N.M. Stat. » Chapter 7 — Taxation
New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 7-36-20 (2026)

Special method of valuation; land used primarily for

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agricultural purposes. A. The value of land used primarily for agricultural purposes shall be determined on the basis of the land's capacity to produce agricultural products. Evidence of bona fide primary agricultural use of land for the tax year preceding the year for which determination is made of eligibility for the land to be valued under this section creates a presumption that the land is used primarily for agricultural purposes during the tax year in which the determination is made. If the land was valued under this section in one or more of the three tax years preceding the year in which the determination is made and the use of the land has not changed since the most recent valuation under this section, a presumption is created that the land continues to be entitled to that valuation.

B. For the purpose of this section:

(1) "agricultural products" means plants, crops, trees, forest products, orchard crops, livestock, poultry, captive deer or elk, or fish; and

(2) "agricultural use" means the:

(a) use of land for the production of agricultural products;

(b) use of land that meets the requirements for payment or other compensation pursuant to a soil conservation program under an agreement with an agency of the federal government;

(c) resting of land to maintain its capacity to produce agricultural products; or

(d) resting of land as the direct result of at least moderate drought conditions as designated by the United States department of agriculture, if the drought conditions occurred in the county within which the land is located for at least eight consecutive weeks during the previous tax year; provided that the land was used in the tax year immediately preceding the previous tax year primarily for a purpose identified pursuant to this paragraph.

C. The department shall adopt rules for determining whether land is used primarily for agricultural purposes. The rules shall provide that the use of land for the lawful taking of game shall not be considered in determining whether land is used primarily for agricultural purposes.

D. The department shall adopt rules for determining the value of land used primarily for agricultural purposes. The rules shall:

(1) specify procedures to use in determining the capacity of land to produce agricultural products and the derivation of value of the land based upon its production capacity;

(2) establish carrying capacity as the measurement of the production capacity of land used for grazing purposes, develop a system of determining carrying capacity through the use of an animal unit concept and establish carrying capacities for the land in the state classified as grazing land;

(3) provide that land the bona fide and primary use of which is the production of captive deer or elk shall be valued as grazing land and that captive deer shall be valued and taxed as sheep and captive elk shall be valued and taxed as cattle; (4) provide for the consideration of determinations of any other governmental agency concerning the capacity of the same or similar lands to produce agricultural products;

(5) assure that land determined under the rules to have the same or similar production capacity shall be valued uniformly throughout the state; and

(6) provide for the periodic review by the department of determined production capacities and capitalization rates used for determining annually the value of land used primarily for agricultural purposes.

E. All improvements, other than those specified in Section 7-36-15 NMSA 1978, on land used primarily for agricultural purposes shall be valued separately for property taxation purposes, and the value of these improvements shall be added to the value of the land determined under this section.

F. The owner of the land shall make application to the county assessor in a tax year in which the valuation method of this section is first claimed to be applicable to the land or in a tax year immediately subsequent to a tax year in which the land was not valued under this section. Application shall be made under oath, shall be in a form and contain the information required by department rules and shall be made no later than thirty days after the date of mailing by the assessor of the notice of valuation. Once land is valued under this section, application need not be made in subsequent tax years as long as there is no change in the use of the land.

G. The owner of land valued under this section shall report to the county assessor whenever the use of the land changes so that it is no longer being used primarily for agricultural purposes. This report shall be made on a form prescribed by department rules and shall be made by the last day of February of the tax year immediately following the year in which the change in the use of the land occurs.

H. Any person who is required to make a report under the provisions of Subsection G of this section and who fails to do so is personally liable for a civil penalty in an amount equal to the greater of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) or twenty-five percent of the difference between the property taxes ultimately determined to be due and the property taxes originally paid for the tax years for which the person failed to make the required report.

History: 1953 Comp., § 72-29-9, enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 258, § 21; 1975, ch. 165, § 3; 1997, ch. 162, § 1; 2005, ch. 231, § 1; 2013, ch. 219, § 1; 2015, ch. 92, § 1.

ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For agriculture generally, see Chapter 76 NMSA 1978. The 2015 amendment, effective June 19, 2015, defined "agricultural products" and expanded the definition of "agricultural use" for property taxes; in Subsection B, added Paragraph (1); redesignated the remainder of Subsection B as Paragraph (2); in Subsection B, Paragraph (2), after "‘agricultural use’ means the", added the designation Subsection B, Paragraph (2)(a); after "use of land for the production of", deleted "plants, crops, trees, forest products, orchard crops, livestock, poultry, captive deer or elk, or fish. The term also includes the" and added "agricultural products"; added the designation Subsection B, Paragraph (2)(b) to the remaining language of former Subsection B; added Subsection B, Paragraphs (2)(c) and (2)(d); and in Subsection F, after "owner of the land", deleted "must" and added "shall", and after "department rules and", deleted "must" and added "shall".

Applicability. — Laws 2015, ch. 92, § 2 provided that the provisions of Laws 2015, ch. 92, § 1 apply to the 2016 and subsequent property tax years.

The 2013 amendment, effective June 14, 2013, provided that an application to use the valuation method for land used primarily for agricultural purposes be made no later than thirty days after the date of mailing by the assessor of the notice of valuation; and in Subsection F, in the second sentence, after "and must be made no later than", deleted "the last day of February of the tax year" and added "thirty days after the date of mailing by the assessor of the notice of valuation".

The 2005 amendment, effective April 6, 2005, in Subsection B, defined "agricultural use" to include production of captive deer or elk; in Subsection C, provided that the rules shall provide that the use of land for lawful taking of game shall not be considered in determining whether land is used primarily for agricultural purposes; and added Subsection D(3) to provide that the rules shall provide that land primarily used for the production of captive deer or elk shall be valued as grazing land, that captive deer shall be valued as sheep and that captive elk shall be valued as cattle.

Saving clauses. — Laws 2005, ch. 231, § 2, provided that nothing in this 2005 act shall affect the authority of the state game commission or the director of the department of game and fish.

The 1997 amendment, June 20, 1997, rewrote Subsection A; substituted "7-36-15 NMSA 1978" for "72-29-5 NMSA 1953" in Subsection E; deleted the last sentence in the introductory paragraph of Subsection F; deleted Paragraphs F(1) and (2); deleted the closing paragraph of Subsection F; and added Subsections G and H.

Elk herd was not livestock for purposes of agricultural classification of property, and, although petitioner's agreement with federal government was proper soil conservation agreement, comparisons of income from multiple uses of property was reasonable proxy for determining that agricultural use was not primary. Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rodarte, 2004-NMSC-035, 136 N.M. 630, 103 P.3d 554, rev'g 2004-NMCA-055, 135 N.M. 630, 92 P.3d 642. Distinction between subdivided agricultural lands not unconstitutional. — Distinction drawn by 72-2-14.1, 1953 Comp., between subdivided and unsubdivided agricultural land, for tax purposes, did not offend N.M. Const., art. VIII, § 1 and did not violate due process. Property Appraisal Dep't v. Ransom, 1973-NMCA-015, 84 N.M. 637, 506 P.2d 794 (decided under prior law).

This section establishes special method of valuation for land used primarily for agricultural purposes, determined on the basis of the land's capacity to produce agricultural products. This "Green Belt" law is clearly an exception to the general mode of property valuation for tax purposes established by the Property Tax Code and the New Mexico constitution, i.e., market value. County of Bernalillo v. Ambell, 1980-NMSC- 062, 94 N.M. 395, 611 P.2d 218.

Agricultural land is to be valued based on its capacity to produce, not on its actual production. Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba Cnty. Assessor, 2004-NMCA-055, 135 N.M. 630, 92 P.3d 642, rev’d 2004-NMSC-035, 136 N.M. 630, 103 P.3d 554.

Legislative intent behind this special method of property tax valuation is to aid the small subsistence farmers in the state. County of Bernalillo v. Ambell, 1980-NMSC-062, 94 N.M. 395, 611 P.2d 218.

Legislative intent. — A broad reading of "agricultural use" so as to entitle owners of residential, yet pastoral, lands generally to tax relief is inconsistent with the plain language of this section; the section evinces a legislative intent to deny tax relief to those who demonstrate mere passive or incidental cultivation of their lands. Alexander v. Anderson, 1999-NMCA-021, 126 N.M. 632, 973 P.2d 884.

Crops produced for sale or home consumption. — While growing alfalfa, fruits, nuts, and vegetables may constitute producing crops, an applicant for exemption is required to demonstrate an objective intent to produce a crop for sale or home consumption. Alexander v. Anderson, 1999-NMCA-021, 126 N.M. 632, 973 P.2d 884.

"Home consumption" construed. — Grazing of recreational horses on taxpayers' property did not satisfy the regulatory provision (3 NMAC 6.5.27.1.1) for "home consumption." Alexander v. Anderson, 1999-NMCA-021, 126 N.M. 632, 973 P.2d 884.

Regulation upheld. — Promulgation of a regulation (3 NMAC 6.5.27.1.1) to implement the "agricultural use" exemption of this section is a legal exercise of delegated legislative authority and the regulation is consistent with this section's manifest intent. Alexander v. Anderson, 1999-NMCA-021, 126 N.M. 632, 973 P.2d 884.

Comparable sales wrong criteria under this section. — County assessors using comparable sales instead of agricultural purposes were using the wrong criteria for determining tax on grazing land under this section. In re Armijo, 1976-NMCA-032, 89 N.M. 131, 548 P.2d 93. Special valuation not applicable once land changed to nonagricultural use. — Once a property's use has changed from agricultural to nonagricultural, there is no longer the need to give the property owner special tax treatment; the legislature did not desire to give special treatment to former owners of agricultural land even after they voluntarily submit to reclassification of their land for property tax purposes. County of Bernalillo v. Ambell, 1980-NMSC-062, 94 N.M. 395, 611 P.2d 218.

Hypothetical or speculative values not basis. — Classification or assessment of property for tax purposes premised upon hypothetical or speculative values believed, ultimately or at some later time, to be or become the true market value of such land cannot legitimately be the basis of determining its value. Gerner v. State Tax Comm'n, 1963-NMSC-022, 71 N.M. 385, 378 P.2d 619.

Grazing land being held for lots. — Classification and valuation of property suitable for grazing purposes at 10 times the valuation of other property of the same character and quality and similarly situated because of its classification as lots held for speculation for oil or other purposes, absent any evidence of such speculative purposes, was so excessive and discriminatory as to entitle taxpayer to relief, despite fact that some other owners of like tracts were similarly assessed or that these lands, while similar to grazing lands, were not actually used for grazing purposes. Gerner v. State Tax Comm'n, 1963- NMSC-022, 71 N.M. 385, 378 P.2d 619.

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Validity, construction and effect of state statutes affording preferential property tax treatment to land use for agricultural purposes, 98 A.L.R.3d 916.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 18 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1979–2022 · leading case: Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rodarte, 2004-NMSC-035, 103 P.3d 554.
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Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rodarte, 2004-NMSC-035, 103 P.3d 554. · cites it 242× “Section 7-36-20(B) further provides that agricultural use "also includes the use of land that meets the requirements for payment or other compensation pursuant to a soil conservation program under an agreement with an agency of the federal government.”
Alexander v. Anderson, 1999-NMCA-021, 973 P.2d 884. · cites it 43× “Specifically, Taxpayers argue that the regulation’s requirement that anything produced on or from the land be produced for sale, commereial use, or home consumption, see 3 NMAC 6.”
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba Cnty. Assessor, 2004-NMCA-055, 92 P.3d 642. · cites it 48× “” Because the Board concluded that elk are not “livestock” for purposes of the Property Tax Code (the Code), NMSA 1978, §§ 7-36-1 to -33 (1973, as amended through 2001), it also concluded that the use of the Ranch primarily for elk habitat “does not pass muster as land used…”
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba Cnty., 440 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2006). · cites it 2× “” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-36-20 (B). It also requires that tax assessors classify as grazing land any land that has “the production of captive deer or elk” as its “bona fide and primary use.”
Cnty. of Bernalillo v. Ambell, 611 P.2d 218 (N.M. 1980). · cites it 4× “00 for tax year 1976 pursuant to Section 7-36-20, N.M.S.A. 1978. This “Green Belt” law establishes an exception to the general mode of property valuations for tax purposes for agricultural lands giving the owners a dramatic tax-break.”
Hurlocker v. Medina, 878 P.2d 348 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “, NMSA 1978, § 7-36-20 (Repl.Pamp.1993) (“Green Belt” law giving preferential tax treatment to agricultural land); see also James D.”
La Jara Land Developers, Inc. v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 639 P.2d 605 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). · cites it 2× “Section 7-36-15(B) states: Unless a method or methods of valuation are authorized in Sections 7-36-20 through 7-36-33 NMSA 1978, the value of property for property taxation purposes shall be its market value as determined by sales of comparable property or, if that method cannot…”
Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. Prop. Tax Div., 625 P.2d 1202 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). · cites it 2× “" By incorporating subsection C under the general provisions section, as opposed to the more specific agricultural purposes section, it is apparent that the terms listed in § 7-36-15(C) were intended to be given a broader application than given to them in Judge Hernandez'…”
W.R. Co. v. North Carolina Prop. Tax Comm'n, 269 S.E.2d 636 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980). “1980); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-36-20 (1978); Ohio Rev.”
Zwaagstra v. DelCurto, 837 P.2d 457 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “1990) (county assessor determines property values in accordance with property tax code and regulations, orders, rulings, and instructions of the division); NMSA 1978, § 7-36-20 (Repl.Pamp.1990) (division shall adopt regulations for determining values of agricultural land but…”
Cable One, Inc. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 412 P.3d 1121 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 4× “1(A) (providing that "[p]roperty subject to valuation for property taxation purposes shall be classified as either residential property or nonresidential property"); § 7-36-20 (providing a special method of valuation for "land used primarily for agricultural purposes"); §…”
Black v. Bernalillo Cnty. Valuation Protests Bd., 619 P.2d 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). · cites it 4× “Rather, the protests address the question of whether the Black family is entitled to the special method of valuation provided for in § 7-36-20. This method of valuation mandates that the value of land be determined on the basis of the land’s capacity to produce agricultural…”
Show all 18 citing cases →
N.M. Stat. § 7-36-20(A): 6 cases
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rodarte, 2004-NMSC-035, 103 P.3d 554. “Section 7-36-20(B) further provides that agricultural use "also includes the use of land that meets the requirements for payment or other compensation pursuant to a soil conservation program under an agreement with an agency of the federal government.”
Alexander v. Anderson, 1999-NMCA-021, 973 P.2d 884. “Specifically, Taxpayers argue that the regulation’s requirement that anything produced on or from the land be produced for sale, commereial use, or home consumption, see 3 NMAC 6.”
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba Cnty. Assessor, 2004-NMCA-055, 92 P.3d 642. “” Because the Board concluded that elk are not “livestock” for purposes of the Property Tax Code (the Code), NMSA 1978, §§ 7-36-1 to -33 (1973, as amended through 2001), it also concluded that the use of the Ranch primarily for elk habitat “does not pass muster as land used…”
Black v. Bernalillo Cnty. Valuation Protests Bd., 619 P.2d 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). “Rather, the protests address the question of whether the Black family is entitled to the special method of valuation provided for in § 7-36-20. This method of valuation mandates that the value of land be determined on the basis of the land’s capacity to produce agricultural…”
Horner v. Voita, No. A-1-CA-39798 (N.M. Ct. App. July 28, 2022).
N.M. Stat. § 7-36-20(A)(B): 1 case
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba Cnty. Assessor, 2004-NMCA-055, 92 P.3d 642. “” Because the Board concluded that elk are not “livestock” for purposes of the Property Tax Code (the Code), NMSA 1978, §§ 7-36-1 to -33 (1973, as amended through 2001), it also concluded that the use of the Ranch primarily for elk habitat “does not pass muster as land used…”
N.M. Stat. § 7-36-20(B): 3 cases
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rodarte, 2004-NMSC-035, 103 P.3d 554. “Section 7-36-20(B) further provides that agricultural use "also includes the use of land that meets the requirements for payment or other compensation pursuant to a soil conservation program under an agreement with an agency of the federal government.”
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba Cnty. Assessor, 2004-NMCA-055, 92 P.3d 642. “” Because the Board concluded that elk are not “livestock” for purposes of the Property Tax Code (the Code), NMSA 1978, §§ 7-36-1 to -33 (1973, as amended through 2001), it also concluded that the use of the Ranch primarily for elk habitat “does not pass muster as land used…”
Alexander v. Anderson, 1999-NMCA-021, 973 P.2d 884. “Specifically, Taxpayers argue that the regulation’s requirement that anything produced on or from the land be produced for sale, commereial use, or home consumption, see 3 NMAC 6.”
N.M. Stat. § 7-36-20(C): 4 cases
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rodarte, 2004-NMSC-035, 103 P.3d 554. “Section 7-36-20(B) further provides that agricultural use "also includes the use of land that meets the requirements for payment or other compensation pursuant to a soil conservation program under an agreement with an agency of the federal government.”
Alexander v. Anderson, 1999-NMCA-021, 973 P.2d 884. “Specifically, Taxpayers argue that the regulation’s requirement that anything produced on or from the land be produced for sale, commereial use, or home consumption, see 3 NMAC 6.”
Black v. Bernalillo Cnty. Valuation Protests Bd., 619 P.2d 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). “Rather, the protests address the question of whether the Black family is entitled to the special method of valuation provided for in § 7-36-20. This method of valuation mandates that the value of land be determined on the basis of the land’s capacity to produce agricultural…”
Black v. Bernalillo Cty. Valuation Protests Bd., 619 P.2d 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
N.M. Stat. § 7-36-20(E): 1 case
Hannahs v. Anderson, 1998-NMCA-152, 966 P.2d 168.
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