N.M. Stat. § 30-4-3 (2026)

False imprisonment consists of intentionally confining or restraining another person without his consent and with knowledge that he has no lawful authority to do so.

Whoever commits false imprisonment is guilty of a fourth degree felony.

History: 1953 Comp., § 40A-4-3, enacted by Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 4-3.

ANNOTATIONS

Motive is not necessary element of crime of false imprisonment. State v. Tijerina, 1972-NMCA-169, 84 N.M. 432, 504 P.2d 642, aff'd, 1973-NMSC-105, 86 N.M. 31, 519 P.2d 127, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 956, 94 S. Ct. 3085, 41 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974).

False imprisonment does not require physical restraint of the victim; it may also arise out of words, acts, gestures, or similar means. State v. Corneau, 1989-NMCA-040, 109 N.M. 81, 781 P.2d 1159, cert. denied, 108 N.M. 668, 777 P.2d 907.

Kidnapping and false imprisonment. — Where over a three week period, at least two circumstances of kidnapping, as well as that of false imprisonment were separated by several days and intervening events that included consensual sex, drinking and daily activities, and terminations of the intent to restrain, defendant's convictions for kidnapping and false imprisonment did not violate the double jeopardy clause. State v. Dombos, 2008-NMCA-035, 143 N.M. 668, 180 P.3d 675, cert. denied, 2008-NMCERT- 002, 143 N.M. 665, 180 P.3d 674.

Lesser included offense of kidnapping. — False imprisonment is a lesser offense necessarily included in kidnapping by holding to service. The distinction between these two offenses is whether the defendant intended to hold the victim to service against the victim's will. State v. Armijo, 1977-NMCA-070, 90 N.M. 614, 566 P.2d 1152.

Absence of intent. — Merely to confine or restrain against a person's will without the requisite intention is not kidnapping, but is false imprisonment under this section, when done with knowledge of an absence of authority. State v. Clark, 1969-NMSC-078, 80 N.M. 340, 455 P.2d 844.

Held without consent. — A person is entitled to withdraw his or her consent or express a lack of consent to an act of criminal sexual penetration at any point prior to the act itself, but force or coercion exerted prior to the act itself will support a conviction for kidnapping or false imprisonment. State v. Pisio, 1994-NMCA-152, 119 N.M. 252, 889 P.2d 860, cert. denied, 119 N.M. 20, 888 P.2d 466.

False imprisonment did not merge with criminal sexual penetration. — There was sufficient evidence to support separate charges for false imprisonment and criminal sexual penetration where the victim testified that defendant would not let her out of the bedroom for a period of time after the criminal sexual penetration occurred. State v. Traeger, 2000-NMCA-015, 128 N.M. 668, 997 P.2d 142, cert. denied, 128 N.M. 689, 997 P.2d 821, aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 2001-NMSC-022, 130 N.M. 618, 29 P.3d 518.

Defendant's convictions of false imprisonment and criminal sexual penetration in the second degree, which arose out of the same conduct, violated the double jeopardy clause. State v. Armendariz, 2006-NMCA-152, 140 N.M. 712, 148 P.3d 798, cert. quashed, 2008-NMCERT-002, 143 N.M. 665, 180 P.3d 674.

Defendant's convictions for false imprisonment and criminal sexual penetration without the use of a deadly weapon, which arose out of the same conduct, did not violate the double jeopardy clause. State v. Fielder, 2005-NMCA-108, 138 N.M. 244, 118 P.3d 752, cert. quashed, 2006-NMCERT-004, 139 N.M. 429, 134 P.3d 120.

"No lawful authority". — Knowledge of lack of authority to restrain a minor spouse could reasonably be inferred from the circumstances as defendant had no lawful authority to engage in domestic violence and he displayed continuing abusive behavior; there was nothing about defendant's actions that permitted an inference that he was acting pursuant to a valid, recognized, and lawful marital authority to act for his spouse in her best interests. State v. Barrera, 2002-NMCA-098, 132 N.M. 707, 54 P.3d 548, cert. denied, 132 N.M. 674, 54 P.3d 78.

False imprisonment does not merge with battery. — Since battery required a touching or application of force and false imprisonment does not, and the elements for proving the two offenses differ, the two offenses do not merge. State v. Muise, 1985- NMCA-090, 103 N.M. 382, 707 P.2d 1192, cert. denied, 103 N.M. 287, 705 P.2d 1138, overruled on other grounds, State v. Laguna, 1999-NMCA-152, 128 N.M. 345, 992 P.2d 896, cert. denied, 128 N.M. 149, 990 P.2d 823.

Consecutive sentences for armed robbery and false imprisonment were proper; since the elements of the two crimes are dissimilar and the evidence required to establish each crime is independent, it was clear the crimes did not merge even when considered in light of the facts. State v. Moore, 1989-NMCA-073, 109 N.M. 119, 782 P.2d 91, cert. denied, 109 N.M. 54, 781 P.2d 782.

Armed robbery and false imprisonment separate offenses. — Because the statutory definitions of armed robbery and false imprisonment make it clear that the legislature intended to protect different individual interests and, therefore, create separately punishable offenses for violations of those interests, and since the record separated the conduct of the defendant which comprised armed robbery and the conduct which comprised false imprisonment and showed how the conduct for each conviction involved completely separate and distinct actions on the part of the defendant, conviction on both counts was proper. State v. Ibarra, 1993-NMCA-040, 116 N.M. 486, 864 P.2d 302, cert. quashed, 117 N.M. 744, 877 P.2d 44 (1994), and cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1157, 115 S. Ct. 1116, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (1995). Merger of conviction for aggravated assault into offense of false imprisonment. — Even though defendant's acts of threatening each of multiple victims with a deadly weapon constituted the means by which his victims were restrained or confined against their will so as to cause the assault to merge into the crime of false imprisonment, the trial court did not err in refusing to merge defendant's convictions of aggravated assault into the offenses of false imprisonment, because there was evidence of multiple acts of aggravated assault committed against each victim. State v. Bachicha, 1991-NMCA-014, 111 N.M. 601, 808 P.2d 51, cert. denied, 111 N.M. 529, 807 P.2d 227.

Merger of assault and false imprisonment. — The charge of assault by a prisoner should not be merged for sentencing purposes with the charge of false imprisonment where the facts supporting the two charges are not identical. Merger is also inappropriate in such a case because the statute prohibiting assault and the statute prohibiting false imprisonment advance two distinct social norms. State v. Gibson, 1992- NMCA-017, 113 N.M. 547, 828 P.2d 980, cert. denied, 113 N.M. 524, 828 P.2d 957.

Double jeopardy not found. — Convictions for accessory to assault with intent to commit a violent felony, accessory to aggravated battery with great bodily harm, and accessory to false imprisonment did not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. State v. Carrasco, 1997-NMSC-047, 124 N.M. 64, 946 P.2d 1075.

Crime of violence. — This crime is a crime of violence for purposes of sentencing a defendant as a career offender under federal law. United States v. Zamora, 222 F.3d 756 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1043, 121 S. Ct. 641, 148 L. Ed. 2d 547 (2000).

Sufficient evidence. — Where defendant pinned the victim, who was defendant's spouse, down in the master bedroom to keep the victim from leaving the house, did not allow the victim to walk freely through the house, rigged a door so the victim could not leave the house, and removed the phones so the victim could not call the police; defendant choked the victim until the victim passed out, and defendant's actions were done with physical force, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for false imprisonment. State v. McGee, 2002-NMCA-090, 132 N.M. 537, 51 P.3d 1191, cert. denied, 132 N.M. 551, 52 P.3d 411.

Evidence sufficient to support conviction. — The evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for false imprisonment where it was shown that the defendant, acting in concert with another, forced a school bus to stop, disabled the bus, and forced the driver, through fear of violence, to remain confined in the bus until police and rescue arrived. State v. Muise, 1985-NMCA-090, 103 N.M. 382, 707 P.2d 1192, cert. denied, 103 N.M. 287, 705 P.2d 1138 (1985), overruled on other grounds, State v. Laguna, 1999-NMCA-152, 128 N.M. 345, 992 P.2d 896, cert. denied, 128 N.M. 149, 990 P.2d 823.

Evidence sufficiency. — A defendant's acts of specifically pointing a rifle at each of several victims on two or more separate instances, accompanied by verbal threats, constituted evidence from which the jury could properly determine that defendant committed the separate offenses of aggravated assault and false imprisonment against each victim. Moreover, the jury could find that defendant falsely imprisoned his victims at the beginning of the episode and thereafter committed additional independent aggravated assaults for which he could be separately punished. State v. Bachicha, 1991-NMCA-014, 111 N.M. 601, 808 P.2d 51, cert. denied, 111 N.M. 529, 807 P.2d 227.

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of false imprisonment where it showed that she was armed; she decided, along with two others, to snatch a stranger off the street; the victim was forced into the back of a two-door car from which he could not get out except through the driver door or the passenger side door; and, as they drove, defendant pressed her foot on the gas pedal to maintain the car's speed while the driver turned around to beat the victim. State v. Smith, 2001-NMSC-004, 130 N.M. 117, 19 P.3d 254.

Evidence introduced to show how the defendant and his cohorts carefully orchestrated a prison escape was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant planned, anticipated, and intended the assault and false imprisonment of a peace officer during the escape. The defendant need not have known the peace officer's name, but only that the victim would be a peace officer. State v. Gibson, 1992-NMCA-017, 113 N.M. 547, 828 P.2d 980, cert. denied, 113 N.M. 524, 828 P.2d 957.

Evidence that intruders threw the house residents, husband and wife, into a closet, sufficed for a conviction of false imprisonment. State v. Ibarra, 1993-NMCA-040, 116 N.M. 486, 864 P.2d 302, cert. quashed, 117 N.M. 744, 877 P.2d 44 (1994) and cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1157, 115 S. Ct. 1116, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (1995).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for false imprisonment, where the victim testified that defendant put a screwdriver up to her side and told her that if she tried to leave, he "would put that screwdriver through" her. State v. Singleton, 2001- NMCA-054, 130 N.M. 583, 28 P.3d 1124, cert. denied, 130 N.M. 558, 28 P.3d 1099.

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of false imprisonment, given that the victims were bound hand and foot. State v. Reyes, 2002-NMSC-024, 132 N.M. 576, 52 P.3d 948.

Verdict not ambiguous. — Handwritten addition to typewriter guilty verdict form which reiterated the guilty verdict but also spoke of defendant's motive in committing crime of false imprisonment did not render the verdict ambiguous and the court committed no error in accepting it. State v. Tijerina, 1972-NMCA-169, 84 N.M. 432, 504 P.2d 642, aff'd, 1973-NMSC-105, 86 N.M. 31, 519 P.2d 127, and cert. denied, 417 U.S. 956, 94 S. Ct. 3085, 41 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974).

No collateral estoppel. — State did not violate guarantee against double jeopardy in prosecuting defendant for assault with intent to commit a violent felony and false imprisonment, after an acquittal on charges of assault on a jail and false imprisonment and kidnapping of another individual arising out of the same incident, since when the jury in the first trial acquitted defendant they did not necessarily conclude that he was not present at the jail that day and thus did not commit any crimes, but simply that he was not guilty of the crimes alleged. State v. Tijerina, 1973-NMSC-105, 86 N.M. 31, 519 P.2d 127, aff'g, 1972-NMCA-169, 84 N.M. 432, 504 P.2d 642, and cert. denied, 417 U.S. 956, 94 S. Ct. 3085, 41 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Imprisonment §§ 157, 160.

Principal's liability for punitive damages because of false arrest or imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, by agent or employee, 93 A.L.R.3d 826.

Defendant's state of mind necessary or sufficient to warrant award of punitive damages in action for false arrest or imprisonment, 93 A.L.R.3d 1109.

Liability for negligently causing arrest or prosecution of another, 99 A.L.R.3d 1113.

Civil liability for "deprogramming" member of religious sect, 11 A.L.R.4th 228.

Penalties for common-law criminal offense of false imprisonment, 67 A.L.R.4th 1103.

Liability of police or peace officers for false arrest, imprisonment, or malicious prosecution as affected by claim of suppression, failure to disclose, or failure to investigate exculpatory evidence, 81 A.L.R.4th 1031.

Free exercise of religion clause of First Amendment as defense to tort liability, 93 A.L.R. Fed. 754.

35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment § 71.