N.M. Stat. § 52-1-19 (2026)

As used in the Workers' Compensation Act, unless the context otherwise requires,
"injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment" shall include
accidental injuries to workers and death resulting from accidental injury as a result of
their employment and while at work in any place where their employer's business
requires their presence but shall not include injuries to any worker occurring while on his
way to assume the duties of his employment or after leaving such duties, the proximate
cause of which is not the employer's negligence.

History: 1953 Comp., § 59-10-12.12, enacted by Laws 1975, ch. 284, § 6; 1986, ch. 22,
§ 3; 1987, ch. 235, § 9.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Repeals and reenactments. — Laws 1975, ch. 284, § 6, repealed former 59-10-12.12,
1953 Comp., relating to injuries sustained in extra-hazardous occupations or pursuit,
and enacted a new 59-10-12.12, 1953 Comp.

Compiler's notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 235, § 54A, effective June 19, 1987, repealed
Laws 1986, ch. 22, § 105 which had formerly repealed this section effective July 1,
1987.

                          I.     GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Traveling employee exception. — A traveling employee is defined as an employee
who is taken away from home by his or her employment and who of necessity must eat
and sleep away from home in order to further the employer’s business and who may be
considered to be in the continuous employment of the employer, day and night. Begay
v. Consumer Direct Personal Care, 2015-NMCA-025, cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-002.
Where worker’s employment involved providing personal care services, through
medicaid, to her mentally disabled son, worker’s employment did not require her to be
away from home as part of her employment, and work-related travel actually ran
contrary to the individual plan of care which she developed for her son, which allowed
for incidental travel, but specified that services should be provided in the patient’s
residence; the traveling employee exception to the going and coming rule was
inapplicable. Begay v. Consumer Direct Personal Care, 2015-NMCA-025, cert. denied,
2015-NMCERT-002.

Aid to construction. — The maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," was only an
aid to construction and did not apply to provision of Workmen's (Workers')
Compensation Act reading: "injuries sustained in extra-hazardous duties incident to the
business," and "The right to the compensation provided for in this act, . . . for any
personal injury accidentally sustained or death resulting therefrom, shall obtain in all
cases" when the conditions and circumstances stated and required by Section 52-1-9
NMSA 1978 were present. Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 1950-NMSC-046, 55 N.M. 81,
227 P.2d 365 (decided under former law).

Question of law where facts undisputed. — Where the historical facts of the case are
undisputed, the question whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the
employment is a question of law. Edens v. N.M. Health & Soc. Servs. Dep't, 1976-
NMSC-008, 89 N.M. 60, 547 P.2d 65.

Scope of employment is to be determined from directions of employer, and not
from any agreement between the employee and her fellow employees; thus, the fact
that an employee agreed with her fellow employees to form a car pool at a shopping
center before proceeding to a required conference was of no consequence to the scope
of her employment. Edens v. N.M. Health & Soc. Servs. Dep't, 1976-NMSC-008, 89
N.M. 60, 547 P.2d 65.

Going to work where accident caused by negligent on-duty coworker. — Worker's
compensation was the exclusive remedy for a worker who was injured on his way to
work in a traffic accident that occurred half an hour before his shift began, two miles
away from his employer's premises, as a direct result of an on-duty coworker's negligent
driving of a vehicle owned by the common employer. Espinosa v. Albuquerque Publ'g
Co., 1997-NMCA-072, 123 N.M. 605, 943 P.2d 1058.

Liability in dual-employment situation. — In the dual-employment situation, if the
accident occurs when the worker is clearly performing services for only one employer,
then that employer is liable for any workmen's (workers') compensation benefits. If,
however, the services being performed at the time of the accident cannot be attributed
to a specific employer, but are services performed for both employers, then both
employers are liable. In the latter case, the benefits are apportioned between the
employers on the basis of the percentage of the worker's total wages paid by each
employer. Clemmer v. Carpenter, 1982-NMCA-098, 98 N.M. 302, 648 P.2d 341, cert.
denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794.
Assault upon employee. — A workman (worker) cannot file an independent common-
law tort claim against an employer and is restricted to an action under the Workmen's
(Workers') Compensation Act when an assault upon him was work-related and arose
out of employment. But, where an employee had completed his work and was on his
way out of the building when an assault occurred, it was not committed in the course of
his employment. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Montoya, 1978-NMSC-057, 91 N.M.
788, 581 P.2d 1283.

General employment as extra-hazardous. — The mere fact that, at the moment of
injury, claimant may have been engaged in extra-hazardous work does not bring him
within the act where his general employment is not classed as extra-hazardous.
Thomas v. Gardner, 1965-NMSC-045, 75 N.M. 371, 404 P.2d 853 (decided under
former law).

Where workman (worker) sustained injuries while taking fellow employee to work
when his truck collided at night with an unlighted road roller of the employer some
distance from where employee's work required him to set out and check flares, the
injury was not compensable under Workmen's (Workers') Compensation Act and did not
preclude a common-law action based on employer's negligence. Olguin v. Thygesen,
1943-NMSC-034, 47 N.M. 377, 143 P.2d 585 (decided under former law).

Carpenter repairing school building. — Carpenter who had been employed to repair
school building by replacing and puttying broken windows, mending and painting
window screens and hanging venetian blinds and who was injured while hanging blinds
was engaged in a single employment of an extra-hazardous nature and was entitled to
compensation on that basis without regard to whether hanging of blinds, standing alone,
was "decoration, alteration or repair" within phrase "building work" as used in former
statute. Scofield v. Lordsburg Mun. Sch. Dist., 1949-NMSC-027, 53 N.M. 249, 205 P.2d
834 (decided under former law).

Returning to job site to draw advance pay. — Assuming that returning to the job site
for the purpose of drawing advance pay was a "normal incident of the employment
relation," injury resulting from altercation with gate guard occurred "while he was on his
way to assume" the duty of his employment and hence the claim for compensation is
barred by this section. Fautheree v. Insulation & Specialties, Inc., 1960-NMSC-056, 67
N.M. 230, 354 P.2d 526 (decided under former law).

Plaintiff’s claim fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers’
Compensation Act. — Where plaintiff was in a motor vehicle accident on her way to
work, and where she and the other driver involved in the accident were both employees
of Los Alamos National Security (LANS), and where the other driver was operating a
vehicle owned by LANS, and where plaintiff filed a complaint in the district court alleging
negligence by both the other driver and LANS, the district court did not err in granting
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, because plaintiff’s claim arose in the course
and scope of her employment by LANS, thus triggering the exclusivity provision of the
Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA). The WCA is therefore plaintiff’s exclusive remedy
and the tort claims brought in the district court were barred. Finn v. Tullock, 2023-
NMCA-002, cert granted.

                             II.    ACCIDENTAL INJURY.

Aggravation by accident of preexisting condition as compensable. — That
claimant in his early life suffered from tuberculosis resulting in a Ghon tubercle does not
preclude claimant from compensation for dust induced hemorrhage on the job, even
though one without such a condition would not have been so adversely affected from
breathing a sudden heavy concentration of dust. The aggravation by accident of a
preexisting condition, whether the result of a disease or a congenital weakness, is
nevertheless compensable. Lucero v. C.R. Davis Contracting Co., 1962-NMSC-136, 71
N.M. 11, 375 P.2d 327, overruled on other grounds by Mascarenas v. Kennedy, 1964-
NMSC-179, 74 N.M. 665, 397 P.2d 312.

Evidence to establish causal connection between work accident and disability. —
Evidence, taken in consideration with the fact that all through a life of heavy work the
claimant, though suffering from tuberculosis in infancy resulting in a scarred lung, had
never before hemorrhaged, and for the first time did so while coughing as the result of
suddenly breathing heavy dust on the job, provided an ample evidence to sustain a
causal connection between work accident and claimant's disability. Lucero v. C.R. Davis
Contracting Co., 1962-NMSC-136, 71 N.M. 11, 375 P.2d 327, overruled on other
grounds by Mascarenas v. Kennedy, 1964-NMSC-179, 74 N.M. 665, 397 P.2d 312.

Evidence substantiates causal relationship between employment and heart
attack. — Regardless of any claimed conflict in the testimony of the medical experts,
where they were in agreement generally in their opinions that an emotional upset results
in stress upon the heart as much as physical stress, and that anger may be a
precipitating cause of heart attacks, either disabling or fatal, and that an employee who
was suffering from advanced generalized arteriosclerosis of the coronary arterial system
would be more affected by severe stress than one who had no arteriosclerosis, the
evidence met the requirements of substantiation and the evidence established a causal
relationship, and the employee, in the course of his employment, became emotionally
upset, suffered a compensable accidental injury and as a result thereof died of a
myocardial infarction due to arteriosclerotic heart disease. Little v. J. Korber & Co.,
1963-NMSC-012, 71 N.M. 294, 378 P.2d 119.

Sudden breathing of dust as accident. — Where there is a sudden breathing by
employee of heavy dust-laden air, caused by the nearby operation of a power broom
sweeping the streets, which when taken into his lungs caused a coughing spell and a
resulting sudden hemorrhage, it can be said to produce an "unintended," "unexpected"
and "unlooked for" result, requiring the court to characterize the event as accidental and
is sufficient to sustain a finding of accidental injury in the course of employment. Lucero
v. C.R. Davis Contracting Co., 1962-NMSC-136, 71 N.M. 11, 375 P.2d 327, overruled
on other grounds by Mascarenas v. Kennedy, 1964-NMSC-179, 74 N.M. 665, 397 P.2d
312.
Intentional torts that are accidental. — When a co-worker commits an intentional tort
against another worker, such an incident will be considered accidental and within the
scope of the Workers' Compensation Act, where the employer did not intentionally or
willfully engage in conduct leading to the incident resulting in the worker’s injury or
where the co-worker’s intentional conduct cannot be imputed to the employer under an
alter ego theory. Griego v. Patriot Erectors, Inc., 2007-NMCA-080, 141 N.M. 844, 161
P.3d 889, cert. denied, 2007-NMCERT-004, 141 N.M. 569, 158 P.3d 459.

Intentional act of co-worker does not preclude recovery. — Where the worker’s
supervisor intentionally slugged the worker while the worker was complaining about the
supervisor to their mutual construction superintendent, the worker’s injury was
accidental and the worker may recover worker’s compensation benefits. Griego v.
Patriot Erectors, Inc., 2007-NMCA-080, 141 N.M. 844, 161 P.3d 889, cert. denied,
2007-NMCERT-004, 141 N.M. 569, 158 P.3d 459.

Non-participant in a workplace accident. — Where worker suffered an injury while on
break at worker’s workplace when a co-worker grabbed worker by the shoulders in the
area of the worker’s neck and lifted the worker off the ground; and the worker was a
non-participating victim of the incident and the horseplay was one-sided on the part of
the co-worker, the worker’s injury was an accidental result of an incident that the worker
neither expected nor designed and was compensable under the Workers’
Compensation Act. Esckelson v. Miners’ Colfax Med. Ctr., 2014-NMCA-052.

Heart attack caused by employment is accidental injury within this article. Segura
v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 1984-NMCA-046, 102 N.M. 535, 697 P.2d 954, cert. quashed,
102 N.M. 412, 696 P.2d 1005 (1985).

Stroke arising out of employment. — A worker's injury, a stroke which was a result of
on the job stress resulting from a safety-related incident, "arose out of" his employment.
Shadbolt v. Schneider, Inc., 1985-NMCA-086, 103 N.M. 544, 710 P.2d 738, cert.
quashed, 104 N.M. 632, 725 P.2d 832.

Requirement or custom established by employer. — An employee who comes upon
the premises on an off day to receive a paycheck, which is a requirement or custom
established by the employer, and is injured while on the premises for that purpose,
sustains the injury while in the course of employment. Martinez v. Stoller, 1981-NMCA-
092, 96 N.M. 571, 632 P.2d 1209.

Slipping on ice not danger peculiar to employment. — As the hazard of slipping on
the ice in the alley was not a causative danger peculiar to the claimant's employment,
the injury received could not properly be found to have arisen out of the employment.
Martinez v. Fidel, 1956-NMSC-023, 61 N.M. 6, 293 P.2d 654 (decided under former
law).

                          III.   COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.
Injury compensable only if related to employment. — An injury is compensable only
if it is shown to be both "arising out of" and "in the course of" employment. Romero v.
S.S. Kresge Co., 1981-NMCA-001, 95 N.M. 484, 623 P.2d 998, cert. denied, 95 N.M.
593, 624 P.2d 535, overruled on other grounds by Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
1987-NMSC-007, 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743.

Burden on claimant to establish accident in course of employment. — Burden is
on the claimant to establish by evidence that worker's death was proximately caused by
an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Sw. Portland Cement
Co. v. Simpson, 135 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1943).

Burden of proof after claimant raised reasonable inference regarding course of
employment. — After claimant has introduced proof of facts raising a natural and
reasonable inference that accident arose out of and in the course of employee's
employment and occurred when he was performing services arising out of and in the
course of his employment, burden rested on the employer to show the contrary. Sw.
Portland Cement Co. v. Simpson, 135 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1943).

Inference by jury as to course of employment. — Where there is substantial
evidence that death of employee resulted from accident and that accident occurred
during his hours of work, at a place where his duties required him to be, or where he
might properly have been in the performance of such duties, the triers of the issues of
fact may reasonably conclude therefrom, as a natural inference, that the accident arose
out of and in the course of the employment. Sw. Portland Cement Co. v. Simpson, 135
F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1943).

Course of employment as presumption of fact. — Since burden is on claimant to
prove that accident arose out of and in the course of employment, either by direct
evidence or by evidence from which these facts may be legitimately inferred, the
presumption is not a legal presumption, but one of fact, that is, a natural inference
drawn from proven facts. Sw. Portland Cement Co. v. Simpson, 135 F.2d 584 (10th Cir.
1943).

Accident arises in course of employment when it occurs within the period of the
employment at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of
his duties and while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing something incidental
thereto. Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 1950-NMSC-046, 55 N.M. 81, 227 P.2d 365.

Claimant not disqualified from disability due to preexisting condition where injury
in course of employment. — That claimant was susceptible to an intervertebral disc
problem, and there was no doubt but that it was because of this preexisting condition
that injury occurred, did not disqualify him from disability benefits, where it was
determined that the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Shannon v.
Sandia Corp., 1968-NMSC-183, 79 N.M. 634, 447 P.2d 514.
Admission of company and insurer support finding of course of employment. —
Admission of making of accident report by the foreman of defendant company and the
payment of weekly compensation and medical benefits by the insurer, while not
conclusive, was sufficient to support a finding that accident arose out of and in the
course of plaintiff's employment by defendant company. Johnson v. J.S. & H. Constr.
Co., 1969-NMCA-122, 81 N.M. 42, 462 P.2d 627.

Employer's admission that he had paid several thousand dollars worth of premiums to
take care of a particular accident was competent evidence the workmen were injured in
an accident arising out of and in the course of their employment, but it was not
conclusive on the point. Feldhut v. Latham, 1955-NMSC-080, 60 N.M. 87, 287 P.2d
615.

When employee is sent by his employer on a special mission away from his regular
work; or by the terms of his contract of employment is burdened with a special duty
incidental thereto, but aside from the labor upon which his wages are measured; while
upon such mission, or in the performance of such duty, the employee is acting within
the course of his employment. Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 1950-NMSC-046, 55 N.M.
81, 227 P.2d 365.

Within scope where helping foreman's stalled car. — Workmen on their way to work
who were injured while pushing general foreman's stalled car at his request were held to
be within the scope of their employment and entitled to compensation under the
Workmen's (Workers') Compensation Act. Feldhut v. Latham, 1955-NMSC-080, 60 N.M.
87, 287 P.2d 615.

Stockholder injured within scope when working as manager. — Evidence showed
that stockholder who was president and member of board of directors of corporation
sustained an injury suffered in an accident arising out of and in the scope of his
employment while working as manager for the defendant corporate employer and that
he died as a result thereof. Shillinglaw v. Owen Shillinglaw Fuel Co., 1962-NMSC-047,
70 N.M. 65, 370 P.2d 502.

Injury is said to arise in course of employment when it takes place within the period
of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is
fulfilling his duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto. Edens v. N.M.
Health & Soc. Servs. Dep't, 1976-NMSC-008, 89 N.M. 60, 547 P.2d 65.

Injury is said to arise in course of employment. — An employee's injury arose in the
course of employment if it happened within the period of employment at some place
where the employee might reasonably be and while he was reasonably fulfilling duties
of his employment or was doing something incidental thereto. McKinney v. Dorlac,
1944-NMSC-017, 48 N.M. 149, 146 P.2d 867 (decided under former law).

Liability under dual-purpose doctrine. — The dual-purpose doctrine provides that
when a worker is on a trip which serves both a business and a personal purpose, and
the business purpose would have necessitated the trip by someone even if it had not
coincided with the personal purpose, then injury occurring on the trip is within the
course of the worker's employment. Clemmer v. Carpenter, 1982-NMCA-098, 98 N.M.
302, 648 P.2d 341, cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794.

Off-premise activity during lunch or meal period. — Where the employee is
engaged in an off-premise activity during the lunch or meal period in furtherance of his
employer's interests, and at the direction of or with the consent of his employer, an
injury sustained by the employee may be compensable under the Workers'
Compensation Act. Smith v. City of Albuquerque, 1986-NMCA-113, 105 N.M. 125, 729
P.2d 1379.

A back injury sustained when claimant, a city risk management coordinator, tripped and
fell in a restaurant after having lunch with a city attorney was compensable, where the
primary purpose of the lunch was to discuss cases on which they had been working,
and 75% of the lunch meeting was devoted to the discussion of city business. Smith v.
City of Albuquerque, 1986-NMCA-113, 105 N.M. 125, 729 P.2d 1379.

Injury in repairing employee's truck. — Under findings of trial court that employee
was required to keep his truck in repair, that injury was received 22 miles from the place
of work in repair shop with which the employer had no connection, and where
employer's business did not require the presence of the employee, the employee's
injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. McDonald v. Denison,
1946-NMSC-046, 51 N.M. 386, 185 P.2d 508 (decided under former law).

                           IV.    EMPLOYER'S PREMISES.

Employer's parking lot did not constitute premises. — Mere employee "use" of a
parking lot is insufficient to consider the lot part of the employer's "premises."
Constantineau v. First Nat'l Bank, 1991-NMCA-040, 112 N.M. 38, 810 P.2d 1258, cert.
denied, 112 N.M. 21, 810 P.2d 1241.

Ingress and egress from employer's premises. — When an employee is going to or
coming from his place of work and is on the employer's premises, he is within the
protective ambit of the Workers' Compensation Act (this article), at least when using the
customary means of ingress and egress or route of employee's travel or is otherwise
injured in a place he may reasonably be expected to be. Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
1987-NMSC-007, 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743.

Railroad crossing which was the sole means of ingress and egress to employer's plant
constituted a part of employer's premises for purposes of recovery of benefits under the
premises exception to the going and coming rule. Garcia v. Mt. Taylor Millwork, Inc.,
1989-NMCA-100, 111 N.M. 17, 801 P.2d 87, cert. denied, 110 N.M. 282, 795 P.2d 87.

                          V.     GOING AND COMING RULE.
The traveling-employee exception to the going and coming rule. — Under the
traveling-employee exception to the going and coming rule, an employee whose work
entails travel away from the employer’s premises is, in most circumstances, under
continuous workers’ compensation coverage from the time he leaves home until he
returns. The exception applies during the entire time the employee is traveling, and
therefore necessarily encompasses injuries incurred while the employee is not actually
working, such as when the employee is engaged in leisure or recreational activities.
One seeking compensation for an injury must still demonstrate that the injury arose out
of and in the course of employment. The requirement is met if the traveling employee
was injured while engaging in an activity that was both reasonable and foreseeable, and
if that activity is not conducted in an unreasonable or unforeseeable manner. Finally, the
activity must confer some benefit on the employer. Armenta v. A.S. Horner, Inc., 2015-
NMCA-092, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-008.

Where worker, on a work-related trip in Springer, New Mexico, had been allowed to
drive employer’s vehicle after work hours to pick up food and alcohol for an employees’
dinner, but after dinner was told by his supervisor to drink moderately and to not leave
the motel, worker, despite the warning, left the motel in employer’s vehicle and headed
to Raton to continue partying. Worker was killed in an accident just north of Springer.
Worker’s blood alcohol concentration was .23 at the time of his death. The accident did
not arise out of and in the course of employment because worker’s decision to take the
vehicle for a ride could be considered foreseeable and reasonable conduct under the
traveling-employee exception, but doing so under the significant influence of alcohol
was not reasonable, and no benefit could have been conferred on employer by worker’s
drinking excessively and driving to Raton, where employer had no business interests.
Armenta v. A.S. Horner, Inc., 2015-NMCA-092, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-008.

Traveling employee exception not applicable. — Where oil field workers were killed
or injured while traveling home after working hours and away from their drilling rig work
site which was located 37 miles from their home town; the workers were sharing a ride
in the private vehicle of one of the workers; the workers were paid an hourly wage
beginning when they arrived at work and ending when the left; the workers were
responsible for their own transportation to the rig site; and the workers were not paid for
travel time or mileage, the workers were not traveling employees and compensation for
their deaths or injuries was precluded by the going and coming rule. Flores v. McKay Oil
Corp., 2008-NMCA-123, 144 N.M. 782, 192 P.3d 777, cert. quashed, 2009-NMCERT-
003, 146 N.M. 604, 213 P.3d 508.

An employee is not in the course of employment while going to and returning from
his work, but there are many exceptions to the rule. Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 1950-
NMSC-046, 55 N.M. 81, 227 P.2d 365.

Application of the going and coming rule was limited by the context. — Where
plaintiff was employed by the department of public safety; plaintiff used a private bus
service that provided transportation to the public to commute to work; the bus service
picked passengers up at a department of transportation parking lot; while walking
through the parking lot to board the bus, plaintiff fell into an unlit hole that was not
clearly marked, barricaded nor cordoned off; the department of transportation’s
obligations and duties as the owner and operator of the parking lot were separate and
distinct from the department of public safety’s status as plaintiff’s employer; the
department of transportation held itself open to the public and had a duty to make a
reasonable inspection of the parking lot and warn visitors of any dangerous conditions;
the parking lot was not provided exclusively for state employees; plaintiff’s use of the
parking lot was unrelated to plaintiff’s duties with the department of public safety; and
plaintiff’s status as a department of public safety employee was separate and distinct
from plaintiff’s status as a commuter using public transportation, the Workers'
Compensation Act did not apply to plaintiff’s claim and did not preclude plaintiff’s claim
of premises negligence against the department of transportation. Quintero v. N.M. Dep't
of Transp., 2010-NMCA-081, 148 N.M. 903, 242 P.3d 470, cert. quashed, 2011-
NMCERT-009, 269 P.3d 904.

Traveling employee exception. — Where workers, who were members of an oil well
drilling crew that worked on the employer's mobile drilling rigs, were injured while
traveling to a rig site; the employer moved its drilling rigs every seven to eight days to a
new location after the drilling of a well was completed; drilling sites were located in rural
areas where lodging was not available, making daily travel necessary; workers resided
in the same municipality and traveled to different drilling sites without having to change
their residences; the employer required the driller to have a full crew present at the
drilling site at the beginning of the driller’s shift; the driller transported the drilling crew to
the rig site; the employer required its drillers to maintain a valid driver's license and
automobile insurance and compensated its drillers for each mile traveled to the rig site;
crew members were not compensated for travel time; and the employer did not dictate
the route or the mode of transportation, the injuries suffered by workers arose out of and
in the course of their employment because the travel was mutually beneficial to both
workers and the employer and workers encountered special hazards unique to their
employment while traveling. Rodriguez v. Permian Drilling Corp., 2011-NMSC-032, 150
N.M. 164, 258 P.3d 443.

One whose work not only requires him to travel, but for whom travel is an integral part of
his employment, is within the scope of employment continuously while traveling.
Therefore such an employee may be eligible for workers' compensation benefits as a
traveling employee for injuries he sustains while away from home. Ramirez v. Dawson
Prod. Partners, Inc., 2000-NMCA-011, 128 N.M. 601, 995 P.2d 1043.

Ordinarily "injuries" sustained by employees while on their way to assume the duties of
their employment or after leaving such duties are not compensable. But there are
exceptions to the rule; among them, where the employment requires the employee to
travel on the highways and where the employer contracts to and does furnish
transportation to and from work. Martinez v. Fidel, 1956-NMSC-023, 61 N.M. 6, 293
P.2d 654 (decided under former law).
In two cases consolidated on appeal, a truck driver who pulled a muscle while moving a
piece of furniture in his motel room, and a truck driver who was killed when taking a
walk while waiting for his truck to arrive had compensable claims under the traveling
employee rule; there were no facts in either case suggesting a distinct deviation from
the business purpose of the trip, and in both cases the activities leading to the injuries
were reasonable and of some benefit to the employer. Chavez v. ABF Freight Sys.,
2001-NMCA-039, 130 N.M. 524, 27 P.3d 1011.

Where employer agreed to furnish transportation. — While employee ordinarily was
not in course of employment when injured while traveling to or from work, where
employer agreed to furnish transportation, and employee was paid by his employer to
transport himself and other employees, and was injured fatally during such a journey,
his death arose out of and in course of employment, and was compensable. Barrington
v. Johnn Drilling Co., 1947-NMSC-030, 51 N.M. 172, 181 P.2d 166 (decided under
former law).

Where employer in employment contract agreed to transport employees to and from
work, an employee who was injured while being transported suffered his injury in the
course of employment. Barrington v. Johnn Drilling Co., 1947-NMSC-030, 51 N.M. 172,
181 P.2d 166 (decided under former law).

Employee required to drive city vehicle to and from work and remain on call at all
times at home was within his "course of employment" when driving home, even though
he spent two and one-half hours after work, and before his drive, socializing and
drinking in a bar. Salazar v. City of Santa Fe, 1983-NMCA-134, 102 N.M. 172, 692 P.2d
1321, cert. quashed, 102 N.M. 225, 693 P.2d 591 (1985).

Traveling between job sites does not fall within the "going and coming" rule, and
an employee who is injured while going from job site to job site will not be excluded from
receiving benefits. Garcia v. Phil Garcia's Elec. Contractor, 1982-NMCA-186, 99 N.M.
374, 658 P.2d 449, cert. denied, 99 N.M. 358, 658 P.2d 433.

Worker's claim was barred by the going and coming rule. — Claimant, who was
injured while walking from a city-owned parking facility to her employer's premises, did
not suffer an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment
pursuant to the "going-and-coming rule", where her employer did not require its
employees to use the parking facility and some employees in fact did use other parking
facilities. Constantineau v. First Nat'l Bank, 1991-NMCA-040, 112 N.M. 38, 810 P.2d
1258, cert. denied, 112 N.M. 21, 810 P.2d 1241.

Worker's claim was not barred by the going and coming rule simply because the
accident occurred after claimant had left the employer's designated parking lot at a
shopping mall but before she had arrived at her employer's shop in the mall, where she
had met a coworker with whom she had coffee in a mall restaurant before slipping on a
heavily waxed floor. Lovato v. Maxim's Beauty Salon, Inc., 1989-NMCA-083, 109 N.M.
138, 782 P.2d 391.
Requirement or custom estalbished by employer. — In action for compensation for
death of employee killed in automobile collision after leaving work over most practical
and usual route traveled by him and other employees on premises of employer,
claimant could not recover without proof of employer's negligence. Cuellar v. American
Employers' Ins. Co., 1932-NMSC-018, 36 N.M. 141, 9 P.2d 685 (decided under former
law).

Under the provisions of this section, an employee ordinarily has no compensable claim
if injured while on his way to assuming the duties of his employment or after leaving
such duties. On the other hand, an employee does have a compensable claim if injured
while on his way to assuming his duties or leaving his duties if the employer's
negligence was the proximate cause of that injury. Galles Chevrolet Co. v. Chaney,
1979-NMSC-027, 92 N.M. 618, 593 P.2d 59.

Where employer is negligent dependents recover compensation. — Where a
workman (worker) leaving his work in road-building, while on his way to his home by a
reasonable and not prohibited route, in the area then being used by his employer, was
killed by negligence in the road-building, attributable to his employer, compensation was
recoverable by his dependents. Cuellar v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 1932-NMSC-
018, 36 N.M. 141, 9 P.2d 685 (decided under former law).

Stop did not deny trip character. — Mere fact that while en route to a construction job
over which project engineer had supervision he called on his desperately ill father did
not deny the trip character as in the course of his employment, where he had resumed
travel on the journey which occasioned the trip, and recovery of compensation for his
death resulting from accidental injury was not thereby precluded. Parr v. N.M. State
Hwy. Dep't, 1950-NMSC-016, 54 N.M. 126, 215 P.2d 602 (decided under former law).

                           VI.    SPECIAL ERRAND RULE.

On trip at employer's direction. — Where employee was fatally injured on trip from
Albuquerque to Roswell, the trip being made at employer's direction and on time paid
for by his employer, the injuries were sustained in course of employment within
provisions of the Workmen's (Workers') Compensation Act. McKinney v. Dorlac, 1944-
NMSC-017, 48 N.M. 149, 146 P.2d 867 (decided under former law).

Deviation en route did not bar recovery. — Where employee was traveling from
Albuquerque to Roswell on employer's business, fact that he had stopped for an hour or
more en route at a bar and cafe, did not bar a recovery for his death under the
Workmen's (Workers') Compensation Act where the fatal injury in automobile accident
took place after he resumed his journey. McKinney v. Dorlac, 1944-NMSC-017, 48 N.M.
149, 146 P.2d 867 (decided under former law).

Special errand rule applicable where employee on special mission. — Where
deceased employee who, along with three others, was ordered by the defendant-
employer to attend a special two-day health and social services department meeting (all
of whom had been requested by their respective supervisors to form a car pool and to
return overnight to their home town between the two sessions in order to save fuel and
reduce travel costs), picked up the three other employees at an agreed on meeting
place, a parking lot, and proceeded in her car to the meeting, and at the close of the first
day's session, after discharging her three colleagues in the same parking lot, drove out
of the parking lot and immediately thereafter was involved in the accident which resulted
in her death, the supreme court held that the special errand rule was applicable in that
deceased was on a special mission for her employer and was within the scope of her
employment from the moment she left home until the moment she would have returned
home at the end of the day, and therefore, her fatal injuries arose out of and in the
course of her employment, and the "going and coming" rule was inapplicable. Edens v.
N.M. Health & Soc. Servs. Dep't, 1976-NMSC-008, 89 N.M. 60, 547 P.2d 65.

The special errand rule states that when an employee, having identifiable time and
space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally
not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may be brought
within the course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the
journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard or urgency of making it in the particular
circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the
service itself. Edens v. N.M. Health & Soc. Servs. Dep't, 1976-NMSC-008, 89 N.M. 60,
547 P.2d 65.

Special errand exception inapplicable. — Where worker’s employment involved
providing personal care services, through medicaid, to her mentally disabled son,
worker provided no evidence that a trip to perform laundry services in a neighboring city
was required by her employer or was incident to her employer’s business, as opposed
to being incident to her natural care-taking role; special errand exception to the going
and coming rule was inapplicable. Begay v. Consumer Direct Personal Care, 2015-
NMCA-025, cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-002.

Leaving for work at earlier time is not sufficient to constitute "special mission"
and to avoid the pronouncement of the "going and coming" rule as embodied in this
section. Ross v. Marberry & Co., 1960-NMSC-013, 66 N.M. 404, 349 P.2d 123 (decided
under former law).

Making bank deposit for employer after hours covered. — Plaintiff who was
required to deposit her employer's funds in a bank after normal working hours each
working day, and who was injured while returning from the bank to the point where her
normal route home continued, was at work at the place where her employer's business
required her to be as well as being within the "special errand" rule, and therefore was
entitled to compensation. Avila v. Pleasuretime Soda, Inc., 1977-NMCA-079, 90 N.M.
707, 568 P.2d 233.

Law reviews. — For note, "Workmen's Compensation in New Mexico: Preexisting
Conditions and the Subsequent Injury Act," see 7 Nat. Resources J. 632 (1967).
For article, "Survey of New Mexico Law, 1979-80: Workmen's Compensation," see 11
N.M.L. Rev. 235 (1981).

For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to workmen's compensation, see 13
N.M.L. Rev. 495 (1983).

For survey of workers' compensation law in New Mexico, see 18 N.M.L. Rev. 579
(1988).

For survey of 1990-91 workers' compensation law, see 22 N.M.L. Rev. 845 (1992).

For note, "Workers' Compensation Law – The Sexual Harassment Claim Quandry:
Workers' Compensation as an Inadequate and Unavailable Remedy: Cox v. Chino
Mines/Phelps Dodge," see 24 N.M.L. Rev. 565 (1994).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers' Compensation
§§ 246 to 250, 263 et seq.

Injury to employee crossing or walking along railroad tracks going to or from work, 50
A.L.R.2d 363.

Workers' compensation: sexual assaults as compensable, 52 A.L.R.4th 731.

Workers' compensation: injuries incurred during labor activity, 61 A.L.R.4th 196.

Workers' compensation: injuries incurred while traveling to or from work with employer's
receipts, 63 A.L.R.4th 253.

Workers' Compensation: Compensability of injuries incurred traveling to or from medical
treatment of earlier compensable injury, 83 A.L.R.4th 110.

Workers' compensation: Law enforcement officer's recovery for injury sustained during
exercise of physical recreation activities, 44 A.L.R.5th 569.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered as result of
sudden stimuli involving nonpersonnel action, 83 A.L.R.5th 103.

Right to workers' compensation for emotional distress or like injury suffered by claimant
as result of sudden stimuli involving nonpersonnel action - compensability under
particular circumstances, 84 A.L.R.5th 249.

99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §§ 153 to 160, 220 to 257(3); 100 C.J.S.
Workmen's Compensation § 611.