New York Consolidated Laws
N.Y. Civil Practice Law & Rules § 5201 (2026)
Debt or property subject to enforcement; proper garnishee
✓ text as retrieved May 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history)
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§ 5201. Debt or property subject to enforcement; proper garnishee. (a) Debt against which a money judgment may be enforced. A money judgment may be enforced against any debt, which is past due or which is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor, whether it was incurred within or without the state, to or from a resident or non-resident, unless it is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the judgment. A debt may consist of a cause of action which could be assigned or transferred accruing within or without the state. (b) Property against which a money judgment may be enforced. A money judgment may be enforced against any property which could be assigned or transferred, whether it consists of a present or future right or interest and whether or not it is vested, unless it is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the judgment. A money judgment entered upon a joint liability of two or more persons may be enforced against individual property of those persons summoned and joint property of such persons with any other persons against whom the judgment is entered. No property lien shall be entered or enforced against a debtor's primary residence in an action arising from a medical debt and brought by a hospital licensed under article twenty-eight of the public health law or a health care professional authorized under title eight of the education law. (c) Proper garnishee for particular property or debt. 1. Where property consists of a right or share in the stock of an association or corporation, or interests or profits therein, for which a certificate of stock or other negotiable instrument is not outstanding, the corporation, or the president or treasurer of the association on behalf of the association, shall be the garnishee. 2. Where property consists of a right or interest to or in a decedent's estate or any other property or fund held or controlled by a fiduciary, the executor or trustee under the will, administrator or other fiduciary shall be the garnishee. 3. Where property consists of an interest in a partnership, any partner other than the judgment debtor, on behalf of the partnership, shall be the garnishee. 4. Where property or a debt is evidenced by a negotiable instrument for the payment of money, a negotiable document of title or a certificate of stock of an association or corporation, the instrument, document or certificate shall be treated as property capable of delivery and the person holding it shall be the garnishee; except that section 8--112 of the uniform commercial code shall govern the extent to which and the means by which any interest in a certificated security, uncertificated security or security entitlement (as defined in article eight of the uniform commercial code) may be reached by garnishment, attachment or other legal process.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 188
cases (19 in the last 5 years), 1963–2025 · leading case: JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Motorola, Inc., 47 A.D.3d 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2007).
JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Motorola, Inc., 47 A.D.3d 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2007). “Motorola also argues that, under Indian law, its potential liability to IITL cannot be “assigned or transferred” (CPLR 5201 [a], [b]) and is therefore unavailable for garnishment.”
Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 926 N.E.2d 1202 (N.Y. 2010). “Defendant Mitchell does not dispute that he is the “proper garnishee” (within CPLR 5201 [c] [1]) *309 for defendants’ ownership/membership interests.”
Supreme Merch. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 514 N.E.2d 1358 (N.Y. 1987). “With respect to the first order of attachment, however, the court ruled that CPLR 5201 (b) and 6202 could not be read "as authorizing creditors to reach a debtor’s contingent interest as property where the effort to do so will often preclude the maturing of that interest, is…”
Mitchell v. Lyons Prof'l Servs., Inc., 109 F. Supp. 3d 555 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). “That leaves us with contracts terminable at will, not even requiring the 30-days’ notice which, based on Mr.”
Donawitz v. Danek, 366 N.E.2d 253 (N.Y. 1977). “From its inception, the Seider-Simpson rule, allowing the attachment of a defendant’s liability insurer’s contractual obligation to defend and indemnify, has met with criticism and rejection (see, e.”
Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Winter, 74 A.D.2d 195 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1980). “(CPLR 5201, subd [c], par 2.) The fact that, if once the funds were in Winter's hands they would theoretically be subject 100% to the claims of creditors, does not alter the exemption, if any, so long as the funds are held by the trust.”
Glassman v. Hyder, 244 N.E.2d 259 (N.Y. 1968). “CPLR 6202 provides that any debt or property against which a money judgment may be enforced under CPLR 5201 is attachable. There are three kinds of things subject to execution, and the same was to some extent true under the Civil Practice Act.”
ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc., 350 N.E.2d 899 (N.Y. 1976). “By virtue of CPLR 6202, an attachment under CPLR 6214 (subd [b]) is effective only if there is within the jurisdiction of our courts a debt or property of the debtor, here LTD, within the meanings of subdivisions (a) or (b) of CPLR 5201, which provide: "(a) Debt against which a…”
IMAX Corp. v. Essel Grp., 154 A.D.3d 464 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2017). “), entered on or about October 9, 2015, which denied the petition for an order pursuant to CPLR 5201 and 5225 (b) directing respondents to deliver funds or property sufficient to satisfy a judgment, unanimously affirmed, with costs.”
Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 533 F. Supp. 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). “The restraining notice and gar *933 nishment forbade Founders to sell, assign, transfer, interfere with, pay over, or dispose of any debt it owed to Shaheen.”
XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lakian, 243 F. Supp. 3d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). “Pangea further argues that the coverage afforded to Lakian under the Policy for the Knox Action constitutes a “debt” under C.P.L.R. § 5201(a) or a “property” under C.”
Simpson v. Loehmann, 234 N.E.2d 669 (N.Y. 1967). “This court in 1966 held in the Seider ease (17 N Y 2d 111, supra) that the contractual obligation of an insurance company to its insured under its liability insurance policy constitutes a “debt” under CPLR 5201 and, as such, is subject to attachment, at the suit of an injured…”
N.Y. Civil Practice Law & Rules § 5201(a): 10 cases
Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 533 F. Supp. 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lakian, 243 F. Supp. 3d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
Gala Enter., Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 970 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Michelsen v. Brush, 233 F. Supp. 868 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
Colonial Press of Miami, Inc. v. Bank of Com., 71 Misc. 2d 987 (N.Y. App. Term. 1972).
N.Y. Civil Practice Law & Rules § 5201(b): 15 cases
XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lakian, 243 F. Supp. 3d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
Neshewat v. Salem, 365 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 533 F. Supp. 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
79 Madison LLC v. Ebrahimzadeh, 203 A.D.3d 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2022).
Gala Enter., Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 970 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
N.Y. Civil Practice Law & Rules § 5201(c)(4): 1 case
Fid. Partners, Inc. v. First Trust Co. of New York, 58 F. Supp. 2d 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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