New Mexico Statutes
N.M. Stat. § 22-10-17 (2026)
Recompiled
✓ laws through the 2025 session (retrieved May 2026)
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ANNOTATIONS
Recompilations. — Laws 2003, ch. 153, § 72 recompiled former 22-10-17 NMSA 1978 as 22-10A-27 NMSA 1978, effective April 4, 2003.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14
cases, 1981–2017 · leading case: West v. San Jon Bd. of Educ., 2003-NMCA-130, 79 P.3d 842.
West v. San Jon Bd. of Educ., 2003-NMCA-130, 79 P.3d 842. “We further hold that by not completing her appeal of the Board’s decision to an independent arbitrator, Plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies under the procedures set forth by the School Personnel Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 22-10-17 and - 17.1 (1991).”
Bd. of Educ. of Carlsbad v. Harrell, 882 P.2d 511 (N.M. 1994). “His contract and Section 22-10-17 (establishing standards and procedures for discharge of certified school employees) afforded him only the right to be fully compensated; he had no right to occupy the office of superintendent.”
Stanley v. Raton Bd. of Educ., 876 P.2d 232 (N.M. 1994). “See NMSA 1978, §§ 22-10-17 and 22-5-4(D). Stanley argues that because the Board issued a notice of intent to discharge him without a superintendent’s recommendation, the Board “overstepped its authority.”
Bd. of Educ. of Taos Mun. Sch. v. Singleton, 712 P.2d 1384 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985). “Following a hearing, the trial court, on March 29, 1983, issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Taos Board to hold a formal hearing, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Sections 22-10-17 and -19 (Repl.Pamp.1984), on the grounds sought for her discharge.”
Stanley v. Raton Bd. of Educ., 876 P.2d 232 (N.M. 1994). “See NMSA 1978, §§ 22-10-17 and 22-5-4(D). Stanley argues that because the Board issued a notice of intent to discharge him without a superintendent's recommendation, the Board "overstepped its authority.”
Santa Fe Pub. Schs. v. Romero, 2001-NMCA-103, 37 P.3d 100. “” Because the Board severed its employment relationship with Romero before his current annual contract had expired, Section 22-10-2(A) makes it clear that the discharge provisions of the Act — Sections 22-10-17 and -17.1 — as opposed to the termination provisions — Sections…”
Alarcon v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 413 P.3d 507 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017). “A "discharge" under the School Personnel Act is "the act of severing the employment relationship with a certified school employee prior to the expiration of the current employment contract[.]" Section 22-10A-2(A); see Section 22-1-2(BB) (defining a "certified school employee" as…”
Larsen v. Farmington Mun. Schs., 2010-NMCA-094, 242 P.3d 493. “See §§ 22-10-17, -17.1 (recompiled at Sections 22-10A-27, -28).”
Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Santa Fe Pub. Schs., 2016-NMCA-009, 9 N.M. 222. “{8} Section 22-10A-28(L)—the harmless error provision—provides that “[u]nless a party can demonstrate prejudice arising from a departure from the procedures established in this section and in Section 22-10-17 NMSA 1978 .”
New Mexico State Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Educ. of Alamogordo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 624 P.2d 530 (N.M. 1981). “1980), which affords tenure rights and Section 22-10-17, N.M.S.A. 1978, which outlines the procedure to be followed if certified school personnel are discharged during the term of a written contract.”
Aguilera v. Bd. of Educ. of the Hatch Valley Schs., 2006-NMSC-015, 132 P.3d 587. “, § 22-10-17 (discharge), as enacted by 1967 N.”
Bd. of Educ. of Alamogordo Pub. Schs. Dist. No. 1 v. Jennings, 651 P.2d 1037 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). “Conduct which is within either of the first two categories, should constitute as a matter of law "other good cause" to terminate a school employee under § 22-10-17(D), N.M.S.A. 1978. The local board has also raised an issue of whether it was legally bound to rehire appellee for…”
N.M. Stat. § 22-10-17(A): 5 cases
Bd. of Educ. of Carlsbad v. Harrell, 882 P.2d 511 (N.M. 1994). “His contract and Section 22-10-17 (establishing standards and procedures for discharge of certified school employees) afforded him only the right to be fully compensated; he had no right to occupy the office of superintendent.”
Larsen v. Farmington Mun. Schs., 2010-NMCA-094, 242 P.3d 493. “See §§ 22-10-17, -17.1 (recompiled at Sections 22-10A-27, -28).”
Santa Fe Pub. Schs. v. Romero, 2001-NMCA-103, 37 P.3d 100. “” Because the Board severed its employment relationship with Romero before his current annual contract had expired, Section 22-10-2(A) makes it clear that the discharge provisions of the Act — Sections 22-10-17 and -17.1 — as opposed to the termination provisions — Sections…”
Stanley v. Raton Bd. of Educ., 876 P.2d 232 (N.M. 1994). “See NMSA 1978, §§ 22-10-17 and 22-5-4(D). Stanley argues that because the Board issued a notice of intent to discharge him without a superintendent’s recommendation, the Board “overstepped its authority.”
Stanley v. Raton Bd. of Educ., 876 P.2d 232 (N.M. 1994). “See NMSA 1978, §§ 22-10-17 and 22-5-4(D). Stanley argues that because the Board issued a notice of intent to discharge him without a superintendent's recommendation, the Board "overstepped its authority.”
N.M. Stat. § 22-10-17(A)(l): 1 case
Santa Fe Pub. Schs. v. Romero, 2001-NMCA-103, 37 P.3d 100. “” Because the Board severed its employment relationship with Romero before his current annual contract had expired, Section 22-10-2(A) makes it clear that the discharge provisions of the Act — Sections 22-10-17 and -17.1 — as opposed to the termination provisions — Sections…”
N.M. Stat. § 22-10-17(B)(2): 1 case
Bd. of Educ. of Taos Mun. Sch. v. Singleton, 712 P.2d 1384 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985). “Following a hearing, the trial court, on March 29, 1983, issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Taos Board to hold a formal hearing, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Sections 22-10-17 and -19 (Repl.Pamp.1984), on the grounds sought for her discharge.”
N.M. Stat. § 22-10-17(D): 1 case
Bd. of Educ. of Alamogordo Pub. Schs. Dist. No. 1 v. Jennings, 651 P.2d 1037 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). “Conduct which is within either of the first two categories, should constitute as a matter of law "other good cause" to terminate a school employee under § 22-10-17(D), N.M.S.A. 1978. The local board has also raised an issue of whether it was legally bound to rehire appellee for…”
N.M. Stat. § 22-10-17(E): 1 case
Santa Fe Pub. Schs. v. Romero, 2001-NMCA-103, 37 P.3d 100. “” Because the Board severed its employment relationship with Romero before his current annual contract had expired, Section 22-10-2(A) makes it clear that the discharge provisions of the Act — Sections 22-10-17 and -17.1 — as opposed to the termination provisions — Sections…”
N.M. Stat. § 22-10-17(G): 1 case
Santa Fe Pub. Schs. v. Romero, 2001-NMCA-103, 37 P.3d 100. “” Because the Board severed its employment relationship with Romero before his current annual contract had expired, Section 22-10-2(A) makes it clear that the discharge provisions of the Act — Sections 22-10-17 and -17.1 — as opposed to the termination provisions — Sections…”
N.M. Stat. § 22-10-17(H): 1 case
Santa Fe Pub. Schs. v. Romero, 2001-NMCA-103, 37 P.3d 100. “” Because the Board severed its employment relationship with Romero before his current annual contract had expired, Section 22-10-2(A) makes it clear that the discharge provisions of the Act — Sections 22-10-17 and -17.1 — as opposed to the termination provisions — Sections…”
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