New Mexico Statutes
N.M. Stat. § 40-3-9 (2026)
Definition of separate and community debts.
✓ current as of May 2026
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A. "Separate debt" means:
(1) a debt contracted or incurred by a spouse before marriage or after entry of
a decree of dissolution of marriage;
(2) a debt contracted or incurred by a spouse after entry of a decree entered
pursuant to Section 40-4-3 NMSA 1978, unless the decree provides otherwise;
(3) a debt designated as a separate debt of a spouse by a judgment or
decree of any court having jurisdiction;
(4) a debt contracted by a spouse during marriage which is identified by a
spouse to the creditor in writing at the time of its creation as the separate debt of the
contracting spouse;
(5) a debt which arises from a tort committed by a spouse before marriage or
after entry of a decree of dissolution of marriage or a separate tort committed during
marriage; or
(6) a debt declared to be unreasonable pursuant to Section 2 [40-3-10.1
NMSA 1978] of this act.
B. "Community debt" means a debt contracted or incurred by either or both spouses
during marriage which is not a separate debt.
History: 1953 Comp., § 57-4A-3, enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 320, § 4; 1983, ch. 75, §
1.
ANNOTATIONS
Purpose. — Subsection A is directed mainly toward relations between couples and
their creditors. The legislature did not intend to restrict the courts' ability to practice
fairness as between two spouses. Fernandez v. Fernandez, 1991-NMCA-001, 111 N.M.
442, 806 P.2d 582.
Requirement of written notice to creditor. — The main purpose of Subsection A(4),
requiring written notice to the creditor, is to protect creditors who might be unaware that
spouses do not intend to create a community debt. As between spouses, however, it is
not as necessary to require strict compliance with the statute. Where there is evidence
that spouses do not intend the debt to be community and take steps to ensure it is not,
a court may find this substantial compliance sufficient to declare the debt separate as
between the spouses. Fernandez v. Fernandez, 1991-NMCA-001, 111 N.M. 442, 806
P.2d 582.
The fundamental purpose behind the written notice requirement of Subsection A(4) is to
protect creditors who might be unaware that the debtor spouse intends to create a
separate debt, rather than a community debt. Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Sproul, 1993-
NMSC-051, 116 N.M. 254, 861 P.2d 935.
Threshold question of whether item is community or separate debt is a legal issue.
Bursum v. Bursum, 2004-NMCA-133, 136 N.M. 584, 102 P.3d 651, cert. denied, 2005-
NMCERT-003, 137 N.M. 290, 110 P.3d 506.
Remainder of wife's attorney's fees not considered community debt. — The district
court could reasonably have ruled that the remainder of wife's attorney fees, while
stipulated to be reasonable in amount for the work done, was unreasonably incurred
and therefore would not be considered community debt. Bursum v. Bursum, 2004-
NMCA-133, 136 N.M. 584, 102 P.3d 651, cert. denied, 2005-NMCERT-003, 137 N.M.
290, 110 P.3d 506.
Fiduciary duty. — Each spouse owes the other a fiduciary duty when managing
community property. This fiduciary duty limits a spouse's ability to enter into any
transaction in which he or she might wish to engage, without fear of subsequent liability
to the other spouse. Fernandez v. Fernandez, 1991-NMCA-001, 111 N.M. 442, 806
P.2d 582.
Wife's estate not liable for loss in public office. — Where no attempt was made to
show that defendant's wife was in any way responsible for the loss appearing in the
records of her husband's public office, her separate estate was not liable for her
husband's separate obligations. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Chavez, 126 F. Supp. 227
(D.N.M. 1954).
Wife's estate exempt from attachment proceedings. — The entire community estate
of the defendant and his wife was not subject to his indebtedness, where the wife, so far
as the record showed, had no knowledge of any shortage on the part of her husband,
nor did she give her consent thereto, or ratify the acts, if any, of her husband, which
resulted in the shortage, and neither did the shortage benefit the community estate, so
far as was shown; therefore, the vested estate of the wife (intervenor) in and to the
community property tracts was exempt from the attachment proceedings instituted by
the bonding company, and the community interest of the husband was subject to sale
under the attachment, inasmuch as his shortages created a separate liability on his part,
resulting in a judgment against him. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Chavez, 126 F. Supp. 227
(D.N.M. 1954).
Separate debt. — At least as between the parties to a divorce, and under certain
circumstances, a debt may be classified as separate even if it was incurred while the
parties lived together and even though it may not meet the strict requirements of
Subsection A. Fernandez v. Fernandez, 1991-NMCA-001, 111 N.M. 442, 806 P.2d 582.
Evidence supported a determination that the parties attempted to arrange a loan as a
separate debt instead of a community debt, where the husband knew that the wife
would not participate in the transaction and that she did not want any community assets
included, the mortgage securing the loan explicitly stated that the husband was a
married man dealing in his sole and separate property, and the wife testified that the
creditor asked her to sign documents disclaiming any interest in the collateral.
Fernandez v. Fernandez, 1991-NMCA-001, 111 N.M. 442, 806 P.2d 582.
Underlying obligation represented by a fraudulently executed promissory note was a
separate debt of the wife, and the proceeds received did not benefit the community,
where the wife committed fraud against her husband by allowing her brother to
impersonate her husband and forge his name on financial documents. Beneficial Fin.
Co. v. Alarcon, 1991-NMSC-074, 112 N.M. 420, 816 P.2d 489.
Husband may have separate credit and debt. — While the credit of the husband
belongs presumptively to the community, still he may contract a separate debt based
upon his separate credit and assets acquired in that manner are his separate property.
Campbell v. Campbell, 1957-NMSC-001, 62 N.M. 330, 310 P.2d 266.
Determination whether tort debt of community or spouse. — This section leaves to
the courts the problem of determining whether a tort committed by a spouse during
marriage is a "community" or a "separate" tort. Under the rule followed in most
community property states, the test to be applied in such cases is an after-the-fact
determination of whether the act in which the spouse was engaged at the time of the
tort was one which was of actual or potential benefit to the community. If it was of
benefit, the tort is a "community" tort, and thus a community debt, to be collected under
the provisions of 40-3-11 NMSA 1978. Dell v. Heard, 532 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1976).
In determining the issue of whether a tort committed by a spouse is a "community" or a
"separate" tort, the test to be applied is an after-the-fact determination of whether the
act in which the spouse was engaged at the time of the tort was one which was of
actual or potential benefit to the community; if it was of benefit, the tort is a "community"
tort, and thus a community debt; if the activity in which the tortfeasor spouse was
engaged was of no benefit to the community, the tort is a "separate" tort and thus a
separate debt. Delph v. Potomac Ins. Co., 1980-NMSC-140, 95 N.M. 257, 620 P.2d
1282.
It is inappropriate to enter a judgment against one spouse solely because the other
spouse has committed a community tort. Such a judgment could readily create
confusion, because the judgment ordinarily could not be executed against the separate
property of the spouse who was not the tortfeasor. Naranjo v. Paull, 1990-NMCA-111,
111 N.M. 165, 803 P.2d 254.
There is no reason why the same court that hears a tort case could not concurrently
decide whether the tort was a community tort, at least when both spouses are
defendants. Such a proceeding should not be foreclosed just because the plaintiff may
also have the option of waiting until execution on the judgment to litigate whether the
tort was a community tort. Naranjo v. Paull, 1990-NMCA-111, 111 N.M. 165, 803 P.2d
254.
Husband's breach of listing agreement subjected community to debts without
wife's concurrence. — The fact that, upon the breach of a real estate listing agreement
by the husband, the listing agent can bring suit, obtain a judgment and levy on the
property without the wife's signature on the agreement is not violative of this section,
inasmuch as a husband can subject the community to certain debts without the
concurrence of his wife. Execu-Systems v. Corlis, 1980-NMSC-121, 95 N.M. 145, 619
P.2d 821.
Attorney's fees incurred due to child visitation issues from previous marriage. —
Chapter 7 debtor-husband was liable for attorney's fees incurred by spouse in
connection with child visitation issues from a previous marriage, as spouse's debt was
incurred as a community debt. In re Strickland, 153 Bankr. 909 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1993).
Trial court's finding of separate property upheld. — The trial court, upon dissolution
of a marriage, has a duty to determine whether debts and obligations incurred by the
parties during coverture are community or separate debts; the trial court's finding
assigning income tax liability and intervenor's claim as husband's separate debts would
not be disturbed where husband had failed to demonstrate on appeal that the trial
court's ruling was unsupported by substantial evidence, nor had husband shown that he
requested a finding of fact on this issue, and wife's counsel had also failed to provide
authority for the merits of her discussion on this issue. Fenner v. Fenner, 1987-NMCA-
066, 106 N.M. 36, 738 P.2d 908, cert. denied, 106 N.M. 7, 738 P.2d 125.
Presumption that debt of the community. — In New Mexico, there is a presumption
that debt incurred by a married person is community debt. Swink v. Sunwest Bank (In re
Fingado), 113 Bankr. 37 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1990).
As a general rule, one spouse may incur a community debt even though the other
spouse does not participate in the transaction. Fernandez v. Fernandez, 1991-NMCA-
001, 111 N.M. 442, 806 P.2d 582.
As between a spouse and the other spouse's creditor, Subsection A(4) requires that the
debtor spouse expressly communicate the separate nature of a marital debt to a
creditor in writing when creating a marital debt intended to be that spouse's separate
obligation, and since the defendant debtor was unable to point to any written provision
in the note or to any other written agreement between himself and the creditor bank that
identified the debt as his own separate obligation, the debt remained a community debt.
Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Sproul, 1993-NMSC-051, 116 N.M. 254, 861 P.2d 935.
Presumption that debt of the community. — The community is liable for community
debts and there is a presumption that all debts contracted during the marriage are
community debts. 1960 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 60-37 (rendered under former law).
Community not obligated for support of spouse's parent. — In terms, at least, no
obligation is placed on the child and his or her spouse to support their parents. The
ultimate effect of the former statute may be exactly this, but not because the obligation,
as created, invests it with this character. Further, it is not an obligation which is incurred
for the benefit of the community. It cannot be said that the discharge of this obligation in
any direct manner enhances, or is intended to enhance, the interest of the community.
1956 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 56-6499 (rendered under former law).
Only husband's share of community subject to his separate tort. — Upon the
question of recovery from the community property for an obligation based on the
husband's separate tort, it would seem that not the whole of the community, but only his
share therein, could be subjected to payment. 1956 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 56-6499
(rendered under former law).
Law reviews. — For article, "The Community Property Act of 1973: A Commentary and
Quasi-Legislative History," see 5 N.M.L. Rev. 1 (1974).
For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to domestic relations, see 12 N.M.L. Rev.
325 (1982).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Liability of community property for
antenuptial debts and obligations, 68 A.L.R.4th 877.
41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 164 et seq.Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24
cases, 1980–2020 · leading case: Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Sproul, 861 P.2d 935 (N.M. 1993).
Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Sproul, 861 P.2d 935 (N.M. 1993). “Sproul”), constituted a community debt under NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-9 (Repl.Pamp.1989). Mrs. Sproul also appeals from the district court’s order subjecting the Sprouls’ residence, owned as community real property, to foreclosure and judicial sale pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section…”
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. v. Silver (In Re Silver), 367 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2007). “§ 40-3-9]) leaves to the courts the problem of determining whether a tort committed by a spouse during marriage is a “community” or a “separate” tort.”
Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Alarcon, 816 P.2d 489 (N.M. 1991). “Community debts are defined by exclusion, all debts contracted or incurred by either spouse during marriage that do not fall within one of the specific subsections of NMSA 1978, 40-3-9 A(1) through (6) defining "separate debt.”
Fernandez v. Fernandez, 806 P.2d 582 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). “See NMSA 1978, § 40-3-9 (Repl. Pamp.1989) (defining separate and community debts).”
Bustos v. Gilroy, 751 P.2d 188 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988). “Principally, wife argues that the parties’ legal expenses relating to their divorce were presumptively community debts under NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-9 (Repl.1986) and in the absence of a showing by husband sufficient to overcome the presumption, the court should have declared…”
Bursum v. Bursum, 102 P.3d 651 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). “Section 40-3-9(A). Unreasonable debt is debt that is acquired by one spouse while living apart that does “not contribute to the benefit of both spouses or their dependents.”
Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994). “075 (amended 1991) (provides for equitable distribution of marital assets and marital liabilities); N.M.Stat. § 40-3-9 (1978 and Supp. 1993) (provides definitions of separate and community debt); Va.”
Blackwell v. Lurie, 71 P.3d 509 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). “2d at 939-42 ; see § 40-3-9. Based upon these community property and community debt designations, the Court recognized and applied the statutory requirement that community debts be paid first from community assets.”
Naranjo v. Paull, 803 P.2d 254 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990). “See NMSA 1978, § 40-3-9 (Repl.Pamp.1989). The Naranjos’ Requested Finding No.”
Fenner v. Fenner, 738 P.2d 908 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987). “See NMSA 1978, § 40-3-9(A) (Repl.1986). Wife’s counsel also fails to provide authority for the merits of her discussion on this issue.”
Swink v. Sunwest Bank (In Re Fingado), 113 B.R. 37 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1990). “§ 40-3-9(A) & (B) (Repl.Pamp.1989) defines separate and community debt and provides in subsection (B) that community debt means “a debt contracted or incurred by either or both spouses during marriage which is not a separate debt.”
In Re Gonzales, 297 B.R. 143 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2003). “1990); Section 40-3-9(A)(5) NMSA 1978 (1999 Repl.”
— N.M. Stat. § 40-3-9(A) — 9 cases
Fernandez v. Fernandez, 806 P.2d 582 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). “See NMSA 1978, § 40-3-9 (Repl. Pamp.1989) (defining separate and community debts).”
Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Alarcon, 816 P.2d 489 (N.M. 1991). “Community debts are defined by exclusion, all debts contracted or incurred by either spouse during marriage that do not fall within one of the specific subsections of NMSA 1978, 40-3-9 A(1) through (6) defining "separate debt.”
Bursum v. Bursum, 102 P.3d 651 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). “Section 40-3-9(A). Unreasonable debt is debt that is acquired by one spouse while living apart that does “not contribute to the benefit of both spouses or their dependents.”
Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Sproul, 861 P.2d 935 (N.M. 1993). “Sproul”), constituted a community debt under NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-9 (Repl.Pamp.1989). Mrs. Sproul also appeals from the district court’s order subjecting the Sprouls’ residence, owned as community real property, to foreclosure and judicial sale pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section…”
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. v. Silver (In Re Silver), 367 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2007). “§ 40-3-9]) leaves to the courts the problem of determining whether a tort committed by a spouse during marriage is a “community” or a “separate” tort.”
— N.M. Stat. § 40-3-9(A)(3) — 3 cases
Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Sproul, 861 P.2d 935 (N.M. 1993). “Sproul”), constituted a community debt under NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-9 (Repl.Pamp.1989). Mrs. Sproul also appeals from the district court’s order subjecting the Sprouls’ residence, owned as community real property, to foreclosure and judicial sale pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section…”
Blackwell v. Lurie, 71 P.3d 509 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). “2d at 939-42 ; see § 40-3-9. Based upon these community property and community debt designations, the Court recognized and applied the statutory requirement that community debts be paid first from community assets.”
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. v. Silver (In Re Silver), 367 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2007). “§ 40-3-9]) leaves to the courts the problem of determining whether a tort committed by a spouse during marriage is a “community” or a “separate” tort.”
— N.M. Stat. § 40-3-9(A)(4) — 3 cases
Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Sproul, 861 P.2d 935 (N.M. 1993). “Sproul”), constituted a community debt under NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-9 (Repl.Pamp.1989). Mrs. Sproul also appeals from the district court’s order subjecting the Sprouls’ residence, owned as community real property, to foreclosure and judicial sale pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section…”
Fernandez v. Fernandez, 806 P.2d 582 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). “See NMSA 1978, § 40-3-9 (Repl. Pamp.1989) (defining separate and community debts).”
Telles v. Telles (N.M. Ct. App. 2020).
— N.M. Stat. § 40-3-9(A)(5) — 2 cases
In Re Gonzales, 297 B.R. 143 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2003). “1990); Section 40-3-9(A)(5) NMSA 1978 (1999 Repl.”
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. v. Silver (In Re Silver), 367 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2007). “§ 40-3-9]) leaves to the courts the problem of determining whether a tort committed by a spouse during marriage is a “community” or a “separate” tort.”
— N.M. Stat. § 40-3-9(A)(6) — 1 case
Welch v. Welch (N.M. Ct. App. 2018).
— N.M. Stat. § 40-3-9(A)(l) — 2 cases
Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Sproul, 861 P.2d 935 (N.M. 1993). “Sproul”), constituted a community debt under NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-9 (Repl.Pamp.1989). Mrs. Sproul also appeals from the district court’s order subjecting the Sprouls’ residence, owned as community real property, to foreclosure and judicial sale pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section…”
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. v. Silver (In Re Silver), 367 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2007). “§ 40-3-9]) leaves to the courts the problem of determining whether a tort committed by a spouse during marriage is a “community” or a “separate” tort.”
— N.M. Stat. § 40-3-9(B) — 10 cases
Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Sproul, 861 P.2d 935 (N.M. 1993). “Sproul”), constituted a community debt under NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-9 (Repl.Pamp.1989). Mrs. Sproul also appeals from the district court’s order subjecting the Sprouls’ residence, owned as community real property, to foreclosure and judicial sale pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section…”
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. v. Silver (In Re Silver), 367 B.R. 795 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2007). “§ 40-3-9]) leaves to the courts the problem of determining whether a tort committed by a spouse during marriage is a “community” or a “separate” tort.”
Bursum v. Bursum, 102 P.3d 651 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). “Section 40-3-9(A). Unreasonable debt is debt that is acquired by one spouse while living apart that does “not contribute to the benefit of both spouses or their dependents.”
Bustos v. Gilroy, 751 P.2d 188 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988). “Principally, wife argues that the parties’ legal expenses relating to their divorce were presumptively community debts under NMSA 1978, Section 40-3-9 (Repl.1986) and in the absence of a showing by husband sufficient to overcome the presumption, the court should have declared…”
Karpien v. Karpien, 207 P.3d 1165 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009).
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