New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 7-36-15 (2026)

Methods of valuation for property taxation purposes;

✓ current as of May 2026
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general provisions.
    A. Property subject to valuation for property taxation purposes under this article of
the Property Tax Code shall be valued by the methods required by this article of the
Property Tax Code whether the determination of value is made by the department or the
county assessor. The same or similar methods of valuation shall be used for valuation
of the same or similar kinds of property for property taxation purposes.

    B. Unless a method or methods of valuation are authorized in Sections 7-36-20
through 7-36-33 NMSA 1978, the value of property for property taxation purposes shall
be its market value as determined by application of the sales of comparable property,
income or cost methods of valuation or any combination of these methods. In using any
of the methods of valuation authorized by this subsection, the valuation authority:

       (1)    shall apply generally accepted appraisal techniques; and
       (2)    in determining the market value of residential housing, shall consider any
decrease in the value that would be realized by the owner in a sale of the property
because of the effects of any affordable housing subsidy, covenant or encumbrance
imposed pursuant to a federal, state or local affordable housing program that restricts
the future use of the property or the resale price of the property or would otherwise
prohibit the owner from fully benefitting from any enhanced value of the property. As
used in this paragraph:

            (a) "subsidy, covenant or encumbrance imposed pursuant to a federal, state
or local affordable housing program" includes those imposed by a nonprofit entity
approved by a governmental entity as a qualifying grantee pursuant to the Affordable
Housing Act [6-27-1 to 6-27-8 NMSA 1978]; and

           (b) "residential housing" means any building, structure or portion thereof that
is primarily occupied, or designed or intended primarily for occupancy, as a residence
by one or more households and any real property that is offered for sale or lease for the
construction or location thereon of such a building, structure or portion thereof.
"Residential housing" includes congregate housing, manufactured homes, housing
intended to provide or providing transitional or temporary housing for homeless persons
and common health care, kitchen, dining, recreational and other facilities primarily for
use by residents of a residential housing project.

   C. Dams, reservoirs, tanks, canals, irrigation wells, installed irrigation pumps, stock-
watering wells and pumps, similar structures and equipment used for irrigation or stock-
watering purposes, water rights and private roads shall not be valued separately from
the land they serve. The foregoing improvements and rights shall be considered as
appurtenances to the land they serve, and their value shall be included in the
determination of value of the land.

   D. The department shall adopt regulations to implement the methods of valuation
authorized in this article of the Property Tax Code.

History: Laws 1973, ch. 258, § 17; 1953 Comp., § 72-29-5; reenacted by Laws 1975,
ch. 165, § 2; 1995, ch. 12, § 11; 2008, ch. 77, § 1.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For constitutional provision as to equality in ad valorem taxation,
see N.M. Const., art. VIII, § 1.

For constitutional provision as to assessment of lands, see N.M. Const., art. VIII, § 6.

The 2008 amendment, effective February 29, 2008, added Paragraph (2) of
Subsection B.
Applicability. — Laws 2008, ch. 77, § 2 provided that the provisions of Laws 2008, ch.
77, § 1 apply to the 2008 and subsequent property tax years.

The 1995 amendment, effective June 16, 1995, in Subsection B, substituted "Sections
7-36-20 through 7-36-33 NMSA 1978" for "Sections 72-29-9 through 72-29-22 NMSA
1953", and substituted the language beginning "by application of the" for "by sales of
comparable property, or, if that method cannot be used due to the lack of comparable
sales data for the property being valued, then its value shall be determined using an
income method or cost methods of valuation" at the end of the first sentence; and
substituted "Section 7-38-90 NMSA 1978" for "72-31-88 NMSA 1953" in Subsection D.

                         I.     GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Exclusive reliance on evidence of prior year comparable sales was reasonable. —
With respect to comparable sales, the legislature intended assessors and protests
boards to consider only data available on January 1 of the tax year of the valuation
notice. AMREP Sw., Inc. v. Sandoval Cnty. Assessor, 2012-NMCA-082, 284 P.3d 1118.

Where the county valuation protests board refused to consider the taxpayer’s
comparable 2009 sales evidence and relied exclusively on comparable 2008 sales for
the valuation of the taxpayer’s property for the 2009 tax year based on the board’s
interpretation of statutory and administrative code provisions that required property to
be valued using only data available on January 1, 2009, the board’s interpretation of the
statutory and administrative code provisions was reasonable. AMREP Sw., Inc. v.
Sandoval Cnty. Assessor, 2012-NMCA-082, 284 P.3d 1118.

Assessor's valuation sufficient evidence. — Since the assessor's valuation is
presumed to be correct it is sufficient evidence, where uncontradicted, to support the
board's decision. Peterson Props. v. Valencia Cnty. Valuation Protests Bd., 1976-
NMCA-043, 89 N.M. 239, 549 P.2d 1074.

How presumption of assessor's valuation may be overcome. — The statutory
presumption of correctness of the value of property by the county assessor for tax
purposes can be overcome by a taxpayer showing that the assessor did not follow the
applicable statutory provisions, or by presenting evidence tending to dispute the factual
correctness of the valuation. La Jara Land Developers, Inc. v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor,
1982-NMCA-006, 97 N.M. 318, 639 P.2d 605.

Admission of taxpayer's evidence when market value indeterminable. — The
protests board could not rely exclusively on the county assessor's valuation of property
even though, according to 72-2-3, 1953 Comp., the assessment must be at "full actual
value," and neither could it rely on comparable sales or sales of comparable lands
where none have occurred; accordingly, the board should have allowed the admission
of the only available relevant evidence which the taxpayer had. In situations where cash
market value could not be determined, earning capacity, cost of reproduction and
original cost less depreciation furnished relevant considerations for determining "value."
In re Miller, 1975-NMCA-116, 88 N.M. 492, 542 P.2d 1182, cert. denied, 89 N.M. 5, 546
P.2d 70, rev'd on other grounds, 89 N.M. 547, 555 P.2d 142 (1976) (decided under prior
law).

Presumption of assessor's valuation not overcome. — Since taxpayer failed to
present any evidence of sales of comparable property or evidence of value based on
generally accepted appraisal techniques, and its only evidence, the purchase price of its
land in question, did not establish a market value under Subsection B, the presumption
of the correctness of the assessor's valuation was not overcome. Peterson Props. v.
Valencia Cnty. Valuation Protests Bd., 1976-NMCA-043, 89 N.M. 239, 549 P.2d 1074.

Presumption of assessor's valuation not overcome. — The presumption of the
correctness of the assessor's valuation was not overcome by the taxpayers' offer, as
evidence of market value, the price for which they purchased the property, where the
sales price was not the result of an arms'-length transaction because of the taxpayers'
mailing campaign to convince landowners to sell their property to the taxpayers at below
market prices. In re Cobb, 1991-NMCA-122, 113 N.M. 251, 824 P.2d 1053, cert. denied,
113 N.M. 44, 822 P.2d 1127 (1992).

Taxpayer rebutted presumption of assessor's valuation. — Since taxpayers
presented uncontradicted evidence that access to their property was physically blocked
and also offered the only substantial evidence of the fair market value of the property in
the form of testimony by a real estate appraiser that because of the lack of access the
highest and best use that the property could be put to was as grazing land by one of the
adjoining landowners, and that as such it had a fair market value of $18.00 per acre, or
$2034 and $5022 respectively for the two tracts, they effectively rebutted the
presumption of 7-38-6 NMSA 1978 that the county assessor's valuations of $313,875
and $169,500 were correct. Petition of Kinscherff, 1976-NMCA-097, 89 N.M. 669, 556
P.2d 355, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 8, 558 P.2d 620.

When county assessor did not follow any statutory method of valuation in 1976,
but simply set the valuation of a shopping center back up to the 1972 figure, the
decisions of the board were arbitrary and capricious, not supported by substantial
evidence in the record taken as a whole, and otherwise not in accordance with law, and
its orders were vacated. San Pedro S. Group v. Bernalillo Cnty. Valuation Protest Bd.,
1976-NMCA-116, 89 N.M. 784, 558 P.2d 53.

Scope of "structures and equipment" in Subsection C. — The inclusion of
Subsection C indicated that the exemption from separate valuation for the structures
and equipment listed in Subsection C is not limited to structures and equipment used for
the purposes of irrigation or stock-watering, but applies to all such structures and
equipment. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. Property Tax Div., 1980-NMCA-063, 95 N.M.
685, 625 P.2d 1202.

No denial of due process in failure to adopt regulations. — Taxpayer was not
denied due process because the property tax department did not adopt regulations that
listed the procedures to be followed, and identified the methods of valuation in general
use by the department and the applicable factors to be included in determining the
value of property, since the amended statute did not require regulations, and taxpayer
had the right of discovery by deposition of all the facts necessary to defend the
assessed valuation of its property. Peterson Props. v. Valencia Cnty. Valuation Protests
Bd., 1976-NMCA-043, 89 N.M. 239, 549 P.2d 1074.

Failure to require equalization does not establish official interpretation. — The fact
that state officials have, for years, known that there are inequalities or lack of uniformity
in tax assessments and have done nothing about it does not establish this as official
"long-standing interpretation." It is, in essence, merely long-standing failure by
respondents and their predecessors to require equalization as plainly required by the
constitution and the legislative enactments. State ex rel. Castillo Corp. v. N.M. Tax
Comm'n, 1968-NMSC-117, 79 N.M. 357, 443 P.2d 850.

Honest judgment most important. — What is most important is that the appraisers,
the assessor and the protest board exercise an honest judgment based upon the
information they possess or are able to acquire. First Nat'l Bank v. Bernalillo Cnty.
Valuation Protest Bd., 1977-NMCA-005, 90 N.M. 110, 560 P.2d 174.

Sovereign immunity not applicable in mandamus of assessment ratio. — In a
mandamus proceeding to require the performance of a duty plainly required under the
constitution, i.e., to prescribe an assessment ratio so that property shall be uniformly
assessed in proportion to its value, the sovereign immunity doctrine is not applicable.
State ex rel. Castillo Corp. v. N.M. Tax Comm'n, 1968-NMSC-117, 79 N.M. 357, 443
P.2d 850.

                                 II.        MARKET VALUE.

                                       A.    IN GENERAL.

"Market value" means a price which a purchaser, willing but not obliged to buy, would
pay an owner, willing but not obliged to sell, taking into consideration all uses to which
the property is adapted and might in reason be applied. Peterson Props. v. Valencia
Cnty. Valuation Protests Bd., 1976-NMCA-043, 89 N.M. 239, 549 P.2d 1074.

Usual factors which are considered in ascertaining fair market value of any given
tract of land are its size, shape, location, topography, accessibility to roads, availability
of public utilities and comparable sales, and, in a given instance, one factor may far
outweigh all the rest in importance. Petition of Kinscherff, 1976-NMCA-097, 89 N.M.
669, 556 P.2d 355, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 8, 558 P.2d 620.

Legislature gave priority to first method of valuation, a valuation determined by
sales of comparable property. It did not do so with reference to the succeeding
methods. If the legislature intended to give priority to the second method, the "income
method," over the third method, the "cost method," for any reason, it would have
phrased the section in language similar to the priority established in the first method of
valuation. First Nat'l Bank v. Bernalillo Cnty. Valuation Protest Bd., 1977-NMCA-005, 90
N.M. 110, 560 P.2d 174.

Proof of purchase price alone is not sufficient to fix market value without evidence
of the details of the sale. Cobb v. Otero Cnty. Assessor, 1983-NMCA-090, 100 N.M.
207, 668 P.2d 323.

Market value not an absolute. — Subsection B makes it clear that market value is not
a given or an absolute, it is only a method of determining value. National Potash Co. v.
Property Tax Div., 1984-NMCA-055, 101 N.M. 404, 683 P.2d 521.

Explanation necessary when market value not used for valuation. — If market
value is not used as the basis for calculating assessed valuation, the assessor must
explain why that approach is not appropriate, or that there is a lack of adequate market
data. Protest of Plaza Del Sol Ltd. P'ship v. Assessor for Cnty. of Bernalillo, 1986-
NMCA-022, 104 N.M. 154, 717 P.2d 1123.

Past or future value not to serve as basis. — What the fair market value of a tract
may have been in the past or speculation as to what it might be in the future cannot
serve as the basis for valuation. Petition of Kinscherff, 1976-NMCA-097, 89 N.M. 669,
556 P.2d 355, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 8, 558 P.2d 620; Bakel v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor,
1980-NMCA-173, 95 N.M. 723, 625 P.2d 1240.

Past market value. — Evidence of what the fair market value of a tract may have been
in the past cannot properly be utilized as the sole basis for valuation of the property for
tax purposes. La Jara Land Developers, Inc. v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 1982-NMCA-
006, 97 N.M. 318, 639 P.2d 605.

Use of mass appraisal method upheld. — The use by the county assessor of the
mass appraisal methodology to value plaintiffs' undeveloped property for tax
assessment purposes was permissible under this statute when the method was based
on standard appraisal procedure, such as comparable sales, and the resulting valuation
bore a reasonable relationship to the market value. In re Cobb, 1991-NMCA-122, 113
N.M. 251, 824 P.2d 1053, cert. denied, 113 N.M. 44, 822 P.2d 1127.

Using one uniform percentage depreciation factor for property valuation
improper. — Any property valuation method which uses one uniform percentage
depreciation factor, regardless of the age of the property, is an improper method of
determining property value; such a method would not, except by mere coincidence,
yield a value consistent with the fair market value of the property. Anaconda Co. v.
Prop. Tax Dep't, 1979-NMCA-158, 94 N.M. 202, 608 P.2d 514, cert. denied, 94 N.M.
628, 614 P.2d 545.

Insufficient evidence to support county assessor’s method of valuation. — Where
appellant sought review of the Bernalillo county valuation protests board’s valuation of
appellant’s commercial property, and where the county assessor testified that the
assessor applies a forty-five percent limitation on operating expenses rather than
applying the taxpayer’s actual reported expenses, but absent data that forty-five percent
is an appropriate limitation on operating expenses in this market, for this property type,
and during this time period, there was insufficient evidence such that a reasonable
person could conclude that the county assessor’s application of the income valuation
method utilized generally accepted appraisal techniques. 2727 San Pedro LLC v.
Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 2017-NMCA-008.

                       B.     COMPARABLE SALES METHOD.

"Comparable property" is property similar to the property being appraised, which has
been recently sold or is currently being offered for sale in the same or competing areas.
Peterson Props. v. Valencia Cnty. Valuation Protests Bd., 1976-NMCA-043, 89 N.M.
239, 549 P.2d 1074; New Mexico Baptist Found. v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 1979-
NMCA-102, 93 N.M. 363, 600 P.2d 309.

"Comparable" is defined as capable of being compared with, worthy of comparison,
and thus must necessarily include dissimilarities as well as similarities. Peterson Props.
v. Valencia Cnty. Valuation Protests Bd., 1976-NMCA-043, 89 N.M. 239, 549 P.2d
1074.

"To compare". — In reviewing sales of other properties, "to compare" means to
examine the characteristics or qualities of one or more properties for the purpose of
discovering their resemblances or differences; the aim is to show relative values by
bringing out characteristic qualities, whether similar or divergent, and thus, comparisons
based on sales may be made according to location, age and condition of improvements,
income and expense, use, size, type of construction and in numerous other ways.
Peterson Props. v. Valencia Cnty. Valuation Protests Bd., 1976-NMCA-043, 89 N.M.
239, 549 P.2d 1074.

Best method is use of comparable sales. — The best method of ascertaining what a
willing and informed buyer would pay a willing and informed seller in usual
circumstances in light of the highest and best use to which the property may be put in
the not too distant future is through the use of comparable sales. Peterson Props. v.
Valencia Cnty. Valuation Protests Bd., 1976-NMCA-043, 89 N.M. 239, 549 P.2d 1074.

Reasonable cash market value, reflected by comparable property sales, is
relevant for determining the correct valuation of a piece of property, if there have been
such sales. Peterson Props. v. Valencia Cnty. Valuation Protests Bd., 1976-NMCA-043,
89 N.M. 239, 549 P.2d 1074.

When comparable sales evidence not presented. — Since the documents relied
upon by a taxpayer as evidence of comparable sales are documents dealing with the
sale of that very improvement whose valuation is the subject of the present dispute and
the only evidence submitted by the taxpayer is the purchase price of the land in
question, the taxpayer failed to present any evidence of sales of comparable property
and the evidence submitted does not establish a market value under Subsection B and
the statutory presumption of correctness of valuation for tax purposes still stands. N.M.
Baptist Found. v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 1979-NMCA-102, 93 N.M. 363, 600 P.2d
309.

Test of comparable sales relevancy left to court's discretion. — The rule regarding
comparable sales is one of relevancy and, not unlike the general evidentiary rule
applied in all proceedings, requiring similarity of conditions. The test is usually left to the
discretion of the court in light of the circumstances of each case. Peterson Props. v.
Valencia Cnty. Valuation Protests Bd., 1976-NMCA-043, 89 N.M. 239, 549 P.2d 1074.

                           C.     INCOME OR COST METHOD.

When income or cost method of valuation utilized. — Since, if reliable comparable
sales data can be reasonably obtained, the comparable sales method must be used,
the taxpayer has the burden to demonstrate either that comparable sales data is not
reasonably obtainable or that it would be unreliable. To demonstrate a lack of reliability,
the taxpayer might show that the location, access, utilities or other such factors
distinguish his property from other such properties. If the taxpayer is able to show that
the comparable sales method should not be utilized, then the income method or cost
method must be used. Bakel v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 1980-NMCA-173, 95 N.M.
723, 625 P.2d 1240.

Methods of valuation. — If the "cost method" or "income method" is employed as the
primary mode of ascertaining the value of property for tax purposes, the appraiser must
determine that there is a lack of comparable sales data precluding utilization of the first
method of valuation and support this determination by substantial evidence. La Jara
Land Developers, Inc. v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 1982-NMCA-006, 97 N.M. 318, 639
P.2d 605.

Income method inapplicable to agricultural land. — By its plain terms, the income
method set forth in this section does not apply to land classified as agricultural.
Agricultural land is to be valued based on its capacity to produce, not on its actual
production. Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba Cnty. Assessor, 2004-NMCA-055, 135
N.M. 630, 92 P.3d 642, rev'd, 2004-NMSC-035, 136 N.M. 630, 103 P.3d 554.

                                     III.   EVIDENCE.

Taxing authority may rely on any relevant evidence. — In assessing property for
taxation the taxing authority may rely on any evidence that is relevant. Assessor's
evidence of a sale of a smaller tract of land in the same vicinity was substantial and
supported the board's decision. Peterson Props. v. Valencia Cnty. Valuation Protests
Bd., 1976-NMCA-043, 89 N.M. 239, 549 P.2d 1074.
Relevant evidence includes that of ratios of assessed value to market value. — To
arrive at uniformity in the assessment of property for taxation, as provided in N.M.
Const., art. VIII, §§ 1 and 2, the taxing authority and the taxpayer can introduce
evidence regarding the ratios of assessed values to market values as the latter are
reflected in actual sales of any other real estate in the taxing district for a reasonable
period prior to the assessment date. Peterson Props. v. Valencia Cnty. Valuation
Protests Bd., 1976-NMCA-043, 89 N.M. 239, 549 P.2d 1074.

No denial of due process in exclusion of irrelevant evidence. — Since former
Subsection B of this section fixed two methods of determining market value, namely
sales of comparable property and the application of generally accepted appraisal
techniques, taxpayer's offer of evidence of a valuation of comparable property was not
relevant and exclusion of such evidence did not deny taxpayer of due process. Peterson
Props. v. Valencia Cnty. Valuation Protests Bd., 1976-NMCA-043, 89 N.M. 239, 549
P.2d 1074.

Appraiser's acceptance of hearsay destroys weight of his opinions. — An expert
appraiser's blanket acceptance of hearsay information and his failure to consider
influencing facts in so-called "comparable sales" all but destroys any weight that might
be given to his opinions. Four Hills Country Club v. Bernalillo Cnty. Property Tax Protest
Bd., 1979-NMCA-141, 94 N.M. 709, 616 P.2d 422.

Section does not give taxpayers right to determine method of valuation, but gives
the county assessor the right to use either the "income method or cost methods of
valuation." First Nat'l Bank v. Bernalillo Cnty. Valuation Protest Bd., 1977-NMCA-005,
90 N.M. 110, 560 P.2d 174.

Taxpayer has right to discover method of valuation used and has a right to
discovery similar in scope to that granted by Rules 26 to 37 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. First Nat'l Bank v. Bernalillo Cnty. Valuation Protest Bd., 1977-NMCA-005,
90 N.M. 110, 560 P.2d 174.

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Requirement of full-value real property
taxation assessments, 42 A.L.R.4th 676.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 29 cases, 1979–2019 · leading case: Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rodarte, 103 P.3d 554 (N.M. 2004).
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rodarte, 103 P.3d 554 (N.M. 2004). · cites it 20× “{17} As authority for this income method of classification, the Board noted that Section 7-36-15 provided for such a method.”
La Jara Land Developers, Inc. v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 639 P.2d 605 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). · cites it 20× “By appellee's admission, the assessor, in determining the tax value of such property, disregarded the mandate of § 7-36-15, supra, which requires valuation by "market value as determined by sales of comparable property" unless comparables cannot be obtained.”
2727 San Pedro LLC v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 2017 NMCA 008 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 8× “In applying any of these approved methods, “the valuation authority .”
Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. Prop. Tax Div., 625 P.2d 1202 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). · cites it 14× “" By incorporating subsection C under the general provisions section, as opposed to the more specific agricultural purposes section, it is apparent that the terms listed in § 7-36-15(C) were intended to be given a broader application than given to them in Judge Hernandez'…”
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba Cnty. Assessor, 2004 NMCA 055 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 9× “The Board concluded that income analysis was appropriate pursuant to Section 7-36-15(B), which provides that “the value of property for property taxation purposes shall be its market value as determined by application of the sales of comparable property, income or cost methods…”
Amrep Sw., Inc. v. Sandoval Cnty. Assessor, 2012 NMCA 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 5× “The particular statutory and administrative code provisions cited by the Board included NMSA 1978, Section 7-36-15(B)(1) (2008). This section provides that the value of property for property taxation purposes shall be its market value as determined by application of the sales of…”
Cnty. of Bernalillo v. Ambell, 611 P.2d 218 (N.M. 1980). · cites it 5× “The limitation upon increases in valuation of property for property taxation purposes provided in Subsection B of this section shall apply only to property that is valued for property taxation purposes under Subsection B of Section 7-36-15 NMSA 1978 using the market value as…”
Anaconda Co. v. Prop. Tax Dep't, 608 P.2d 514 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979). · cites it 2× “258, § 17(B) (current version at § 7-36-15(B), N.M.S.A. 1978). Since there was not sufficient data available to arrive at a market value for the property in question, the above statute required that the property be valued by methods of valuation in general use and authorized by…”
Maloof v. San Juan Cnty. Valuation Protests Bd., 845 P.2d 849 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “Protestant’s brief-in-chief concedes that the Assessor’s determination of value was based upon the sales comparison approach as required by statute (NMSA 1978, § 7-36-15 (Repl.Pamp.1990)), and that the Assessor testified that “sales data and income data indicated that there was…”
Hansman v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 625 P.2d 1214 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). · cites it 3× “The limitation upon increases in valuation of property for property taxation purposes provided in Subsection B of this section shall apply only to property that is valued for property taxation purposes under Subsection B of Section 7-36-15 N.M.S.A. 1978 using the market value as…”
Zhao v. Montoya, 2012 NMCA 056 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 11× “22(G)(6)NMAC,“[e]vidence of the sale price of the property being valued is not sufficient to establish a market value under Section 7-36-15 ... if the evidence of the sales of comparable property indicates the sales price was not the market value.”
Bakel v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 625 P.2d 1240 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). · cites it 5× “We believe the resolution of this seeming paradox lies in the balance of § 7-36-15 which states: ... if that method [comparable sales] cannot be used due to the lack of comparable sales data for the property being valued, then its value shall be determined by using an income…”
— N.M. Stat. § 7-36-15(A) — 2 cases
2727 San Pedro LLC v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 2017 NMCA 008 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016). “In applying any of these approved methods, “the valuation authority .”
— N.M. Stat. § 7-36-15(B) — 19 cases
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rodarte, 103 P.3d 554 (N.M. 2004). “{17} As authority for this income method of classification, the Board noted that Section 7-36-15 provided for such a method.”
La Jara Land Developers, Inc. v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 639 P.2d 605 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). “By appellee's admission, the assessor, in determining the tax value of such property, disregarded the mandate of § 7-36-15, supra, which requires valuation by "market value as determined by sales of comparable property" unless comparables cannot be obtained.”
2727 San Pedro LLC v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 2017 NMCA 008 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016). “In applying any of these approved methods, “the valuation authority .”
Anaconda Co. v. Prop. Tax Dep't, 608 P.2d 514 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979). “258, § 17(B) (current version at § 7-36-15(B), N.M.S.A. 1978). Since there was not sufficient data available to arrive at a market value for the property in question, the above statute required that the property be valued by methods of valuation in general use and authorized by…”
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba Cnty. Assessor, 2004 NMCA 055 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). “The Board concluded that income analysis was appropriate pursuant to Section 7-36-15(B), which provides that “the value of property for property taxation purposes shall be its market value as determined by application of the sales of comparable property, income or cost methods…”
— N.M. Stat. § 7-36-15(B)(1) — 5 cases
Amrep Sw., Inc. v. Sandoval Cnty. Assessor, 2012 NMCA 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). “The particular statutory and administrative code provisions cited by the Board included NMSA 1978, Section 7-36-15(B)(1) (2008). This section provides that the value of property for property taxation purposes shall be its market value as determined by application of the sales of…”
2727 San Pedro LLC v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 2017 NMCA 008 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016). “In applying any of these approved methods, “the valuation authority .”
Zhao v. Montoya, 2012 NMCA 056 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). “22(G)(6)NMAC,“[e]vidence of the sale price of the property being valued is not sufficient to establish a market value under Section 7-36-15 ... if the evidence of the sales of comparable property indicates the sales price was not the market value.”
Zhao v. Montoya, 2012 NMCA 56 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
— N.M. Stat. § 7-36-15(B)(l) — 1 case
Amrep Sw., Inc. v. Sandoval Cnty. Assessor, 2012 NMCA 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). “The particular statutory and administrative code provisions cited by the Board included NMSA 1978, Section 7-36-15(B)(1) (2008). This section provides that the value of property for property taxation purposes shall be its market value as determined by application of the sales of…”
— N.M. Stat. § 7-36-15(C) — 1 case
Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. Prop. Tax Div., 625 P.2d 1202 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). “" By incorporating subsection C under the general provisions section, as opposed to the more specific agricultural purposes section, it is apparent that the terms listed in § 7-36-15(C) were intended to be given a broader application than given to them in Judge Hernandez'…”
— N.M. Stat. § 7-36-15(D) — 1 case
Four Hills Country Club v. BERNALILLO, ETC., 616 P.2d 422 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
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