New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 40-4-1 (2026)

Dissolution of marriage.

✓ current as of May 2026
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On the petition of either party to a marriage, a district court may decree a dissolution
of marriage on any of the following grounds:

   A. incompatibility;

   B. cruel and inhuman treatment;
   C. adultery; or

   D. abandonment.

History: 1953 Comp., § 22-7-1, enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 319, § 1.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For annulment, see 40-1-9 NMSA 1978.

For provisions of the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, see 40-
10A-101 to 40-10A-403 NMSA 1978.

                         I.      GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Forum non conveniens. — Where jurisdiction, residence, and incompatibility are
shown to exist, a New Mexico trial court has no discretionary right to deny a divorce.
The plaintiff's choice of forum should not be disturbed except for weighty reasons.
Spruyt v. Spruyt, 1993-NMSC-020, 115 N.M. 405, 851 P.2d 1072.

Court not to deny divorce where ground shown. — The legislature has power to
prescribe the causes affording grounds for divorce, and where a statutory ground is
shown to exist, the court has no discretionary right to deny a divorce. State ex rel.
DuBois v. Ryan, 1973-NMSC-097, 85 N.M. 575, 514 P.2d 851; Buckner v. Buckner,
1981-NMSC-007, 95 N.M. 337, 622 P.2d 242.

                               II.    INCOMPATIBILITY.

Court must decree divorce upon finding of incompatibility. — The legislature,
acting properly within its powers, has established "incompatibility" as a ground for
divorce and once such a finding is made that it exists, a divorce decree must be
entered. Garner v. Garner, 1973-NMSC-067, 85 N.M. 324, 512 P.2d 84.

Court not vacating incompatibility finding cannot vacate divorce award. — The
trial court, having found husband and wife to be incompatible, having awarded a divorce
on that ground, and not having vacated that finding, lacked discretion and power to
vacate the award. State ex rel. DuBois v. Ryan, 1973-NMSC-097, 85 N.M. 575, 514
P.2d 851.

Irreconcilableness important factor in incompatibility. — Although incompatibility is
difficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness, irreconcilableness is an important
factor to be considered in deciding incompatibility. State ex rel. DuBois v. Ryan, 1973-
NMSC-097, 85 N.M. 575, 514 P.2d 851.

Misconduct, fault or blame not significant if incompatibility exists. — Either
husband or wife may secure a divorce on the ground of incompatibility regardless of
whether either, both or neither has been guilty of misconduct, and regardless of whether
either, both or neither is at fault or to blame. Misconduct, fault or blame is of no
significance, if in fact incompatibility exists. State ex rel. DuBois v. Ryan, 1973-NMSC-
097, 85 N.M. 575, 514 P.2d 851.

Doctrine of recrimination as defense is abolished in proceedings where a divorce is
sought on the grounds of incompatibility. Henceforth, evidence of any recriminatory act
is only admissible to the extent that such act may have weight as proof on the issue of
incompatibility as a ground for divorce. Garner v. Garner, 1973-NMSC-067, 85 N.M.
324, 512 P.2d 84; State ex rel. DuBois v. Ryan, 1973-NMSC-097, 85 N.M. 575, 514
P.2d 851.

Wife may establish separate residence where incompatibility exists. — Where
incompatibility exists a wife is justified, under this act, in establishing a separate
residence and domicile from that of her husband even though a divorce decree has not
been granted or a divorce proceeding instituted. Bassett v. Bassett, 1952-NMSC-100,
56 N.M. 739, 250 P.2d 487.

                     III.    CRUEL AND INHUMAN TREATMENT.

Physical cruelty not essential to support decree. — A finding that a plaintiff
established physical cruelty, as for instance, an impairment of health by reason of acts
found to constitute cruelty, is not essential to support a decree on the ground of cruelty.
Holloman v. Holloman, 1945-NMSC-036, 49 N.M. 288, 162 P.2d 782.

                                IV.    ABANDONMENT.

Adultery subsequent to abandonment as bar to divorce suit. — Adultery by a wife
subsequent to abandonment by her husband is bar to the wife's suit for divorce. Chavez
v. Chavez, 1935-NMSC-077, 39 N.M. 480, 50 P.2d 264 (decided under prior law).

                        V.    GROUNDS UNDER PRIOR LAWS.

Husband's failure to support. — Where it appeared that a husband had the mental
and physical ability to provide for the support of his family, and neglected to do so, or
was indifferent, the wife was entitled to a divorce. Taylor v. Taylor, 1915-NMSC-002, 20
N.M. 13, 145 P. 1075 (decided under prior law).

Wife convicted of felony and imprisoned. — Where a wife was convicted of a felony,
and was legally committed to the warden of the penitentiary, who sent her to the
governor who issued to her a conditional pardon, she was "imprisoned" within the
meaning of this section. Klasner v. Klasner, 1918-NMSC-021, 23 N.M. 627, 170 P. 745
(decided under prior law).

Law reviews. — For article, "Annulment of Marriages in New Mexico: Part II - Proposed
Statute," see 2 Nat. Resources J. 270 (1962).
For article, "New Mexico Community Property Law and the Division of Retirement Plan
Benefits Pursuant to the Dissolution of Marriage," see 13 N.M.L. Rev. 641 (1983).

For symposium, "The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment on the New Mexico
Criminal Code," see 3 N.M.L. Rev. 106 (1973).

For symposium, "Equal Rights in Divorce and Separation," see 3 N.M.L. Rev. 118
(1973).

For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to domestic relations, see 12 N.M.L. Rev.
325 (1982).

For article, "Arbitration of Domestic Relations Disputes in New Mexico," see 16 N.M.L.
Rev. 321 (1986).

For note, "Tort Law - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the Marital Context:
Hakkila v. Hakkila," see 23 N.M.L. Rev. 387 (1993).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation
§§ 12, 19, 20 to 128.

Refusal of sexual intercourse as ground for divorce, 82 A.L.R.3d 660.

Avoidance of procreation of children as ground for divorce or separation, 4 A.L.R.2d
227.

What constitutes duress sufficient to warrant divorce, 16 A.L.R.2d 1430.

Insanity as affecting right to divorce or separation on other grounds, 19 A.L.R.2d 144.

Conviction in another jurisdiction as within statute making conviction of crime a ground
of divorce, 19 A.L.R.2d 1047.

Acts or omissions of spouse causing other spouse to leave home as desertion by
former, 19 A.L.R.2d 1428.

Recrimination as defense to divorce sought on ground of incompatibility, 21 A.L.R.2d
1267.

Pension of husband as resource which court may consider in determining amount of
alimony, 22 A.L.R.2d 1421.

Insanity as substantive ground of divorce or separation, 24 A.L.R.2d 873.

Racial, religious or political differences as ground for divorce, separation or annulment,
25 A.L.R.2d 928.
Wife's failure to follow husband to new domicil as constituting desertion or abandonment
as ground for divorce, 29 A.L.R.2d 474.

What amounts to habitual intemperance, drunkenness and the like, within statute
relating to substantive grounds for divorce, 29 A.L.R.2d 925.

Charge of insanity, or attempt to have spouse committed to mental institutions, as
ground for divorce, 33 A.L.R.2d 1230.

Concealed premarital unchastity or parenthood as ground of divorce, 64 A.L.R.2d 742.

Homosexuality as a ground for divorce, 78 A.L.R.2d 807.

Divorce: time of pendency of former suit as part of period of desertion, 80 A.L.R.2d 855.

Acts occurring after commencement of suit for divorce as ground for decree under
original complaint, 98 A.L.R.2d 1264.

Single act as basis of divorce or separation on ground of cruelty, 7 A.L.R.3d 761.

Right of one spouse, over objection, to voluntarily dismiss claim for divorce, 16 A.L.R.3d
283.

Retrospective effect of statute prescribing grounds of divorce, 23 A.L.R.3d 626.

Separation within the statute making separation a substantive ground of divorce, 35
A.L.R.3d 1238.

Transvestism or transsexualism of spouse as justifying divorce, 82 A.L.R.3d 725.

Adulterous wife's right to permanent alimony, 86 A.L.R.3d 97.

What constitutes "incompatibility" within statute specifying it as substantive ground for
divorce, 97 A.L.R.3d 989.

Right of incarcerated mother to retain custody of infant in penal institution, 14 A.L.R.4th
748.

Excessiveness or adequacy of amount of money awarded as permanent alimony
following divorce, 28 A.L.R.4th 786.

Enforceability of agreement requiring spouse's co-operation in obtaining religious bill of
divorce, 29 A.L.R.4th 746.

Effect of death of party to divorce proceeding pending appeal or time allowed for
appeal, 33 A.L.R.4th 47.
Right to jury trial in state court divorce proceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955.

Lis pendens as applicable to suit for separation or dissolution of marriage, 65 A.L.R.4th
522.

Insanity as defense to divorce or separation suit - post-1950 cases, 67 A.L.R.4th 277.

Homosexuality, transvestism, and similar sexual practices as grounds for annulment of
marriage, 68 A.L.R.4th 1069.

Joinder of tort actions between spouses with proceeding for dissolution of marriage, 4
A.L.R.5th 972.

Homosexuality as ground for divorce, 96 A.L.R.5th 83.

27A C.J.S. Divorce §§ 13-70.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 17 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1981–2026 · leading case: Chatterjee v. King, 2011 NMCA 12 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010).
Chatterjee v. King, 2011 NMCA 12 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 8× “1 to apply only to proceedings between a husband and a wife.”
Chatterjee v. King, 2012 NMSC 19 (N.M. 2012). · cites it 4× “In the motion to dismiss, King neither admitted nor denied any of the facts that Chatterjee claimed in her Petition.”
Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 497 S.E.2d 531 (W. Va. 1997). “§ 2A:34-2(a) (1987); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-1 (c) (1994); N.Y.”
Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 2× “A cautious approach to the tort of intramarital outrage also finds support in the *1326 public policy of New Mexico to avoid inquiry into what went wrong in a marriage.”
Thornton v. Gamble, 688 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984). “1983), and find nothing comparable to Washington’s policy favoring a prompt dissolution of unworkable marriages, Herrasen, which would support any right to piece-meal review of interlocutory decisions in divorce cases.”
Vigil v. Haber, 888 P.2d 455 (N.M. 1994). · cites it 2× “2d 851, 853 (1973); see NMSA 1978, § 40-4-1(A) (Repl.Pamp.1994) (stating grounds for divorce includes incompatibility).”
Buckner v. Buckner, 622 P.2d 242 (N.M. 1981). · cites it 2× “Section 40-4-1, N.M.S.A. 1978, provides that “a district court may decree a dissolution of marriage.”
Diamond v. Diamond, 2011 NMCA 2 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “Mother asserts that the UPA, read in concert with the Dissolution of Marriage statutes, NMSA 1978, §§ 40-4-1 to -20 (1901, as amended through 2008) (DM statutes), does not give the district court authority to award child support to an emancipated minor.”
Griego v. Oliver, 2014 NMSC 003 (N.M. 2013). “See §§ 40-4-1 to -20. Finally, the Family Preservation Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 40-15-1 to -4 (2005), also supports our conclusion that the overriding purpose of our marriage laws is the stability of marriage for the benefit of married couples and their families.”
Sanders v. Rosenberg, 896 P.2d 491 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 2× “It is unfortunate but true that much domestic relations litigation is not in the best interests of children. Nonetheless, our legislature has provided for the resolution of domestic disputes in court with all of the benefits and burdens of the adversary system.”
Chatterjee v. King, 253 P.3d 915 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 5× “{16} Respondent argued at oral argument before this Court that the dissolution of marriage statutes, NMSA 1978, §§ 40-4-1 to -20 (1901, as amended through 2008), do not apply to this case because there was no marriage or dissolution thereof.”
Butterworth v. Jackson (N.M. 2026). · cites it 4× “To the extent the Legislature created any statutory rights 8 in Section 40-2-1, it also created a statutory remedy where the terms of Section 40- 9 2-1 are violated: divorce under NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-1 (1973). 10 {23} Instead, the legal recourse for lack of affection in a…”
— N.M. Stat. § 40-4-1(A) — 5 cases
Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). “A cautious approach to the tort of intramarital outrage also finds support in the *1326 public policy of New Mexico to avoid inquiry into what went wrong in a marriage.”
Vigil v. Haber, 888 P.2d 455 (N.M. 1994). “2d 851, 853 (1973); see NMSA 1978, § 40-4-1(A) (Repl.Pamp.1994) (stating grounds for divorce includes incompatibility).”
Hobson v. Hobson (N.M. Ct. App. 2014).
Butterworth v. Jackson (N.M. 2026). “To the extent the Legislature created any statutory rights 8 in Section 40-2-1, it also created a statutory remedy where the terms of Section 40- 9 2-1 are violated: divorce under NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-1 (1973). 10 {23} Instead, the legal recourse for lack of affection in a…”
I Cedrins v. R Shrestha (N.M. Ct. App. 2009).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.