A. The physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the child shall be the
primary consideration for the termination of parental rights. The court may terminate the
rights of the child's parents as provided by the Adoption Act.
B. The court shall terminate parental rights with respect to a child when:
(1) the child has been abandoned by the parents;
(2) the child has been a neglected or abused child and the court finds that the
conditions and causes of the neglect and abuse are unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future; or
(3) the child has been placed in the care of others, including care by other
relatives, either by a court order or otherwise, and the following conditions exist:
(a) the child has lived in the home of others for an extended period of time;
(b) the parent-child relationship has disintegrated;
(c) a psychological parent-child relationship has developed between the
substitute family and the child;
(d) if the court deems the child of sufficient capacity to express a preference,
the child no longer prefers to live with the natural parent;
(e) the substitute family desires to adopt the child; and
(f) a presumption of abandonment created by the conditions described in
Subparagraphs (a) through (e) of this paragraph has not been rebutted.
C. A finding by the court that all of the conditions set forth in Subparagraphs (a)
through (e) of Paragraph (3) of Subsection B of this section exist shall create a
rebuttable presumption of abandonment.
History: 1978 Comp., § 32A-5-15, enacted by Laws 1993, ch. 77, § 142; 1995, ch. 206,
§ 33; 2022, ch. 41, § 60.
ANNOTATIONS
Cross references. — For the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, see 25 U.S.C. §
1901.
The 2022 amendment, effective July 1, 2022, removed a provision related to Indian
children which is now covered by the Indian Family Protection Act; and deleted former
Subsection D, which provided "The termination of parental rights involving an Indian
child shall comply with the requirements of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978.".
Applicability. — Laws 2022, ch. 41, § 73 provided that the provisions of Laws 2022,
ch. 41 apply to all cases filed on or after July 1, 2022.
The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995, substituted "the Adoption Act" for "this
article" in Subsection A, in Subsection B, added Subparagraph (3)(f) and made minor
stylistic changes in Subparagraphs (3)(d) and (3)(e), and inserted "Subparagraph (a)
through (e) of" in Subsection C.
A biological father’s conduct prior to a child’s birth cannot be used as a basis for
finding that the father caused the disintegration of the parent-child relationship. Helen G.
v. Mark J. H., 2006-NMCA-136, 140 N.M. 618, 145 P.3d 98, rev'd, 2008-NMSC-002,
143 N.M. 246, 175 P.3d 914.
Criminal's consent to adoption. — Man convicted of criminal sexual penetration of a
child had no constitutional right under the due process clauses of the United States or
New Mexico constitutions to withhold consent to adoption of the child conceived and
born as a result of that act. Christian Child Placement Serv. of the N.M. Christian
Children's Home v. Vestal, 1998-NMCA-098, 125 N.M. 426, 962 P.2d 1261.
"Neglect" by noncustodial parent. — Termination of parental rights by reason of
"neglect" requires a showing by clear and convincing evidence of culpability on the part
of the parent through intentional or negligent disregard of the child's well-being and
proper needs. If the parents are separated and living in different communities, in order
to hold a noncustodial parent responsible for the neglect of the parent having actual
physical custody of the child, it must be established that the noncustodial parent knew
or should have known of the condition of the child, that the child was without proper
care by the custodial parent because of the faults or habits of that parent, and when
able to do so, to provide that care. In re Adoption of J.J.B., 1993-NMCA-145, 117 N.M.
31, 868 P.2d 1256, rev'd in part on other grounds, 1995-NMSC-026, 119 N.M. 638, 894
P.2d 994, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 860, 116 S. Ct. 168, 133 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1995).
Insufficient evidence to support termination of parental rights. — In a termination
of parental rights proceeding, where petitioners sought termination of the mother’s
parental rights based on presumptive abandonment, the district court’s ruling that the
mother abandoned the child was not supported by the evidence when petitioners failed
to assert that the child was abandoned or provide any evidence that the child was
abandoned by his mother, and although there was some evidence providing a basis for
finding abuse and neglect, the evidence did not establish clearly and convincingly that
the mother’s condition warranted a termination of her parental rights. In re Adoption
Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093.
Law reviews. — For note, "Family Law - New Mexico Expands Due Process Rights of
Parents in Termination of Parental Rights: In Re Ruth Anne E.," see 31 N.M.L. Rev. 439
(2001).
For comment, "Custody Standards in New Mexico: Between Third Parties and Biological
Parent, What is the Trend?", see 27 N.M. L. Rev. 547 (1997).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Legal malpractice in defense of parents
at proceedings to terminate parental rights over dependent or neglected children, 18
A.L.R.5th 902.
Parent's use of drugs as factor in award of custody of children, visitation rights, or
termination of parental rights, 20 A.L.R.5th 534.
Smoking as factor in child custody and visitation cases, 36 A.L.R.5th 377.
Sufficiency of evidence to establish parent's knowledge or llowance of child's sexual
abuse by another under statute permitting termination of parental rights for 'allowing' or
'knowingly allowing' such abuse to occur, 53 A.L.R.5th 499.
Notes of Decisions
In the Matter of Adoption Petition of Romero, 2006-NMCA-136, 145 P.3d 98.
· cites it 19× “See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to “ensure due process protections”); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that “[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
Helen G. v. Mark Jh, 145 P.3d 98 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 19× “See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to "ensure due process protections"); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that "[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093, 10 N.M. 568.
· cites it 37× “Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
State v. Garcia, 2005-NMCA-065, 113 P.3d 406.
· cites it 2× “” NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-15(A) (1995). This focus on the child is different from the focus of sentencing in a criminal case.”
Matter of Adoption of JJB, 894 P.2d 994 (N.M. 1995).
· cites it 2× “As a result, the court terminated the father's parental rights under New Mexico's "presumptive abandonment statute," NMSA 1978, § 32-1-54(B)(4) (Repl.”
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093.
· cites it 37× “Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
Matter of Adoption of JJB, 868 P.2d 1256 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 2× “" The trial judge also stated, "I go back to [Father] and I know what his position is. I certainly don't see him as being an unfit parent.”
Roth v. Bookert, 894 P.2d 994 (N.M. 1995).
· cites it 2× “As a result, the court terminated the father’s parental rights under New Mexico’s “presumptive abandonment statute,” NMSA 1978, § 32-l-54(B)(4) (Repl.”
Roth v. Bookert, 868 P.2d 1256 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 2× “” The trial judge also stated, "I go back to [Father] and I know what his position is. I certainly don't see him as being an unfit parent.”
N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-15(A): 3 cases
State v. Garcia, 2005-NMCA-065, 113 P.3d 406.
“” NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-15(A) (1995). This focus on the child is different from the focus of sentencing in a criminal case.”
In the Matter of Adoption Petition of Romero, 2006-NMCA-136, 145 P.3d 98.
“See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to “ensure due process protections”); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that “[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
Helen G. v. Mark Jh, 145 P.3d 98 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
“See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to "ensure due process protections"); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that "[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-15(B): 5 cases
In the Matter of Adoption Petition of Romero, 2006-NMCA-136, 145 P.3d 98.
“See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to “ensure due process protections”); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that “[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
Helen G. v. Mark Jh, 145 P.3d 98 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
“See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to "ensure due process protections"); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that "[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093, 10 N.M. 568.
“Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093.
“Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-15(B)(1): 1 case
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093.
“Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-15(B)(2): 3 cases
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093, 10 N.M. 568.
“Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093.
“Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-15(B)(3): 9 cases
Matter of Adoption of JJB, 894 P.2d 994 (N.M. 1995).
“As a result, the court terminated the father's parental rights under New Mexico's "presumptive abandonment statute," NMSA 1978, § 32-1-54(B)(4) (Repl.”
In the Matter of Adoption Petition of Romero, 2006-NMCA-136, 145 P.3d 98.
“See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to “ensure due process protections”); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that “[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
Helen G. v. Mark Jh, 145 P.3d 98 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
“See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to "ensure due process protections"); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that "[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093, 10 N.M. 568.
“Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093.
“Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-15(B)(3)(a): 4 cases
In the Matter of Adoption Petition of Romero, 2006-NMCA-136, 145 P.3d 98.
“See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to “ensure due process protections”); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that “[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
Helen G. v. Mark Jh, 145 P.3d 98 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
“See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to "ensure due process protections"); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that "[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093, 10 N.M. 568.
“Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093.
“Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-15(B)(3)(b): 2 cases
In the Matter of Adoption Petition of Romero, 2006-NMCA-136, 145 P.3d 98.
“See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to “ensure due process protections”); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that “[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
Helen G. v. Mark Jh, 145 P.3d 98 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
“See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to "ensure due process protections"); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that "[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-15(B)(3)(c): 4 cases
In the Matter of Adoption Petition of Romero, 2006-NMCA-136, 145 P.3d 98.
“See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to “ensure due process protections”); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that “[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
Helen G. v. Mark Jh, 145 P.3d 98 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
“See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to "ensure due process protections"); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that "[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093, 10 N.M. 568.
“Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093.
“Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-15(B)(l): 1 case
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093, 10 N.M. 568.
“Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-15(C): 4 cases
In the Matter of Adoption Petition of Romero, 2006-NMCA-136, 145 P.3d 98.
“See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to “ensure due process protections”); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that “[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
Helen G. v. Mark Jh, 145 P.3d 98 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
“See NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-2 (1993) (stating that purpose of the Adoption Act is to establish protective and secure adoptive family relationships and to "ensure due process protections"); § 32A-5-15(A) (stating that "[t]he physical, mental and emotional welfare and needs of the…”
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093, 10 N.M. 568.
“Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
In re Adoption Petition of Darla D. v. Grace R., 2016-NMCA-093.
“Although Petitioners cite Section 32A-5-15 as the basis for terminating Mother’s parental rights, the verified petition in this case alleged that Mother’s parental rights were “being sought to be terminated on the basis of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.