N.M. Stat. § 3-17-1 (2026)

The governing body of a municipality may adopt ordinances or resolutions not
inconsistent with the laws of New Mexico for the purpose of:

  A. effecting or discharging the powers and duties conferred by law upon the
municipality;

   B. providing for the safety, preserving the health, promoting the prosperity and
improving the morals, order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and its
inhabitants; and

  C. enforcing obedience to the ordinances by prosecution in the municipal court and
metropolitan courts and upon conviction the imposition of:

        (1)    except for those violations of ordinances described in Paragraphs (2) and
(3) of this subsection, a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or
imprisonment for not more than ninety days or both;

       (2)    for a violation of an ordinance prohibiting driving a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, a fine of not more than one thousand
dollars ($1,000) or imprisonment for not more than three hundred sixty-four days or
both; and

       (3)    for violations of an industrial user wastewater pretreatment ordinance as
required by the United States environmental protection agency, a fine of not more than
one thousand dollars ($1,000) a day for each violation.

History: 1953 Comp., § 14-16-1, enacted by Laws 1965, ch. 300; 1967, ch. 146, § 5;
1987, ch. 92, § 1; 1989, ch. 234, § 1; 1990, ch. 100, § 1; 1990, ch. 113, § 1; 1993, ch.
66, § 1.

                                     ANNOTATIONS
Cross references. — For zoning authority of county or municipality, see 3-21-1 NMSA
1978 et seq.

For jurisdiction of municipal courts, see 35-14-2 NMSA 1978.

For proceedings to enforce violations of ordinances, see 35-15-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.

The 1993 amendment, effective January 1, 1994, deleted "third and every subsequent
conviction of" preceding "violation" and substituted "three hundred sixty-four days" for
"six months" in Paragraph (2) of Subsection C.

1990 amendments. — Laws 1990, ch. 100, § 1, effective July 1, 1990, in Subsection C,
substituting "for a second" for "for a third" at the beginning of Paragraph (2), inserting
the subparagraph designation "(a)" in Paragraph (2) and adding a Subparagraph (b)
thereof, relating to impoundment or immobilization for not more than 60 days of the
motor vehicle the convicted person was driving at the time of the offense, was approved
March 5, 1990. However, Laws 1990, ch. 113, § 1, effective May 16, 1990, in
Subsection C, inserting "and metropolitan courts" in the introductory clause, substituting
"Paragraphs (2) and (3)" for "Paragraph (2)" in Paragraph (1), adding Paragraph (3) and
making a minor stylistic change, was approved later on March 5, 1990. The section is
set out as amended by Laws 1990, ch. 113, § 1. See 12-1-8 NMSA 1978.

The 1989 amendment, effective July 1, 1989, substituted "five hundred dollars ($500)"
for "three hundred dollars ($300)" in Subsection C(1).

The 1987 amendment, effective June 19, 1987, in Subsection C, in the opening clause,
substituted "prosecution in municipal court and upon conviction the imposition of" for all
the material following "enforcing obedience to the ordinances by" as set out in the main
pamphlet and added Paragraphs (1) and (2).

                          I.     GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

No standing to challenge civil forfeiture ordinance. — Where the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that they or their members have suffered an injury in fact or experienced
the imminent threat of injury by the enforcement of a municipal ordinance that provided
for the civil forfeiture of vehicles operated by persons arrested for DWI, the plaintiffs did
not have standing to challenge the ordinance under the requirements for traditional
standing, organizational standing, facial constitutional challenge of the ordinance, or the
doctrine of great public importance. ACLU v. City of Albuquerque, 2007-NMCA-092, 142
N.M. 259, 164 P.3d 958, aff’d, 2008-NMSC-045, 144 N.M. 471, 188 P.3d 1222.

Police officer may make warrantless arrest for misdemeanor if he has probable
cause to believe the offense occurred in his presence. Tanberg v. Shlotis, 401 F.3d
1151 (10th Cir. 2005).
Home rule municipalities. — Powers set forth in this section and 3-18-1 NMSA 1978
are independent municipal powers within the meaning of the home rule amendment
because they are powers delegated to municipalities completely independent from the
home rule amendment. New Mexicans for Free Enterprise v. City of Santa Fe, 2006-
NMCA-007, 138 N.M. 785, 126 P.3d 1149.

Delegation of authority by municipal officers improper. — There is no authority that
municipal officers may delegate their authority regarding the conduct of municipal affairs
to a state official in whose appointment they have no voice and over whom they have no
control. Adams v. City of Albuquerque, 1957-NMSC-006, 62 N.M. 208, 307 P.2d 792.

While courts are not bound by declarations of a legislative body that its
enactment is in the interest of the public safety and welfare, they are not to be
ignored; indeed, they are entitled to great weight and will ordinarily be respected, unless
obviously untrue or absurd. Farnsworth v. City of Roswell, 1957-NMSC-053, 63 N.M.
195, 315 P.2d 839.

Authority of Subsection A. — A municipality may adopt ordinances for the purpose of
protecting its inhabitants and preserving peace and order under authority of Subsection
A of this section. City of Hobbs v. Biswell, 1970-NMCA-086, 81 N.M. 778, 473 P.2d 917,
cert. denied, 81 N.M. 772, 473 P.2d 911.

Authority of Subsection B. — The ordinance adopting authority of Subsection B of
this section, often referred to as a general welfare clause, is independent of and in
addition to ordinance adopting authority conferred by specific statutes. City of Hobbs v.
Biswell, 1970-NMCA-086, 81 N.M. 778, 473 P.2d 917, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 772, 473
P.2d 911.

Power to regulate use of the streets is a delegation of the police power of the state
government and whatever reasonably tends to make regulation effective is a proper
exercise of that power. City of Roswell v. Mitchell, 1952-NMSC-027, 56 N.M. 201, 242
P.2d 493.

Extra-territorial public works. — When public rights and needs come in conflict with
other interests, the municipality can exercise its discretionary authority to adopt a public
policy whose objective is the greatest public good. Thus, the city's decision to build the
bridge across the river, even though involving land outside the city's limits, was legal
and presumed valid. State ex rel. Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. City of
Albuquerque, 1994-NMSC-126, 119 N.M. 150, 889 P.2d 185.

Municipalities are not authorized to withhold utility service from a subsequent
owner. Bettini v. City of Las Cruces, 1971-NMSC-054, 82 N.M. 633, 485 P.2d 967.

Presumption of validity. — If there is a relationship between an ordinance and its
purpose, then unless its determination of the best method for preserving public health
and safety is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be equivalent to fraud, it will not be set
aside. City of Hobbs v. Chesport, Ltd., 1966-NMSC-158, 76 N.M. 609, 417 P.2d 210;
Fowler v. City of Santa Fe, 1963-NMSC-045, 72 N.M. 60, 380 P.2d 511; Martinez v.
Cook, 1952-NMSC-034, 56 N.M. 343, 244 P.2d 134.

Franchise without referendum. — A franchise to maintain and operate an existing
water plant, and to make additions, extensions and betterments thereto, may be granted
by ordinance by a city without a referendum to the people. Asplund v. City of Santa Fe,
1926-NMSC-002, 31 N.M. 291, 244 P. 1067.

Prosecution for violation of a municipal ordinance is a quasi-criminal proceeding.
City of Roswell v. Gallegos, 1966-NMSC-246, 77 N.M. 170, 420 P.2d 438; City of Santa
Fe v. Baker, 1980-NMCA-169, 95 N.M. 238, 620 P.2d 892.

Board members required to take final action. — Where municipal ordinance, which
created a personnel board of five members, provides that a majority of all board
members shall constitute a quorum and that final action may be taken by the majority of
members present at a meeting, the ordinance does not require that final action be taken
by all five members of the board. Smyers v. City of Albuquerque, 2006-NMCA-095, 140
N.M. 198, 141 P.3d 542.

Validity of action where board members' terms have expired. — Where municipal
ordinance provides that a board member remains in office until a successor has been
duly qualified, the validity of a board's action was not affected by the fact that the term of
two members of the board had expired. Smyers v. City of Albuquerque, 2006-NMCA-
095, 140 N.M. 198, 141 P.3d 542.

                                     II.    VALIDITY.

Business license. — An ordinance which required businesses to retain a license and
pay a license fee of 1% of annual gross business was invalid as a revenue measure.
Town of Mesilla v. Mesilla Design Center & Book Store, Inc., 1962-NMSC-156, 71 N.M.
124, 376 P.2d 183.

Door to door soliciting. — A municipality has the power to enforce reasonable door to
door soliciting and canvassing regulations to protect its citizens from crime and undue
annoyances. However, an ordinance which conditions the solicitation of aid upon the
determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause lays a forbidden burden
upon the exercise of First Amendment liberties. Weissman v. City of Alamogordo, 472
F. Supp. 425 (D. N.M. 1979).

Vagueness. — City ordinance which specifically prohibited maintaining solid waste and
inoperable vehicles on property was not void for vagueness in that a reasonable person
would be on notice as to what conduct would constitute violation of ordinance. City of
Roswell v. Hancock, 1998-NMCA-130, 126 N.M. 109, 967 P.2d 447.
Recital in ordinance not prerequisite to validity. — No New Mexico statute requires
a recital in city ordinance as a prerequisite to the validity of ordinances adopted under
this section, and absent a showing of such a prerequisite, an ordinance with the
enacting clause required by 3-17-2 NMSA 1978 is validly adopted. City of Hobbs v.
Biswell, 1970-NMCA-086, 81 N.M. 778, 473 P.2d 917, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 772, 473
P.2d 911.

Drug paraphernalia ordinance. — A drug paraphernalia ordinance is neither vague
nor overbroad which requires proof of subjective intent to engage in proscribed conduct.
Weiler v. Carpenter, 695 F. 2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1982).

Forfeiture hearing. — An ordinance which failed to provide for hearing in connection
with forfeiture of drug paraphernalia violates due process. Weiler v. Carpenter, 695 F.2d
1348 (10th Cir. 1982).

Noise ordinance. — A noise ordinance which made it unlawful to create any
unreasonably loud, disturbing or unnecessary noise or noise of such character, intensity
or duration as to be detrimental to the repose, life or health of others and listed certain
specific acts that were prohibited was not unconstitutionally vague for failing to specify
permissible decibel levels. City of Farmington v. Wilkins, 1987-NMCA-088, 106 N.M.
188, 740 P.2d 1172, cert. denied, 106 N.M. 174, 740 P.2d 1158.

Parking meter ordinance. — Where parking meter ordinance was enacted primarily as
a traffic regulation and not for the revenue incidental thereto, the ordinance is not
unconstitutional or otherwise invalid because, incidentally, the city's receipts of money
are increased. City of Roswell v. Mitchell, 1952-NMSC-027, 1982-NMSC-078, 56 N.M.
201, 242 P.2d 493.

Location of adult bookstore. — An ordinance which prohibited the location of an adult
bookstore within 1,000 feet of certain specified facilities, including a residential area was
unconstitutionally vague. Harris Books, Inc. v. City of Santa Fe, 1982-NMSC-078, 98
N.M. 235, 647 P.2d 868.

Loitering. — Portions of an ordinance which prohibited loitering in public streets, places
and gatherings, businesses or private property without lawful business, and which
prohibited loitering about a public, private or parochial school, college or buildings, on
foot or in a vehicle, without lawful business were unconstitutional because they
condemned acts to which no reasonable person would attribute wrong doing or
misconduct. Balizer v. Shaver, 1971-NMCA-010, 82 N.M. 347, 481 P.2d 709.

Inoperable automobiles. — An ordinance which made it unlawful to keep solid waste
and inoperable vehicles on private property was not void for vagueness. City of Roswell
v. Hancock, 1998-NMCA-130, 126 N.M. 109, 967 P.2d 449, cert. denied, 126 N.M. 107,
967 P.2d 447.
Pit bull dogs. — An ordinance banning the ownership or possession of a dog of the
breed known as the American Pit Bull Terrier, was not void for vagueness, did not
violate substantive or procedural due process, and did not take private property without
just compensation in view of the fact that prior to the enactment of the ordinance
residents had repeatedly been attacked in their persons and animals by pit bulls and a
child had been severely mauled by a pit bull while walking home from school. Garcia v.
Village of Tijeras, 1988-NMCA-090, 108 N.M. 116, 767 P.2d 355, cert. denied, 107 N.M
785, 765 P.2d 758.

Disorderly house. — In an ordinance which made it unlawful to keep any "common, ill-
governed disorderly house", the words "common" and "ill-governed" were
unconstitutionally vague, but the word "disorderly" was not unconstitutionally vague and
the constitutional words would be severed from the ordinance. City of Farmington v.
Phillips, 1978-NMCA-120, 92 N.M. 304, 587 P.2d 451.

Loitering on school grounds. — To interpret a city ordinance prohibiting loitering on
school grounds without lawful business there as saying that no one had the right to be
on school property without permission would raise serious constitutional questions,
where the ordinance did not state that permission to be on school grounds was
required. Anderson v. Shaver, 290 F. Supp. 920 (D.N.M. 1968).

                                   III.   PREEMPTION.

Preemption test. — The test for state preemption of a municipal ordinance is not
whether the municipality misstates the law in findings stated in the ordinance or whether
some overlap exists between an ordinance and a statute. The test is whether the
ordinance permits an act the statute prohibits, or vice versa. Rio Grande Kennel Club v.
City of Albuquerque, 2008-NMCA-093, 144 N.M. 636, 190 P.3d 1131.

State law preemption. — Both the state law regarding DWI and Section 3-17-1C(2)
NMSA 1978 demonstrate by their plain language that the legislature did not intend to
preempt the field of DWI legislation and preclude municipalities from enacting DWI
ordiances. New Mexico's DWI statutes clearly contemplate the existence of municipal
DWI ordinances in that the statutes discuss the proper interaction between such
ordinances and the statutes. City of Rio Rancho v. Mazzi, 2010-NMCA-054, 148 N.M.
553, 239 P.3d 149, cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-005, 148 N.M. 574, 240 P.3d 1048.

                          IV.     ORDINANCE AND STATUTE.

Lesser penalties. — The city did not exceed its authority by enacting an ordinance
providing a lesser penalty than state DWI statutes thereby limiting the right to a jury trial.
Such an ordinance is not inconsistent with the laws of New Mexico because it does not
permit an act prohibited by the general law or vice versa. City of Rio Rancho v. Mazzei,
2010-NMCA-054, 148 N.M. 553, 239 P.3d 149, cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-005, 148
N.M. 574, 240 P.3d 1048.
Petty misdemeanor penalty for DWI. — Where a municipal ordinance prohibited
exactly the same acts as those acts prohibited by state DWI statutes, and the only
substantive difference between the ordinance and state law was that the ordinance
imposed a petty misdemeanor penalty and state law imposed a misdemeanor penalty,
the ordinance was not inconsistent with state law. City of Rio Rancho v. Mazzei, 2010-
NMCA-054, 148 N.M. 553, 239 P.3d 149, cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-005, 148 N.M.
574, 240 P.3d 1048.

A home rule municipality is free to impose any penalty for DWI that complies with
Article X, Section 6 of the New Mexico Constitution and 3-17-1(C)(2) NMSA 1978. City
of Rio Rancho v. Mazzei, 2010-NMCA-054, 148 N.M. 553, 239 P.3d 149, cert. denied,
2010-NMCERT-005, 148 N.M. 574, 240 P.3d 1048.

The legislature has not preempted the field of DWI legislation. City of Rio Rancho
v. Mazzei, 2010-NMCA-054, 148 N.M. 553, 239 P.3d 149, cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-
005, 148 N.M. 574, 240 P.3d 1048.

More restrictive ordinances. — An ordinance can be more restrictive than a state law,
as long as it supplements, compliments or duplicates the state statute, but does not
conflict with it. ACLU of New Mexico v. City of Albuquerque, 2006-NMCA-078, 139 N.M.
761, 137 P.3d 1215.

Regulation of water wells. — An ordinance which prohibited drilling of water wells
within 200 feet of a water distribution line did not conflict with a statute which prohibited
the drilling of a water well within 300 feet of a water distribution line because the
ordinance was less restrictive. Stennis v. City of Santa Fe, 2008-NMSC-008, 143 N.M.
320, 176 P.3d 309.

Ordinance may duplicate or complement statutory regulation. — The fact of double
regulation does not result in the withdrawal of the municipality's authority to regulate. An
ordinance may duplicate or complement statutory regulations. City of Hobbs v. Biswell,
1970-NMCA-086, 81 N.M. 778, 473 P.2d 917, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 772, 473 P.2d 911.

Exclusive garbage contract. — A municipal ordinance providing for the letting of an
exclusive garbage contract and the contract awarded under the ordinance was a
reasonable exercise of the municipality's police power to protect the health and welfare
of the community. Gomez v. City of Las Vegas, 1956-NMSC-021, 61 N.M. 27, 293 P.2d
984.

Ordinance more strict than state statute was not inconsistent with state law on
the same subject because it provided for greater restrictions or prescribed higher
standards than the law. City of Hobbs v. Biswell, 1970-NMCA-086, 81 N.M. 778, 473
P.2d 917, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 772, 473 P.2d 911.

Exclusive garbage contract. — The burning, removal and disposal of garbage involve
public health and safety and an ordinance granting an exclusive contract to collect,
remove and dispose of garbage, and making it unlawful to burn garbage related to
public health and safety, was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Barber's
Supermarkets, Inc. v. City of Grants, 1969-NMSC-115, 80 N.M. 533, 458 P.2d 785.

Motor vehicle ordinances. — Under statute municipality may enact motor vehicle
ordinances notwithstanding that state statute likewise covers same subject matter and
provides penalty for violations. Mares v. Kool, 1946-NMSC-032, 51 N.M. 36, 177 P.2d
532.

Inspections permitted. — Where city ordinance is broader than the state statute in that
it permits inspection by persons not necessarily police officers, but nothing in the state
statute prohibits inspection by other than police officers, there was no conflict between
city and state regulations. City of Hobbs v. Biswell, 1970-NMCA-086, 81 N.M. 778, 473
P.2d 917, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 772, 473 P.2d 911.

                             V.     SPECIFIC ORDINANCES.

Minimum wage. — Minimum wage ordinance enacted by City of Santa Fe is within the
power of the city to enact and is constitutional. New Mexicans for Free Enterprise v. City
of Santa Fe, 2006-NMCA-007, 138 N.M. 785, 126 P.3d 1149.

Home rule municipality may set minimum wage higher than that required by the state
Minimum Wage Act because of the independent powers possessed by municipalities in
New Mexico and the absence of any conflict with state law. New Mexicans for Free
Enterprise v. City of Santa Fe, 2006-NMCA-007, 138 N.M. 785, 126 P.3d 1149.

Sale of intoxicating liquor. — A municipality has sufficient charter power to enact
ordinance prohibiting sale of intoxicating liquor. City of Clovis v. Dendy, 1931-NMSC-
007, 35 N.M. 347, 297 P. 141 (decided under prior law).

Garbage collection and disposal. — The authority to establish health measures is
authority for the municipality to place garbage collection and disposal exclusively with
itself. City of Hobbs v. Chesport, Ltd., 1966-NMSC-158, 76 N.M. 609, 417 P.2d 210.

Keeping of livestock. — In action attacking validity of ordinance prohibiting the
keeping of livestock within restricted district of city, plaintiffs must prove specific facts
showing ordinance unreasonable to overcome finding of city board, stated in preamble,
that such keeping was a nuisance and endangered public health, and fact that plaintiffs'
stables were kept clean and sanitary was no ground for holding ordinance invalid.
Mitchell v. City of Roswell, 1941-NMSC-007, 45 N.M. 92, 111 P.2d 41, explained in
Green v. Town of Gallup, 1941-NMSC-050, 46 N.M. 71, 120 P.2d 619.

Regulation of pawnbrokers. — City had authority to enact ordinances under its
general welfare power and its police power to regulate pawnbrokers. City of Hobbs v.
Biswell, 1970-NMCA-086, 81 N.M. 778, 473 P.2d 917, cert. denied, 81 N.M. 772, 473
P.2d 911 (decided under prior law).
Regulation of warehousemen. — Under this section, municipal corporations are
authorized to regulate the business of warehousemen, such business being affected
with a public interest. Daniel v. City of Clovis, 1929-NMSC-061, 34 N.M. 239, 280 P.
260 (decided under prior law).

City may require a druggist to give bond as security that he will obey the law in
dispensing liquor, but where the bond is made collectible only upon conviction for
violation of the ordinance, it becomes a penalty limited to $300. City of Roswell v.
Jacoby, 1916-NMSC-034, 21 N.M. 702, 158 P. 419 (decided under prior law).

State misdemeanor statute does not preempt municipal ordinance. — The state
statute providing a full misdemeanor penalty for certain acts of domestic violence does
not preclude prosecution of an offense under a municipal ordinance that only provides a
petty misdemeanor penalty. 2008 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 08-06.

While an ordinance cannot conflict with a state statute, it is proper for an ordinance
to cover the same subject matter as a state law. Local ordinances and state statutes
may complement, support, implement and strengthen one another. 1963 Op. Att'y Gen.
No. 63-40 (rendered under former law).

Ordinance may not punish criminal act less severely. — Where an offense is
identified as a felony under state law, a municipality may not enact an ordinance which
purports to punish the same offense and set a lesser penalty therefor. 1981 Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 81-24.

Traffic ordinances. — The city of Roswell has authority to enact a traffic ordinance and
prescribe a penalty for a violation of same by including payment of fine or imprisonment,
or both, as long as the penalties and the imprisonment do not exceed the sum of $300
or 90 days in jail, or both. 1953 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 53-5828.

Wearing of crash helmets by motorcycle riders. — A municipality may not require by
ordinance the wearing of crash helmets by riders of motor-driven cycles having not
more than five horsepower. The adoption of such an ordinance would be an
unconstitutional restriction upon a person's civil liberty, for the ordinance would seek to
restrict his liberty when such restriction would not result in a benefit to the public at large
or tend to preserve the safety of the community. The municipality might constitutionally
require all motorcycle riders under a certain age to wear safety helmets, so long as the
grouping does not include adults. 1966 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-15.

Restrictions on political activities. — A county personnel ordinance can contain
prohibitions against a covered employee holding a political position which is
incompatible with his county employment, or provide that if the holding of a political
office interfered with the full-time performance of his county employment, it would be
grounds for termination of his employment. 1964 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 64-144.
A county ordinance which precludes any person from soliciting contributions for any
political party or for any partisan political purpose from covered county employees if he
knows that they are covered employees would be valid only if limited to working hours.
1964 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 64-144.

Regulation of fireworks. — The Fireworks Licensing and Safety Act (60-2C-1 et seq.
NMSA 1978) expressly removed for municipalities their general authority to regulate
fireworks and replaced it with limited authority to regulate the use of aerial and ground
audible devices. To the extent that municipalities have regulatory authority over
specified devices, those devices are subject to double regulation as long as municipal
regulations do not conflict with the act's requirements. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-11.

The Fireworks Licensing and Safety Act (60-2C-1 et seq. NMSA 1978) denies all
municipalities, including those with home rule charters, from regulating fireworks other
than as provided by the statute. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-11.

Section limits enforcement. — This section is clearly a limitation on the powers of
cities and towns to provide for enforcement of municipal ordinances. 1960 Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 60-199.

The town of Grants may impose a jail sentence alone, or a fine and a jail sentence, for
the violation of one of its ordinances, subject to the limitations imposed in this section.
1958 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 58-217.

Law reviews. — For note, "County Regulation of Land Use and Development," see 9
Nat. Resources J. 266 (1969).

For article, "Prisoners Are People," see 10 Nat. Resources J. 869 (1970).

For article, "Rights of New Mexico Municipalities Regarding the Siting and Operation of
Privately Owned Landfills," see 21 N.M.L. Rev. 149 (1990).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations,
Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions §§ 343 to 345.

"Radius," meaning of the term employed in ordinance as descriptive of area, location or
distance, 10 A.L.R.2d 605.

Emergency: conclusiveness of declaration of emergency in ordinance, 35 A.L.R.2d 586.

Simultaneous repeal and reenactment of all, or part, of legislative act, effect of, 77
A.L.R.2d 336.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance requiring or prohibiting posting or other
publication of price of commodity or services, 89 A.L.R.2d 901, 80 A.L.R.3d 740.
Validity of regulations as to contraceptives or the dissemination of birth control
information, 96 A.L.R.2d 955.

Mining or quarrying operations or oil production within municipal limits, ordinance
prohibiting or regulating, 10 A.L.R.3d 1226.

Curfew: validity and construction of curfew statute, ordinance or proclamation, 59
A.L.R.3d 321, 83 A.L.R.4th 1056.

Initiative process: adoption of zoning ordinance or amendment thereto through initiative
process, 72 A.L.R.3d 991.

Referendum: adoption of zoning ordinance or amendment thereto as subject of
referendum, 72 A.L.R.3d 1030.

Validity, construction, and effect of "Sunday closing" or "blue" laws - modern status, 10
A.L.R.4th 246.

Right of municipal corporation to review of unfavorable decision in action or prosecution
for violation of ordinance - modern status, 11 A.L.R.4th 399.

62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 160, 248.