N.M. Stat. § 32A-2-14 (2026)

A. A child subject to the provisions of the Delinquency Act is entitled to the same
basic rights as an adult, except as otherwise provided in the Children's Code, including
rights provided by the Delinquency Act, except as otherwise provided in the Children's
Code [32A-1-1 NMSA 1978].

   B. If after due notice to the parent, guardian or custodian and after a hearing
determining indigency, the parent, guardian or custodian is declared indigent by the
court, the public defender shall represent the child. If the court finds that the parent,
guardian or custodian is financially able to pay for an attorney but is unwilling to do so,
the court shall order the parent, guardian or custodian to reimburse the state for public
defender representation.

   C. No person subject to the provisions of the Delinquency Act who is alleged or
suspected of being a delinquent child shall be interrogated or questioned without first
advising the child of the child's constitutional rights and securing a knowing, intelligent
and voluntary waiver.

   D. Before any statement or confession may be introduced at a trial or hearing when
a child is alleged to be a delinquent child, the state shall prove that the statement or
confession offered in evidence was elicited only after a knowing, intelligent and
voluntary waiver of the child's constitutional rights was obtained.
   E. In determining whether the child knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived
the child's rights, the court shall consider the following factors:

          (1)   the age and education of the respondent;

          (2)   whether the respondent is in custody;

          (3)   the manner in which the respondent was advised of the respondent's
rights;

      (4)   the length of questioning and circumstances under which the respondent
was questioned;

       (5)    the condition of the quarters where the respondent was being kept at the
time of being questioned;

       (6)  the time of day and the treatment of the respondent at the time of being
questioned;

       (7)   the mental and physical condition of the respondent at the time of being
questioned; and

        (8)    whether the respondent had the counsel of an attorney, friends or relatives
at the time of being questioned.

    F. Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, no confessions, statements
or admissions may be introduced against a child under the age of thirteen years on the
allegations of the petition. There is a rebuttable presumption that any confessions,
statements or admissions made by a child thirteen or fourteen years old to a person in a
position of authority are inadmissible.

   G. An extrajudicial admission or confession made by the child out of court is
insufficient to support a finding that the child committed the delinquent acts alleged in
the petition unless it is corroborated by other evidence.

    H. The child and the parent, guardian or custodian of the child shall be advised by
the court or its representative that the child shall be represented by counsel at all stages
of the proceedings on a delinquency petition, including all post-dispositional court
proceedings. If counsel is not retained for the child or if it does not appear that counsel
will be retained, counsel shall be appointed for the child.

   I. A child under the age of thirteen alleged or adjudicated to be a delinquent child
shall not be fingerprinted or photographed for identification purposes without obtaining a
court order.
   J. The court, at any stage of the proceeding on a petition under the Children's
Code, may appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a party if the child has no
parent, guardian or custodian appearing on behalf of the child or if the parent's,
guardian's or custodian's interests conflict with those of the child. A party to the
proceeding or an employee or representative of a party shall not be appointed as
guardian ad litem.

    K. The court shall appoint a guardian for a child if the court determines that the child
does not have a parent or a legally appointed guardian in a position to exercise effective
guardianship. No officer or employee of an agency that is vested with the legal custody
of the child shall be appointed guardian of the child except when parental rights have
been terminated and the agency is authorized to place the child for adoption.

    L. A person afforded rights under the Delinquency Act shall be advised of those
rights at that person's first appearance before the court on a petition under that act.

    M. A serious youthful offender who is detained prior to trial in an adult facility has a
right to bail as provided under SCRA 1986, Rule 5-401. A child held in a juvenile facility
designated as a place of detention prior to adjudication does not have a right to bail but
may be released pursuant to the provisions of the Delinquency Act.

   N. The provisions of the Delinquency Act shall not be interpreted to limit the right of
a child to petition a court for a writ of habeas corpus.

History: 1978 Comp., § 32A-2-14, enacted by Laws 1993, ch. 77, § 43; 2003, ch. 225,
§ 9; 2009, ch. 239, § 17.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For general provisions, basic rights, see 32A-1-16 NMSA 1978.

For explanation of basic rights in the Children's Court, see Rule 10-224 NMRA.

The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, in Subsection A, after "Children’s Code",
added the remainder of the sentence; and in Subsection H, in the first sentence, after
"delinquency petition", added the remainder of the sentence.

Applicability. — Laws 2009, ch. 239, § 71, provided that the provisions of this act apply
to all children who, on July 1, 2009, are on release or are otherwise eligible to be placed
on release as if the Juvenile Public Safety Advisory Board Act had been in effect at the
time they were placed on release or became eligible to be released.

The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, deleted "or not" near the beginning of
Paragraphs E(2) and (8) and added Subsection N.
Confession found voluntary. — Where a child, who was almost seventeen years of
age, confessed to murder while the child was held in a detention center; at the officer’s
request, the child agreed to visit with the officers; the officers read the child the child’s
Miranda rights, told the child that the interview would stop if the child wanted it to stop,
and informed the child about the possible consequences of a conviction of murder; the
child acknowledged by a nod of the head the reading of each Miranda right and after the
rights were read, stated that the child understood the child’s Miranda rights; the officers,
at the child’s request, brought the child’s mother into the interview room before they
began questioning the child; during the interview, the child asked if the child could visit
with the child’s mother alone; the officers refused the request and the child then asked
the child’s mother to leave the room; the officers asked child to explain what happened;
the child then confessed to the murder; the interview lasted less than one hour; the child
had a lengthy juvenile arrest record, had been read Miranda rights on previous
occasions, and on one occasion had refused to speak to authorities without a lawyer;
and although a clinical psychologist testified that the child suffered from ADHD, that the
child’s primary language was Spanish, that the child was raised in a traditional Latino
household that made the child deferential to authority figures which would enable the
officers to convince the child to confess, the child spoke fluent English, never claimed
not to understand the questions, and gave detailed, narrative responses to the
questions; the officers told the child that the officers could not promise the child anything
about a possible sentence or disposition, and after confessing to the murder, the child
asked the officers what they thought might happen, the child knowingly and intelligently
waived the child’s Miranda rights, voluntarily consented to the interrogation, and
voluntarily confessed. State v. Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024, 150 N.M. 232, 258 P.3d
1024.

Right to speedy trial. — Constitutional speedy-trial requirements guaranteed under the
sixth amendment of the United States constitution also apply in children's court
proceedings in New Mexico. In re Darcy S., 1997-NMCA-026, 123 N.M. 206, 936 P.2d
888.

Admissibility of statements of a child under thirteen. — The confessions,
statements, or admissions of individuals under thirteen years of age regardless of the
context in which, or to whom, they were made are not admissible in a delinquency
proceeding. State v. Jade G., 2007-NMSC-010, 141 N.M. 284, 154 P.3d 659.

Admissibility of fingerprints of a child under thirteen. — Where the fingerprints of a
child under the age of thirteen are taken pursuant to a search warrant, before a formal
petition of delinquency is filed, the protections of this section do not apply and cannot be
used as the basis to exclude the child’s fingerprints from evidence at the delinquency
hearing. State v. Jade G., 2007-NMSC-010, 141 N.M. 284, 154 P.3d 659.

Results of field sobriety tests are not statements. — Evidence of a child’s lack of
muscular coordination during field sobriety tests and the child’s response to an officer’s
request that the child count during the one-leg-stand test are not statements that are
subject to suppression under Subsection D of Section 32A-2-14 NMSA 1978. State v.
Randy J., 2011-NMCA-105, 150 N.M. 683, 265 P.3d 734, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-
009, 269 P.3d 903.

Consent to blood test is not a statement. — A child’s consent to take a blood test
pursuant to the Implied Consent Act is not a statement under Subsection D of Section
32A-2-14 NMSA 1978, because the child’s consent is implied as a matter of law under
Section 66-8-107 NMSA 1978. State v. Randy J., 2011-NMCA-105, 150 N.M. 683, 265
P.3d 734, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-009, 269 P.3d 903.

Results of a blood test are not statements. — A child’s blood test results is not a
statement under Subsection D of Section 32A-2-14 NMSA 1978. State v. Randy J.,
2011-NMCA-105, 150 N.M. 683, 265 P.3d 734, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-009, 269
P.3d 903.

Physical evidence of DUI. — Where a child, who was sixteen years of age, was
subject to investigatory detention for DUI; the police officer failed to inform the child of
the child’s constitutional rights as required by Section 32A-2-14 NMSA 1978; the officer
had the child perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN), walk-and-turn, and one-
leg-stand field sobriety tests; and after the officer read the Implied Consent Act to the
child, the child consented to a blood test, the results of the field sobriety tests, the
child’s consent to a blood test, and the results of the blood test were not statements
subject to suppression under Subsection D of Section 32A-2-14 NMSA 1978. State v.
Randy J., 2011-NMCA-105, 150 N.M. 683, 265 P.3d 734, cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-
009, 269 P.3d 903.

Constitutionality of Subsection F. — The rebuttable presumption that the statements
and confessions of a child under 13 years are inadmissible is in accord with the
legislative purpose of providing extra protection for the very young, and the provision
was not unconstitutional as applied to a 16-year-old defendant. State v. Setser, 1997-
NMSC-004, 122 N.M. 794, 932 P.2d 484.

Presumption in Subsection F. — The term "rebuttable presumption," in Subsection F,
is not used in exclusive reference to the factors of Subsection E; rather, it relates to
admissibility, and it precludes the children's court from treating a 13 or 14-year-old child
in the same manner as a child over the age of 14 or an adult. In re Francesca L., 2000-
NMCA-019, 128 N.M. 673, 997 P.2d 147, cert. quashed, 132 N.M. 194, 46 P.3d 101,
holding limited by State v. Adam J., 2003-NMCA-080, 133 N.M. 815, 70 P.3d 805, cert.
denied, 2003-NMCERT-006, 133 N.M. 771, 70 P.3d 761..

If the court is not satisfied that the rebuttable presumption of Subsection F of this
section has been overcome based on the personal traits of the child, the court’s inquiry
is complete and the confession, statement, or admission in question is inadmissible. To
the extent that In re Francesca L., 2000-NMCA-019, 128 N.M. 673, 997 P.2d 147, cert.
quashed, 132 N.M. 194, 46 P.3d 101, states to the contrary, it is overruled, State v.
Adam J., 2003-NMCA-080, 133 N.M. 815, 70 P.3d 805, cert. denied, 2003-NMCERT-
006, 133 N.M. 771, 70 P.3d 761.
Subsection F is construed to eliminate application of Subsection G of this section,
which permits corroborated extrajudicial admissions and confessions. State v. Jade G.,
2005-NMCA-019, 137 N.M. 128, 108 P.3d 534, aff'd, 2007-NMSC-010, 141 N.M. 284,
154 P.3d 659.

Child’s statements inadmissible. — Subsection F of this section plainly forbids
admission of the statements child made to relatives and neighbors regarding the
shooting of her father by the child. State v. Jade G., 2005-NMCA-019, 137 N.M. 128,
108 P.3d 534, aff'd, 2007-NMSC-010, 141 N.M. 284, 154 P.3d 659.

Thirteen-year-old child's incriminating statement made to an assistant principal
was presumptively inadmissible. — Where child, a thirteen-year-old student, was
charged with the delinquent act of unlawful carrying of a deadly weapon on school
premises, and where child moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to an
assistant principal and to the school resource officer, and where the district court
entered an order granting the suppression of child's statement to the school resource
officer, but otherwise denied the motion, the district court erred in partially denying
child's motion to suppress, because the assistant principal was a person in a position of
authority, and as such, the district court erred by not concluding that child's statement to
the assistant principal was presumptively inadmissible under Subsection F of this
section. State v. Cesar B., 2020-NMCA-048.

State’s burden of proof in rebutting the presumption of inadmissibility in
Subsection F. — To overcome the presumption of inadmissibility in Subsection F of
this section, the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that at the time the
thirteen or fourteen-year-old child made his or her statement to a person in a position of
authority, the child had the maturity to understand his or her constitutional and statutory
rights and the force of will to invoke such rights. In order to obtain the clear and
convincing evidence needed to rebut the presumption of inadmissibility, the interrogator
who is in a position of authority must first adequately advise the thirteen or fourteen-
year-old child of his or her Miranda and statutory rights and then invite the child to
explain, on the record, his or her actual comprehension and appreciation of each
Miranda warning. State v. DeAngelo M., 2015-NMSC-033, aff’g on other grounds 2015-
NMCA-019.

Where thirteen-year-old child, charged with murder, residential burglary, tampering with
evidence, and larceny, was subjected to a custodial interrogation by three law
enforcement officers, during which child made inculpatory statements regarding a
burglary that connected child to a murder, the trial court erred in denying child’s motion
to suppress the statements where the officers failed to advise child of his Miranda and
statutory rights in a clear and intelligible manner and where it was not clear from the
record that child fully comprehended and appreciated his constitutional and statutory
rights. Moreover, the fact that child continued to answer questions after unambiguously
asserting his right to remain silent provided additional evidence that child did not
possess either the maturity to understand his rights or the force of will to assert those
rights. The state did not meet its burden of rebutting the presumption of inadmissibility
under 32A-2-14F NMSA 1978. State v. DeAngelo M., 2015-NMSC-033, aff’g on other
grounds 2015-NMCA-019.

Rebutting the presumption in Subsection F. — Rebutting the presumption in
Subsection F of this section requires the state to present clear and convincing evidence
that, in the totality of the circumstances, the child’s personal traits give him an above-
average ability to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights in the way the
statute presumes a fifteen-year-old child can. State v. DeAngelo M., 2015-NMCA-019,
cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-002.

Where thirteen-year-old child accused of murder, burglary, larceny and tampering with
evidence, was on the lowest end of the age range at which his statements could be
used, and where lay witnesses did not present evidence of the child’s actual grades or
test scores from his regular school or present evidence of any school records
concerning the child, but based their opinion that the child had above average
intelligence solely on a single interaction with the child during the interrogation, the state
did not present clear and convincing evidence that the child had the capacity to
understand his rights and understand the consequences of waiving those rights in the
way a fifteen-year-old child would. State v. DeAngelo M., 2015-NMCA-019, cert.
granted, 2015-NMCERT-002.

Construction. — Subsection C is an exception to the general rule in Subsection A that
children are entitled to the same basic rights as adults; therefore, this section is not a
mere codification of Miranda, but was intended instead to provide children with greater
statutory protection than constitutionally mandated. State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030,
131 N.M. 1, 33 P.3d 1.

Waiver of Miranda rights. — Even though the 16-year-old defendant suffered from
certain conditions and disorders that affected her cognitive abilities, there was no
evidence that she lacked sufficient intelligence to understand her rights; therefore, her
confession, given voluntarily after a valid waiver of her Miranda rights, was admissible.
State v. Setser, 1997-NMSC-004, 122 N.M. 794, 932 P.2d 484.

Motion to suppress 17-year-old defendant's statement was properly denied, because,
although the interrogation took place at a police station while he was in handcuffs and
without a parent present, he had previous experience with the court system and had
been questioned by police officers and represented by attorneys in the past, there was
no evidence that he needed to be provided with a special form in order to understand
his rights or knowingly waive them, and, in view of his age and eleventh-grade
education, his alert condition at the time of the interrogation, and the manner in which
his rights were explained to him, he was more likely than not to understand and
knowingly waive them, even without his parent present. State v. Lasner, 2000-NMSC-
038, 129 N.M. 806, 14 P.3d 1282.

In evaluating the trial court's determination that 17-year-old defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights, it is necessary to look at the
totality of circumstances, giving particular emphasis to the factors listed in Subsection E.
State v. Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, 127 N.M. 207, 979 P.2d 718.

Expanded protections in Children’s Code. — The Children’s Code protections apply
more broadly than the constitutional protections recognized in Miranda; the Children’s
Code protections apply in any scenario after a child has been subject to formal charges,
in any scenario in which a child is subject to an investigative detention, and in any
scenario at all in which a child is suspected of being a delinquent child. State v. Rivas,
2017-NMSC-022.

Waiver of Miranda rights by juvenile defendant. — Where fifteen-year-old defendant,
charged with first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, tampering with evidence, and
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, agreed to be interviewed by a police detective after
having been advised of his rights, after being given an opportunity to read, and read
aloud from, a standard advice of rights form before signing the form and indicating a
desire to speak to the detective, where nothing in the record indicated that defendant
lacked sufficient intelligence to understand his rights or the repercussions of waiving
those rights or that defendant suffered from any impairment of mental or physical
condition, and where there was no coercive or manipulative conduct by law
enforcement, the totality of the circumstances indicated that defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination. State v. Rivas,
2017-NMSC-022.

Miranda warning not required. — Police officers may ask questions about needles or
weapons prior to pat-down search to assure safety of officers without giving the
individual Miranda warning. State v. Gerald B., 2006-NMCA-022, 139 N.M. 113, 129
P.3d 149.

Unwarned statements to probation officers are inadmissible in a subsequent
prosecution. — Where defendant, a juvenile probationer, arrived at his probation office
with his parents and voluntarily stated that he wanted to turn himself in for shooting and
killing two people, and where his probation officer escorted defendant to a supervisor’s
office and talked to defendant until police arrived, but failed to advise defendant of his
Miranda rights or his right to remain silent under 32A-2-14 NMSA 1978, the statements
made in the supervisor's office were inadmissible in a subsequent prosecution, because
after defendant made his initial voluntary statement in the lobby of the probation office,
defendant was suspected of committing a new delinquent act, was not free to leave the
probation office and was thus subject to an investigatory detention, and this section
requires a child to be warned of the statutory right against self-incrimination when
subject to an investigatory detention. State v. Filemon V., 2018-NMSC-011.

Midstream Miranda warnings are ineffective in informing a suspect of his or her
constitutional rights. — Where defendant, a juvenile probationer, arrived at his
probation office with his parents and voluntarily stated that he wanted to turn himself in
for shooting and killing two people, and where his probation officer escorted defendant
to a supervisor's office and talked to defendant until police arrived, but failed to advise
defendant of his Miranda rights or his right to remain silent under 32A-2-14 NMSA 1978,
and where police transported defendant to the Silver City police department where
defendant proceeded to give a full statement regarding the murders without being
advised of his constitutional rights, and where defendant was subsequently taken to an
interview room where he was read his Miranda warnings by the case agent assigned to
the murder investigation and was instructed to sign a written waiver of rights, which
defendant and his mother signed, and where defendant proceeded to give a second
statement to police which included the same content as the first statement he gave to
the police, the district court did not err in suppressing the post-Miranda statement,
because the midstream Miranda warning was ineffective in informing defendant of his
Miranda rights while he was in custodial interrogation; the first and second police
interviews were effectively continuous and the officer did not remedy the initial failure to
warn by informing defendant that his first statement could not be used against him at
trial. State v. Filemon V., 2018-NMSC-011.

Federal Miranda warnings not required prior to interview with probation officer. —
Where a juvenile probationer admitted to his juvenile probation officer (JPO) that he had
used drugs, the district court, in the ensuing probation revocation hearing, erred in
granting the child’s motion to suppress inculpatory statements based on the JPO’s
failure to give Miranda warnings to the child before questioning him, because Miranda’s
requirements do not apply to a probationer’s statements made during an interview with
his probation officer since the probationer is not in custody for purposes of receiving
Miranda protection and there is no formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of
the degree associated with a formal arrest. State v. Taylor E., 2016-NMCA-100, cert.
denied.

Warning of statutory rights not required prior to interview with probation officer.
— Where a juvenile probationer admitted to his juvenile probation officer that he had
used drugs, the district court, in the ensuing probation revocation hearing, erred in
granting the child’s motion to suppress inculpatory statements based on the JPO’s
failure to advise the juvenile of his constitutional rights before questioning him, because
the protections set forth in 32A-2-14(C) NMSA 1978 are triggered, not by a JPO’s
suspicion that a probationer may have violated a condition of probation or where the
child is alleged in a revocation petition to have done so, but only when a child is subject
to an investigatory detention and where a law enforcement officer questions a child
based on a suspicion that the child has committed a delinquent act or where the child is
alleged to have done so in a delinquency petition. State v. Taylor E., 2016-NMCA-100,
cert. denied.

Warning of right to withhold consent to field sobriety tests is not required. — A
police officer is not required to advise a minor of a right to refuse to perform field
sobriety tests. State v. Candace S., 2012-NMCA-030, 274 P.3d 774, cert. denied, 2012-
NMCERT-002.

The failure of a police officer to advise a minor of a right to remain silent does not render
field sobriety tests inadmissible, because the performance of field sobriety tests does
not constitute statements subject to suppression. State v. Candace S., 2012-NMCA-
030, 274 P.3d 774, cert. denied, 2012-NMCERT-002.

Failure to advise minor of a right to remain silent and of a right to withhold
consent to field sobriety tests. — Where a police officer had reasonable suspicion to
administer field sobriety tests and breath alcohol tests to defendant who was a minor,
the officer’s failure to advise defendant of a right to remain silent and of a right to
withhold consent to the tests did not render the tests inadmissible. State v. Candace S.,
2012-NMCA-030, 274 P.3d 774, cert. denied, 2012-NMCERT-002.

Rights of a child during an investigatory detention. — Under this section, a child
who is suspected or alleged of having committed a delinquent act cannot be
interrogated or questioned during an investigatory detention unless the child is first
advised of his or her statutory right to remain silent and the child knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waives his or her rights. The state bears the burden of proving that the
child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the statutory right to remain silent.
The remedy for violating this section is to preclude the admission, in court proceedings,
of any statement or confession elicited from the child. State v. Antonio T., 2015-NMSC-
019, rev’g 2013-NMCA-035, 298 P.3d 484.

Waiver of statutory right. — Where sixteen-year-old child made incriminatory
statements during an investigatory detention after being suspected of committing the
delinquent act of driving while intoxicated (DWI), evidence that officers conducted the
DWI investigation in the public parking lot of a convenience store in plain view of store
employees, traffic, and other members of the public entering and exiting the store, that
the length of time between child’s initial contact with police and his arrest for DWI lasted
only twelve minutes, that the officer’s demeanor toward child was professional and
courteous and that there was no indication that child felt in fear of the interaction, and
that the officer informed child of his right to remain silent, established that child
understood his statutory right and the consequences of waiving that right. Under the
totality of the circumstances, the evidence was consistent with a determination that child
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. State v. Wyatt
B., 2015-NMCA-110, cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-010.

Questioning a child suspected of delinquent behavior by a school administrator
in the presence of a law enforcement officer constitutes an investigatory
detention. — When a child suspected of delinquent behavior is questioned in the
presence of a law enforcement officer, that child is subjected to an investigatory
detention, triggering the protections of 32A-2-14 NMSA 1978. State v. Antonio T., 2015-
NMSC-019, rev’g 2013-NMCA-035, 298 P.3d 484.

Where the assistant principal of a high school suspected a seventeen-year-old student
of being intoxicated and questioned the child in the presence of the student resource
officer, a certified law enforcement officer, the questioning of the child constituted an
investigatory detention triggering the protections of 32A-2-14 NMSA 1978. The
statements made by the child in response to the assistant principal’s questions were
inadmissible because the child was not advised of his statutory right to remain silent
and the state failed to prove that the child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived
his statutory right to remain silent. State v. Antonio T., 2015-NMSC-019, rev’g 2013-
NMCA-035, 298 P.3d 484.

Interrogation of a student by a school administrator in the presence of a police
officer. — Where a vice principal interrogated a high school student, who was
suspected of being intoxicated, in the vice principal’s office in the presence of a
uniformed police officer; the purpose of the vice principal’s investigation was to ensure
the safety of defendant and other students; the vice principal called the officer to
administer a breath test and to protect the vice principal; the officer administered the
breath test on defendant and searched a bathroom where defendant said defendant
had disposed of a bottle of alcohol; defendant admitted to drinking; and defendant’s
statements were used in a defendant’s juvenile case, defendant was not entitled to
Miranda warnings from the vice principal despite the presence of the police officer
because the interrogation constituted an investigatory detention, not a custodial
detention, and the vice principal was acting to serve the school’s interests in a safe
environment, not on behalf of law enforcement. State v. Antonio T., 2013-NMCA-035,
298 P.3d 484, cert. granted, 2013-NMCERT-003.

Suppression not required. — When child volunteered that he possessed marijuana, in
response to police officer's inquiry about needles during a pat-down search, child was
not entitled under this section to the suppression of the statements or marijuana. State
v. Gerald B., 2006-NMCA-022, 139 N.M. 113, 129 P.3d 149.

State to prove voluntariness of confession. — Whether a juvenile knowingly and
voluntarily waives his constitutional rights before giving a confession is an issue distinct
from the competency of the juvenile, requires the consideration of different factors, and
is an issue as to which the state carries the burden of proof; if the children's court fails to
make the state prove by the preponderance of the evidence that a juvenile knowingly
and voluntarily waived his or her rights, a delinquency determination may be reversed.
State v. Jason F., 1998-NMSC-010, 125 N.M. 111, 957 P.2d 1145.

Investigatory detention triggers statute. — A child need not be under custodial
interrogation in order to trigger the protections of this section. The protections are
triggered when a child is subject to an investigatory detention and therefore, prior to
questioning, a child who is detained or seized and suspected of wrongdoing must be
advised that he or she has the right to remain silent and that anything said can be used
in any delinquency hearing. State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, 131 N.M. 1, 33 P.3d 1.

Objective standard of determining wrongdoing. — In the context of investigatory
stops, determining whether a child is "suspected" of wrongdoing should be measured by
an objective standard. State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, 131 N.M. 1, 33 P.3d 1.

Administrative questioning does not trigger statute. — This section does not
require that officers give children constitutional warnings prior to: (1) questions
pertaining to a child's age or identity; (2) general on-the-scene questioning; or (3)
volunteered statements made by a child. State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, 131 N.M.
1, 33 P.3d 1.

Remedy for violation. — If during an investigatory detention, a child is not advised of
the right to remain silent and warned of the consequence of waiving that right, any
statement or confession obtained as a result of the detention or seizure is inadmissible
in any delinquency proceeding. State v. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, 131 N.M. 1, 33
P.3d 1.

Dismissal not a remedy. — There is no statutory provision for the dismissal of a
delinquency petition based on a violation of any of the statutory rights granted under this
section. In re Jade G., 2001-NMCA-058, 130 N.M. 687, 30 P.3d 376, cert. quashed, 132
N.M. 484, 51 P.3d 527 (2002), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, State v. Jade
G., 2007-NMSC-010, 141 N.M. 284, 154 P.3d 659.

Purpose of Subsection I of this section is to afford greater protection for children under
13 than to older children and adults in regard to fingerprinting. State v. Jade G., 2005-
NMCA-019, 137 N.M. 128, 108 P.3d 534, aff'd, 2007-NMSC-010, 141 N.M. 284, 154
P.3d 659.

Fingerprints. — An obvious purpose of Subsection I of this section is to require at
some stage a judge’s independent review of a request for a juvenile’s fingerprints, to
balance the accountability and protective purposes of the Delinquency Act with the
protection to be afforded children under 13. State v. Jade G., 2005-NMCA-019, 137
N.M. 128, 108 P.3d 534, aff'd, 2007-NMSC-010, 141 N.M. 284, 154 P.3d 659.

Special master's refusal to rule on a juvenile's motion to suppress does not violate
this rule if the children's court reviews the matter both before and after the adjudicatory
hearing conducted by the special master. State v. Jason F., 1998-NMSC-010, 125 N.M.
111, 957 P.2d 1145.

Validity of waiver. — Although Subsection E(8) of this section directs courts to
consider the presence or absence of an attorney, friend, or relative at the questioning,
that is merely one of the factors relevant in determining the validity of a waiver of rights,
and there is no statutory requirement that parents be notified about a custodial
interrogation of their juvenile child. State v. Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, 127 N.M. 207,
979 P.2d 718.

The state was not required to prove that 17-year-old defendant expressly waived his
rights in order to demonstrate a constitutionally valid waiver. State v. Martinez, 1999-
NMSC-018, 127 N.M. 207, 979 P.2d 718.

Consent of minor to vehicle search. — A police officer need not advise a minor of the
right to refuse to consent in order to obtain the valid consent of the minor to search the
minor’s vehicle. State v. Carlos A., 2012-NMCA-069, 284 P.3d 384, cert. denied, 2012-
NMCERT-006.

Where the minor, who was seventeen years of age, was stopped by a police officer for
a traffic violation; the officer smelled the odor of marijuana; the minor consented to the
search of the minor’s vehicle; the officer did not advise the minor and the minor did not
know that the minor had a right to refuse to consent; the contact between the minor and
the officer was low-key, polite, cooperative, and not hostile; the officer did not exert any
unusual pressure on the minor; and the encounter lasted about ten minutes from the
time of the stop to the end of the vehicle search, there was substantial evidence that the
minor voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle. State v. Carlos A., 2012-
NMCA-069, 284 P.3d 384, cert. denied, 2012-NMCERT-006.

Law reviews. — For note, "Children's Law: Investigatory Detention of Juveniles in New
Mexico: Providing Greater Protection than Miranda Rights for Children in the Area of
Police Questioning - State of New Mexico v. Javier M.," see 32 N.M.L. Rev. 393 (2002).