who has a lawful right to continue therein until the happening of some future
event. 1959 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 59-01.

A statute means what it says. Southern Union Gas Co. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 82 N.M. 405, 482 P.2d 913 (1971), overruled on other grounds, De Vargas
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Campbell, 1975-NMSC-026, 87 N.M. 469, 535 P.2d 1320.

When statute makes sense no language read into it. — An appellate court may not
read into a statute language which is not there, particularly if it makes sense as written.
State ex rel. Barela v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., 1969-NMSC-038, 80 N.M. 220,
453 P.2d 583.

When meaning plain, no construction. — When the meaning of the statute is plain,
there is no room for construction. State v. Clark, 1969-NMCA-004, 80 N.M. 91, 451 P.2d
995, rev’d on other grounds, 1969-NMSC-078, 80 N.M. 340, 455 P.2d 844.

When words free from ambiguity and doubt, no interpretation. — In interpreting a
statute the intent is to be first sought in the meaning of the words used, and when they
are free from ambiguity and doubt and express plainly, clearly and distinctly the sense
of the legislature, no other means of interpretation should be resorted to. City of Roswell
v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Comm'n, 1972-NMCA-160, 84 N.M. 561, 505 P.2d
1237, cert. denied, 84 N.M. 560, 505 P.2d 1236 (1973).

When terms plain and unambiguous no room for construction. — The meaning of
a statute is to be ascertained primarily from its terms, and where they are plain and
unambiguous, there is no room for construction. Southern Union Gas Co. v. New
Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 1971-NMSC-035, 82 N.M. 405, 482 P.2d 913, overruled on
other grounds, De Vargas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Campbell, 1975-NMSC-026, 87 N.M.
469, 535 P.2d 1320.

No room exists for construction when language of act is clear and unambiguous.
Giomi v. Chase, 1942-NMSC-071, 47 N.M. 22, 132 P.2d 715.

Statute free of ambiguity given literal meaning. — Where the statute is free of
ambiguity it must be given its literal meaning. Sunset Package Store, Inc. v. City of
Carlsbad, 1968-NMSC-105, 79 N.M. 260, 442 P.2d 572.
No construction when words plain and unambiguous. — If words in the statute
being considered are plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction. State v.
McHorse, 1973-NMCA-144, 85 N.M. 753, 517 P.2d 75.

No construction when words plain and unambiguous. — Where a statute is plain,
meaningful and unambiguous, there is no room for construction. State ex rel. Barela v.
New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., 1969-NMSC-038, 80 N.M. 220, 453 P.2d 583.

If language unambiguous legislative intent understood as it is written. —
Legislative intent must be ascertained primarily from the language of the statute and if
the language used is plain and unambiguous, the legislature must be understood as
meaning what is expressly declared. 1959 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 59-63.

Unless ambiguity, no construction. — Rule of statutory construction that unless there
is ambiguity in a statute, construction is uncalled for. 1959 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 59-63.

The plain meaning of the language contained in legislation is controlling. — Once
legislation is enacted, the plain meaning of the language contained in the legislation is
controlling regardless of a legislator's original intent, and once funds are appropriated by
the legislature, those funds cannot be expended for any purpose that the legislature did
not contemplate in the statute, and therefore, where a capital outlay funding request that
was signed into law in 2019 unequivocally stated that the funds appropriated will be
used to "plan, design, construct, equip and make improvements to Kearns field to
comply with the federal American with Disabilities Act of 1990 in Milan in Cibola County"
the appropriation cannot be utilized for any other purpose, regardless of the legislator's
original intent in requesting the funding. Legislative intent (4/24/20), Att'y Gen. Adv. Ltr.
2020-05.

All parts of act generally considered. — Generally all parts of an act of a legislature
should be considered so as to give effect to the whole statute. 1955 Op. Att'y Gen. No.
55-6247.