N.M. Stat. § 52-1-1 (2026)

Chapter 52, Article 1 NMSA 1978 shall be known and may be cited as the "Workers'
Compensation Act".

History: Laws 1929, ch. 113, § 1; C.S. 1929, § 156-101; 1941 Comp., § 57-901; 1953
Comp., § 59-10-1; Laws 1959, ch. 67, § 1; 1986, ch. 22, § 1; 1987, ch. 235, § 1.

                                   ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For Occupational Disease Disablement Law, see 52-3-1 NMSA
1978 et seq.

For no compensation payable under Workers' Compensation Act for occupational
disease, see 52-3-46 NMSA 1978.

For when members of New Mexico mounted patrol are covered by Workers'
Compensation Act, see 29-6-5 NMSA 1978.

For premiums for workers' compensation insurance as material furnished in remedies
against contractors performance bond, see 48-2-17 NMSA 1978.

For hospital liens upon personal injury damages recovered not including workers'
compensation, see 48-8-1 NMSA 1978.

For Occupational Health and Safety Act not to supersede or affect Workers'
Compensation Act, see 50-9-21 NMSA 1978.

For Workers' Compensation Assigned Risk Pool Act, see 59A-33-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.

For safety devices required by Mining Safety Act as also required by Workers'
Compensation Act, see 69-8-15 NMSA 1978.

                         I.    GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Sufficient evidence of employment. — Where worker testified that employer’s
manager hired worker to drive employer’s truck and instructed worker to take the truck
to a gas station and purchase fuel and that worker discovered a defective light while
inspecting the truck in preparation for driving it and was trying to get information on
having the light fixed when worker was injured; a fax dated after the accident referred to
the manager’s efforts to find a replacement driver for worker from another trucking
company; and employer filed an injury report with the workers' compensation
administration in the employer’s home state, there was sufficient evidence to support
the finding that worker was an employee of employer. Nelson v. Homier Distrib. Co.,
Inc., 2009-NMCA-125, 147 N.M. 318, 222 P.3d 690.

Constitutionality upheld. — The court's former ruling in State ex rel. Hovey Concrete
Prods. Co. v. Mechem, 1957-NMSC-075, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 is expressly
overruled and the creation of a workmen's [workers'] compensation administration and
vesting in it the determination of controversies thereunder is held to be a valid
constitutional exercise of legislative power. Wylie Corp. v. Mowrer, 1986-NMSC-075,
104 N.M. 751, 726 P.2d 1381.

The Workers’ Compensation Act does not violate equal protection. Sanchez v.
M.M. Sundt Const. Co., 1985-NMCA-087, 103 N.M. 294, 706 P.2d 158.

The Workers’ Compensation Act does not violate substantive due process. Madrid
v. St. Joseph Hosp., 1996-NMSC-064, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250.

Workmen's [Workers'] compensation is not a fundamental right. Casillas v.
S.W.I.G., 1981-NMCA-045, 96 N.M. 84, 628 P.2d 329, cert. denied, 96 N.M. 116, 628
P.2d 686, and appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 934, 102 S. Ct. 467, 70 L. Ed. 2d 242.

Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory;
its provisions apply to all workers subject to it. Casillas v. S.W.I.G., 1981-NMCA-045, 96
N.M. 84, 628 P.2d 329, cert. denied, 96 N.M. 116, 628 P.2d 686, and appeal dismissed,
454 U.S. 934, 102 S. Ct. 467, 70 L. Ed. 2d 242.

Supreme court without jurisdiction to eliminate rights conferred by act. —
Supreme court is without jurisdiction to eliminate rights that were conferred in the
Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act by the legislature. Gonzales v. Sharp &
Fellows Contracting Co., 1947-NMSC-021, 51 N.M. 121, 179 P.2d 762.

Court not to alter clear legislative condition. — It is not the province of the court, but
of the legislature, to make changes in the provisions of statute law. Where the law-
making body has specified clearly who shall be entitled to compensation benefits and
under what circumstances, the court should not alter the conditions required to obtain
such benefits. Sanchez v. Bernalillo Cnty., 1953-NMSC-038, 57 N.M. 217, 257 P.2d
909.

Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is not exclusive remedy of the
employee. — An employee has a claim against a third party. Montanez v. Cass, 1975-
NMCA-142, 89 N.M. 32, 546 P.2d 1189, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. N.M.
Elec. Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 1976-NMSC-028, 89 N.M. 278, 551 P.2d 634.
Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act does not make employer an insurer of
the employee against injury or death occurring during his hours of employment. Little v.
J. Korber & Co., 1963-NMSC-012, 71 N.M. 294, 378 P.2d 119.

Employer not an insurer. — The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act does not
make the employer an insurer of the employee against injury or death occurring during
his hours of employment. The burden is always on a plaintiff to establish that the
employee sustained an accidental injury in the course of his employment and arising out
of it. Where there is a sequence of events in rapid order, such a brief hiatus of time
between exertion, followed by the quenching of thirst with refrigerated water and, then,
sudden death, the natural experience of mankind suggests there likely is a causal
connection between the strain and exhaustion, on the one hand, and the consequent
death on the other. The latter, of course, may not rest on mere suspicion, surmise or
guess. But it may arise as a fair and legitimate inference from circumstances in
evidence. Teal v. Potash Co. of Am., 1956-NMSC-006, 60 N.M. 409, 292 P.2d 99.

Reduction in earning capacity has always been primary concern of workmen's
[workers'] compensation legislation. Webb v. Hamilton, 1968-NMSC-008, 78 N.M.
647, 436 P.2d 507, overruled on other grounds by Am. Tank & Steel Corp. v.
Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052, 90 N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030.

Vocational rehabilitation. — Under this chapter, an injured worker is entitled to such
vocational rehabilitation services as are necessary to return her to suitable employment.
While this requirement is mandatory in nature, the worker has the burden of presenting
sufficient evidence so as to establish a need for rehabilitation benefits. Gutierrez v.
Amity Leather Prods. Co., 1988-NMCA-006, 107 N.M. 26, 751 P.2d 710.

No express consent by state to be sued in act. — The language appearing in
Section 21-7-4 NMSA 1978 relating to the powers of the board of regents of the
university, "of suing and being sued, or contracting and being contracted with," are
grants of power to sue and be sued only upon such matters as are within the scope of
other corporate powers of such institutions, while on the other hand, the Workmen's
[Workers'] Compensation Act is in derogation of the common law, sui generis and
contains therein no express consent by the state to be sued. Zamora v. Regents of
Univ. of N.M., 1955-NMSC-077, 60 N.M. 41, 287 P.2d 237.

Negligence action against state under special law. — Laws 1947, ch. 162, allowing
a particular person to sue the state for injuries resulting from its negligence is a special
law (no other person who might have a like claim could prosecute such a suit under the
act); hence, since a general law could be enacted providing that the state shall be liable
to persons injured or killed on account of the negligence of the state, its officers and
employees, the act in question is void. Lucero v. N.M. State Hwy. Dep't, 1951-NMSC-
017, 55 N.M. 157, 228 P.2d 945.

No statute forbidding benefits to worker receiving benefits under other statute. —
There is no provision in the compensation statute forbidding benefits to an injured
worker on the ground that he is receiving benefits under some other local or federal
statute. Snead v. Adams Constr. Co., 1963-NMSC-075, 72 N.M. 94, 380 P.2d 836 (see
Section 52-1-47.1 NMSA 1978).

A worker is not precluded from recovering benefits under both the Public Employees'
Retirement Act and the Workers' Compensation Act. Montney v. State ex rel. State
Hwy. Dep't, 1989-NMCA-002, 108 N.M. 326, 772 P.2d 360, superseded by statute,
Moya v. City of Albuquerque, 2007-NMCA-057, 141 N.M. 617, 159 P.3d 266.

This section imposes upon board of regents no legal obligation to compensate
financially for injuries sustained by their workmen [workers] in the course of their
employment. Zamora v. Regents of Univ. of N.M., 1955-NMSC-077, 60 N.M. 41, 287
P.2d 237.

Measure of disability. — There is no presumption in the Workmen's (Workers')
Compensation Law that every workman [worker] is completely able-bodied when he
enters his employment; the measure of disability under the statute is the relationship
between the workman's [worker's] ability to do work prior to the injury, and such ability
following the injury. Snead v. Adams Constr. Co., 1963-NMSC-075, 72 N.M. 94, 380
P.2d 836.

If a veterans administration payment is a pension, it cannot be considered to
reduce the amount of workmen's [workers'] compensation. Snead v. Adams Constr.
Co., 1963-NMSC-075, 72 N.M. 94, 380 P.2d 836.

Evidence of dependency upon decedent. — If there is substantial support in the
evidence for the finding that plaintiffs were not dependent to any extent upon the
decedent within the meaning, purpose and intent of the Workmen's [Workers']
Compensation Act, then plaintiffs must fail on appeal. Lopez v. Schultz & Lindsay
Constr. Co., 1968-NMCA-064, 79 N.M. 485, 444 P.2d 996, cert. denied, 79 N.M. 448,
444 P.2d 775.

Compensation benefits not community assets. — Compensation benefits payable
under the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act, under this section, for injuries
sustained during coverture, are not community assets. Richards v. Richards, 1955-
NMSC-043, 59 N.M. 308, 283 P.2d 881.

Preexisting disability not disabling under act. — Finding of the trial court that the
15% partial permanent disability, set forth in the certificate of preexisting disability was,
in truth and in fact, not disabling so as to interfere with his ability to work in any
particular, establishes that plaintiff did not have a preexisting disability under the
Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act even when the doctor's answers to questions
raised a conflict in the evidence concerning the application of the Subsequent Injury Act.
Ballard v. Southwest Potash Corp., 1969-NMCA-008, 80 N.M. 10, 450 P.2d 448.
Condition for compensation where preexisting impairment present. — Assuming a
certificate of preexisting impairment and assuming that procedural requirements are
met, applicability of the act depends on four things: (a) a preexisting permanent physical
impairment; (b) a subsequent disability compensable under the Workmen's [Workers']
Compensation Act; (c) the subsequent disability must be permanent and (d) the
subsequent disability must be materially and substantially greater than that which would
have resulted from the subsequent injury alone. Ballard v. Southwest Potash Corp.,
1969-NMCA-008, 80 N.M. 10, 450 P.2d 448.

A stroke causally connected to work stress was compensable, even though the
worker suffered from a preexisting condition, hypertension, which made the workman
[worker] more susceptible to injury. Shadbolt v. Schneider, Inc., 1985-NMCA-086, 103
N.M. 544, 710 P.2d 738, cert. quashed, 104 N.M. 632, 725 P.2d 832 (1986).

Traumatic neurosis compensable. — Traumatic neurosis, when directly caused by an
accident within the purview of this act, was compensable. Jensen v. United Perlite
Corp., 1966-NMSC-111, 76 N.M. 384, 415 P.2d 356, overruled on other grounds by
American Tank & Steel Corp. v. Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052, 90 N.M. 513, 565 P.2d
1030.

Whether legislature intended fee collected from compensation cases. — Whether
or not fee levied upon all civil actions filed was generally being collected could not
influence decision as to whether legislature intended fee to be collected from those filing
workmen's [workers'] compensation claims. State ex rel. Sanchez v. Reese, 1968-
NMSC-186, 79 N.M. 624, 447 P.2d 504 (decided under former law).

Supreme court addition fund fee not collected where other fees are not. — By
making the supreme court addition fund fee collectible "in addition" to other fees. it is
certain that the legislature did not intend for it to be collected where the other fees were
not. State ex rel. Sanchez v. Reese, 1968-NMSC-186, 79 N.M. 624, 447 P.2d 504
(decided under former law).

Anyone as workman [worker] not excluded. — Nothing in the Workmen's [Workers']
Compensation Act is indicative of an intention to exclude from its benefits anyone who
is in fact performing duties of a "workman [worker]." Shillinglaw v. Owen Shillinglaw Fuel
Co., 1962-NMSC-047, 70 N.M. 65, 370 P.2d 502.

Refusal to find medical causation supported. — Where doctor who testified as to
claimant's epilepsy stated that he could not say, with any certainty, that the epilepsy
was caused by accident, trial court's refusal to find "medical causation" was supported.
Torres v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., 1971-NMCA-043, 82 N.M. 511, 484 P.2d
353.

Employer's liability not diminished because workman [worker] works while on
compensation. — To hold that the employer's liability should be diminished because
his injured workman (worker) has seen fit to suffer the discomforts of his infirmity and
obtain employment, rather than to simply exist on the compensation the law allows him,
seems inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the Workmen's [Workers']
Compensation Act. Evans v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 253 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1958).

Employer entitled to credit for monies paid under contractual benefits plan. —
Trial court did not err in granting an employer credit against workers' compensation
benefits for monies paid to its employee under the employer's accident and disability
plans, where the benefit plan was in the nature of a contract and the employee's rights
should be equally governed by it. Carter v. Mountain Bell, 1986-NMCA-103, 105 N.M.
17, 727 P.2d 956.

Repair of school building as extra-hazardous employment. — Carpenter engaged
in repair of school building was engaged in "extra-hazardous employment" covered by
the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act even though when he was injured he was
merely hanging venetian blinds. Scofield v. Lordsburg Mun. Sch. Dist., 1949-NMSC-
027, 53 N.M. 249, 205 P.2d 834 (decided under former law).

Disability en route to cafe compensable where employer gave consent. — Where
workman [worker] employed as janitor, laborer and night watchman sustains disability
while en route to nearby cafe where, with employer's knowledge and consent and no
deduction in pay, workman [worker] ate lunch, disability is compensable. Sullivan v.
Rainbo Baking Co., 1962-NMSC-138, 71 N.M. 9, 375 P.2d 326.

                           II.     CONSTRUCTION OF ACT.

This act is remedial legislation and must be liberally construed to effect its
purpose. Lipe v. Bradbury, 1945-NMSC-002, 49 N.M. 4, 154 P.2d 1000; Stevenson v.
Lee Moor Contracting Co., 1941-NMSC-033, 45 N.M. 354, 115 P.2d 342; Malone v.
Swift Fresh Meats Co., 1978-NMSC-007, 91 N.M. 359, 574 P.2d 283; Security Trust v.
Smith, 1979-NMSC-024, 93 N.M. 35, 596 P.2d 248.

Liberal construction. — Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to be construed
liberally. Corzine v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1969-NMCA-051, 80 N.M. 418, 456 P.2d
892, cert. denied, 80 N.M. 388, 456 P.2d 221; Wilson v. Mason, 1967-NMCA-002, 78
N.M. 27, 426 P.2d 789.

As is true in all humanitarian statutes, remedial in nature, the Workmen's [Workers']
Compensation Act has received a liberal interpretation from both trial judges and
appellate courts in New Mexico. Valencia v. Stearns Roger Mfg. Co., 124 F. Supp. 670
(D.N.M. 1954).

It is the duty of supreme court to construe the compensation act liberally to give effect to
its benevolent purpose and to construe the findings of the court liberally so as to support
the judgment. Casados v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 1967-NMSC-212, 78 N.M. 392, 432
P.2d 103, overruled on other grounds by American Tank & Steel Corp. v. Thompson,
1977-NMSC-052, 90 N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030.
The court is committed to liberal construction of the Workmen's [Workers']
Compensation Act in favor of the workman [worker], and the injury need not result
momentarily in order to be accidental; yet, some relationship between the accident
relied upon and the injury suffered must be established. It cannot rest upon mere
speculation. Lemon v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 1954-NMSC-121, 58 N.M. 830, 277 P.2d
542; Henderson v. Texas-N.M. Pipe Line Co., 1942-NMSC-060, 46 N.M. 458, 131 P.2d
269.

Reasonable doubts resolved in favor of employees. — The Workmen's [Workers']
Compensation Act must be liberally construed, and reasonable doubts resolved in favor
of employees. Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 1950-NMSC-046, 55 N.M. 81, 227 P.2d
365; Sena v. Continental Cas. Co., 1982-NMCA-060, 97 N.M. 753, 643 P.2d 622, cert.
denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794.

Workmen's [Workers'] compensation statutes should be liberally and fairly construed in
the workman's [worker's] favor to insure the full measure of his exclusive statutory
remedy. Evans v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 253 F.2d 383 (10th Cir. 1958).

The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of the
employee. Briscoe v. Hydro Conduit Corp., 1975-NMCA-147, 88 N.M. 568, 544 P.2d
283; Briggs v. Zia Co., 1957-NMSC-074, 63 N.M. 148, 315 P.2d 217; Schiller v.
Southwest Air Rangers, Inc., 1975-NMSC-018, 87 N.M. 476, 535 P.2d 1327; Anaya v.
N.M. Steel Erectors, Inc., 1980-NMSC-057, 94 N.M. 370, 610 P.2d 1199.

The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to be given a liberal construction in
favor of claimants. Shillinglaw v. Owen Shillinglaw Fuel Co., 1962-NMSC-047, 70 N.M.
65, 370 P.2d 502; Mann v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 1954-NMSC-088, 58 N.M. 626, 274
P.2d 145.

The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of the
claimant. Yardman v. Cooper, 1959-NMSC-043, 65 N.M. 450, 339 P.2d 473, overruled
on other grounds by Montell v. Orndorff, 1960-NMSC-063, 67 N.M. 156, 353 P.2d 680.

Liberal construction does not mean total disregard for statute. — This section is to
be liberally construed in favor of claimant, but liberal construction does not mean total
disregard for the statute, or repeal of it under the guise of construction. Copeland v.
Black, 1959-NMSC-009, 65 N.M. 214, 334 P.2d 1116, overruled on other grounds by
Montell v. Orndorff, 1960-NMSC-063, 67 N.M. 156, 353 P.2d 680; Anaya v. N.M. Steel
Erectors, Inc., 1980-NMSC-057, 94 N.M. 370, 610 P.2d 1199.

The court has frequently held that the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to be
liberally construed in favor of the claimant; however, liberal construction does not mean
a total disregard for the statute, or repeal of it under the guise of construction. Ross v.
Marberry & Co., 1960-NMSC-013, 66 N.M. 404, 349 P.2d 123.
Liberal construction does not mean total disregard for the statute. Yardman v. Cooper,
1959-NMSC-043, 65 N.M. 450, 339 P.2d 473, overruled on other grounds by Montell v.
Orndorff, 1960-NMSC-063, 67 N.M. 156, 353 P.2d 680; Varela v. Mounho, 1978-
NMCA-086, 92 N.M. 147, 584 P.2d 194, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324.

Liberal construction does not mean enlarging apparent legislative intent. — The
statute must be liberally construed in favor of the workman [worker], but this does not
mean enlarging on the apparent legislative intent or giving words meaning beyond their
ordinary scope. Hicks v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers' Ass'n, 1959-NMSC-076, 66 N.M. 165,
344 P.2d 475.

Liberal construction not to be construed so as to nullify its provisions. — The
Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is remedial and should be liberally interpreted
so as to accomplish its purposes, while at the same time a reasonable construction
must be accorded it, and it shall not be construed in such a way as to nullify certain of
its provisions. Geeslin v. Goodno, Inc., 1965-NMSC-053, 75 N.M. 174, 402 P.2d 156;
Security Trust v. Smith, 1979-NMSC-024, 93 N.M. 35, 596 P.2d 248; Transamerica Ins.
Co. v. Sydow, 1981-NMCA-121, 97 N.M. 51, 636 P.2d 322.

Court must construe act in reasonable manner. — The supreme court gives to the
Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act a liberal construction in favor of the laborer,
but still the court must construe the act in a reasonable manner, and not in such a way
as would abrogate certain portions of the statute to the preference of other portions
thereof. Boggs v. D & L Constr. Co., 1963-NMSC-044, 71 N.M. 502, 379 P.2d 788,
overruled on other grounds by Am. Tank & Steel Corp. v. Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052,
90 N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030.

Beneficent purpose not thwarted by technical refinement. — The Workmen's
[Workers'] Compensation Act is remedial in nature; is given a liberal interpretation by
both the trial and reviewing courts; reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of the
employee; its beneficent purposes may not be thwarted by technical refinement or
interpretation. Lucero v. C.R. Davis Contracting Co., 1962-NMSC-136, 71 N.M. 11, 375
P.2d 327, overruled on other grounds by Mascarenas v. Kennedy, 1964-NMSC-179, 74
N.M. 665, 397 P.2d 312.

Technical precision in pleading not required. — Claims for workmen's [workers']
compensation are to be liberally construed and technical precision in pleading is not
generally required. Gonzales v. Gackle Drilling Co., 1962-NMSC-063, 70 N.M. 131, 371
P.2d 605.

Rule of liberal construction applies to Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Law,
not to evidence offered in support of a claim under that law. Guidry v. Petty Concrete
Co., 1967-NMSC-048, 77 N.M. 531, 424 P.2d 806.

Liberal construction has no application to consideration to be given by trier of
fact. — The rule of liberal construction of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act
has no application to the consideration, weight and credibility to be given the evidence
by the trier of the facts. Young v. Signal Oilfield Serv., Inc., 1969-NMCA-125, 81 N.M.
67, 463 P.2d 43.

Although the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act must be liberally construed to
effect its purpose, this view of liberal construction applies only to the law and not to the
facts. Lopez v. Schultz & Lindsay Constr. Co., 1968-NMCA-064, 79 N.M. 485, 444 P.2d
996, cert. denied, 79 N.M. 448, 444 P.2d 775; Brown v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 1962-
NMSC-040, 70 N.M. 46, 369 P.2d 968.

Claimant not relieved of burden of proof. — The liberal construction of the
Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act applies to the law, not to the evidence offered
in support of a claim under the law. The rule of liberal construction does not relieve a
claimant of the burden of establishing his right to compensation by a preponderance of
the evidence, nor does it permit a court to award compensation where the requisite
proof is absent. Mascarenas v. Kennedy, 1964-NMSC-179, 74 N.M. 665, 397 P.2d 312.

Statute as sui generis. — The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is sui generis
and creates exclusive rights, remedies and procedure uncontrolled by codes of
procedure in actions at law or equity. Lipe v. Bradbury, 1945-NMSC-002, 49 N.M. 4,
154 P.2d 1000.

Workmen's [Workers'] compensation statutes are sui generis and create rights,
remedies and procedures which are exclusive. They are in derogation of the common
law and are not controlled or affected by the code of procedure in suits at law or actions
in equity except as provided therein. Garza v. W.A. Jourdan, Inc., 1977-NMCA-136, 91
N.M. 268, 572 P.2d 1276, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 249, 572 P.2d 1257.

Rights, remedies and procedure exclusive. — Workmen's [Workers'] compensation
statutes are sui generis and create rights, remedies and procedures which are
exclusive. Anaya v. City of Santa Fe, 1969-NMSC-025, 80 N.M. 54, 451 P.2d 303; Day
v. Penitentiary of N.M., 1954-NMSC-064, 58 N.M. 391, 271 P.2d 831.

Rules of procedure are not applicable except as specifically provided. — That
workmen's [workers'] compensation statutes are sui generis, and that the rules of
procedure in civil actions are not applicable except as specifically provided therein, has
been long recognized by this court. Holman v. Oriental Refinery, 1965-NMSC-029, 75
N.M. 52, 400 P.2d 471.

The workmen's [workers'] compensation statutes are sui generis and create rights and
procedures which are exclusive and are in derogation of the common law and the code
of procedure with certain exceptions as provided in the statutes. Magee v. Albuquerque
Gravel Prods. Co., 1959-NMSC-027, 65 N.M. 314, 336 P.2d 1066.

Employment in violation of federal law still governed by Worker's Compensation
Act. — Suit for wrongful death of 16-year-old who died from injuries incurred while
working for employer was barred because the case was governed by the Worker's
Compensation Act, despite the fact that the employment of the child was in violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act. The legislature's legalization of employment for 16-year-
old workers in Section 50-6-4 NMSA 1978 reflects an intent that the exclusivity of the
Worker's Compensation Act apply to such employment. Boyd v. Permian Servicing Co.,
1992-NMSC-013, 113 N.M. 321, 825 P.2d 611.

Legislative intent as to purpose of elective act. — The purpose under an elective act
such as this is to cause the employer to obtain compensation protection. It is contrary to
legislative intent that any technical delay which in no way prejudices a claimant would
give rise to a common-law suit. Quintana v. Nolan Bros., 1969-NMCA-083, 80 N.M. 589,
458 P.2d 841.

Purpose of act. — This act was evidently intended to extend its protection to persons
who are not employees at common law. Its purpose is to avoid uncertainty in litigation
and to assure the injured workmen and their dependents prompt payment of
compensation. Jones v. George F. Getty Oil Co., 92 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1937), cert.
denied, 303 U.S. 644, 58 S. Ct. 644, 82 L. Ed. 1106 (1938).

The basic purpose of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to ensure that
industry carry the burden of personal injuries suffered by workers in the course of their
employment. Superintendent of Ins. v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 1986-NMCA-
012, 104 N.M. 605, 725 P.2d 581.

The Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act expresses the intention and policy of this
state that employees who suffer disablement as a result of injuries causally connected
to their work shall not become dependent upon the welfare programs of the state, but
shall receive some portion of the wages they would have earned had it not been for the
intervening disability. Casias v. Zia Co., 1979-NMCA-068, 93 N.M. 78, 596 P.2d 521,
cert. denied, 93 N.M. 8, 595 P.2d 1203.

The purpose of this act is to provide a humanitarian and economical system for
compensating injured workmen, while being fair to the employer. Anaya v. N.M. Steel
Erectors, Inc., 1980-NMSC-057, 94 N.M. 370, 610 P.2d 1199.

Primary purpose of Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to keep an injured
workman [worker] and his family at least minimally secure financially; public policy
demands it. Aranda v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 1979-NMCA-097, 93 N.M. 412, 600 P.2d
1202, cert. denied, 93 N.M. 683, 604 P.2d 821; Casillas v. S.W.I.G., 1981-NMCA-045,
96 N.M. 84, 628 P.2d 329, cert. denied, 96 N.M. 116, 628 P.2d 686, and appeal
dismissed, 454 U.S. 934, 102 S. Ct. 467, 70 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1981).

Purpose of Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to provide a form of
recovery for workmen or his heirs. The employer is entitled to present whatever relevant
evidence deemed necessary to establish its position, and it is the duty of the district
court to see to the fulfillment of that statutory purpose within the framework of the facts
and the law. Livingston v. Loffland Bros., 1974-NMCA-047, 86 N.M. 375, 524 P.2d 991,
cert. denied, 86 N.M. 372, 524 P.2d 988.

To avoid uncertainty in litigation and to assure injured workmen prompt payment of
compensation, the court has often said that the act should be liberally construed to
accomplish the purposes for which it was enacted. Mirabal v. International Minerals &
Chem. Corp., 1967-NMSC-043, 77 N.M. 576, 425 P.2d 740.

Spirit of this act flows in direction of workman [worker] and his protection; the
compensation carrier should not seek technical, circuitous routes to avoid its
responsibilities. Perea v. Gorby, 1980-NMCA-048, 94 N.M. 325, 610 P.2d 212.

Purpose of depriving noncomplying employer of common-law defenses under an
elective act such as this is to cause the employer to obtain compensation protection. It
would seem contrary to legislative intent that any technical delay which in no way
prejudices a claimant would give rise to a common-law suit. Mirabal v. International
Minerals & Chem. Corp., 1967-NMSC-043, 77 N.M. 576, 425 P.2d 740.

Purpose of industry carrying burden of injuries. — The basic purpose of the
Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is to ensure that industry carries the burden of
personal injuries suffered by workmen in the course of their employment, and
consequently, the relationship of the parties is not to be determined from the name
attached to it by them, but from the consequences which the law imputes to their
agreement to prevent evasion of the obligations which the act imposes upon employers.
Yerbich v. Heald, 1976-NMCA-026, 89 N.M. 67, 547 P.2d 72.

Claims for compensation under Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act are
judicial in nature, and constitute civil actions, and thus are actions subject to removal
under the federal removal statute. Valencia v. Stearns Roger Mfg. Co., 124 F. Supp.
670 (D.N.M. 1954).

Idea of negligence foreign to recovery. — The idea of negligence as an essential to
recovery is generally foreign to the theory of workmen's [workers'] compensation.
Cuellar v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 1932-NMSC-018, 36 N.M. 141, 9 P.2d 685.

Interests of claimant and public paramount. — Within the policy considerations of
the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act the interests of the claimant and the public
are paramount. Codling v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 1976-NMCA-044, 89 N.M. 213,
549 P.2d 628; Ruiz v. City of Albuquerque, 1978-NMCA-015, 91 N.M. 526, 577 P.2d
424, cert. denied, 91 N.M. 491, 576 P.2d 297.

Purpose of act. — To prevent claimant from being on welfare rolls was part of
legislative scheme of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act, and the legislative
scheme was not meant to allow a recovery comparable to that in the normal tort
recovery. Codling v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 1976-NMCA-044, 89 N.M. 213, 549 P.2d
628.
Right to be sued must be found in act. — The rights and remedies provided by the
Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act are in derogation of the common law and
consent to be sued must be found in the act itself. Day v. Penitentiary of N.M., 1954-
NMSC-064, 58 N.M. 391, 271 P.2d 831.

Decisions of other states persuasive but not binding. — The Workmen's [Workers']
Compensation Act of New Mexico is sui generis and creates rights, remedies and
procedures which are exclusive; therefore, the decisions of other states, if any, which
have comparable statutory provisions are persuasive but not binding on the court.
Security Ins. Co. v. Chapman, 1975-NMSC-052, 88 N.M. 292, 540 P.2d 222.

Performance of medical services within act's scope. — The fact that a person
performed medical services, vel non, does not take her outside the scope of the
Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act. McKenzie v. Daubenheyer, 465 F. Supp. 1
(D.N.M. 1977).

Engineering works as used in section enumerating hazardous occupations does not
include operation of a truck on a highway and the owner of a milk truck, accordingly,
was not engaged in an "extra-hazardous occupation" making the truck driver's death
compensable under the act. Hernandez v. Border Truck Line, 1946-NMSC-002, 49 N.M.
396, 165 P.2d 120 (decided under former law).

                  III.   EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP.

Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act is based upon employer-employee
relationship. Maynerich v. Little Bear Enters., Inc., 1971-NMCA-079, 82 N.M. 650, 485
P.2d 984.

The employer-employee relationship, to which the act applies, is one created by
contract between the parties; consequently, if the employer in this case seeks to avail
itself of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act as a bar to a common-law action,
then it must show a valid contract of employment between it and the minor employee.
Maynerich v. Little Bear Enters., Inc., 1971-NMCA-079, 82 N.M. 650, 485 P.2d 984.

Supervision of results does not transform independent contractor to employee.
— Supervision relating to results contracted to be accomplished does not transform the
relationship of employer-independent contractor to that of employer-employee. Roybal
v. Bates Lumber Co., 1966-NMSC-057, 76 N.M. 127, 412 P.2d 555.

Length of time in work irrelevant. — Whether the injured person had been doing work
for five or 50 minutes, and whether he would have continued in this work for a shorter or
greater length of time is irrelevant in determining whether one is a special employee.
Wuertz v. Howard, 1966-NMSC-264, 77 N.M. 228, 421 P.2d 441.

Corporate officer is employee. — Corporate officer not in fact sole owner of the
corporation and performing nonexecutive work ordinarily performed by employees is
generally held to be an employee covered by the act, notwithstanding the corporate
office held by him. Shillinglaw v. Owen Shillinglaw Fuel Co., 1962-NMSC-047, 70 N.M.
65, 370 P.2d 502.

Corporate officer injured performing duty of employees. — A corporate officer may
be considered an employee under the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act,
particularly when he is injured while performing a duty which was ordinarily done by
employees. Shillinglaw v. Owen Shillinglaw Fuel Co., 1962-NMSC-047, 70 N.M. 65, 370
P.2d 502.

                           IV.    COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Meaning of "date when the compensable injury manifests itself" or "date when the
workman [worker] knows or should know he has suffered a compensable injury" is
applicable to all of the portions of the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act where
the terms "time of accident," "time of injury," "date of disability," "date of accidental
injury," or words of similar import are used, recognizing the reality of possible latent
injuries and that payment of compensation is a partial substitute for wages formerly
earned by the workman [worker] at the time when he can no longer earn the same
wage. Casias v. Zia Co., 1979-NMCA-068, 93 N.M. 78, 596 P.2d 521, cert. denied, 93
N.M. 8, 595 P.2d 1203.

                            V.     PROCEDURAL MATTERS.

Lack of jurisdiction at any stage of proceeding is controlling consideration to be
resolved before going further. Baker v. Shufflebarger & Assocs., 1966-NMSC-189, 77
N.M. 50, 419 P.2d 250, overruled in part on other grounds by American Tank & Steel
Corp. v. Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052, 90 N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030.

Federal court jurisdictional minimum met where right to all payments in issue. —
A possibility that payments of workmen's [workers'] compensation benefits will terminate
before the total reaches the jurisdictional minimum necessary for the federal district
court to entertain the case after removal is immaterial if the right to all the payments is in
issue, since future payments under the act are not in any proper sense contingent,
although they may be decreased or cut off altogether by the operation of conditions
subsequent. Valencia v. Stearns Roger Mfg. Co., 124 F. Supp. 670 (D.N.M. 1954).

In the nature of civil complaints, workmen's [workers'] compensation cases are not
civil actions but are sui generis. State ex rel. Sanchez v. Reese, 1968-NMSC-186, 79
N.M. 624, 447 P.2d 504.

Conventional methods of administration of justice employed. — The New Mexico
Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act may be classified as one of the "judicial" acts,
whereby the workmen's [workers'] compensation claim in the first instance is filed in a
court of record in a district court of the state, process issued by said court and a trial of
the cause had, either before the district judge without a jury, or with a jury; there are
certain differences in the procedure between a workmen's [workers'] compensation
case and the ordinary damage case. But at the same time, from an overall standpoint,
the conventional methods of administration of justice are employed in workmen's
[workers'] compensation cases. Valencia v. Stearns Roger Mfg. Co., 124 F. Supp. 670
(D.N.M. 1954).

Disqualification of judge statute applicable to compensation claims. — Provision
of statute for the disqualification of a judge by a party to any action or proceeding is
applicable to claims prosecuted under the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act.
State ex rel. Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Arledge, 1950-NMSC-039, 54 N.M. 267, 221
P.2d 562.

Nothing inconsistent in applying general rules covering jury trials to workmen's
[workers'] compensation cases. Bryant v. H.B. Lynn Drilling Corp., 1959-NMSC-001,
65 N.M. 177, 334 P.2d 707.

Limitations under this act commence to run from time of employer's failure to pay
compensation for a disability when the disability can be ascertained and duty to
compensate arises rather than from the date of the accident. Anderson v. Contract
Trucking Co., 1944-NMSC-020, 48 N.M. 158, 146 P.2d 873.

Claim not too late where employer's doctor indicated injury minor. — Where at
time of injury employee was led to believe by employer's doctor that injury was minor
and attributed eye weakness to advancing age and natural causes, employee's claim for
compensation filed within statutory time after discovery of seriousness of the injury more
than two years after the accident was not too late. Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co.,
1944-NMSC-020, 48 N.M. 158, 146 P.2d 873.

Special interrogatory should cover both requisites to right to compensation set
forth in Section 52-1-9 NMSA 1978: whether employee was performing services arising
out of and in course of his employment at time of the accident, and whether the
employee's death was proximately caused by an accident arising out of and in course of
his employment. Sw. Portland Cement Co. v. Simpson, 135 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1943).

No provision made for special interrogatories. — The Workmen's [Workers']
Compensation Act gives the right of trial by jury to either party but makes no provision
for special interrogatories. However, to submit special interrogatories without a general
verdict unless the latter is waived or consented to is reversible error. Saavedra v. City of
Albuquerque, 1959-NMSC-036, 65 N.M. 379, 338 P.2d 110.

A motion for dismissal is in order where claim shows that the defendant was not at
time of employee's death engaged in an extra-hazardous business covered under the
act. Hernandez v. Border Truck Line, 1946-NMSC-002, 49 N.M. 396, 165 P.2d 120
(decided under former law).
No summary judgment for claims filed prior to Laws 1959. — A workmen's
[workers'] compensation claim filed prior to the effective date of Laws 1959, ch. 67, may
not be disposed of on summary judgment. Gonzales v. Gackle Drilling Co., 1962-
NMSC-063, 70 N.M. 131, 371 P.2d 605 (decided under former law).

Motion for summary judgment erroneously granted where evidence showed not
special employee. — Trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary
judgment in personal injury suit on grounds that appellant, a welder sent to appellee's
premises by his regular employer, was a special employee and thus was barred from
further recovery by the Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Act, where testimony of
appellant disclosed that the work he was engaged in at the time of the accident was in
the usual performance of his duties and that if any of appellee's agents had given him
instructions contrary to those of his regular employer he would not have followed them.
Such evidence, if not contradicted by other evidence to be offered in the trial thereafter
ordered, would have required the conclusion that appellant was employed solely by his
regular employer and was not prevented by the act from recovery from appellee.
Davison v. Tom Brown Drilling Co., 1966-NMSC-115, 76 N.M. 412, 415 P.2d 541.

Right to remove to federal court not waived by electing state compensation. —
The claimant's argument that the employer elected to be governed by the laws of New
Mexico, by having sought the protection afforded by the Workmen's [Workers']
Compensation Act and thus should not be able to remove a case thereunder to a
federal forum was without merit since a state cannot constitutionally provide, by statute,
an instrumentality whereby the right to remove a case to a federal tribunal can be
waived. Valencia v. Stearns Roger Mfg. Co., 124 F. Supp. 670 (D.N.M. 1954).

In order to make out case calling for directed verdict for employer, one is
compelled to weigh the evidence and draw inferences against the verdict, which should
be resolved in favor of the verdict for the employee. Teal v. Potash Co. of Am., 1956-
NMSC-006, 60 N.M. 409, 292 P.2d 99.

In compensation case, evidence of pecuniary circumstances of parties is
incompetent. Hamilton v. Doty, 1958-NMSC-139, 65 N.M. 270, 335 P.2d 1067.

Where evidence before trial court conflicted as to causal connection between
accident and death, it was for the trial court to resolve the disagreement. Mayfield v.
Keeth Gas Co., 1970-NMCA-032, 81 N.M. 313, 466 P.2d 879.

Admission of evidence of strenuous training course. — Trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting testimony relating to strenuousness of training course decedent
was taking at the time of his death, offered by employee who had taken the course
under sufficiently similar circumstances and conditions. Brown v. General Ins. Co. of
Am., 1962-NMSC-040, 70 N.M. 46, 369 P.2d 968.

Admission of self-serving declaration of deceased workman [worker]. — While
recognizing the trend toward a greater admissibility of declarations of deceased persons
where the same information cannot be obtained in a more purified or authentic form, the
self-serving declarations of a decedent in a workmen's [workers'] compensation case
will not be admitted on the ground of necessity alone even though it was the only
available evidence bearing on the issue. Brown v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 1962-
NMSC-040, 70 N.M. 46, 369 P.2d 968.

Causal connection between false statement and injury. — There was substantial
evidence to support the hearing officer's determination of a causal connection between
the claimant's false representation on her employment application and her subsequent
injury, in the form of the claimant's physical impairment rating and the respondent's
expert testimony that the claimant was at an increased risk due to her prior undisclosed
injury. Jaynes v. Wal-Mart Store No. 824, 1988-NMCA-076, 107 N.M. 648, 763 P.2d 82.

Effect of false representation on application for employment. — A claimant who
knowingly and willfully made false representations on his application for employment
regarding past employment, and who failed to reveal his prior history of a work-related
injury was barred from receiving compensation benefits. Sanchez v. Memorial Gen.
Hosp., 1990-NMCA-095, 110 N.M. 683, 798 P.2d 1069, cert. denied, 110 N.M. 653, 798
P.2d 1039.

Jury to accept or reject expert's testimony. — Medical testimony, as other expert
evidence, is intended to aid, but not to conclude, a court or jury. "The jury is entitled to
rely upon rational inferences deductible from the evidence, whether arising from expert
testimony or otherwise." It is within the province of the jury to accept or reject expert
surgeon's testimony. Seay v. Lea Cnty. Sand & Gravel Co., 1956-NMSC-004, 60 N.M.
399, 292 P.2d 93.

The jury is privileged to accept, reject or give such weight to the testimony of expert
witnesses only, as it deemed the same entitled to have. Teal v. Potash Co. of Am.,
1956-NMSC-006, 60 N.M. 409, 292 P.2d 99.

Jury inference regarding heart attack proper. — Jury inference that an unusual
strain on decedent's heart, helped along by difficulty in breathing caused by fumes from
testing a new process, invoked a heart attack and death is proper. Teal v. Potash Co. of
Am., 1956-NMSC-006, 60 N.M. 409, 292 P.2d 99.

Evidence supported giving issue to jury. — That claimant suffered an emotional
upset at his office, related to his work, three hours before the stroke, coupled with
medical testimony that fatigue and emotional upsets hasten the precipitation of a fatal
incident in an individual with essential hypertension, and that there was "a strong
probability of connection" between these factors and decedent's cerebral hemorrhage,
refute a contention that "the jury should not have been permitted to speculate upon the
issue." Salazar v. County of Bernalillo, 1962-NMSC-014, 69 N.M. 464, 368 P.2d 141.

Jury question whether causal connection between accident and disability. —
Even where no positive statement can be made as to the causal connection by medical
witnesses, court was correct in sending the case to the jury on the basis of the medical
testimony, such as it was, and the lay testimony as to the events surrounding the
accident both before and after it happened, as it was for jury determination as to
whether there was a natural sequence of events which indicate a causal connection
between work accident and disability sustained. Lucero v. C.R. Davis Contracting Co.,
1962-NMSC-136, 71 N.M. 11, 375 P.2d 327, overruled on other grounds by
Mascarenas v. Kennedy, 1964-NMSC-179, 74 N.M. 665, 397 P.2d 312.

Claimant has burden of proving compensable accident. Romero v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
1981-NMCA-001, 95 N.M. 484, 623 P.2d 998, cert. denied, 95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535,
overruled on other grounds by Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1987-NMSC-007, 105
N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743.

Failure of court to find fact as finding against party with burden. — Even if
omissions were made, it is the rule in this jurisdiction that a failure by the trial court to
find a material fact must be regarded as a finding against the party having the burden of
establishing such fact. Baker v. Shufflebarger & Assocs., Inc., 1966-NMSC-189, 77
N.M. 50, 419 P.2d 250.

No attack on findings where no objection on requested findings. — Where
workmen's [workers'] compensation proceeding's findings were not objected to and no
requested findings were timely made under Rule 52(b), N.M.R. Civ. P. (now Paragraph
B of Rule 1-052 NMRA), the court's findings could not be attacked. Gillit v. Theatre
Enters., Inc., 1962-NMSC-141, 71 N.M. 31, 375 P.2d 580.

No denial of appeal right where accepted less compensation than entitled. —
Under Workmen's [Workers'] Compensation Law, a workman [worker] cannot be denied
the right of appeal by his acceptance of a compensation award in an amount less than
that to which he is entitled. Evans v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 253 F.2d 383 (10th Cir.
1958).

After notice of appeal from judgment in workman [worker's] compensation case
was filed, trial court lost jurisdiction of the cause and acted properly in refusing to set
aside its judgment. Ledbetter v. Lanham Constr. Co., 1966-NMSC-058, 76 N.M. 132,
412 P.2d 559.

Prejudgment interest. — Section 56-8-4D NMSA 1978 contains an express exemption
for the state from awards of prejudgment interest in favor of an injured worker in a
workers' compensation action. Montney v. State ex rel. State Hwy. Dep't, 1989-NMCA-
002, 108 N.M. 326, 772 P.2d 360, cert. denied, 108 N.M. 197, 769 P.2d 731.

Only favorable evidence considered on appeal. — On appeal in compensation
hearing only that evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom which
support the findings will be considered. All evidence unfavorable to the findings will be
disregarded. Lopez v. Schultz & Lindsay Constr. Co., 1968-NMCA-064, 79 N.M. 485,
444 P.2d 996, cert. denied, 79 N.M. 448, 444 P.2d 775.
Not weighing conflicting evidence or credibility of witnesses. — In reviewing
workmen's [workers'] compensation cases, court of appeals considers only evidence
and inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
support the findings, and will not weigh conflicting evidence or credibility of the
witnesses. Lopez v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 1972-NMCA-079, 83 N.M. 799, 498 P.2d 686.

Voluntary payment of compensation benefits is merely competent evidence as to
any issue in a workman's [worker's] compensation suit and does not create any
presumptions or shifts in the original burden. Romero v. S.S. Kresge Co., 1981-NMCA-
001, 95 N.M. 484, 623 P.2d 998, cert. denied, 95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535, overruled on
other grounds by Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1987-NMSC-007, 105 N.M. 503, 734
P.2d 743; but see Perea v. Gorby, 1980-NMCA-048, 94 N.M. 325, 610 P.2d 212;
Medrano v. Ray Willis Constr. Co., 1981-NMCA-096, 96 N.M. 643, 633 P.2d 1241.

Employer's voluntary payment of employee's benefits admission of accident. —
By voluntarily paying an injured employee workmen's [workers'] compensation benefits,
the employer admits that the employee's disability was a natural and direct result of an
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and relieves plaintiffs of the
burden of establishing any causal connection as a medical probability by expert medical
testimony. Perea v. Gorby, 1980-NMCA-048, 94 N.M. 325, 610 P.2d 212; but see
Romero v. S.S. Kresge Co., 1981-NMCA-001, 95 N.M. 484, 623 P.2d 998, cert. denied,
95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535, overruled on other grounds by Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 1987-NMSC-007, 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743.

Claimant's testimony as only evidence supporting trial court's finding remains
undisturbed on appeal. — Where claimant's testimony is the only evidence which has
a bearing on the cause of the accident and if her statement will support the trial court's
finding that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment, the finding shall
not be disturbed on appeal. Romero v. S.S. Kresge Co., 1981-NMCA-001, 95 N.M. 484,
623 P.2d 998, cert. denied, 95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535, overruled on other grounds by
Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1987-NMSC-007, 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743.

Supreme court will not disturb findings where substantial evidence. — It is clear
that in workmen's [workers'] compensation cases, as in other appeals, where
substantial evidence is present to support a finding, the supreme court will not disturb
the same on appeal. Yates v. Matthews, 1963-NMSC-038, 71 N.M. 451, 379 P.2d 441.

Judgment not reversed though rule erroneously applied where evidence
substantial. — A workmen's [workers'] compensation case which presented a question
concerning traumatic neurosis required an extra-cautious view of the evidence, but
when the trial court construed the evidence in a manner more favorable to the claimant,
its judgment was not to be reversed even though an erroneous rule may have been
applied to the weight to be given the evidence, because the evidence in that case
substantially supported the findings without applying the erroneous rule. Jensen v.
United Perlite Corp., 1966-NMSC-111, 76 N.M. 384, 415 P.2d 356, overruled on other
grounds by American Tank & Steel Corp. v. Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052, 90 N.M. 513,
565 P.2d 1030.

Public officers not entitled to benefits. — Prior to 1972, members of the New Mexico
state labor and industrial commission, the state fair commission, the racing commission
and the livestock board, were all public officers, not employees, and not entitled to
benefits under this act. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-109 (rendered under former law).

Law reviews. — For note, "Workmen's Compensation in New Mexico: Pre-existing
Conditions and the Subsequent Injury Act," see 7 Nat. Resources J. 632 (1967).

For comment on Johnson v. C & H Constr. Co., 78 N.M. 423, 432 P.2d 267 (Ct. App.
1967), see 8 Nat. Resources J. 522 (1968).

For survey, "Workmen's Compensation," see 6 N.M. L. Rev. 413 (1976).

For note, "Medical Benefits Awarded to an Illegal Alien: Perez v. Health and Social
Services," see 9 N.M. L. Rev. 89 (1978-79).

For article, "Survey of New Mexico Law, 1979-80: Torts," see 11 N.M.L. Rev. 217
(1981).

For article, "Survey of New Mexico Law, 1979-80: Workmen's Compensation," see 11
N.M.L. Rev. 235 (1981).

For note, "Harmon v. Atlantic Richfield Co.: The Duty of an Employer to Provide a Safe
Place to Work for the Employee of an Independent Contractor," see 12 N.M.L. Rev. 559
(1982).

For article, "Survey on New Mexico Law, 1982-83: Workmen's Compensation," see 14
N.M.L. Rev. 211 (1984).

For comment, "Comparative Fault Principles Do Not Affect Negligent Employer's Right
to Full Reimbursement of Compensation Benefits Out of Worker's Partial Third-Party
Recovery - Taylor v. Delgarno Transp., Inc.," see 14 N.M.L. Rev. 437 (1984).

For comment, "A Comparison of Workers' Compensation in the United States and
Mexico," see 26 N.M.L. Rev. 133 (1996).

For article, "The Role of the Vocational Expert in Worker's Compensation Cases," see
14 N.M.L. Rev. 483 (1984).

For survey of workers' compensation law in New Mexico, see 18 N.M.L. Rev. 579
(1988).
For case note, "WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW: A Clinical Psychologist is
Qualified to Give Expert Medical Testimony Regarding Causation: Madrid v. Univ. of
California, d/b/a Los Alamos National Laboratory," see 18 N.M.L. Rev. 637 (1988).

For 1984-88 survey of New Mexico administrative law, 19 N.M.L. Rev. 575 (1990).

For annual survey of New Mexico Workers' Compensation Law, see 20 N.M.L. Rev. 459
(1990).

For note, "Workers' Compensation Law - Bad Faith Refusal of an Insurer To Pay
Workers' Compensation Benefits: Russell v. Protective Insurance Company," see 20
N.M.L. Rev. 757 (1990).

For note, "The Sexual Harassment Claim Quandary: Workers' Compensation as an
Inadequate and Unavailable Remedy: Cox v. Chino Mines/Phelps Dodge," see 24
N.M.L. Rev. 565.

For note, "Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Holds Worker's Compensation
Premiums Are Not Entitled to Fringe Benefits Priority Status - In Re S. Star Foods, Inc.,"
see 28 N.M.L. Rev. 487 (1998).

For comment, “A Comparison of Workers’ Compensation in the United States and
Mexico,” see 26 N.M. L. Rev. 133 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers' Compensation
§§ 1, 4.

Workmen's compensation as insurance, 119 A.L.R. 1245.

Application for, or award, denial or acceptance of, compensation under State
Workmen's Compensation Act as precluding action under Federal Employers Liability
Act by one engaged in interstate commerce within that act, 6 A.L.R.2d 581.

Workmen's compensation benefits, voluntarily paid under statute of one state, as bar to
claim or ground for reduction of claim of compensation under statute of another state, 8
A.L.R.2d 628.

Master's liability for failure to inform servant of disease or physical condition disclosed
by medical examination, 69 A.L.R.2d 1213.

Right of employee to maintain common-law action for negligence against workmen's
compensation insurance carrier, 93 A.L.R.2d 598.

Unemployment compensation benefits applied for or received as affecting claim for
workmen's compensation, 96 A.L.R.2d 941.
Right to maintain malpractice suit against injured employee's attending physician
notwithstanding receipt of workmen's compensation award, 28 A.L.R.3d 1066.

Insured's receipt of or right to workmen's compensation benefits as affecting recovery
under accident, hospital or medical expense policy, 40 A.L.R.3d 1012.

Homeowners' or personal liability insurance as providing coverage for liability under
Workmen's Compensation Laws, 41 A.L.R.3d 1306.

Automobile insurance, exclusion of employees of insured covered by workmen's
compensation, 45 A.L.R.3d 288.

Modern status of effect of Workmen's Compensation Act on right of third person
tortfeasor to recover contribution from employer of injured or killed workman, 100
A.L.R.3d 350.

Recovery for discharge from employment in retaliation for filing workers' compensation
claim, 32 A.L.R.4th 1221.

Workers' compensation: liability of successive employers for disease or condition
allegedly attributable to successive employments, 34 A.L.R.4th 958.

Third-party tortfeasor's right to have damages recovered by employee reduced by
amount of employee's workers' compensation benefits, 43 A.L.R.4th 849.

Willful, wanton, or reckless conduct of co-employee as ground of liability despite bar of
workers' compensation law, 57 A.L.R.4th 888.

Ownership interest in employer business as affecting status as employee for workers'
compensation purposes, 78 A.L.R.4th 973.

Workers' Compensation: Compensability of injuries incurred traveling to or from medical
treatment of earlier compensable injury, 83 A.L.R.4th 110.

Eligibility for workers' compensation as affected by claimant's misrepresentation of
health or physical condition at time of hiring, 12 A.L.R.5th 658.

Validity, construction and application of workers' compensation provisions relating to
nonresident alien dependents, 28 A.L.R.5th 547.

Divorce and separation: workers' compensation benefits as marital property subject to
distribution, 30 A.L.R.5th 139.

Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage: validity, construction and effect of
policy provision purporting to reduce coverage by amount paid or payable under
workers' compensation law, 31 A.L.R.5th 116.
Collateral source rule: admissibility of evidence of availability to plaintiff of free public
special education on issue of amount of damages recoverable from defendant, 41
A.L.R.5th 771.

Violation of employment rule barring claim for worker's compensation, 61 A.L.R.5th 375.

Workers' compensation: availability, rate, or method of calculation of interest on
attorney's fees or penalties, 79 A.L.R.5th 201.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant
as result of nonsudden stimuli - Right to compensation under particular statutory
provisions, 97 A.L.R.5th 1.

99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 1.