N.M. Stat. § 12-2A-20 (2026)

A. In considering the text of a statute or rule in light of Sections 2 through 7 [12-2A-2
to 12-2A-7 NMSA 1978] and Sections 18 and 19 [12-2A-18 and 12-2A-19 NMSA 1978]
of the Uniform Statute and Rules Construction Act, and the context in which the statute
or rule is applied, the following aids to construction may be considered in ascertaining
the meaning of the text:

      (1)    the meaning of a word or phrase may be limited by the series of words or
phrases of which it is a part; and

      (2)    the meaning of a general word or phrase following two or more specific
words or phrases may be limited to the category established by the specific words or
phrases.

   B. In addition to considering the text of a statute or rule in light of Sections 2 through
7 and Sections 18 and 19 of the Uniform Statute and Rules Construction Act, the
context in which the statute or rule is applied and the aids to construction in Subsection
A of this section, the following aids to construction may be considered in ascertaining
the meaning of the text:

        (1)    a settled judicial construction in another jurisdiction as of the time a statute
or rule is borrowed from the other jurisdiction;
      (2)     a judicial construction of the same or similar statute or rule of this or
another state;

      (3)     an official commentary published and available before the enactment or
adoption of the statute or rule;

         (4)   an administrative construction of the same or similar statute or rule of this
state;

         (5)   a previous statute or rule, or the common law, on the same subject;

      (6)    a statute or rule on the same or a related subject, even if it was enacted or
adopted at a different time; and

       (7)    a reenactment of a statute or readoption of a rule that does not change the
pertinent language after a court or agency construed the statute or rule.

    C. If, after considering the text of a statute or rule in light of Sections 2 through 7
and Sections 18 and 19 of the Uniform Statute and Rules Construction Act, the context
in which the statute or rule is applied and the aids to construction in Subsections A and
B of this section, the meaning of the text or its application is uncertain, the following aids
to construction may be considered in ascertaining the meaning of the text:

        (1)    the circumstances that prompted the enactment or adoption of the statute
or rule;

      (2)     the purpose of a statute or rule as determined from the legislative or
administrative history of the statute or rule; and

         (3)   the history of other legislation on the same subject.

History: Laws 1997, ch. 173, § 20.

                                      ANNOTATIONS

Effective dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 173 § 22 made the Uniform Statute and Rule
Construction Act effective July 1, 1997.

Decisions of other jurisdictions. — Courts may consider other jurisdictions’
interpretations of Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act to effectuate the purpose of
uniformity with other states that have likewise adopted the uniform act. Corum v.
Roswell Senior Living LLC, 2010-NMCA-105, 149 N.M. 287, 248 P.3d 329, cert. denied,
2010-NMCERT-010, 149 N.M. 64, 243 P.3d 1146.
The fundamental rule in construing statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the legislature. State v. Chavez, 1966-NMSC-217, 77 N.M. 79, 419 P.2d
456.

Purpose of statutory construction. — The supreme court will construe a statute to
give it its intended effect. New Mexico State Hwy. Comm'n v. Ferguson, 1982-NMSC-
107, 98 N.M. 680, 652 P.2d 230.

Courts must interpret a statute so as to accomplish the ends sought by the
legislature. C. de Baca v. Baca, 1964-NMSC-006, 73 N.M. 387, 388 P.2d 392.

Intent of legislature ascertained by statutory construction. — In construing a
statute, a court must do so with the ultimate purpose of ascertaining and giving effect to
the manifest intent of the legislature. Wells v. County of Valencia, 1982-NMSC-048, 98
N.M. 3, 644 P.2d 517.

Intent determined from language of statute. — Where there is ambiguity,
interpretation is required, but that interpretation is for the purpose of determining
legislative intent when it is to be determined primarily from the language used in the
statute. State v. McHorse, 1973-NMCA-144, 85 N.M. 753, 517 P.2d 75.

Statement of legislators. — The statement of legislators, especially after the passage
of legislation, cannot be considered competent evidence in establishing what the
legislature intended in enacting a measure. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed'n of
Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, 125 N.M. 401, 962 P.2d 1236.

When language plain, intention expressed given effect. — The intention, of course,
must be the intention expressed in the statute, and where the meaning of the language
employed is plain, it must be given effect. State v. Ortiz, 1967-NMCA-019, 78 N.M. 507,
433 P.2d 92.

Words given ordinary meaning unless intent indicates otherwise. — The court
must view the legislative intent from the language of the act and the words will be given
their ordinary meaning unless a different intent is clearly indicated. Davis v. Comm'r of
Revenue, 1971-NMCA-129, 83 N.M. 152, 489 P.2d 660, cert. denied, 83 N.M. 151, 489
P.2d 659.

When words are added, rejected or substituted. — Courts will not add words except
where necessary to make the statute conform to the obvious intent of the legislature, or
to prevent its being absurd but where the language of the legislative act is doubtful or an
adherence to the literal use of words would lead to injustice, absurdity or contradiction,
the statute will be construed according to its obvious spirit or reason, even though this
requires the rejection of words or the substitution of others. State v. Nance, 1966-
NMSC-207, 77 N.M. 39, 419 P.2d 242, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1039, 87 S. Ct. 1495, 18
L. Ed. 2d 605 (1967).
When words are transposed. — Words and phrases of statute may be transposed to
carry out manifest intent of act. State ex rel. Dresden v. District Court of Second Judicial
Dist., 1941-NMSC-013, 45 N.M. 119, 112 P.2d 506.

Defined terms. — When a term, comprised of more than one word, is expressly
defined in a statute and a shortened form of the term appears elsewhere in the statutes
in context similar to the use of the long form, and when the statute includes no definition
for the shortened form, the court will presume that the two terms have the same
definition. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed'n of Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, 125
N.M. 401, 962 P.2d 1236.

Construction not to be absurd, literal interpretation yields to intent. — The
legislative intent must be given effect by adopting a construction which will not render
the statute's application absurd or unreasonable and the court will not be bound by a
literal interpretation of the words if such strict interpretation would defeat the intended
object of the legislature. State v. Nance, 1966-NMSC-207, 77 N.M. 39, 419 P.2d 242,
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1039, 87 S. Ct. 1495, 18 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1967).

The courts are committed to an acceptance of the intent of the language employed
by the legislature rather than the precise definition of the words themselves. State v.
Nance, 1966-NMSC-207, 77 N.M. 39, 419 P.2d 242, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1039, 87 S.
Ct. 1495, 18 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1967).

Entire provision read to give effect to all parts. — Statutes are to be given effect as
written, and where free from ambiguity, there is no room for construction. Where there is
ambiguity, however, and meaning is not clear, resort may be had to construction and
interpretation and, even then, intent is to be determined primarily from the language
used, and the entire provision is to be read together so that all parts are given effect in
arriving at the intent of the drafters and promulgators. Fort v. Neal, 1968-NMSC-149, 79
N.M. 479, 444 P.2d 990.

All of statute and those in pari materia read together. — All of the provisions of a
statute, together with other statutes in pari materia, must be read together to ascertain
the legislative intent. Allen v. McClellan, 1965-NMSC-094, 75 N.M. 400, 405 P.2d 405,
overruled on other grounds by N.M. Livestock Bd. v. Dose,1980-NMSC-022, 94 N.M.
68, 607 P.2d 606.

The purpose of the "pari materia" rule is to ascertain and carry into effect the
legislature's intention. State v. Chavez, 1966-NMSC-217, 77 N.M. 79, 419 P.2d 456.

Consideration of contemporaneous documents. — Contemporaneous documents
presented to and presumably considered by the legislature during the course of
enactment of a statute may be considered by a court in attempting to glean legislative
intent. State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d
1352.
Act in violation of statute void, exception. — The general rule of law is that an act
done in violation of a statutory prohibition is void and confers no right upon the
wrongdoer; but this rule is subject to the qualification that when, upon a survey of the
statute, its subject matter and the mischief sought to be prevented, it appears that the
legislature intended otherwise, effect must be given to that intention. State ex rel. State
Tax Comm'n v. Garcia, 1967-NMSC-098, 77 N.M. 703, 427 P.2d 230.

Statutes are to be interpreted with reference to their manifest object, and "if the
language is susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other
defeat such manifest object, it should receive the former construction." Martinez v.
Research Park, Inc., 1965-NMSC-146, 75 N.M. 672, 410 P.2d 200, overruled on other
grounds by Sundance Mech. & Util. Corp. v. Atlas, 1990-NMSC-031, 109 N.M. 683, 789
P.2d 1250.

Evils to be corrected and purpose considered in construction. — The evils which
the legislature intended to correct and the purpose of the legislation must be considered
in construing a statute. It cannot be assumed that the legislature would do a futile thing.
Hayes v. Hagemeier, 1963-NMSC-095, 75 N.M. 70, 400 P.2d 945.

Ordinary rules and intent are guides to construe penal statutes. — Penal statutes
are not to be subjected to any strained or unnatural construction in order to work
exemptions from their penalties, and such statutes must be interpreted by the aid of the
ordinary rules for the construction of statutes, and with the cardinal object of
ascertaining the intention of the legislature. State v. Ortiz, 1967-NMCA-019, 78 N.M.
507, 433 P.2d 92.

Presumption when one state adopts statute of another state. — Where one state
adopts a statute of another state there is a presumption that it likewise adopts the
construction of the statute by the courts of the state from which it was adopted. Gray v.
Armijo, 1962-NMSC-082, 70 N.M. 245, 372 P.2d 821.

State court's construction of own statutes binds federal agencies and courts. — A
state court has the function of declaring and construing its own statutes. Such
determination is binding not only upon federal administrative agencies but upon federal
courts as well. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 1966-NMSC-271,
77 N.M. 481, 424 P.2d 397.

Long-standing interpretations by agencies not lightly overturned. — Long-standing
interpretations of a doubtful or uncertain statute by the administrative agency charged
with administering the statute are persuasive and will not be lightly overturned by the
courts. Martinez v. Research Park, Inc., 1965-NMSC-146, 75 N.M. 672, 410 P.2d 200,
overruled on other grounds by Sundance Mech. & Util. Corp. v. Atlas, 1990-NMSC-031,
109 N.M. 683, 789 P.2d 1250.

When factual issues similar administrative construction is highly persuasive. — A
long-standing administrative construction of a statute in granting a tax exemption is
highly persuasive authority, however, such a rule is predicated upon the premise that
the factual issues are similar. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, Lodge No. 461 v.
N.M. Prop. Appraisal Dep't, 1971-NMCA-124, 83 N.M. 505, 494 P.2d 167, aff'd, 1972-
NMSC-006, 83 N.M. 445, 493 P.2d 411.

Custom does not relieve party of clear-cut obligations of ordinance. Sanchez v. J.
Barron Rice, Inc., 1967-NMSC-077, 77 N.M. 717, 427 P.2d 240.

Legislative acquiescence is used only when direct interpretative methods fail. —
Use of legislative acquiescence in exercise of power by an agency as evidence of
legislative interpretation of a statute is to be resorted to only where meaning is doubtful,
and when direct methods of interpretation have failed. State ex rel. Lee v. Hartman,
1961-NMSC-171, 69 N.M. 419, 367 P.2d 918.

Ascertainment of legislative intent. — The controlling consideration in construing a
statute is ascertainment of the legislative intent, and such legislative intent is
determined primarily from the language actually contained in the statute. 1962 Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 62-65.

Matter may be implied to effect intent. — The spirit, as well as the letter of the
statute, must be respected; and where the whole context of a law demonstrates a
particular intent in the legislature to effect a certain object, some degree of implication
may be called in to aid that intent. 1961 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 61-75.

Failure to disapprove of agency's interpretation is persuasive. — Where the
legislature has met since the particular department placed its interpretation on a given
statute, its failure to indicate that the administrative construction is not actually in accord
with legislative intent is a persuasive argument that the legislative body approves of the
administrative agency's construction. 1961 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 61-75.

When statutes void. — A statute may be void for vagueness where no ascertainable
legislative intent is revealed. It may be equally void where there is more than one
reasonable construction possible but there is no means of determining which
construction was intended by the legislature. 1961 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 61-32.

Effect of construction prior to amendment. — When a statute has been construed
and the legislature in amending the same substantially sets forth the section in
language identical with that which has theretofore been construed, the legislature may
be regarded as adopting the construction theretofore made. 1961 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 61-
41.