New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 42-2-1 (2026)

Declaration of intent.

✓ current as of May 2026
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The legislature hereby determines and declares that the construction of urgently
needed public roads and state highways is being delayed by the inability to enter into
timely possession of the condemned property; that the landowner must wait the
termination of prolonged litigation before he receives compensation for his property; that
the delay in possession and therefore construction of the facility results in increased
construction costs and thereby injuriously affects the public. The legislature, recognizing
its responsibility, intends to solve these problems by establishing a special procedure
whereby the state can enter into possession at the inception of the proceeding, and the
interests of the property owner are protected by providing for an adequate bond prior to
vesting of title and the taking of possession and also safeguarding the property owners'
right to a speedy judicial determination of the total just compensation due. This
legislation is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, [and]
safety, the promotion of the general welfare and to minimize the economic and financial
dislocation caused by highway construction.
   The special procedure set forth herein shall be in addition to any other
condemnation procedure now in effect and shall not be construed as repealing or
amending such procedure by implication.

History: 1953 Comp., § 22-9-39, enacted by Laws 1959, ch. 324, § 1.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Bracketed material. — The bracketed material was inserted by the compiler and is not
part of the law.

Legislative intent. — It would have been practically impossible for the legislature to
have stated more clearly their intention that compensation should be paid when public
property was condemned for highway purposes. The requirement for payment is clearly
without regard to the nature of uses being made and accordingly includes property
being used for a governmental as well as a proprietary purpose. State ex rel. State Hwy.
Comm'n v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 1963-NMSC-074, 72 N.M. 86, 380 P.2d 830.

Provision for compensation when property condemned for highway purposes. —
Since highways are state projects paid for by the public of the state at large, including in
many instances contribution by the federal government, it is only just and proper that
the legislature in its wisdom should provide for compensation when public property is
taken for highway purposes. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Board of Cnty.
Comm'rs, 1963-NMSC-074, 72 N.M. 86, 380 P.2d 830 (1963).

Loss of business due to restriction of direct access, noncompensable. — Loss of
business or of prospective business, because the traveling public cannot reach a
roadside business establishment as readily as before the restriction of direct access,
amounts only to a diversion of traffic and is noncompensable. State ex rel. State Hwy.
Comm'n v. Brock, 1968-NMSC-165, 80 N.M. 80, 451 P.2d 984.

Once reasonable access is given to the main highway system by means of frontage
roads, any circuity of travel occasioned by the loss of direct ingress and egress is
noncompensable. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Brock, 1968-NMSC-165, 80 N.M.
80, 451 P.2d 984.

Mere inconvenience resulting from the closing of streets or roads which requires circuity
of travel by those abutting on such roads to reach the main highway system does not
give rise to a legal right in one so inconvenienced, when another reasonable, although
perhaps not equally accessible, means of ingress and egress is afforded. State ex rel.
State Hwy. Comm'n v. Brock, 1968-NMSC-165, 80 N.M. 80, 451 P.2d 984.

Rule relating to dismissal of actions inapplicable. — The special statutory eminent
domain procedure is inconsistent with rule 41(b) and (e), N.M.R. Civ. P. (now Rule 1-
0041 NMRA), relating to dismissal of actions, and these rules are therefore inapplicable
to eminent domain proceedings brought under the special alternative procedure where
a permanent order of entry has been made as to some part of the property being
condemned. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Burks, 1968-NMSC-121, 79 N.M. 373,
443 P.2d 866.

Effect of trial court's refusal to allow expert to testify. — The trial court's refusal to
allow plaintiff's expert appraiser to testify as to the fair market value of the property in
question, after a detailed and lengthy examination into the expert's qualifications was
reversible error. City of Santa Fe v. Gonzales, 1969-NMSC-085, 80 N.M. 401, 456 P.2d
875.

All public land, no matter how acquired, subject to condemnation. — The fact that
public lands were in part or whole acquired by trust funds is immaterial. The chapter
draws no such distinction. It subjects all public land to eminent domain without
distinction so long as a determination has been made that the land is required for a
greater public need. Laws 1959, ch. 324, gives the state and all of its political
subdivisions the right to acquire public property by right of eminent domain for use of
public highways. 1960 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 60-156.

Law reviews. — For article, "Frontland Taking - Backland Value", 9 Nat. Resources J.
237 (1969).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1974–2025 · leading case: City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 845 P.2d 753 (N.M. 1992).
City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 845 P.2d 753 (N.M. 1992). · cites it 4× “NMSA 1978, §§ 42-2-1 to -24 (Orig.Pamp.).”
Santa Fe S. Ry., Inc. v. Baucis Ltd. Liab. Co., 952 P.2d 31 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 2× “UJI 13-701 and 13-702 are a correct statement of the law under the former Act and under the current alternative condemnation procedure allowed for public roads, state highways and flood control projects.”
Cnty. of Dona Ana Ex Rel. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners v. Bennett, 867 P.2d 1160 (N.M. 1994). · cites it 2× “The County filed its petition under the Special Alternative Condemnation Procedure established by NMSA 1978, Sections 42-2-1 to -24 (Orig.Pamp. & Cum.”
Bd. of Educ., Moriarty Mun. Sch. Dist. v. Thunder Mountain Water Co., 161 P.3d 869 (N.M. 2007). “{3} The School District filed a petition for eminent domain to condemn the water line extension and associated property in accordance with the Eminent Domain Code, NMSA 1978, Sections 42A-1-1 to -33 (1981, as amended through 2001) and the Special Alternative Condemnation…”
State v. Milton, 526 P.2d 436 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974). · cites it 2× “For jails under control of sheriffs, see § 42-2-1 et seq., N.M.S.A. 1953 (2nd Repl.”
City of Albuquerque v. SMP Props., LLC, 2021 NMSC 011 (N.M. 2021). · cites it 2× “See NMSA 1978, § 42-2-1 (1959) (providing for a “special [alternative condemnation] procedure whereby the state can enter into possession at the inception of the proceeding”).”
Cnty. of Bernalillo v. Morris, 872 P.2d 371 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 4× “NMSA 1978, §§ 42-2-1 to -24 (Orig.Pamp. & Cum.”
Moriarty Mun. Sch. Dist. v. Thunder Mountain Water Co., 2006 NMCA 135 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006). “Thunder Mountain refused and the School District filed its petition for eminent domain to condemn the water line extension and associated property pursuant to the Eminent Domain Code, NMSA 1978, Sections 42A-1-1 to -33 (1981, as amended through 2001) and the Special Alternative…”
Bd. of Educ., Rio Rancho Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 1998 NMCA 048 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 2× “See NMSA 1978, §§ 42-2-1 to 42-2-16 (1981). Under this procedure the condemning authority can obtain expedited access to the property to be condemned by depositing with the district court clerk the amount the authority is offering the property owner and also filing a surety…”
Cobb v. Sapphire Aviation LLC (N.M. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 2× “In the FSA, Andra and the Cobbs acknowledged their designation as statutory beneficiaries under the New Mexico Wrongful Death Act (WDA), NMSA 1978, §§ 42-2-1 to -4 (1882, as amended through 2001), but waived its application as to distribution of statutory percentages.”
Moriarty Mun. Sch. Dist. v. Thunder Mtn., 145 P.3d 92 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006). “Thunder Mountain refused and the School District filed its petition for eminent domain to condemn the water line extension and associated property pursuant to the Eminent Domain Code, NMSA 1978, Sections 42A-1-1 to -33 (1981, as amended through 2001) and the Special Alternative…”
Smith v. New Mexico Coal 401(K) Pers. Sav. Plan, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (D.N.M. 2008). “' § 42-2-1, et seq. (R. 508-509.) On January 25, 2005, shares of Mr.”
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