New York Consolidated Laws

N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 72 (2026)

Special proceeding or habeas corpus to obtain visitation rights or custody in respect to certain infant grandchildren

✓ current as of May 2026
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§ 72. Special proceeding or habeas corpus to obtain visitation rights
or custody in respect to certain infant grandchildren. 1. Where either
or both of the parents of a minor child, residing within this state, is
or are deceased, or where circumstances show that conditions exist which
equity would see fit to intervene, a grandparent or the grandparents of
such child may apply to the supreme court by commencing a special
proceeding or for a writ of habeas corpus to have such child brought
before such court, or may apply to the family court pursuant to
subdivision (b) of section six hundred fifty-one of the family court
act; and on the return thereof, the court, by order, after due notice to
the parent or any other person or party having the care, custody, and
control of such child, to be given in such manner as the court shall
prescribe, may make such directions as the best interest of the child
may require, for visitation rights for such grandparent or grandparents
in respect to such child.
  2. (a) Where a grandparent or the grandparents of a minor child,
residing within this state, can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the
court the existence of extraordinary circumstances, such grandparent or
grandparents of such child may apply to the supreme court by commencing
a special proceeding or for a writ of habeas corpus to have such child
brought before such court, or may apply to family court pursuant to
subdivision (b) of section six hundred fifty-one of the family court
act; and on the return thereof, the court, by order, after due notice to
the parent or any other person or party having the care, custody, and
control of such child, to be given in such manner as the court shall
prescribe, may make such directions as the best interests of the child
may require, for custody rights for such grandparent or grandparents in
respect to such child. An extended disruption of custody, as such term
is defined in this section, shall constitute an extraordinary
circumstance.
  (b) For the purposes of this section "extended disruption of custody"
shall include, but not be limited to, a prolonged separation of the
respondent parent and the child for at least twenty-four continuous
months during which the parent voluntarily relinquished care and control
of the child and the child resided in the household of the petitioner
grandparent or grandparents, provided, however, that the court may find
that extraordinary circumstances exist should the prolonged separation
have lasted for less than twenty-four months.
  (c) Nothing in this section shall limit the ability of parties to
enter into consensual custody agreements absent the existence of
extraordinary circumstances.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 358 cases (47 in the last 5 years), 1980–2026 · leading case: The Matter of Ricardo Suarez v. Melissa Williams, 44 N.E.3d 915 (NY 2015).
The Matter of Ricardo Suarez v. Melissa Williams, 44 N.E.3d 915 (NY 2015). · cites it 12× “This custody dispute between a child’s mother and paternal grandparents concerns the interpretation and application of Domestic Relations Law § 72 (2) and this Court’s decision in Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys ( 40 NY2d 543 [1976]).”
Wilson v. McGlinchey, 811 N.E.2d 526 (NY 2004). · cites it 5× “In October 1999, the grandparents filed a petition pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72 seeking visitation with their four-month-old granddaughter.”
Morgan v. Grzesik, 287 A.D.2d 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). · cites it 10× “Family Court granted petitioner visitation with her grandchildren pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72 despite the opposition of respondent parents.”
Ziarno v. Ziarno, 285 A.D.2d 793 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). · cites it 9× “Following a hearing, Family Court determined that petitioner had standing to maintain the proceeding under Domestic Relations Law § 72 and granted the requested monthly visitation.”
Hertz v. Hertz, 291 A.D.2d 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). · cites it 9× “At issue on this appeal is whether Domestic Relations Law § 72, New York’s grandparental visitation statute, is unconstitutional on its face in light of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Troxel v Granville ( 530 US 57 ).”
Carton v. Grimm, 51 A.D.3d 1111 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). · cites it 7× “Moreover, they specifically assert that Family Court applied the incorrect standard of law when it failed to find extraordinary circumstances pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72 (2) (b) as to the oldest child, who had remained in their care and custody for more than 24…”
Matter of Brown v. Comer, 136 A.D.3d 1173 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). · cites it 4× “Initially, Family Court incorrectly relied upon Domestic Relations Law § 72 (2) — i.e., a prolonged separation for at least 24 continuous months — as the basis for its finding of extraordinary circumstances.”
Matter of William O. v. Wanda A., 2017 NY Slip Op 4503 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). · cites it 4× “grandparents” (Domestic Relations Law § 72 [2] [a], [b]; see Matter of Suarez v Williams, 26 NY3d 440, 448 [2015]).”
Matter of Seddio v. Artura, 139 A.D.3d 1075 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). · cites it 5× “The order, after a fact-finding hearing, granted the grandmother’s petition for visitation with her grandchildren pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72. *1076 Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.”
Matter of Marchant v. Marchant, 2020 NY Slip Op 4310 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020). · cites it 4× “With respect to the two younger children, the grandfather was required to establish circumstances in which equity would see fit to intervene to pursue visitation, as both parents of those children are still alive ( see Domestic Relations Law § 72[1]). "In considering whether a…”
Donna SS. v. Amy TT., 149 A.D.3d 1211 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). · cites it 4× “A grandparent, in particular, may make the requisite showing of extraordinary circumstances sufficient to confer upon him or her standing to seek custody by establishing that there has been an “extended disruption of custody” (Domestic Relations Law § 72 [2] [a]; see Matter of…”
Matter of Smith v. Anderson, 137 A.D.3d 1505 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). “4 In this regard, even assuming—without deciding—that the *1508 grandmother could rely upon the mother’s own testimony, together with the “extended disruption of custody” provisions of Domestic Relations Law § 72, to establish the requisite extraordinary circumstances (see…”
— N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) — 24 cases
Matter of Marchant v. Marchant, 2020 NY Slip Op 4310 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020). “With respect to the two younger children, the grandfather was required to establish circumstances in which equity would see fit to intervene to pursue visitation, as both parents of those children are still alive ( see Domestic Relations Law § 72[1]). "In considering whether a…”
Matter of Galizia v. Drucker, 2020 NY Slip Op 4306 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020).
Matter of Noguera v. Busto, 2020 NY Slip Op 07385 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020).
Matter of Rodriguez v. Concepcion, 2020 NY Slip Op 07068 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020).
Matter of Poznik v. Salkin, 2023 NY Slip Op 01092 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023).
— N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 72(2) — 1 case
Matter of Seltzer v. Patterson, 2021 NY Slip Op 02532 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021).
— N.Y. Domestic Relations Law § 72(2)(a) — 1 case
Matter of Yates v. Buckner-Engram, 2025 NY Slip Op 00231 (N.Y. App. Div. 2025).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.